IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-30278
Summary Calendar
RANDY S. LAPLANTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KEITH HALL, Warden,
Federal Corrections Institute,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana
(94-CV-1288-P)
October 27, 1995
Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-appellant Randall S. Laplante (Laplante), an alien
incarcerated at FCI Oakdale, Louisiana, pursuant to a sentence
imposed by the United States District Court in Massachusetts, on
July 15, 1994, filed the instant habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.”
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
2241 in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Louisiana seeking judicial review of the Bureau of Prison’s
(BOP) calculation of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b)(2). Laplante moved for summary judgment and also filed an
amended petition. Laplante contended that under section 3585(b)(2)
he was entitled to 32 days’ credit on his sentence to confinement
for certain time he had been in custody prior to sentencing, and
that the BOP had wrongfully denied him this credit. No attack was
made on his conviction or on the sentence itself.
The respondent complied with the district court’s order to
file an answer and to supply the administrative records regarding
Laplante’s claims.
The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who, on December
22, 1994, recommended dismissal, both on the merits because section
3585(b)(2) was “not applicable,” and as moot because “Laplante will
suffer no present substantial collateral consequences as a result
of th[e] allegedly unlawful period of detention.”
Laplante filed objections, which the district court overruled
when, in January 1995, it adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
dismissed the section 2241 petition both on the merits and “for the
additional reason that this Court believes the petition moot as it
has been advised the Petitioner was deported in November, 1994[.]”
Laplante now appeals that dismissal.
The following facts are relevant. In 1993, Laplante pleaded
guilty to violating 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), a felony, and on
August 19, 1993, was sentenced by the United States District Court
2
in Massachusetts to a six-month term of imprisonment and a three-
year period of supervised release. He completed service of the
confinement portion of his sentence and was released on September
24, 1993, to the custody of the INS. Three days hence, on
September 27, 1993, he was placed in the custody of the State of
Massachusetts due to outstanding Massachusetts state charges. The
Massachusetts state charges were dismissed and on October 15, 1993,
Laplante was returned to INS custody where he remained until
October 26, 1993, at which time he was deported to Canada. It is
this 32-day period, from September 24, 1993, to October 26, 1993,
for which Laplante seeks credit in the instant section 2241
petition.
After deportation on October 26, 1993, Laplante reentered the
United States and was arrested on December 13, 1993, by
Massachusetts authorities and held on bail until placed in INS
custody on December 16, 1993. On December 28, 1993, he was
transferred to the custody of the BOP for violating the terms of
his supervised release which, inter alia, prohibited his reentry
into the United States without permission of the Attorney General
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
After a hearing on January 11, 1994, the United States
District Court in Massachusetts revoked Laplante’s period of
supervised release and resentenced him to an 11-month term of
imprisonment and a 24-month term of supervised release.1 After
1
We have held that supervised release may not be reimposed in
these circumstances. United States v. Holmes, 954 F.2d 270, 272
(5th Cir. 1992). The First Circuit has held to the contrary. See
3
serving his eleven-month sentence, he was released from BOP custody
on November 10, 1994, to INS custody and subsequently, on or before
December 1, 1994, was deported once again to Canada where,
ostensibly, he remains.
Laplante contends that the district court erred by dismissing
his section 2241 petition. Specifically, he contends that the
district court’s determination that his petition was moot because
he had been deported was erroneous, and also that the district
court erred when construing section 3585(b)(2). We agree that the
petition was properly dismissed as moot, and hence affirm on that
basis, without reaching the merits.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissing Laplante’s
petition, inter alia, as moot, determining that no live case or
controversy existed because “the mere possibility that Laplante
will be released from INS custody[2] and not deported before the
expiration of his term of supervised release is too speculative to
give rise to a case or controversy,” citing Bailey v. Southerland,
821 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1987). The magistrate judge reasoned
that even if Laplante received the credit sought for time served,
he “would have still been subject to the [INS] detainer upon
completion of his sentence.”
Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that no collateral
United States v. O’Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 (1st Cir. 1993).
Laplante does not in this proceeding challenge the 1994 imposition
of supervised release.
2
Laplante was in custody awaiting deportation proceedings at
the time that the magistrate judge made his recommendation, but has
subsequently been deported to Canada.
4
consequences were substantially present stemming from the alleged
illegal calculation of his sentence and, thus, the issue was moot,
citing Maggard v. Florida Parole Commission, 616 F.2d 890, 891 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1980). The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and “for the additional
reason that this Court believes the petition moot as it has been
advised that the Petitioner was deported,” dismissed Laplante’s
habeas petition. Laplante argues, however, that if his sentence is
credited with the 32 days, his current period of supervised release
also will end 32 days earlier.
Laplante, as he was in BOP custody when his petition was
filed, meets the “in custody” requirements of section 2241
notwithstanding his release from custody prior to judgment. Under
Carafas v. LaVallee, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559 (1968), the issue of
mootness in habeas cases turns on the substantiality of any present
collateral consequences that may stem from the alleged illegal
detention. Maggard at 891. As Laplante does not in this
proceeding challenge either his conviction or sentence (neither
that in 1993 nor that in 1994), but only the duration of his
confinement under the 1994 sentence, the only relevant possible
collateral consequences are those which would stem from his having,
under his theory, been made to serve 32 days longer than he should
have had to under the 1994 sentence. The only possible collateral
consequence of this is that his 24-month period of supervised
release will commence 32 days later than (according to him) it
should have and will thus terminate 32 days later. However,
5
Laplante, an alien, was deported prior to the district court’s
judgment. While his supervised release term continues to run
notwithstanding his deportation,3 it is not practically enforceable
or effective while he remains outside the United States. Under 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), he is precluded from legally reentering the
United States (without the express consent of the Attorney General
to his application for admission, should he make such). In these
circumstances, we conclude that the possibility of any adverse
collateral consequences to Laplante from the assertedly wrongful
possible 32-day prolongation of the term of his supervised release
is not sufficiently substantial to prevent his release from
confinement and deportation prior to judgment from mooting his
instant section 2241 petition.
The district court’s judgment dismissing the section 2241
petition as moot is
AFFIRMED.4
3
See United States v. Brown, 54 F.2d 234, 237-239 (5th Cir.
1995).
4
To the extent that the judgment of dismissal below
alternatively ruled on the merits, it is modified to be solely on
the basis of mootness; when a case becomes moot dismissal generally
should be on that basis alone.
6