FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 31 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MILES HALL, No. 10-56996
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01195-JLS-
WVG
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE MEMORANDUM *
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH,
PENNSYLVANIA, a corporation,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
ASSOCIATED UNDERWRITERS and
UNITED TRUCKERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 11, 2012
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: NOONAN and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER, Chief District
Judge.**
National Union appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-
beneficiary Miles Hall in this diversity action for insurance benefits. The district
court found that National Union failed to effectively limit its $1,000,000 accident
insurance coverage to $250,000 in cases of accidental death and therefore owed
beneficiary Miles Hall $1,000,000 upon his father’s death. National Union raises
three issues on appeal: whether Hall’s complaint adequately placed the terms of the
policy in issue; whether the district court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that
the policy conferred a $1,000,000 death benefit; and whether the district court
erred in denying National Union’s motion for reconsideration.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, see Pickern v.
Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006), and an order
denying a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, see SEC v. Platforms
Wireless Intern. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
A. Pleading
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Here, Hall’s operative
complaint sought $1,000,000 in benefits under the theory that a temporary
2
insurance policy created by the decedent’s application for coverage was in effect at
the time he died. Hall attached a copy of the insurance application to the
complaint. The complaint also alleged, in paragraph 18, that Hall was entitled to
$1 million because “[t]here was no conspicuous plain or clear statement of any
lesser limit of liability or any reduction of benefits payable to Robert Hall’s
designated beneficiary ever communicated to Robert Hall [the decedent] prior to
his death . . . .” Paragraph 18 was sufficient to put National Union on notice that
the terms of its Certificate of insurance were at issue. Furthermore, National
Union responded to the complaint by introducing a copy of the Certificate, thereby
placing it in issue. The court did not err when it interpreted the terms of the
Certificate in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment.
B. Interpretation of the policy
Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law in California. See
TRB Investments, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 4th 19, 27 (2006);
Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 32 Cal. 4th 1198, 1204 (2004). “[T]o be
enforceable, any provision that takes away or limits coverage reasonably expected
by an insured must be conspicuous, plain and clear. . . . in words that are part of the
working vocabulary of the average layperson.” Haynes, 32 Cal. 4th at 1204
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the decedent signed up for $1,000,000 in
3
coverage. National Union faxed him a Certificate entitled “$1,000,000 Combined
Single Limit Occupational Accident Benefit.” An itemized entry for “AD&D”
coverage, payable at $250,000, was neither plain, clear, nor understandable to a
layperson. See id. It therefore did not effectively limit coverage upon accidental
death to $250,000. The district court did not err in finding, as a matter of law, that
the Certificate entitled Hall to a $1,000,000 benefit.
C. Rule 59 motion
National Union moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59. “Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate if (1) the district
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed
clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an
intervening change in controlling law.” SEC v. Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at
1100 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, National Union sought to use Rule
59 to introduce the declaration of an insurance expert in the trucking industry. It
could have introduced this evidence in its opposition to Hall’s motion for summary
judgment, but chose not to. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was
not clear error, nor was there any intervening change in controlling law. Therefore,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying National Union’s Rule 59
motion.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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FILED
Hall v. National Union Fire Insurance, No. 10-56996 MAY 31 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
GRITZNER, Chief District Judge, concurring: U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
I concur in sections B and C only, and in the result.