In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-2319
M ANUEL G ALVAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
T HOMAS N ORBERG , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:04-cv-04003—Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
A RGUED A PRIL 4, 2012—D ECIDED M AY 7, 2012
Before E ASTERBROOK , Chief Judge, and F LAUM and
M ANION, Circuit Judges.
F LAUM, Circuit Judge. Manuel Galvan filed a § 1983
action against Chicago police officers Thomas Norberg
and Alan Lucas, seeking damages arising from a traffic
stop, a vehicle search, and an arrest. Galvan contends
that the officers lacked probable cause, whereas the
officers maintain that they were following up on an
anonymous tip that Lucas had received. After the jury
2 No. 11-2319
returned a verdict in favor of defendants Norberg and
Lucas, Galvan moved for a new trial. Judge Shadur
granted the motion but without giving defendants an
opportunity to respond. He ruled that the verdict was
against the manifest weight of the evidence, reasoning
that Lucas had fabricated the tip and that the other
officers offered false testimony to support this fabrica-
tion. Judge Shadur then recused himself, and the case
was reassigned to Judge Chang. Defendants moved to
reconsider the new trial order. Judge Chang granted
their motion and reinstated the verdict.
We conclude that Judge Chang did not abuse his discre-
tion by reconsidering the new trial grant, a non-final
order, and determining that the jury’s verdict was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was
no direct evidence contradicting Lucas’s testimony
about the tip, there was other evidence to support
this testimony, and the jury was able to weigh the incon-
sistencies and make credibility determinations. We there-
fore affirm the district court’s reinstatement of the
verdict in favor of defendants.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Officer Lucas claims that he was standing near the
front desk in the police station on December 30, 2002
when he answered a phone call. The caller asked whether
any “narcs” were working, referring to police officers in
civilian dress and unmarked cars. After Lucas told the
No. 11-2319 3
caller that no narcs were available, the caller asked whether
a “blue belly,” meaning a general police officer, was
available. Lucas identified himself as one, and
the caller responded that he had information about the
transportation of approximately 200 pounds of marijuana.
When describing the tip at trial, Lucas testified that
the informant had stated that “two dudes” would be
driving in a “tricked out” and “shiny clean” black pickup
truck. The truck would be traveling south on Pulaski
Avenue in the vicinity of Irving Park Road during the
“time frame of 4 or 5 o’clock in the evening until 6 o’clock
or thereabouts.” At trial, Lucas could not remember
whether the informant had told him the race or
nationality of the truck’s occupants, although Lucas
had testified in a March 2005 deposition that the
informant had said that the men were Hispanic. Lucas
testified at trial that the informant had told him that
the occupants’ ages were “between 25 and 30, 25 or
35, something like that,” though he had testified in his
deposition that “[the caller] told me 25 or 30.” Norberg,
Lucas’s partner, testified at trial that Lucas had told
him that there would be two Hispanic males between
the ages of 25 and 30 in the pickup truck, although
Norberg had previously testified in a deposition that
there would be “one to two” men. In his deposition,
Norberg stated that he did not know the caller’s gender,
but at trial he stated that Lucas had told him that the
caller was male. Norberg admitted that he testified that
the caller was male because Lucas had told him this
detail during the week before the trial.
4 No. 11-2319
After receiving the tip, Lucas attended roll call at the
police station. Lucas told Norberg about the tip, but he
could not recall whether he had also told Lieutenant
Joseph Porebski, that evening’s watch commander.
Porebski stated in a signed but undated affidavit that
Lucas had approached him with the anonymous tip—
that “a black shiny clean trick line pickup truck
occupied by two Hispanic males would be traveling
southbound on Pulaski near Irving Park Road between
4 p.m. and . . . 6 p.m. [and] this pickup truck will be
transporting hundreds [of] pounds of marijuana.” At
trial, Porebski testified that he remembered being told
that “there would be a large movement of marijuana . . .
in a truck,” as well as other details that he could no
longer remember. He remembered thinking that the
tip was “fairly good” and worth following up on.
After roll call, Lucas and Norberg began their patrol
and set up a moving surveillance. Lucas and Norberg
stopped a truck matching the tip’s description around
5:30 p.m. According to Norberg’s trial testimony, the
pickup made an “evasive move from the left lane to
the curb lane and also [did] not us[e] his turn signals.”
Lucas similarly testified that the pickup “dart[ed] to the
far right lane quickly.” Norberg testified that he
stopped the truck partially because of this traffic offense
and partially because it matched the informant’s descrip-
tion. Lucas agreed that the maneuver constituted a
traffic offense but believed that they had stopped the
truck solely because it matched the description.
Norberg approached the driver’s side of the truck, and
Lucas approached the passenger’s side. Norberg told
No. 11-2319 5
Manuel Galvan, who had been driving, that he had
been stopped for a traffic violation. Norberg testified
at trial that he smelled burnt marijuana through the
open window, though he did not mention this observa-
tion in his earlier deposition or in the case report. Lucas
testified that he saw a small bag that looked like a bag
of marijuana fly through the air from the driver’s side
to the passenger’s side, landing on the floor of the
pickup. Norberg testified that he saw Galvan throw
two bags over to the passenger’s side. Both officers
testified that they then saw the passenger, later identi-
fied as Juan Luna, kick two bags against the pas-
senger’s side door. The case report, however, stated that
Galvan threw the bags to the floor and then Luna
kicked the bags over to the driver’s side. Both officers
asserted that the report’s statement was incorrect as to
the direction of Luna’s kick. At trial, Galvan denied
throwing the drugs, but he did not deny that the bags
were in the truck or that they belonged to him.
The officers removed both men from the truck and
searched it. Lucas testified that they searched the truck
because they planned to tow it (pursuant to a police
provision requiring the towing of a vehicle believed to
contain marijuana), and police procedure requires a
search prior to towing. Norberg testified to this reason
and added they also searched the pickup because it
matched the tip’s description. The officers found two
bales of plant material wrapped in plastic in the truck
bed. Because one of the bags was ripped open, the
officers could see the material. Lucas told Norberg,
“I think this is reefer.” Lucas also burned and smelled the
6 No. 11-2319
material, leading him to conclude that the bales were
cannabis (as the tip had predicted). Luna and Galvan
insisted that the bales were hay from a recent nativity
play at St. Wenceslaus Church. The officers neverthe-
less arrested Galvan and Luna for being in possession
of marijuana in the amount of approximately $661,000.
The officers brought the vehicle and the suspected
cannabis to the police station. Lucas burned a sample
from one of the bales for Lieutenant Porebski and
Sergeant Lawrence Casey. At trial, Casey testified
that he did not remember whether the bales looked
like marijuana, although he had stated in his 2005 deposi-
tion that “if I had to guess, I would say . . . it looked
more like hay than a bale of marijuana.” Casey could
not remember whether the burnt sample smelled like
hay or marijuana. Porebski testified that he was initially
unsure that the bales were marijuana, but he became
convinced that they were after consulting a drug
reference book and smelling an unlit sample.
Galvan was charged with possession of 100,000 grams
of marijuana. Lucas completed the case report that eve-
ning. The report referenced the anonymous tip, stating
that “Caller told the [officer] that a black pickup truck . . .
would be in the vicinity of Irving and Pulaski, and
that inside the truck would be approximately 200
[pounds] of cannabis.” At trial, Lucas characterized the
report as “a summary,” admitting that it did not
include other details about the tip.
Seven gray bins containing the plant material and
baling twine found in the truck bed were sent to the
No. 11-2319 7
Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. Test results
revealed that these samples were not marijuana. The
results were laid out in a report dated January 2, 2003,
which was allegedly faxed to the attention of Officer
Norberg on January 3.1 Lucas and Norberg have denied
ever receiving this report. Because Galvan could not
post bond and the officers were not aware of the
negative lab results for the bales, Galvan remained in
custody. While preparing for a preliminary hearing, the
Office of the State’s Attorney received the negative test
results. On January 21, the Office filed a writ to bring
Galvan from jail and moved to dismiss the criminal
charges. On January 23, the motion was granted, and
Galvan was released from custody.
B. Procedural Background
Galvan filed a § 1983 action against Officer Norberg,
Officer Lucas, Officer Jorge Rivera, Cook County
Sheriff Michael Sheahan, and the City of Chicago,
alleging federal claims of false arrest and imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and failure to supervise, direct,
and discipline; and state law claims of malicious pros-
ecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
indemnity. Galvan subsequently agreed to dismiss
Sheahan and the City of Chicago as defendants, and
the district court dismissed the claims against Rivera.
1
The laboratory also determined that the two small bags
were indeed marijuana and indicated this in a report dated
January 14, 2003.
8 No. 11-2319
The case against Norberg and Lucas went to trial, which
was presided over by Judge Shadur. The jury was asked
to consider whether Officers Norberg and Lucas
stopped the pickup truck without reasonable suspicion
and whether they arrested Galvan without probable
cause. After deliberating for less than a day, the jury
returned a verdict for defendants Norberg and Lucas
as to both claims.
1. The Granting of a New Trial
On August 20, 2009, Galvan moved for judgment as a
matter of law and alternatively for a new trial. Defendants
were not given an opportunity to provide a written
response to this motion. On September 2, 2009, Judge
Shadur held a hearing and indicated that he would
“probably want to hear from” defense counsel. Judge
Shadur did not ultimately give either party the
opportunity to respond before he denied the motion for
judgment as a matter of law and granted the motion for
a new trial. He focused on the impeachment of Lucas,
Norberg, and Porebski, and the fact that the case report
did not contain many of the details that the officers
later testified to:
I almost without exception rely on the ability of jurors
to get things right. I am sorry to say that what I saw
and heard in this case represented the most
distressing falsehoods coming from the mouths of
some members of the Chicago Police Department, a
force for which I have always had respect and I have
always sought to credit, because I believe so
strongly in law enforcement.
No. 11-2319 9
Allen [sic] Lucas’ testimony was I believe patently
false and indeed perjurious. His account of the
so-called “anonymous tip” was nothing more as I
heard it than a total arrest fabrication. And the rest of
his story spring boarded [from] that basic lie.
Just as distressing I will say, was also the closing
of ranks by other members of the Chicago Police
Department in an effort to buttress that fabrication
on his part.
...
Just look at the Lucas story. If it’s to be believed
there was someone out there familiar with gang
lingo and familiar with drugs from the way that
he spoke, [and] he knew that a pickup truck of a
particularly distinctive appearance—the shiny, clean,
tricked up or tricked out[,] special paint, black, all
of these particulars, was going to be driving in a
specific direction north to south on Pulaski Road
in that afternoon, occupied by two males, sometimes
described as just two males, sometimes as Hispanic
males, depending on when Lucas testified at his[]
deposition or during the trial. And that truck was
going to be carrying a large quantity of marijuana.
Look what happened: A miracle happened. A miracle
happened. . . . Now why do I say a miracle? Just
exactly that kind of truck fitting that particularize[d]
description to a tee . . . and occupied by two males
was driving down that very street in that very direc-
tion during the specified time frame. And that second
truck was carrying a large quantity of hay. Mirabile
10 No. 11-2319
dictu. You know, to say that crediting such a patently
bogus after the fact horror story is contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence is frankly a
major understatement. It’s sad to say that. But Lucas
I think demonstrated himself to have no respect for
the truth. . . .
As for the story of the two bags of user mari-
juana, if that stood alone it might be said that a
fact-finding body, a jury, might reasonably buy
either side’s argument about credibility. But you see
it doesn’t stand alone. It has to be looked at in light
of the fake description that Lucas gave. And regret-
tably that was . . . coupled with the big, big lie
about the purported justification for the stop. Where
officers are so demonstrably untrustworthy on the
big picture, the strong inference is that the two bags
of marijuana would also be a cover story, if I can
make a bad pun “a plant” to sanitize the officer’s
grossly illegal, indeed unconstitutional conduct.
At the end of the hearing, Judge Shadur recused himself.
2. The Reinstatement of the Jury’s Verdict
Defendants filed a motion to reconsider with Judge Hart,
the newly assigned judge. The case was then reassigned
to Judge Chang, who solicited supplemental briefs. On
May 18, 2011, Judge Chang granted defendants’ motion
and reinstated the jury’s verdict.
Judge Chang began his analysis by addressing the
propriety of his reconsideration of the new trial decision.
Judge Chang stated that non-final orders can be revised
No. 11-2319 11
at any time before the entry of a final judgment, though
he also noted case law cautioning judges to revise deci-
sions only in extraordinary circumstances. Judge Chang
determined that the “law of the case” doctrine operated
with less force because defendants had not been given
an opportunity to respond to plaintiff’s motion for a
new trial. Judge Chang further concluded that he had
“a freer hand” to reconsider, since Judge Shadur “did
not rely on first-hand observations of the witnesses’
demeanor, body language, or tone of voice.”
Judge Chang agreed with defendants that the jury’s
verdict was not against the manifest weight of the trial
evidence.2 He pointed out that there was no direct
evidence contradicting Lucas’s testimony about the
details of the tip or his receipt of the tip. Judge Chang
determined that Judge Shadur’s ruling was based on his
“common-sense notion that the tip was too good to be
true” rather than on “actual evidence, let alone a manifest
weight of evidence, that required the jury to reject the
testimony that Lucas had received the tip.” Judge Chang
identified specific facts indicating that the tip was not
too good to be true, namely that the tip was inaccurate
as to the occupants’ ages and that the information
2
Judge Chang rejected defendants’ broader argument that a
judge lacks the authority to discredit a witness’s testimony on
a new trial motion unless the testimony is indisputable.
Judge Chang explained that the trial judge cannot remove
evidence from consideration unless no reasonable jury could
believe it, but that the trial judge retains the authority to find
testimony not credible in light of the manifest weight of the
evidence.
12 No. 11-2319
could have been provided by “[a]ny person familiar
with Luna’s or Galvan’s work schedule and with Luna’s
truck.” Judge Chang also determined that the testi-
mony from Lucas, Norberg, and Porebski provided suf-
ficient evidence for the jury to find that Lucas had
actually received the tip. Judge Chang pointed out that
the reference to the tip in the case report meant that
Lucas would have had to start laying the foundation
for the cover-up even before the lab report indicated
that the bales were not marijuana. Judge Chang noted
how quickly this fabrication would have had to occur
and the level of cooperation needed from Norberg
and Porebski. Judge Chang pointed to evidence other
than the tip, including the traffic offense and the two
bags of suspected marijuana, that could support a
finding of probable cause. Finally, Judge Chang
rejected Galvan’s argument that the verdict was against
the manifest weight of the evidence because the offi-
cers’ testimony was conflicting and inconsistent.
Judge Chang emphasized that the jury heard the
evidence and made its credibility determinations.
Galvan appeals Judge Chang’s reinstatement of the
jury’s verdict and urges us to reinstate Judge Shadur’s
grant of a new trial.
II. Discussion
A. The Decision to Reconsider Plaintiff’s Motion for
a New Trial
The grant of a new trial (in civil cases) is a non-final,
non-appealable order. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
No. 11-2319 13
449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980); Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314
(7th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
provides that non-final orders “may be revised at any
time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all
the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” FED.
R. C IV. P. 54(b); see also Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v.
United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47 (1943). Because the grant of
a new trial is an interlocutory order and thus subject
to revision by the district court, the district court has
the discretionary authority to reconsider a new trial order.
See Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 635 F.2d 1165, 1170-
72 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698,
704 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a judge has the power
to reconsider an interlocutory order at any time before
final judgment). Here, Judge Chang did not err by
deciding to reconsider the new trial order.3 He properly
relied on the order’s interlocutory status as giving
him the authority to reconsider and revise it.
Judge Chang also stated that, under the “law of the case”
doctrine, judges should refrain from reopening issues
decided in earlier stages of the case absent extraordinary
3
Although we refer to the motion before Judge Chang as a
motion to reconsider, the motion is not a traditional Rule 59(e)
motion to reconsider, which can only follow a “judgment.”
Judge Shadur’s grant of a new trial had the effect of vacating the
judgment that normally follows the jury’s verdict. Rule 54(b)
governs non-final orders and permits revision at any time
prior to the entry of judgment, thereby bestowing sweeping
authority upon the district court to reconsider a new
trial motion.
14 No. 11-2319
circumstances. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988); United States v. Harris, 531
F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). We have recognized,
however, that the law of the case doctrine is discre-
tionary and does not preclude a district court from re-
opening a decided issue. See Harris, 531 F.3d at 513; see
also Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227
(7th Cir. 1995) (referring to the doctrine as “no more
than a presumption, one whose strength varies with
the circumstances”).4 We nevertheless advise judges
that, because litigants have a right to expect consistency
even if judges change, the second judge should
“abide by the rulings of the first judge unless some new
development, such as a new appellate decision, convinces
him that his predecessor’s ruling was incorrect.” Fujisawa
Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir.
2005) (noting that the law of the case doctrine is less
controlling when the disputed issue is not presented
in “precisely the same way” to the later judge).
Judge Chang correctly determined that the law of the
case doctrine applies with less force in this case since the
prior order was interlocutory and since a “new develop-
4
Based on the interlocutory nature of an order granting a new
trial, some courts have ruled that the law of the case doctrine
has no force at all in this context. See, e.g., Langevine v. District
of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Day v. Amax,
Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1983). But see United States
v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the
doctrine to a grant of a new trial).
No. 11-2319 15
ment” occurred: defendants had not been given the
opportunity to respond to the initial new trial ruling
and thus Judge Chang was confronted with the first
adversarial presentation of the new trial issue. Addi-
tionally, although Judge Chang did not preside over
the trial, he was well equipped to reconsider the new
trial grant. Judge Chang aptly recognized that he had
a “freer hand” in reconsidering the ruling because
Judge Shadur “did not rely on first-hand observations
of the witnesses’ demeanor, body language, or tone of
voice.” Judge Shadur relied on his common-sense notion
of the case (i.e., that the tip was too good to be
true), rather than on any in-court observations. Thus,
Judge Chang possessed both the authority and the
ability to reconsider the new trial order.
Because we conclude that Judge Chang properly exer-
cised his discretion in deciding to reconsider the grant
of the new trial, we now must consider whether
Judge Chang acted within his discretion in reinstating
the jury’s verdict in favor of defendants.
B. The Decision to Reinstate the Jury’s Verdict
The ruling on a motion for a new trial is a matter com-
mitted to the district court’s discretion, see Latino, 58
F.3d at 314, and we review a district court’s ruling on
a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, see Davis
v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 445 F.3d 971, 979 (7th Cir. 2006).
Our review of a decision denying a new trial is
“extremely deferential,” as opposed to our “somewhat
more exacting” review of a decision granting a new trial.
16 No. 11-2319
See In re Innovative Constr. Sys., 793 F.2d 875, 888 (7th Cir.
1986). We review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict. See Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t,
590 F.3d 427, 444-45 (7th Cir. 2009). Judge Shadur
granted the new trial based on his conclusion that the
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence; Judge Chang then reconsidered this ruling and
reinstated the jury’s verdict. We review Judge Chang’s
decision to determine whether he abused his discretion
in concluding that no new trial was warranted because
the verdict was not actually against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
We have recognized that “[if], after evaluating the
evidence, the district court is of the opinion that the
verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a
new trial is appropriate.” Mejia v. Cook Cnty., 650 F.3d
631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011). Although “the district court has
the power to get a general sense of the weight of the
evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and
the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial,”
id. at 633, we have cautioned that “[t]he district court’s
power to grant a new trial on weight grounds is not
unlimited: a certain deference to the jury’s conclusions
is appropriate,” id. at 633 n.1. The district court also
has less freedom to overturn a jury verdict in cases in-
volving issues that are easily understood by laypeople.
See Latino, 58 F.3d at 314. We recently clarified the
standard for a district court’s assessment of a motion
for a new trial:
In conducting its own assessment of the evidence
presented, the district court cannot remove a piece
No. 11-2319 17
of evidence from the calculus merely because the
court believes it was not credible and then, with that
piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial
because the verdict is now against the weight. Latino
v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 315-17 (7th Cir. 1995). In weigh-
ing the facts, the district court is bound to the same
evidence the jury considered, and can strike a piece
of evidence from its weighing process only if “rea-
sonable persons could not believe” it because it
“contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws.” Id.
at 315. Put simply, if the evidence was admitted
before the jury, the district court is usually stuck with
it in ruling on a motion for a new trial, for better
or worse.
Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633-34. We have similarly expressed
that the party moving for a new trial “must demonstrate
that no rational jury could have rendered a verdict
against [him].” King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534
(7th Cir. 2004); see also Latino, 58 F.3d at 315 (“[N]ew trials
granted because the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence are proper only when the record shows
that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of
justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to
be overturned or shocks our conscience.”).
Judge Chang provided a detailed explanation as to
why the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. He emphasized that “there was
no direct evidence” contradicting Lucas’s testimony
about receiving a tip or about the tip’s details.
Judge Chang criticized Judge Shadur’s opinion for
18 No. 11-2319
“rel[ying] on what it viewed as the common-sense
notion that the tip was too good to be true. But there was
no actual evidence, let alone a manifest weight of
evidence, that required the jury to reject the testimony
that Lucas had received the tip.” Judge Chang con-
cluded that the combination of Lucas’s, Norberg’s, and
Porebski’s testimony supplied sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that Lucas had actually received the anony-
mous tip. Judge Chang also found the case report
to serve as additional evidence in support of the ver-
dict. He further pointed out that if the tip was an “af-
ter-the-fact cover-up,” Lucas would have had to
start laying the groundwork before the lab reports
came back negative and would have had just two hours
between the arrest and the report to fabricate the
story. Judge Shadur’s perception of the anonymous tip
is understandable, given the conflicting testimony and
the lack of details in the case report; however, the
standard for granting a new trial requires the jury’s
verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. We agree with Judge Chang’s
assessment that sufficient evidence was presented to the
jury to support its verdict.
We also agree with Judge Chang’s view that the tip
was not necessarily too good to be true. He pointed to
the discrepancy about the occupants’ ages as illustrating
that the tip was not perfect. Judge Chang stated that
the jury could have plausibly concluded that “the tipster
in fact was someone with some familiarity with Galvan
or Luna” or that “there was indeed a tipster who saw
another truck matching the same details, and that
Galvan was in the wrong place at the wrong time.” Accord-
No. 11-2319 19
ing to Judge Chang, a person familiar with the truck and
with Luna or Galvan’s work schedule would have been
able to provide all of the information in the tip. The hay
sat in the truck for four days, allowing ample time
for someone to observe it, and anyone who had seen
the truck would have been able to describe it to police.
The tip could have been provided by someone who
mistook the hay for marijuana or by someone who
knew that it was hay but wanted Luna or Galvan arrested.
Thus, Judge Chang properly concluded that the jury’s
verdict rests on plausible theories of the evidence pre-
sented.
Judge Chang acknowledged that portions of the testi-
mony were inconsistent or conflicting, but he reasoned
that “[t]he jury heard all of the conflicting and inconsistent
testimony, bad memories and impeachment and all,
and then did precisely what it is called upon to do,
which is make a credibility determination that was not
manifestly outweighed by other evidence.” Judge Chang
further explained that the jury could have attributed
the inconsistencies to “the passage of time and the
fading of memories.” Judge Chang did not abuse his
discretion by deferring to the jury’s credibility deter-
minations. The jury weighed the evidence, including the
conflicting testimony, and arrived at a verdict that
is supported by the evidence—or at least a verdict that
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Our task is not to determine whether Officer Lucas
fabricated the anonymous tip but rather to determine
whether Judge Chang abused his discretion in
20 No. 11-2319
concluding that the jury’s verdict was not contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence.5 In this case, regard-
less of whether the district court believed that the jury
arrived at the correct outcome, there was no direct evi-
dence contradicting Lucas’s testimony about the details
of the tip or the fact that he received it. It was well
within the province of the jury to decide whether the
inconsistencies called into question the existence of the
tip. The case report, Norberg’s testimony, and Porebski’s
testimony all support Lucas’s testimony and the jury’s
verdict. Judge Shadur’s theory that Lucas fabricated the
tip and obtained the cooperation of other officers is
plausible, but the theory that defendants presented
(and the jury accepted) is also plausible. We therefore
hold that Judge Chang did not abuse his discretion by
concluding that the verdict was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence and reinstating the jury’s verdict.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the district court’s
decision to reconsider the motion for a new trial and
reinstate the jury’s verdict.
5
By requiring adherence to the manifest weight standard, we
ensure that the district court gives the appropriate level of
deference to the jury’s determinations. See Mejia, 650 F.3d at
633 n.1.
5-7-12