DLD-180
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1396
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WAYNE PETTAWAY,
Appellant
v.
SCI ALBION;
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION CAMP HILL
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-11-cv-00158)
Magistrate Judge: Susan Paradise Baxter
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 10, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 22, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Wayne Pettaway, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at
Albion, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Albion”), initiated a civil rights action against SCI-Albion
and the state Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania by filing a motion for injunctive relief. His
complaint was filed thereafter, and in it Pettaway alleged that the DOC improperly
deducted court costs and fees from his prison account, pursuant to Act 84, over a period
of years despite the fact that his “commitment order” provided that his fine and court
costs were to be paid by Allegheny County. Pettaway sought money damages.
Pettaway later filed a “supplemental” complaint, in which he provided certain
details about his attempt to grieve the “theft” of his funds through prison channels. He
provided a portion of the transcript from sentencing, wherein the trial judge stated: “And
I will put costs on the county,” and another item indicating that those costs totaled
$605.19 for two different convictions. Still another item, a “Memo” dated February 11,
2011 from the DOC, indicated that that the collection of costs from Pettaway’s prison
account had been terminated, and that any funds in the DOC’s possession that had not
already been remitted to Allegheny County ($6.29) had been returned to Pettaway’s
account. As to money already remitted, Pettaway was invited by the Superintendent to
contact Allegheny County for the return of his funds.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
12(b)(6), and Pettaway submitted a written response in opposition. In an order entered on
February 2, 2012, the Magistrate Judge granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the
complaint. 1 The Magistrate Judge determined that Pettaway’s claim was barred by the
1
The parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1).
2
Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions in the federal courts against a State and
its agencies. The DOC, which administers SCI-Albion, is an agency of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment
immunity that the Commonwealth enjoys. Moreover, the DOC is not a “person” against
whom a civil rights action may be brought. The Magistrate Judge further determined that
any amendment by Pettaway to name specific persons responsible for the wrongful
deductions would be futile, because the availability of the grievance procedure at SCI-
Albion satisfied all the requirements of due process. Pettaway in fact used the post-
deprivation remedy provided by the prison to obtain the return of at least some of his
money.
Pettaway appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk
granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was
subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance
under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He was invited to submit argument in
writing.
We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous. An appellant may prosecute his appeal
without prepayment of the fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), but the in forma pauperis statute
provides that the Court shall dismiss the appeal at any time if the Court determines that it
is frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An appeal is frivolous when it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Pettaway’s appeal lacks an arguable basis in the law. A motion to dismiss should be
granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
3
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). We look for “enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
elements of” a claim for relief. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Where that is missing, the complaint
must be dismissed.
The Magistrate Judge properly dismissed Pettaway’s complaint. Suit against the
Commonwealth’s Department of Corrections and SCI-Albion is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment because Pennsylvania has not consented to suit in federal court. See
Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (immunity of States from
suits in federal courts is fundamental aspect of state sovereignty). The Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections is a state agency. See 71 Pa. Adm. Code § 61. Congress may
abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity, and a State may consent to suit, Lombardo, 540
F.3d at 195-96, but Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity from section 1983
actions, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), and Pennsylvania has withheld its
consent to suit in federal court, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). See Laskaris v.
Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981).
Moreover, as a state agency and the prison it administers, the Department of
Corrections and SCI-Albion are not “persons” and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Any amendment
to Pettaway’s complaint to name persons who could be sued under section 1983 would be
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futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
Procedural due process guarantees that the State will not deprive an individual of a
protected interest in property without due process of law, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
537 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), but
the United States Supreme Court has held that meaningful post-deprivation remedies
provide sufficient due process for negligent deprivations of property, Parratt, 451 U.S. at
530, and intentional deprivations of property, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984). The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections grievance procedure provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy, see, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000), and the existence of this post-deprivation
remedy forecloses his due process claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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