UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4348
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEON DINKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-02061-CMC-1)
Submitted: September 26, 2012 Decided: October 22, 2012
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, William K. Witherspoon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Deon Dinkins pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Dinkins challenges the district court’s denial of his
motions to suppress evidence and his statements to police. We
affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d
243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a
suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. Id.
The evidence and statements that Dinkins sought to
suppress resulted from the execution of a search warrant on
Dinkins’ residence. Dinkins first argues that the district
court erred in concluding that probable cause supported the
issuance of the search warrant in this case. When presented
with an application for a search warrant, the magistrate’s task
“is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The reviewing
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court must determine whether the warrant application “provide[d]
the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause.” Id. at 239. Reviewing courts
accord great deference to a magistrate’s probable cause
determination. United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th
Cir. 1994).
We have reviewed the record and agree with the
district court that the magistrate had a substantial basis to
conclude that probable cause existed to support issuance of a
search warrant of Dinkins’ residence. Therefore, the district
court did not err in denying Dinkins’ motion to suppress the
evidence discovered in the search.
Dinkins also challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress an incriminating statement regarding his ownership of
the firearm, claiming he was not advised of his rights as
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However,
the district court found credible the testimony of two arresting
officers that verbal Miranda warnings were issued prior to
Dinkins’ statement.
We defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations, “for it is the role of the district court to
observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial
motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,
232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
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reviewed the record, and conclude that the district court’s
credibility findings are not clearly erroneous, and that,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, the court did not err in denying the motion to
suppress the contested statement. Although Dinkins argues on
appeal that his claim is supported by the lack of a written
waiver, a written waiver is not required under Miranda. See
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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