UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-10424
Summary Calendar
CAROL A. STEPHENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SHIRLEY S. CATER,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(2:93-CV-203)
(October 16, 1995)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Carol A. Stephens’ application for social security disability
and SSI benefits was denied by the administrative law judge (ALJ)
at step four of the well known sequential process.2 The district
court found that: Stephens retained the residual functional
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the
basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on
the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that
Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th
Cir. 1991).
capacity to perform her past relevant work; the ALJ’s evaluation of
Stephens’ activities (that she leads a very active lifestyle) was
not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ failed to articulate
reasons for his unfavorable credibility determination of Stephens’
subjective complaints of pain and limitations; and that the ALJ
improperly found Stephens capable of performing her past relevant
work based on vocational-expert testimony indicating that she was
not capable of performing such work. The district court reversed
the step-four determination that Stephens was not disabled, and
remanded this case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
for further analysis at step five of the sequential process.
Stephens argues to this Court that this case should have been
remanded for an award of benefits rather than for further
proceedings. Relying on Goodley v. Harris, 608 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1979), she contends that the district court held that the
Commissioner did not adduce substantial evidence to carry her
burden of proof that Appellant had the residual functional capacity
for substantial gainful activity, and that the appropriate
disposition is rendition of judgment in Appellant’s favor rather
than giving the Commissioner a second chance to prove her case.
It is within the district court’s discretion to remand to the
Commissioner for a further hearing or to direct the Commissioner to
award benefits. See Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th
Cir. 1991) (cited with approval in Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d
105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The Commissioner is correct that Stephens has misconstrued the
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district court’s opinion. The district court essentially held that
Stephens had sustained her burden of proof at step four and that
the case should be remanded for further analysis at step five for
the Commissioner to show that Appellant could perform some other
work.
When a denial of benefits at step four is reversed, remand for
evaluation at step five is generally appropriate, unless there is
no substantial evidence in the record that the claimant can perform
other work, in which case a remand for evaluation at the fifth step
would be useless. In Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686
(5th Cir. 1981), this Court held that there was no substantial
evidence to support the Secretary’s determination that the claimant
could return to his previous work. Thus, the burden of proof
shifted to the Secretary to show that the claimant was capable of
performing substantial gainful employment. Because there was no
evidence in the record regarding this factor, this Court remanded
the case for further fact-findings in order to determine if the
Secretary could meet this burden. This Court did not hold that the
claimant was entitled to benefits at this stage. See also Lauer v.
Bowen, 818 F.2d 636, 64l (7th Cir. 1987) (step-four determination
reversed and case remanded for step-five inquiry).
Stephens’ reliance on Goodley v. Harris is misplaced. In
Goodley, although we did not discuss the five-step process, and it
is not clear at exactly which step benefits were denied, this Court
stated that there was an absence of evidence that the claimant
could engage in some kind of gainful employment, and so remanded
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for an award of benefits. 608 F.2d at 237. Likewise, in Ferguson
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1985), the record did not
contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the
claimant’s alcoholism was not a significant impairment to gainful
activity and so this Court remanded with instructions to enter
judgment for the claimant.
In this case, although there was some testimony by the
vocational expert regarding other work that claimant may or may not
be able to do based on varying hypotheticals, the record is not
clear that there is no substantial gainful employment that
Appellant could perform based on her condition, therefore an award
of benefits is not warranted at this stage of the proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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