UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4077
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DWAYNE LANNY CUTHRELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00212-TDS-3)
Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: August 27, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bryan Gates, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Randall Stuart Galyon, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dwayne Lanny Cuthrell appeals the district court’s
judgment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C),
846 (2006). Cuthrell’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his
opinion, that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
raising the issue of whether the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing Cuthrell. Cuthrell was notified of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so.
We affirm.
We review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires us to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is
procedurally reasonable, we then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We
presume that a sentence within or below a properly calculated
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Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court should first
calculate the Guidelines range and give the parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem
appropriate. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
Cir. 2007). The district court should then consider relevant
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence
requested by either party. Id. When rendering a sentence, the
district court must make and place on the record an
individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the
case. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328, 330. In explaining the chosen
sentence, the “sentencing judge should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007). While a district court must consider the statutory
factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the
record. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
2006).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Cuthrell’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
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in sentencing him. The district court properly calculated his
Guidelines range, reasonably determined that a sentence within
that range was appropriate in this case, and adequately
explained its sentencing decision.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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