UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2333
PRISCILLA REID HAMMOND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:10-cv-02441-JFA)
Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: July 26, 2012
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard A. Harpootlian, Graham L. Newman, Michael D. Scott,
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Weston Adams, III, Sterling G. Davies, Helen F.
Hiser, MCANGUS, GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Priscilla Reid Hammond was attacked and beaten by an
armed carjacker in a parking lot of Kershaw County Medical
Center (“KCMC”). Hammond filed this diversity action against
AlliedBarton Security Services LLC (“AlliedBarton”), alleging
that AlliedBarton was negligent in providing security services
to KCMC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of AlliedBarton, and Hammond appeals. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Hammond challenges the district court’s conclusions
that AlliedBarton had only assumed those duties evidenced by its
contractual agreement, that it had not breached a duty
voluntarily assumed through its contractual relationship with
KCMC, and that Hammond otherwise failed to provide evidence of a
breach. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Robinson v. Clipse, 602
F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Although a business owner, such as KCMC, has a duty to
take reasonable care to protect invitees to its property from
foreseeable risk, see, e.g., Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 716 S.E.2d
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910, 913 (S.C. 2011), this duty does not automatically extend to
AlliedBarton. We conclude that Hammond has failed to provide
evidence sufficient to establish that AlliedBarton should be
held responsible for KCMC’s duty to ensure the safety of KCMC’s
patrons, beyond the scope of those duties specifically
undertaken pursuant to their contractual relationship. See
Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 638 S.E.2d 650,
656-57 (S.C. 2006); Dorrell v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 605 S.E.2d
12, 14 (S.C. 2004). Taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to Hammond, we also conclude that the record does not
establish that AlliedBarton either voluntarily assumed duties
beyond its contractual requirements, breached its duties under
the contract, or failed to adequately train its employees.
Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of AlliedBarton.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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