FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD ANTHONY JENKINS, No. 11-35084
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00900-BR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
GRAVES, Officer; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted, June 26, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prison Richard Anthony Jenkins appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and
Eighth Amendment violations arising out of his placement in segregation pending
a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo, Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2007), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Jenkins’s due
process claim because Jenkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether his week-long placement in segregation resulted in any deprivations or
changes in the conditions of confinement constituting an “atypical and significant
hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” that would give rise
to a protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see
also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447, 449 (9th Cir. 2000) (where there is no
protected liberty interest, there is no due process claim, substantive or procedural).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Jenkins’s Eighth
Amendment claims because Jenkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether his stay in segregation resulted in any physical harm or posed a
substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(to establish violation of Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment, plaintiff must show that conditions of confinement posed a substantial
risk of serious harm); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (conditions
must amount to a denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery because
Jenkins failed to show that discovery would have yielded facts that would have
precluded summary judgment. See Little v. City of Seattle, 683 F.2d 681, 685 (9th
Cir. 1988) (the district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery when
the discovery could not have affected summary judgment); Klingele v. Eikenberry,
849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The burden is on the nonmoving party . . . to
show what material facts would be discovered that would preclude summary
judgment.”).
Jenkins’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Jenkins’s motion of objection to extension of time, filed on May 16, 2011, is
denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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