UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5126
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID BRANDON WATSON, a/k/a Timothy Brian Webster,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-01251-TLW-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 7, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Brandon Watson appeals his conviction and
ninety-month sentence following his conditional guilty plea,
pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession with intent
to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (2006), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A) (2006). On appeal, Watson’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court erred in denying the motion to
suppress, whether the court fully complied with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Watson’s guilty plea, and
whether Watson’s sentence was reasonable. Watson filed a pro se
supplemental brief in which he argued that the district court
erred in denying the motion to suppress. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Both Watson and counsel question the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress the drugs and firearms
recovered during a warrantless search of Watson’s hotel room.
In considering the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, “[w]e review the district court’s legal determinations
de novo and its factual determinations for clear error.” United
States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010). When the
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district court has denied a suppression motion, “we construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id.
“A voluntary response to an officer’s knock . . . does
not generally implicate the Fourth Amendment, and thus an
officer generally does not need probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to justify knocking on the door and then making verbal
inquiry.” United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir.
2001). To enter the residence, however, the officer must have a
warrant or there must exist “exigent circumstances” justifying a
warrantless entry. Id. at 494. Exigent circumstances include
situations in which “police officers (1) have probable cause to
believe that evidence of illegal activity is present and
(2) reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or removed
before they could obtain a warrant.” Id. at 494-95; see United
States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981) (enumerating
additional factors for determining exigency).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court did
not err in finding that exigent circumstances justified the
police officers’ warrantless entry into Watson’s hotel room. To
the extent Watson challenges the officers’ credibility, “[w]e
. . . defer to a district court’s credibility determinations,
for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses
and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to
suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th
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Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
district court did not err in denying Watson’s motion to
suppress the drugs and firearms recovered during the search.
Counsel next questions whether the district court
fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Watson’s guilty plea.
Our review of the plea hearing reveals that the district court
substantially complied with Rule 11 in conducting the plea
colloquy and that any minor omissions by the court did not
affect Watson’s substantial rights. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error standard);
United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002)
(providing standard of review). Thus, the district court did
not err in finding that Watson’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary.
Finally, counsel questions whether Watson’s sentence
was reasonable. In reviewing a sentence, we must first ensure
that the district court did not commit any “significant
procedural error,” such as failing to properly calculate the
applicable Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once
we have determined that there is no procedural error, we must
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
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If the sentence imposed is within the appropriate Guidelines
range, we consider it presumptively reasonable. United States
v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The
presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we
conclude that the district court committed no procedural or
substantive error in sentencing Watson to ninety months’
imprisonment, a term that included a within-Guidelines sentence
on the drug charge and the statutory mandatory minimum sentence
on the firearms charge. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review); see
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Watson, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Watson requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Watson. We dispense with oral argument because
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the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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