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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-12232
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00036-JRH-WLB
CARLO CARUANA,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
COLUMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
CHARLES R. NAGLE,
Superintendent of Schools,
DEWAYNE PORTER,
Director of Transportation,
ROBERT JARRELL, et al.,
Assistant Superintendent,
Defendants–Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 19, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Carlo Caruana appeals from an adverse summary judgment in favor of the
Columbia County Board of Education (“Board”) on Caruana’s claims that the
Board breached a settlement agreement governing Caruana’s employment as a
school bus driver and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due
process when it terminated him from his job without providing him with a pre- or
post-termination appeal hearing. Having considered the parties’ briefs and the
record, we find no reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the Board.
I. Background
Caruana was hired as a school bus driver for the Columbia County School
District in August 2004 for an indefinite period of time and worked without an
employment contract. He later joined the Transport Workers Union Local No.
279. In May 2009, Caruana was terminated from his position after a parent
reported to the assistant principal that Caruana had acted inappropriately toward
his two elementary school-aged sons and had made sexually explicit comments to
another student on his bus route. After confirming the comment with the student
and speaking with other students who corroborated the comments, the assistant
principal referred the matter to the director of the county’s transportation
department. The director met with Caruana several times regarding the allegations,
which Caruana denied and asserted that the students had a motive to fabricate the
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story because Caruana had previously reported some of the students for school
discipline. After completing his investigation, the director informed Caruana that
he would recommend termination and explained the appeal options available to
Caruana.
Caruana submitted his appeal to the deputy superintendent, who met with
Caruana to hear his side of the story, and determined that he should be terminated.
Next, the school district’s superintendent reviewed the termination
recommendations of both the transportation director and the deputy superintendent.
He determined that Caruana made inappropriate references to male genetalia to an
elementary school student and, given the two other prior occasions for which
Caruana was advised about his behavior,1 that his conduct warranted termination.
The superintendent advised Caruana that he could have his termination reviewed
by the Board. Caruana requested the Board to review his termination and to give
him a hearing on his appeal. The Superintendent provided the Board with all
documents pertaining to the termination recommendations, witness statements and
Caruana’s written materials. The Board considered all of the submissions and
voted to approve the termination recommendation, without conducting a hearing.
II. Discussion
1
Caruana had two other prior incidents, in which he was accused of making inappropriate
comments to female students and in looking at female students inappropriately. Because the
incidents could not be corroborated, Caruana was advised to avoid inappropriate conversations
with students and received a written warning.
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On appeal, Caruana argues that a 2007 settlement agreement between his
union and the school district provided him with an unqualified right to an in-person
hearing before the Board based on the superintendent’s termination
recommendation and that the district court erred in its reading of the settlement
agreement. He also argues that he has a constitutionally protected property right to
his continued employment as a bus driver such that the failure to provide him with
a pre- or post-termination hearing, where he could be represented by a lawyer and
present and cross-exam witnesses, violated his procedural due process rights.2
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the Board agreed to expand the
grievance procedures for “classified at-will” employees (also referred to as
“auxiliary personnel”), which includes bus drivers such as Caruana. The Board
policy that applies to classified employees is known as policy GCK. The other
major category of school district employees are referred to as “certified”
employees, which includes teachers and administrators who hold advanced degrees
and state certifications. “Certified” employees are governed by the Board policy
known as GAE. Caruana maintains that the terms of the settlement agreement
made policy GAE applicable to “classified” employees like himself and that such
GAE policy contains the right to an appeal hearing before the Board.
2
Caruana raised other claims before the district court regarding violations of his First
Amendment and Equal Protection rights based on his union membership, but which he does not
challenge on appeal. We, therefore, deem those claims abandoned.
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We see no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that the 2007
settlement agreement did not make policy GAE applicable to “classified”
employees. The district court noted that policy GAE is clear that it applies only to
“certified” (and not “classified”) personnel and that its purpose to implement state
law regarding duties to “certified” personnel. Caruana’s position as a bus driver is
not a certified position. Moreover, the district court noted that policy GAE does
not even apply to termination-related policies for certified employees, which are
covered in a separate policy. Instead, the district court correctly concluded that
policy GCK, which explicitly references classified, at-will employees, governs the
procedures related to Caruana’s termination. Indeed, Board policy GCK, dated
December 8, 2009 and entitled “Suspension/Termination (Auxiliary Personnel),”
provides the appeal procedures by which Caruana’s termination is governed. This
policy provides that the superintendent can temporarily terminate, pending Board
approval, an auxiliary employee. Those employees who have twenty-four months
of continuous employment, (as Caruana had), have the right to have the Board
review their termination. The Board, upon good cause, has the discretion to grant
such employees an appeal hearing. All of these procedures were followed in
Caruana’s case, although the Board chose not to grant Caruana an in-person
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hearing, and instead approved his termination upon review of the written
submissions.3
Next, Caruana argues that he had a constitutionally protected property right
in his continued employment and therefore his Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process rights were violated when he was not given a formal pre- or post-
termination hearing. In order to establish a procedural due process violation,
Caruana must show “a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or
property interest; state action; and constitutionally inadequate process.” See
Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994). Here, the district court
concluded that Caruana failed to establish that he had a protected property interest
in his continued employment and therefore granted summary judgment to the
Board on this claim.
“To obtain a protected property interest in employment, a person must have
more than a mere unilateral expectation of continued employment; one must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.” Warren v. Crawford,
927 F.2d 559, 562 (11th Cir. 1991). “A public employee who may be terminated
3
Caruana also argues that the Board failed to abide by the terms of the 2007 settlement
agreement, which contemplated an expansion of due process protections for classified
employees, by not providing him with an in-person appeal hearing. We see no merit to this
argument. Prior to 2007, classified employees did not have the right to Board review of
decisions regarding their termination, whereas as a result of the settlement agreement, classified
employees with twenty-four months of continuous employment have the right to appeal their
termination recommendations to the Board. Here, Caruana appealed his termination
recommendation to the Board, which considered his appeal and voted in favor of termination.
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only for cause, however, has a protected property interest in continued
employment.” Id. Caruana argues that same Board policy GCK that governs the
suspension or termination appeal procedures available to classified employees
establishes his property right in his employment. He notes that the policy allows
the superintendent to temporarily suspend or terminate an employee “who fails to
comply with employment expectations and rules, who fails to perform assigned
duties, or for other good and sufficient cause.” Caruana, argues that the phrase “or
for other good and sufficient cause,” establishes that employees like him can be
fired only for good cause. We see no reversible error in the district court’s
conclusion that this policy does not limit termination to only “for cause” reasons
and thus does not create a protected property interest.
Moreover, the additional limiting language in the policy that “[n]othing in
this policy shall grant the right to continued employment or change the legal status
of at-will employees,” supports the conclusion that Caruana could be terminated
for reasons other than only for good cause. Because there is no dispute that
Caruana was hired for an indefinite term and that he did not have an employment
contract, this policy does not establish that Caruana has “a legitimate claim of
entitlement to continued employment.” See Warren, 927 F.2d at 562.
AFFIRMED.
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