UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5115
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOEL RAMIREZ-MONTANEZ, a/k/a Gilberto Ramirez, a/k/a
Herbert Ramirez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00118-JRS-1)
Submitted: May 30, 2012 Decided: June 4, 2012
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Elizabeth W.
Hanes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Richard D.
Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joel Ramirez-Montanez (“Ramirez”) pled guilty,
pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of illegally
reentering the United States after having been removed following
conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006). In the plea agreement, Ramirez
reserved the right to challenge the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence of his identity obtained
following a stop of the pickup truck in which he was a
passenger. Ramirez argues on appeal that he was unreasonably
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and that the
evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal
seizure. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review for clear error the factual findings
underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and
the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster,
634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial
of a suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below.
Id.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a law
enforcement officer “may conduct a brief investigatory stop
where the officer has reasonable suspicion [but not probable
2
cause to believe] that criminal activity may be afoot.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a temporary stop must be
“justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Officers may
stop a suspect when they can “point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21. Courts
are to judge those facts “against an objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure . . . warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 21-22
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A Terry or investigative stop may become a full-scale
arrest requiring probable cause under certain circumstances.
“The test for determining whether an individual is in custody or
under arrest is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with formal arrest.” Park v. Shiflett,
250 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(explaining that, instead of being distinguished by the absence
of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ from custodial
3
interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary to
verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court correctly determined that the
initial stop of the pickup truck was a Terry stop supported by
reasonable suspicion. We find no merit to Ramirez’ assertion
that the stop of the truck was transformed into a full-scale
arrest requiring probable cause by the ICE officers’ attire,
alleged armaments, and positioning of their vehicles relative to
the truck. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109
(4th Cir. 1995). We further conclude that the officers’
confirmation of Ramirez’ identity during the stop provided the
probable cause necessary to support his subsequent arrest.
United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4