UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4928
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEON FRED COLLINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:10-cr-00066-RJC-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 11, 2012
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executor Director, Ross Richardson, Assistant
Federal Defender, Elizabeth Blackwood, Research & Writing
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M.
Tompkins, United States Attorney, Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leon Fred Collins pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2006), and was
sentenced as a career offender to a term of 210 months’
imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1
(2010)(Career Offender Guideline). Collins appeals his
sentence, alleging both procedural and substantive error. We
affirm.
At his sentencing hearing, Collins argued that a
variance below the Career Offender Guidelines range was
appropriate because the Career Offender Guideline was developed
in a flawed manner, unlike other Guidelines, and was unlikely to
produce a sentence that achieved the objectives of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). The district court declined to vary downward.
We review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard, which requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
Collins first maintains that the district court procedurally
erred by (1) treating the Career Offender Guideline as mandatory
and failing to appreciate that the court had the authority to
vary below the Career Offender Guidelines range, (2) applying
the Career Offender Guideline mechanically in the apparent
belief that a sentence within the range carried a presumption of
2
reasonableness, and (3) failing to provide a rationale for the
sentence by giving an individualized assessment of Collins’
particular case. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 328-330
(4th Cir. 2009) (explaining need for individualized rationale to
facilitate appellate review).
None of Collins’s claims are supported by the record.
The district court acknowledged the advisory nature of the
Guidelines and addressed Collins’ argument for a variance, if
briefly. The district court further discussed the specific
facts of his case and explained that Collins’ record of
robberies, drug crime, failure to benefit from drug treatment,
and violations of probation and supervised release argued
against a more lenient sentence. We conclude that Collins has
not shown procedural error.
If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence by examining “the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
This Court treats a sentence within a properly calculated
Guidelines range as presumptively reasonable. Id. at
217; United States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir.
2008).
3
Collins contends that the district court did not
seriously consider his argument that the Career Offender
Guideline is flawed because it is not based on empirical data.
Relying on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007)
(approving deviation from advisory Guidelines range for crack
cocaine offenses), Collins argues that, in deciding whether to
depart or vary below a properly calculated Guidelines range, the
district court may vary from the range based on policy
considerations. However, although “a sentencing court may be
entitled to consider policy decisions underlying the Guidelines,
it is under no obligation to do so.” United States v. Rivera-
Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation
omitted). Kimbrough does not require appellate courts to
disagree with the policy underlying a Guideline. United
States v. Talamantes, 620 F.3d 901, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam). While “district courts certainly may disagree with the
Guidelines for policy reasons and may adjust a sentence
accordingly[,] . . . if they do not, [appellate courts] will not
second-guess their decisions under a more lenient standard
simply because the particular Guideline is not empirically-
based.” United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 367
(5th Cir. 2009). We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it declined to vary below the Career
Offender Guidelines range.
4
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5