11-2573-ag
Kristanto v. Holder
BIA
A095 149 776
A094 816 870
Ferris, I.J.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 19th day of July, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________
EDWIN KRISTANTO, CAHYANING DEWI
KARTIKASARI,
Petitioners,
11-2573-ag
v. NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, Youman, Madeo, &
Fasano, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
Assistant Director; Tracey N.
McDonald, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioners Edwin Kristanto and Cahyaning Dewi
Kartikasari, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review
of a May 25, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming the June 29,
2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Noel Anne Ferris,
denying Kristanto’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Edwin Kristanto, Nos. A095 149 776/A094 816
870(B.I.A. May 25, 2011), aff’g, Nos. A095 149 776/A094 816
870(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 29, 2009). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history of the case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we consider both
the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable
standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d
Cir. 2009).
The agency reasonably found that the mistreatment
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described by Kristanto was insufficient to rise to the level
of past persecution. Kristanto contends that the agency
failed to consider his experiences in the aggregate. When
determining whether an applicant has demonstrated
persecution, the IJ must view events cumulatively, rather
than addressing the severity of each event in isolation.
See Manzur v. DHS, 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir. 2007).
However, here, both the BIA and the IJ properly reviewed the
incidents described in his testimony in the aggregate, and
reasonably found that Kristanto was not harmed to the degree
necessary to reach the high threshold of “persecution,” but
rather experienced “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). The
record shows that Kristanto was never subjected to serious
physical or mental harm and, accordingly, he was unable to
show that his experiences in Indonesia amounted to past
persecution. See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72
(2d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that “persecution is an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment our
society regards as offensive”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, the agency reasonably relied on State
Department country reports in finding that Kristanto failed
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to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.
See Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting that State Department country reports “often provide
a useful and informative overview of conditions in the
applicant’s home country,” but they “do not automatically
discredit contrary evidence presented by the applicant”).
Here, although Kristanto contends that the BIA failed to
“balance” the information contained in the country reports
with his background evidence, the BIA specifically
considered his evidence and rejected it. The BIA reasonably
relied on the more recent 2007 country report, rather than
the 2006 report submitted by Kristanto, and Kristanto has
not indicated how the newspaper articles he submitted are
relevant to the area of Indonesia in which he lived, or
support his specific claim.
In his brief, Kristanto does not challenge the agency’s
finding that he failed to present evidence of an
individualized claim of future persecution, or the denial of
withholding of removal and CAT relief, and he has therefore
abandoned any challenge to these findings. See Yueqing
Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir.
2005). Moreover, to the extent that Kristanto has not
abandoned his pattern or practice claim, the agency did not
4
err in determining that he failed to establish a pattern or
practice of persecution against Chinese Christians in
Indonesia. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d
Cir. 2009). In Santoso, we upheld a BIA determination that
no such pattern or practice of persecution exists. Id. at
112 (taking judicial notice of the fact that “Indonesia is a
nation state consisting of approximately 6000 inhabited
islands and that, in many places, Roman Catholicism is
predominant.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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