UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4982
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM JOE JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00941-RBH-8)
Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: July 19, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles T. Brooks, III, THE BROOKS LAW OFFICES, LLC, Sumter,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Joe Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine
and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 140 months in prison. In
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Johnson’s attorney has filed a brief certifying that there are
no meritorious issue for appeal. Johnson has filed a pro se
brief claiming that his attorney provided ineffective assistance
of counsel. We affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence.
Because Johnson did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea, we review his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing for plain error.
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).
Even if Johnson establishes plain error, correction of the error
is appropriate only if we conclude that it “seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
district court fully complied with Rule 11 when accepting
Johnson’s plea, we find the plea was knowing and voluntary and,
consequently, final and binding. United States v. Lambey, 974
F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Turning to Johnson’s sentence, we review a sentence
for reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard.
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Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step
in this review requires us to ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error. United States v.
Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Only if we find a
sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider its substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009). Here, Johnson’s within-Guidelines sentence is
presumed reasonable, United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 350 (2011), and our careful
review of the record reveals no procedural or substantive error
in its imposition.
Finally, we consider Johnson’s pro se claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, such claims are
not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
establishes counsel’s “objectively unreasonable performance” and
resulting prejudice. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435
(4th Cir. 2008). Instead, ineffective assistance claims are
most appropriately pursued in a post-conviction motion pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011). See United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the
record does not conclusively establish counsel’s
ineffectiveness, we decline to consider Johnson’s claim on
direct appeal.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Johnson requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Johnson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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