FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOYLE DOLEN LANCASTER, No. 11-16203
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00284-JCM-
RAM
v.
CITY OF RENO, NEVADA; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Doyle Dolen Lancaster, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants at
the City of Reno police department, the Washoe County jail, and the Nevada
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Department of Corrections violated his constitutional rights and failed to provide
reasonable accommodation for his disabilities. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2009). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v.
Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred the claims against the
City of Reno and Washoe County defendants because all of the actions or
omissions attributed to these defendants occurred more than two years prior to the
filing of the complaint. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109 (§ 1983 actions
governed by forum state personal injury statute of limitations); Pickern v. Holiday
Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (state personal injury
statute of limitations applies to Americans with Disabilities Act claims); see also
Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[u]nder
federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the
injury which is the basis of the action” (internal citation omitted)).
Dismissal of Lancaster’s claims against defendants Skolnick, Helling, and
Benedetti was proper because Lancaster failed to allege facts sufficient to show a
specific policy or practice that was a “moving force” behind any specific instance
2 11-16203
of deliberate indifference and, thus, failed to state a claim against them. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (to state an official capacity claim,
plaintiff must show that a specific policy or custom was the “moving force” behind
unconstitutional conduct); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,
268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in
civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to alter
or amend the judgment and for reconsideration because Lancaster failed to provide
or allege new law, facts, or evidence indicating that reconsideration was warranted.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Lancaster’s remaining contentions, including those concerning tolling, are
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 11-16203