NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-2318
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KARL PONDS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00483-001)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 21, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed September 24, 2012)
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OPINION
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Karl Ponds appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and his sentence of 120-months’ imprisonment. He argues
that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and, as such, that trial
counsel was ineffective in not seeking a judgment of acquittal, (2) the District Court erred
by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of justification, and (3) his sentence is
unreasonable. We will affirm.
I.
Background
Philadelphia Police Officer Michael Tritz (“Tritz”) drove to the 5100 block of
Arch Street with his partner, Officer Timothy Dougherty (“Dougherty”), in response to a
radio call about a shooting. As the officers pulled onto the block, Tritz turned on the
vehicle’s high-powered spotlight. He saw Karl Ponds (“Karl” or “Ponds”) on the
sidewalk holding a gun in his right hand and his nephew William Ponds (“William”) a
few feet away holding a drink.
Tritz put the vehicle in park, jumped out with his weapon drawn, ordered Karl to
get on the ground, and handcuffed him. Tritz then collected the sawed-off shotgun that
Karl had placed on the sidewalk. Tritz walked Karl to the police car to search him, at
which point Karl said, “This ain’t my gun. You didn’t see me with that. If you’s going to
put it on me, you can put it on me.” Supp. App. at 11. When Tritz searched Karl, he
found a black and white adult-sized skeleton face mask in the back pocket of his pants.
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Two weeks prior to this incident, Karl had been released from federal prison after serving
a seven-year sentence for a previous conviction under § 922(g)(1).
William was walking away from Karl when the officers arrived. As Tritz
apprehended Karl, Dougherty exited the vehicle and apprehended William. Dougherty
did not see either Karl or William holding the sawed-off shotgun, but he saw Tritz
recover the gun from the ground where Karl had been standing. William told the officers
that he was the victim of the shooting earlier that evening. He was later charged with
possession of the shotgun.
Karl Ponds was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At his jury trial, Ponds testified that the gun and ammunition
belonged to William, who had retrieved them because “somebody was shooting at him.”
Supp. App. 107-08, 117. According to Ponds, he arrived at his sister’s house at 5137
Arch Street and saw William coming down the steps with a gun in his hand. Ponds
admitted that he took the gun and placed it on the ground, but explained that he only did
so because “I didn’t want [William] to accidentally shoot me because he was drinking”
and “I was actually afraid that I might get shot with that gun.” Supp. App. at 105, 118.
Both before and after Ponds testified, the District Court and the parties discussed
whether a jury instruction regarding the defense of justification would be appropriate.
The Court ultimately granted the Government’s objection to the defense, concluding that
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Ponds, did not establish the
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immediacy element as defined by this court in United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 97
(3d Cir. 2008). Ponds was convicted.
At the sentencing hearing, the Government moved for an upward departure from
the Guidelines range of 92-115 months’ imprisonment, arguing that Ponds’ criminal
history category was inadequate to reflect the seriousness of his past criminal conduct
and his likelihood of committing future crimes. The District Court denied the
Government’s motion, but found that a “modest variance” of five months above the
advisory Guidelines range was warranted based on Ponds’ “ironclad incorrigibility and
utter lack of remorse.” Supp. App. at 156-57. The District Court thus sentenced Ponds to
the statutory maximum term of 120-months imprisonment. Ponds appeals his conviction
and sentence.
II.
Analysis
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ponds argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a judgment of acquittal. In reviewing
claims as to the sufficiency of evidence, we draw all inferences in favor of the jury
verdict. See United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010). Because Ponds did
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not file a motion for acquittal, this court reviews his sufficiency claim under a plain error
standard. See United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002).
To establish that Ponds violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Ponds had a prior felony conviction punishable
by more than one year imprisonment; (2) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; and
(3) Ponds “knowingly possessed” the firearm. United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344
(3d Cir. 2000). The first two elements were stipulated at trial, and Ponds contests only
the sufficiency of the evidence of the “knowing possession” element. To prove this
element, the Government only needed to prove Ponds’ awareness that he possessed a
firearm. See id.
Karl Ponds testified that he “took the gun away [from William] and just placed it
on the ground.” Supp. App. at 105. Even this brief possession of the firearm is sufficient
to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Mercado, 412 F.3d
243, 251 (1st Cir. 2005) (evidence that a defendant “held the firearm for a few seconds”
could properly support a § 922(g) conviction). Ponds’ ineffective assistance claim thus
also fails.1 See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting
ineffective assistance claim where there was no merit to defendant’s underlying claim of
error).
1
While this court generally does not entertain ineffective assistance claims on
direct appeal, there is a “narrow exception” when the facts in the existing record are
“sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v.
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).
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B. Justification Defense
A defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under
§ 922(g)(1) may succeed with a justification defense if he proves the following four
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) that the defendant or someone else
was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the
defendant did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to
engage in criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative that
would avoid both the criminal conduct and the threatened death or injury; and (4) that
there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal act and the avoidance of the
threatened harm.” Dodd, 225 F.3d at 342 (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537,
540-41 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Based on the evidence Ponds presented, he failed to demonstrate that an
instruction as to the justification defense would be appropriate. Ponds testified that he
was worried that William would “accidentally” shoot him, but William did not threaten
Karl, and the justification defense is only available “where the immediacy and specificity
of the threat is compelling . . . .” Alston, 526 F.3d at 96-97 (“The defendants who have
been granted the defense faced split-second decisions where their lives, or the lives of
others, were clearly at risk.”). Additionally, Karl did not attempt to seek a legal
alternative, such as asking William to put the gun down. Given that Karl testified that he
and William “both, at the same time, laid the shotgun on the ground,” Supp. App. at 113,
this legal alternative may have been successful. See Alston, 526 F.3d at 97 (“[A]
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defendant cannot claim justification as a defense for an illegal action that he chose to
pursue in the face of other potentially effective, but legal options.” (alteration in original,
internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because Ponds failed to offer sufficient
evidence as to two of the required elements of this defense, the District Court did not err
by refusing to include an instruction to the jury regarding the defense of justification.
C. Reasonableness of Sentence
Ponds argues that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence
of 120 months. We review Ponds’ sentence for both procedural and substantive
reasonableness. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Review of the
sentencing transcript reveals that the sentencing was procedurally sound, and the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a “modest variance” above the advisory
Guidelines range was justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Supp. App. at 156.
Ponds’ 120-month statutory maximum sentence was neither procedurally nor
substantively unreasonable, and is thus affirmed.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
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