FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 17, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 12-4097
v. (D. Utah)
STEVEN LICHFIELD, (D.C. Nos. 1:09-CR-00097-TS-1 and
1:11-CV-00155-TS)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and movant, Steven Lichfield, appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the district court’s denial
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)
(requiring a COA to appeal dismissal of § 2255 motion). Because the issues
raised by Lichfield are either untimely, procedurally barred or, on their merits,
fail to meet the standard for issuance of a COA, we deny his request for a COA
and dismiss this matter.
I.
Mr. Lichfield pled guilty on June 14, 2010, to one count of production of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The district court
sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years’
imprisonment. Judgment was entered on October 19, 2010. The court entered an
amended judgment, adding restitution, on January 21, 2011. Mr. Lichfield did not
file a direct appeal.
On October 21, 2011, Mr. Lichfield filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion,
seeking to correct his sentence. He argued that there was a disparity between the
sentence he received and the sentence given to another individual involved in
child pornography crimes, and that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to
seek an agreement with the government for a departure for substantial assistance
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual §5K1.1; (2)
for telling Mr. Lichfield that the court could impose a sentence below the
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mandatory minimum, and (3) for failing to present and emphasize all of Mr.
Lichfield’s positive qualities.
The government filed a response to Mr. Lichfield’s motion on
December 23, 2011, arguing that all of his claims were either procedurally barred
or failed on their merits. Mr. Lichfield filed an “Amended Motion” on January 3,
2012, arguing that he was entitled to a §5K1.1 downward departure for substantial
assistance, that the failure to grant him such a departure violated his
constitutional rights, that he had been selectively prosecuted, and that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to assert that he should be prosecuted in state, rather
than federal, court.
Mr. Lichfield subsequently, on March 22, 2012, filed a reply brief, in
which he stated he was withdrawing his amended motion. His reply brief restated
some of the issues he had raised previously: his claims that he was entitled to a
§5K1.1 downward departure, that the government was not justified in refusing to
grant such a departure, that the failure to grant such a departure violated his
constitutional rights, and that his sentence was disparately long compared to
another person. In addition, Mr. Lichfield argued ineffective assistance of
counsel, again restating some issues raised previously, but also raising some new
arguments. The restated arguments were that his counsel was ineffective for
telling him that the court could sentence him below the mandatory minimum, and
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that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an agreement with the
government to seek a §5K1.1 downward departure.
The new arguments Mr. Lichfield raised were that counsel was ineffective
in not explaining fully the plea agreement, in refusing to seek to withdraw Mr.
Lichfield’s guilty plea, in failing to file a direct appeal, and in operating under a
conflict of interest.
The district court denied Mr. Lichfield’s § 2255 motion, finding that some
of his claims were untimely, some were procedurally barred, and the remainder
were meritless. We consider each set of issues in turn.
A. Time-barred issues
In concluding that certain issues were time-barred, the district court
observed the statutory time limits applicable to § 2255 motions. Specifically, 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f) provides that
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this
section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making
a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
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(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
In the absence of an appeal, a criminal conviction becomes final upon the
expiration of the time in which to take a direct criminal appeal. United States v.
Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2006). Under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the time for a direct criminal appeal expired fourteen days
after the entry of the judgment being appealed. Thus, Mr. Lichfield’s conviction
became final on February 4, 2011 (fourteen days after January 21, 2011).
Applying the time limits of § 2255(f), the district court correctly observed
that Mr. Lichfield’s § 2255 motion had to be filed, at the latest, by February 4,
2012 (one year after February 4, 2011). Thus, Mr. Lichfield’s initial § 2255
motion and his “Amended Motion” (filed on October 21, 2011 and January 3,
2012, respectively) were timely, but his “reply” brief, filed on March 22, 2012, to
the extent that it sought to raise new claims, was not. That is not, however,
necessarily fatal to his reply brief. “Pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, an untimely amendment to a timely § 2255 motion which, by
way of additional facts, clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the original
motion may, in the District Court’s discretion, relate back to the date of the
original motion. . . .” United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1206 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir.
2000)).
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While some of Mr. Lichfield’s claims in his “reply” brief related back to his
timely filings, the district court found that his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel relating to his plea agreement, his guilty plea, the failure to file a direct
appeal and conflict of interest were new and did not relate back. As a result, the
district court correctly found itself without jurisdiction to consider those four
claims. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A district court
does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive § 2255
. . . claim until [the appropriate court of appeals] has granted the required
authorization.”).
B. Procedurally-barred issues
With respect to the claims the district court found procedurally barred, the
court explained, citing United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 341 (10th Cir. 1996),
that “[a] § 2255 motion is not available to test the legality of a matter which
should have been raised on direct appeal.” As we stated in Cox, “[w]hen a
defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal, he is barred from raising the
issue in a § 2255 proceeding, unless he establishes either cause excusing the
procedural default and prejudice resulting from the error or a fundamental
miscarriage of justice if the claim is not considered.” Cox, 83 F.3d at 341.
The district court concluded, again correctly, that all of Mr. Lichfield’s
issues except his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been
raised on direct appeal. Thus, they were procedurally barred, absent a
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demonstration of cause, prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Mr.
Lichfield suggests to us that his counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the failure to file
a direct appeal. The district court did not address this issue, as it concluded Mr.
Lichfield made no effort to establish cause for and prejudice from the defaulted
claims. We agree with that conclusion and will not address an argument for cause
and prejudice not raised below.
C. Issues on merits
The district court concluded that the only issues to be resolved on their
merits were Mr. Lichfield’s claims that his counsel was ineffective in certain
ways. As indicated above, these issues were: Mr. Lichfield’s claims that his
counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to seek an agreement with the government
for a §5K1.1 downward departure; (2) representing to Mr. Lichfield that the court
could impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years;
(3) failing to assert all positive aspects of Mr. Lichfield; and (4) failing to seek to
have Mr. Lichfield tried in state, as opposed to federal, court.
The district court correctly analyzed Mr. Lichfield’s ineffectiveness claims
under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Under Strickland, a defendant asserting a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel must show that counsel’s performance (1) “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and (2) resulted in
prejudice, meaning “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Our
review is “highly deferential” and we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Finally, a court “may address the performance and
prejudice components in any order, but need not address both if [the defendant]
fails to make a sufficient showing of one.” Boltz v. Mullin, 415 F.3d 1215, 1222
(10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (10th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Mr. Lichfield’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to procure an agreement with the government for a USSG §5K1.1
downward departure, the district court found counsel’s performance was not
deficient because the government retains enormous discretion in deciding whether
to make a §5K1.1 motion. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087,
1090 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the §5K1.1 “motion is ordinarily left to the
Government’s discretion (unless the Government gives up that discretion as part
of a plea agreement)”); United States v. Abston, 401 Fed. Appx. 357, 363 (10th
Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting that “the government has almost boundless
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discretion in deciding whether to move for . . . a [§5K1.1] departure”). 1 The court
also found no prejudice, since the government was well aware of Mr. Lichfield’s
assistance but declined to file a departure motion. Thus, the district court
concluded counsel could have done nothing more.
Regarding the claim of ineffectiveness based on the allegation that counsel
told Mr. Lichfield that the court could sentence him below the mandatory
minimum, the district court held that counsel “may” not have been ineffective,
since the court does in fact have the authority to depart from a statutory
mandatory minimum in certain circumstances. But even if the court did not have
such authority, the district court concluded that Mr. Lichfield, having been
informed both in writing and orally, was well aware that a statutory mandatory
minimum applied. Thus, counsel’s statement did not prejudice him.
On the ineffectiveness claim based on a purported failure to present all of
Mr. Lichfield’s positive qualities, the district court rejected this claim on the
ground that Mr. Lichfield fails to provide anything specific he claims his counsel
should have presented. There was therefore no deficient performance.
Additionally, the court determined that Mr. Lichfield failed to show prejudice
because he was subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.
1
While unpublished decisions are not binding authority, we cite this
decision because we agree with its holding as stated.
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The court also rejected Mr. Lichfield’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective because counsel failed to seek to have Mr. Lichfield tried in state,
rather than federal, court. The district court noted that Mr. Lichfield was charged
with violating a federal crime and he admitted, during the change in plea hearing,
that he had violated federal law. Thus, this claim of Mr. Lichfield’s was
meritless, and counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise it. See United States
v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 797 (10th Cir. 2006) (“If the omitted issue is without
merit, then counsel’s failure to raise it is not prejudicial, and thus is not
ineffective assistance.”).
II.
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to this court’s review of a § 2255
motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); see Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1199
(10th Cir. 2009) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). “We
will issue a COA only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Allen, 568 F.3d at 1199 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to make such a
showing, a prisoner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the district court denies a
motion on procedural grounds, as well as on the merits of the underlying
constitutional claims, the movant must show that reasonable jurists would find
debatable both (1) whether the motion states a valid claim of the denial of
constitutional right, and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to
invoke it to dispose of [an issue], a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that
the district court erred in dismissing the [issue] or that the [movant] should be
allowed to proceed further. In such a circumstance, no appeal would be
warranted.” Id.
As set forth above, we agree with the district court’s analysis of all the
issues, both procedural and substantive. No reasonable jurist could debate the
propriety of the district court’s rulings on those issues.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lichfield’s request for a COA is DENIED
and this matter is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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