UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4848
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TAHIRAH CARTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00493-JFM-2)
Submitted: May 30, 2012 Decided: June 6, 2012
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas J. Saunders, LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS J. SAUNDERS, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. James G. Warwick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tahirah Carter pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and distribute heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court sentenced Carter to
135 months of imprisonment and she now appeals. Appellate
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the Government should have
been required to move for a downward departure for substantial
assistance and whether Carter should have been allowed to
withdraw her guilty plea. Carter has filed a pro se
supplemental brief raising additional issues. * Finding no error,
we affirm.
Counsel and Carter first argue that the Government’s
refusal to move for a downward departure for substantial
assistance under the advisory Guidelines was a breach of the
plea agreement and resulted from impermissible motives. “As a
general matter, the government has the power, but not the duty,
to make a motion for a downward departure under [U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual] § 5K1.1 [(2011)].” United States v. Dixon,
998 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1993). A court, however, has the
authority to review the government’s “refusal to file a
*
We have fully considered the additional issues raised in
Carter’s pro se brief and conclude they lack merit.
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substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if [the
court finds] that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive.” Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).
In addition, when the government “bridles its
discretion with the terms of the plea agreement, . . . the
district court has the power to review the government’s refusal
to make the motion just as it would any alleged breach of the
plea agreement.” Dixon, 998 F.2d at 230 (citations omitted).
Plea agreements are interpreted generally under contract law.
Id. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that
the Government’s refusal to move for a downward departure was
not a breach of the plea agreement and was not the result of an
unconstitutional motive.
Counsel and Carter next argue that her guilty plea was
involuntary and she should have been able to withdraw her plea
because the Government failed to move for a downward departure
and Carter was coerced into entering into the plea agreement.
The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea
of guilt is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). Accordingly, prior to
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with
the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that
she understands, the nature of the charges to which the plea is
offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible
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penalty she faces, and the various rights she is relinquishing
by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also
must determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea.
Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir.
1991). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Carter’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and there was no
basis for withdrawal of the plea.
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment
of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform
Carter, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Carter requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Carter. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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