UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4057
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEREMIAH DAVID VENNING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:10-cr-00892-DCN-1)
Submitted: October 5, 2012 Decided: October 22, 2012
Before WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremiah David Venning seeks to appeal his conviction
and sentence for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Venning pleaded
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to thirty-
six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel for Venning filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether Venning’s guilty plea hearing complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; whether Venning’s waiver of his appellate
rights was valid; and whether the denial of Venning’s motion to
suppress was a miscarriage of justice. The Government has moved
to dismiss the appeal as barred by Venning’s waiver of the right
to appeal included in the plea agreement. Venning has not filed
a supplemental pro se brief, despite an extension of time within
which to do so.
Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript
of the Rule 11 hearing, we conclude that Venning knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and
sentence. Accordingly, because Venning knowingly and
voluntarily entered into the waiver and the Government now seeks
to enforce it, we grant the motion to dismiss in part and
dismiss Venning’s appeal as to his challenge to the denial of
his motion to suppress, as it is clearly within the waiver’s
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scope. As to the remaining issues raised in the Anders brief,
we find them without merit, and affirm. Finally, we have
reviewed the entire record in accordance with Anders and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal outside the scope of the
waiver. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment as to
all issues not encompassed by Venning’s valid waiver of
appellate rights.
This court requires that counsel inform Venning, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Venning requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Venning.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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