UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1597
ANGELIA M. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:08-cv-00003-CCB)
Argued: October 25, 2011 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Byron Leslie Warnken, WARNKEN, LLC, Towson, Maryland,
for Appellant. Lewis S. Yelin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kerry D.
Staton, Jonathan Schochor, SHOCHOR, FEDERICO & STATON, P.A.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Tony West, Assistant
Attorney General, Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Thomas M. Bondy, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angelia Anderson appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint against the United States for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that
Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Section
5-109(a)(1) constituted a five-year statute of repose that
barred Anderson’s Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim against
the United States, which alleged that she received negligent
medical care at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in
Baltimore, Maryland.
After considering the briefs and oral arguments of the
parties, we certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland the
following question:
Does Section 5-109(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code constitute a
statute of limitations or a statute of repose?
Anderson v. United States, 669 F.3d 161, 162 (4th Cir. 2011).
On June 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals of Maryland answered
this question, holding that Section 5-109(a)(1), by its plain
text and as confirmed by review of its legislative history,
constitutes a statute of limitations. Anderson v. United
States, No. 14, Sept. Term 2011, 2012 WL 2361489 (Md. June 22,
2012). As a state statute of limitations, Section 5-109(a)(1)
is inapplicable to Anderson’s claim under the FTCA, because the
FTCA is governed by its own two-year statute of limitations that
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Anderson indisputably met. Anderson, 669 F.3d at 164-65.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in
dismissing Anderson’s complaint as time barred.
We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment
dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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