[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-10116 MAY 30, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00149-DHB-WLB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TYRONE ROBINSON,
a.k.a. Ty,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 30, 2012)
Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Robinson pled guilty in 2008 to being a convicted felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 52
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. Robinson’s
term of supervised release commenced on October 10, 2011, and in November, 2011,
his probation officer petitioned the district court to issue a warrant for his arrest based
on his failure to abide by the conditions of his supervised release. Following a hearing,
at which Robinson stipulated that he had violated three of the conditions, the district
court revoked his supervised release and imposed a 12-month sentence of
imprisonment. On appeal, Robinson argues that his 12-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider his stipulation, his
mitigation arguments, whether a lesser sentence would have been appropriate, and the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008). Our “reasonableness” review “merely asks whether the trial court abused its
discretion,” and the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that
the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).
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A district court may revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release if the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his
supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In imposing a sentence of imprisonment,
the district court is required to consider certain factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Id. § 3583(e). These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed to (a) afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (b) protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant, and (c) provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (3) the
sentencing range established by the Guidelines; (4) the pertinent policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (6) the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7).
In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we typically perform two steps.
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the §
3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation
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from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007)).
If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err, we must consider
the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard,’” based on the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51). This review is “deferential,” requiring us to determine “whether the sentence
imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in
section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “[W]e
will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [district court] accorded to
a given factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all
the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2962 (2011).
We will “vacate the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813
(2011). In explaining the sentence, the district court need not specifically discuss each
of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Although we do not automatically presume reasonableness for a sentence within the
guidelines range, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United States
v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
Robinson has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable.1 To begin with, because Robinson’s 12-month sentence
is within the advisory guidelines range of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment, there is an
ordinary expectation of reasonableness. Id. Moreover, contrary to Robinson’s
argument on appeal, the district court did take into consideration his arguments offered
in mitigation, specifically noting that it was not unreasonable for Robinson to have
some contact with the people he had met at his halfway house. Further, in discussing
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the district court specifically emphasized
(1) Robinson’s deliberate attempt to mislead his probation officer, (2) his failure to
explain why the violations occurred so late in the evening, and (3) the short length of
time between Robinson’s release from prison and the violation. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1). The district court also discussed its observation that Robinson had failed
to “take the rules [it] imposed very seriously” before announcing its decision to revoke
1
Robinson raises no challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, and
accordingly, he has waived any claim in this respect. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d
1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are
deemed abandoned).
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his supervised release and impose a 12-month prison sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring the sentence imposed to “afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by emphasizing only some of the
factors because the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is within the
discretion of the district court. Snipes, 611 F.3d at 872. Nor was the district court
required to explicitly discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, particularly when the
explanation for its sentencing decision took these factors into account. Scott, 426 F.3d
at 1329. Robinson has not demonstrated a clear error of judgment in the district court’s
weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, and therefore, has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm
his 12-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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