NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUL 16 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JANET A. HAGGERTY, No. 11-35410
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00153-RRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,
Soc. Sec. Admin,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 28, 2012
Fairbanks, Alaska
Before: GOODWIN, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Janet Haggerty appeals the judgment affirming the Administrative Law
Judge’s (ALJ) decision to deny her Social Security claims for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The ALJ denied Haggerty’s claims because it found her impairments not to
be “severe,” see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921, because those impairments did
not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work-related activities for twelve
consecutive months.
Haggerty summarizes “the principal thrust of the argument” to be that the
ALJ “selectively focused on distorted aspects of medical records that resulted in an
unjustified finding of non-disability.” Haggerty relies on two cases holding that,
before rejecting a treating doctor’s uncontroverted medical opinion, the ALJ is
“required to provide specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence
in the record.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2006);
accord Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ
was only required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting his
opinion.”).
In this case, the ALJ did not completely reject medical opinions, but he did
discount the weight he assigned to some of them. The ALJ gave “significant
weight” to the conclusions of Dr. Burgess and the state psychological consultant,
but he gave “little weight” to the conclusions of Dr. Michels and Dr. O’Connor.
The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Michels’s conclusions because they were “not
supported by the fairly normal mental status examination,” “based primarily on the
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claimant’s self report,” and “inconsistent with the claimant’s activities, which
indicate greater functional capability than alleged.” The ALJ gave less weight to
Dr. Connor’s “global assessment of functioning” score of Haggerty because it was
not consistent with Dr. O’Connor’s progress notes and not consistent with
Haggerty’s activities.
In his written decision, the ALJ discounted the medical opinions based on
specific, legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The ALJ was specific when he compiled a long list of Haggerty’s activities, which
included driving, cooking, and volunteering at the fire department. The ALJ’s use
of those activities to discount inconsistent medical opinions was a legitimate
reason. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b), (c)(4), (6); 416.927(b), (c)(4) (“Generally,
the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we
will give to that opinion.”), (6). The ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Michel’s conclusion
because it was not well supported by acceptable diagnostic techniques was also a
legitimate reason. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), (3), 416.927(c)(2), (3) (“The
more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion,
particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give
that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more
weight we will give that opinion.”).
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Therefore, even assuming that Widmark and Edlund apply to this case, in
which the ALJ did not actually reject an uncontroverted medical opinion, the
ALJ’s decision to give less weight to some medical opinions was based on specific,
legitimate reasons that were supported by substantial evidence in the record.
AFFIRMED.
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