(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL. v.
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
No. 03–1230. Argued April 26, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
Petitioners, a trucking company engaged in both interstate and intra-
state hauling and a trucking association, asked Michigan courts to
invalidate the State’s flat $100 annual fee imposed on trucks engaged
in intrastate commercial hauling, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§478.2(1), claiming that it discriminates against interstate carriers
and imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade because
trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engage in less in-
trastate business than trucks carrying only intrastate loads. The
State Court of Claims rejected the claim, holding that, because the
fee is regulatory and intended for the Michigan Motor Carrier Act’s
administration, it is not amenable to apportionment; that it is an ap-
propriate exercise of the State’s police power; and that it does not im-
plicate the Commerce Clause because it falls only on intrastate com-
merce. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State Supreme
Court declined review.
Held: Michigan’s fee does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
That Clause prevents a State from “jeopardizing the welfare of the
Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce
across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would
not bear.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S.
175, 180. Applying this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause principles
and precedents here, nothing in §478.2(1) offends the Commerce
Clause. The flat fee is imposed only on intrastate transactions. It
does not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activi-
ties or enterprises. It applies evenhandedly to all carriers making
domestic journeys and does not reflect an effort to tax activity taking
place outside of the State. Nothing in this Court’s case law suggests
that such a neutral, locally focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the
2 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN
PUB. SERV. COMM’N
Syllabus
dormant Commerce Clause. That is not surprising, since States im-
pose numerous flat fees on local business and service providers, e.g.,
insurers and auctioneers. The Constitution neither displaces States’
authority to shelter their people from health and safety menaces nor
unduly curtails their power to lay taxes to support state government.
The record, moreover, shows no special circumstances suggesting
that Michigan’s fee operates as anything other than an unobjection-
able exercise of the State’s police power. Neither does it show that
the flat assessment unfairly discriminates against interstate truck-
ers. Because the costs the fee seeks to defray, e.g., those of regulating
vehicular size and weight, would seem more likely to vary per truck
or per carrier than per-mile traveled, a per-truck, rather than a per-
mile, assessment is likely fair. And petitioners provide no details of
their preferred alternative miles-traveled system or point to evidence
of its practicality. Nor is there any reason to infer that the State’s
lump-sum levy on purely local activity erects an impermissible dis-
criminatory roadblock. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U. S. 266, distinguished. As for petitioners’ “internal consis-
tency” argument—that if every State did the same as Michigan, an
interstate trucker doing local business in multiple States would have
to pay a fee of several hundred or thousand dollars—any interstate
firm with local outlets normally expects to pay local fees uniformly
assessed on all those engaging in local business. Pp. 3–9.
255 Mich. App. 589, 662 N. W. 2d 784, affirmed.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and STEVENS, O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 03–1230
_________________
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND
USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MICHIGAN
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether a flat $100 fee that
Michigan charges trucks engaging in intrastate commer-
cial hauling violates the dormant Commerce Clause. We
hold that it does not.
I
A subsection of Michigan’s Motor Carrier Act imposes
upon each motor carrier “for the administration of this act,
an annual fee of $100.00 for each self-propelled motor
vehicle operated by or on behalf of the motor carrier.”
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §478.2(1) (West 2002). The provi-
sion assesses the fee upon, and only upon, vehicles that
engage in intrastate commercial operations—that is, on
trucks that undertake point-to-point hauls between Michi-
gan cities. See Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 592–594, 662 N. W. 2d
784, 789 (2003). Petitioners, USF Holland, Inc., a truck-
ing company with trucks that engage in both interstate
and intrastate hauling, and the American Trucking Asso-
ciations, Inc. (ATA), asked the Michigan courts to invali-
2 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN
PUB. SERV. COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
date the provision. Both petitioners told those courts that
trucks that carry both interstate and intrastate loads
engage in intrastate business less than trucks that confine
their operations to the Great Lakes State. Hence, because
Michigan’s fee is flat, it discriminates against interstate
carriers and imposes an unconstitutional burden upon
interstate trade.
The Michigan Court of Claims rejected the carriers’
claim for three reasons. First, the $100 fee “is regulatory
and intended” for the Motor Carrier Act’s administration,
which includes “regulation of vehicular size and weight,
insurance requirements and safety standards.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 44a. Such a fee “is not amenable to a fee
structure based on apportionment by usage rates.” Ibid.
Second, the fee reflects a “legitimate expression of the
[S]tate’s concern that the welfare of its citizens be pro-
tected,” and hence an appropriate exercise of the State’s
police power. Ibid. Third, the fee does not implicate the
Commerce Clause because it falls only on intrastate, not
interstate, commerce. Id., at 45a.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It did not
agree that the intrastate nature of §478.2(1) sheltered the
fee from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 255 Mich. App., at
617–619, 662 N. W. 2d, at 802. Nonetheless, the court
rejected the truckers’ claim because the statute “regulates
evenhandedly,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 804, and
because the record lacked any “evidence that any trucking
firm’s route choices [were] affected by the imposition of the
fee,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803–804. Rather, the
record indicated that any “effect . . . on interstate com-
merce is incidental,” rendering the truckers’ claim of
discrimination “a matter of pure speculation.” Ibid.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners leave
to appeal. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, ___ Mich. ___, 673 N. W. 2d 752 (2003). We
granted their petition for certiorari and consolidated the
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Opinion of the Court
case with Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, No. 03–1234, a case in which interstate
truckers sought review of a separate state motor carrier
fee. We now affirm the Michigan court’s judgment sus-
taining §478.2(1).
II
Our Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.”
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935).
Thus, this Court has consistently held that the Constitu-
tion’s express grant to Congress of the power to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 3,
contains “a further, negative command, known as the
dormant Commerce Clause,” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995), that “cre-
ate[s] an area of trade free from interference by the
States,” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429
U. S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This negative command prevents a State from “jeopardiz-
ing the welfare of the Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing]
burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that
commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.”
Jefferson Lines, supra, at 180.
Thus, we have found unconstitutional state regulations
that unjustifiably discriminate on their face against out-
of-state entities, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S.
617 (1978), or that impose burdens on interstate trade that
are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits,” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142
(1970). We have held that States may not impose taxes
that facially discriminate against interstate business and
offer commercial advantage to local enterprises, see, e.g.,
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99–100 (1994), that improp-
erly apportion state assessments on transactions with out-
4 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN
PUB. SERV. COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
of-state components, Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948), or that have the “inevitable
effect [of] threaten[ing] the free movement of commerce by
placing a financial barrier around the State,” American
Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 284 (1987).
Applying these principles and precedents, we find noth-
ing in §478.2(1) that offends the Commerce Clause. To
begin with, Michigan imposes the flat $100 fee only upon
intrastate transactions—that is, upon activities taking
place exclusively within the State’s borders. Section
478.2(1) does not facially discriminate against interstate
or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The statute ap-
plies evenhandedly to all carriers that make domestic
journeys. It does not reflect an effort to tax activity that
takes place, in whole or in part, outside the State. Noth-
ing in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally
focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
This legal vacuum is not surprising. States impose
numerous flat fees upon local businesses and service
providers, including, for example, upon insurers, auction-
eers, ambulance operators, and hosts of others. See, e.g.,
Wyo. Stat. §33–36–104 (Lexis 2003); S. C. Code Ann. §38–
7–10 (West 2002). Although we have “long since rejected
any suggestion that a state tax . . . affecting interstate
commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny
because it attaches only to a ‘local’ or intrastate activity,”
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 615
(1981), we have also made clear that the Constitution
neither displaces States’ authority “to shelter [their] peo-
ple from menaces to their health or safety,” D. H. Holmes
Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 29 (1988) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted), nor “unduly curtail[s]” States’ power
“to lay taxes for the support of state government,”
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33,
48 (1940).
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
Opinion of the Court
The record, moreover, shows no special circumstance
suggesting that Michigan’s fee operates in practice as
anything other than an unobjectionable exercise of the
State’s police power. To the contrary, as the Michigan
Court of Appeals pointed out, the record contains little, if
any, evidence that the $100 fee imposes any significant
practical burden upon interstate trade. See 255 Mich.
App., at 620–622, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803–804. The record
does show, for example, that some interstate trucks “top
off” some interstate hauls with intrastate pickups and
deliveries. See Brief for Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants
in Nos. 226052, 226122 (Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. 3, Affidavit
of James C. Crozier ¶7 (licensing and fuel manager of TNT
Holland Motor Express, Inc. describing this practice). But
it does not tell us the answers to such questions as: How
often does “topping off” occur across the industry? Does
the $100 charge make a difference by significantly dis-
couraging interstate carriers from engaging in “topping
off”? Does the possibility of obtaining a 72-hour intrastate
permit for $10 alleviate the alleged problem? See
§478.2(3); see also Brief for Respondents 2, n. 3 (4,928 tem-
porary permits were issued in 2004). If the fees ($100 and
$10) discourage “topping off,” does that local commercial
effect make a significant interstate difference? Would a
variable fee (of the kind the truckers advocate) eliminate
such difference? The minimal facts in the record tell us
little about these matters. Compare App. 60–61, Supple-
mental Affidavit of Thomas R. Lonergan ¶10(e) (official of
the Michigan Public Service Commission stating that top-
ping off is rare for most interstate carriers because it dis-
rupts schedules and shipping patterns), with Reply Brief for
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants in Nos. 226122, 226137
(Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. A, Supplemental Affidavit of James
C. Crozier ¶6 (TNT Holland frequently tops off interstate
loads). And at oral argument, ATA conceded the absence
of record facts that empirically could show that the $100
6 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN
PUB. SERV. COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
fee significantly deters interstate trade. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.
Neither does the record show that the flat assessment
unfairly discriminates against interstate truckers. The fee
seeks to defray costs such as those of regulating “vehicular
size and weight,” of administering “insurance require-
ments,” and of applying “safety standards.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 44a. The bulk of such costs would seem more
likely to vary per truck or per carrier than to vary per-mile
traveled. See 255 Mich. App., at 612–617, 662 N. W. 2d,
at 799–801. And that fact means that a per-truck, rather
than a per-mile, assessment is likely fair. Cf. Jefferson
Lines, 514 U. S., at 199 (rejecting taxpayer’s discrimination
claim in part because “miles traveled within the State sim-
ply are not a relevant proxy for the benefit conferred upon
the parties to a sales transaction”). Nothing in the record
suggests the contrary.
Nor would an effort to switch the manner of fee assess-
ment—from lump sum to, for example, miles traveled—be
burden free. The record contains an affidavit, sworn by a
Michigan Public Service Commission official, that states
that to obtain the same revenue (about $3.5 million)
through a per-mile fee would require the State to create a
“data accumulation system” capable of separating out
intrastate hauls and determining their length, and to
develop related liability, billing, and auditing mecha-
nisms. App. 64, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas
R. Lonergan ¶2. This affidavit, on its face, suggests that
the game is unlikely to be worth the candle. While peti-
tioners argue the contrary, they do not provide the details
of their preferred alternative administrative system nor
point to record evidence showing its practicality. See
Jefferson Lines, supra, at 195 (State is not required to use
a particular apportionment formula just because it may be
“possible” to do so).
Petitioners insist that they do not need empirically to
demonstrate the existence of a burdensome or discrimina-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7
Opinion of the Court
tory impact upon interstate trucking, or (presumably) the
unfairness of the assessment in relation to defrayed costs,
or (presumably) the administrative practicality of the
alternatives. They say that our earlier case, American
Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987),
requires invalidation of the $100 flat fee, even in the ab-
sence of such proof. We disagree.
In Scheiner, this Court invalidated a flat $25 “marker
fee” and a flat “axle tax” that Pennsylvania levied upon all
trucks (interstate and intrastate) that used its roads,
including trucks that merely crossed Pennsylvania’s bor-
ders to transport, say, Ohio goods to New Jersey custom-
ers. See id., at 273–275. Data showed that the fees im-
posed a cost per mile on interstate trucks that was
approximately “five times as heavy as the cost per mile
borne by local trucks.” Id., at 286. The assessments
largely helped to raise revenue “to improve and maintain
[the State’s] highways and bridges,” id., at 270, thereby
helping to cover costs likely to vary significantly with
truck-miles traveled, see ibid. And the assessments did
“not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of
the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.” Id., at 290. In light of
these considerations, Pennsylvania’s lump-sum taxes
“threaten[ed] the free movement of commerce by placing a
financial barrier around the State of Pennsylvania.” Id.,
at 284. We concluded that “[i]f each State imposed flat
taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances
into its territory, there [was] no conceivable doubt that
commerce among the States would be deterred.” Ibid.
The present fee, as we have said, taxes purely local
activity; it does not tax an interstate truck’s entry into the
State nor does it tax transactions spanning multiple
States. See 255 Mich. App., at 592–594, 662 N. W. 2d, at
789. We lack convincing evidence showing that the tax
deters, or for that matter discriminates against, interstate
activities. See supra, at 5. Nor is the tax one that, on its
8 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN
PUB. SERV. COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
face, would seem to call for an assessment measured per
mile rather than per truck. See supra, at 6. Conse-
quently, we lack any reason to infer that Michigan’s lump-
sum levy erects, as in Scheiner, an impermissible dis-
criminatory road block.
Petitioners add that Michigan’s fee fails the “internal
consistency” test—a test that we have typically used
where taxation of interstate transactions are at issue.
Generally speaking, that test asks, “What would happen if
all States did the same?” See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U. S. 252, 261 (1989); Jefferson Lines, supra, at 185 (test
looks to the structure of the tax to see whether its identi-
cal application by every State “would place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce
intrastate”). We must concede that here, as petitioners
argue, if all States did the same, an interstate truck would
have to pay fees totaling several hundred dollars, or even
several thousand dollars, were it to “top off” its business
by carrying local loads in many (or even all) other States.
But it would have to do so only because it engages in local
business in all those States. An interstate firm with local
outlets normally expects to pay local fees that are uni-
formly assessed upon all those who engage in local busi-
ness, interstate and domestic firms alike. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth Edison, 453 U. S., at 623–624 (dormant
Commerce Clause does not seek “to relieve those engaged
in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax
burden even though it increases the cost of doing busi-
ness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jefferson
Lines, supra, at 187–188 (in context of sales tax, “the
Commerce Clause does not forbid the actual assessment of
a succession of taxes by different States on distinct events
as the same tangible object flows along”). A motor carrier
is not special in this respect.
In sum, petitioners have failed to show that Michigan’s
fee, which does not seek to tax a share of interstate trans-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9
Opinion of the Court
actions, which focuses upon local activity, and which is
assessed evenhandedly, either burdens or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or violates the Commerce
Clause in any other relevant way. See Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) (noting
that a tax will be sustained where it is applied to an activ-
ity with a “substantial nexus” to the taxing State; where,
if applied to interstate activity, it is “fairly apportioned”;
where it does not discriminate; and where it is “fairly
related to the services provided”).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Michigan Court
of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 03–1230
_________________
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND
USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MICHIGAN
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
Michigan imposes a flat fee on trucks that engage in
purely intrastate commercial operations. I agree with the
Court that this fee does not violate the negative Commerce
Clause. Unlike the Court, ante, at 3–4, 8–9, I reach that
determination without adverting to various tests from our
wardrobe of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause
fashions: the balancing approach from Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970), the four-factor test from
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977),
and the internal-consistency test from cases such as Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987).
Instead, I ask whether the fee “facially discriminates
against interstate commerce” and whether it is “indistin-
guishable from a type of law previously held unconstitu-
tional by this Court.” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U. S. 186, 210 (1994) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg-
ment). As the Court correctly concludes, Michigan’s fee
meets neither of those conditions. It does not facially
discriminate against interstate commerce, ante, at 4, and
it is distinguishable from petitioners’ best analogue, the
fees invalidated in Scheiner, which applied to interstate
trucks even when they engaged in no intrastate business,
ante, at 7–8.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 03–1230
_________________
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND
USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MICHIGAN
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
I would affirm the judgment of the Michigan Court of
Appeals because “ ‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no
basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense,
and has proved virtually unworkable in application,’
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U. S. 564, 610 (1997) (THOMAS, J., dissenting), and, conse-
quently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state
statute.” Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U. S. 59, 68
(2003) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).