UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4939
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KASHUN WATSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00941-RBH-9)
Submitted: June 21, 2012 Decided: June 25, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carla Faye Grabert-Lowenstein, Conway, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kashun Watson pled guilty in a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 50
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006). He was sentenced to 151 months in prison. In
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Watson’s attorney has filed a brief certifying that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning (1) the validity
of Watson’s guilty plea; (2) Watson’s classification as a career
offender; (3) the district court’s refusal to apply a one-to-one
ratio of cocaine to cocaine base; and (4) the reasonableness of
Watson’s sentence. Although informed of his right to do so,
Watson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Because Watson did not move to withdraw his plea, we
review his Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Here, we find no
error, as the district court fully complied with Rule 11 when
accepting Watson’s plea. Given no indication to the contrary,
we therefore find that Watson’s plea was knowing and voluntary,
and, consequently, final and binding. See United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review Watson’s sentence for reasonableness, using
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
2
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review requires us
to ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008). Procedural errors include improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the sentence, “including an explanation
for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. Only if we find a sentence procedurally reasonable can we
consider substantive reasonableness. United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
As counsel notes, the district court did not err in
concluding that Watson qualified as a career offender pursuant
to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1(a) (2010).
Watson was convicted of the controlled substance offenses
supporting his career offender designation well before the
completion of the conduct supporting his instant conviction.
Accordingly, those offenses properly supported the application
of USSG § 4B1.1(a). See USSG § 4B1.2(c); United States v.
Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2002).
Further, the district court did not err in declining
to apply a one-to-one ratio with respect to cocaine and cocaine
base when sentencing Watson. Because Watson’s offense involved
3
a significant quantity of both drugs, the application of such a
ratio would not have affected his sentence, given his career
offender status and the district court’s decision to grant him
the benefit of the statutory amendments of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220. Because Watson’s sentence was
otherwise procedurally and substantively reasonable, we find no
error in its imposition.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Watson’s conviction and sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform Watson, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Watson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Watson. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4