FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 16, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PAUL HUGGINS, Prophet Evangel Dr.
Rev.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 12-1039
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED (D.C. No. 1:11-cv-03239-LTB)
STATES; PRESIDENT OF THE (D. Colo.)
UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES
CONGRESS; COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
STATE OF COLORADO; UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL;
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY;
COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Paul Huggins, proceeding pro se, filed a civil action in the district court
against the State of Colorado, as well as various federal and Colorado state officials. The
magistrate judge concluded that the claims alleged in Huggins’ complaint were
unintelligible and directed Huggins to file an amended complaint that complied with the
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. After Huggins failed to file
an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the magistrate judge’s order, the district
court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b). Huggins now appeals from that order of dismissal. Exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s decision.
I
On December 12, 2011, Huggins filed a pro se complaint naming as defendants the
Supreme Court of the United States, the President of the United States, the United States
Congress, the Colorado Department of Corrections, the State of Colorado, the United
States Attorney, and the Colorado Supreme Court. On December 19, 2011, the
magistrate judge assigned to the case granted Huggins leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. But the magistrate judge also concluded that Huggins’
complaint “[wa]s deficient because [it] d[id] not comply with the pleading requirements
of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” R., Vol. 1, at 66. More specifically,
the magistrate judge concluded that “Huggins’ claims for the most part [we]re
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unintelligible,” and that Huggins’ complaint “fail[ed] to set forth a short and plain
statement of the grounds on which the Court’s jurisdiction depend[ed] or the basis for
relief.” Id. at 67. After briefly explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 required
Huggins to “state with specificity what each named Defendant did to him, when they did
it, how their action harmed him, and what specific legal right they violated,” the
magistrate judge directed Huggins to file an amended complaint within thirty days. Id.
The magistrate judge also warned Huggins that if he “fail[ed] within the time allowed to
file an Amended Complaint that complie[d] with th[e] [magistrate judge’s] Order, the
action w[ould] be dismissed without further notice.” Id.
Huggins did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the magistrate
judge’s order. Consequently, on January 25, 2012, the district court issued an order of
dismissal. In that order, the district court noted that it had reviewed Huggins’ original
complaint and agreed with the magistrate judge that it failed to comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8. And “[b]ecause . . . Huggins . . . failed to file an Amended
Complaint with the time allowed” by the magistrate judge, the district court ordered “that
the Complaint and action [be] dismissed without prejudice pursuant to [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 41(b) for failure to file an Amended Complaint and for failure to
prosecute.” Id. at 70. The district court also denied Huggins leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal.
Huggins filed a notice of appeal on February 2, 2012. He has since filed with this
court an opening brief and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
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II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the rule relied upon by the district court in
dismissing Huggins’ complaint, provides, in relevant part: “If the plaintiff fails . . . to
comply with [court] rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or
any claim against it.” We have consistently interpreted Rule 41(b) “to permit courts to
dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.” Olsen v. Mapes, 333
F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003). We review a dismissal under Rule 41(b) for an
abuse of discretion, asking whether the district court made “a clear error of judgment or
exceed[ed] the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-
12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
After examining Huggins’ appellate pleadings and the record on appeal, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Huggins’ complaint
without prejudice. The allegations in Huggins’ complaint, as both the magistrate judge
and the district court noted, are unintelligible. And although the magistrate judge
explained to Huggins what he must do to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Huggins neither filed an amended complaint or otherwise
responded to the magistrate judge’s order. Indeed, even in his appellate brief, which itself
is largely incomprehensible, Huggins offers no explanation for why he failed to comply
with the magistrate judge’s order.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Huggins’ motion for leave to
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proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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