NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1664
___________
ALFREDO MESTRE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN WAGNER; L.T. CASTRO; CHAPLAIN MCKEOWN; SGT. SVENSON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 5:10-cv-07141)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 17, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 26, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Alfredo Mestre, Jr., a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from
the District Court’s dismissal of this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background
of this case, we discuss the events leading to this appeal only briefly. In February 2011,
Mestre filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against the warden of the Berks
County Jail System (“BCJS”), a BCJS chaplain, and two BCJS officers (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “Defendants”). In that complaint, which sought injunctive
relief and damages, Mestre alleged that, shortly after his arrival at the BCJS, he requested
a vegan diet for religious reasons. Although he was initially told that this request would
be taken care of the following day, he continued to receive meat and “meat products”
with some of his meals for the next several weeks. During that time, he sold or traded the
non-vegan food. Thereafter, it appears that he received only vegan meals.
Defendants ultimately filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On February 1,
2012, the District Court entered an opinion and order addressing those motions. In its
opinion, the court construed Mestre’s action as raising claims under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.,
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as asserting a challenge to the prison’s grievance
process. The court concluded that, because Mestre had been transferred out of the BCJS,
his request for injunctive relief was moot. As for his request for damages, the court
concluded that all of his claims failed, and that amendment would be futile. As a result,
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the court granted Defendants’ respective motions and dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise
plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).”1 Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). In
conducting this review, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “We may affirm the district court on any ground
supported by the record.” Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, the District Court did not err in dismissing Mestre’s request for injunctive
relief as moot. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(“An inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and
declaratory claims.”). As for his request for damages, we hold that, for substantially the
reasons provided by the District Court, Mestre’s Equal Protection claim and his challenge
to the prison’s grievance process were properly dismissed. (See Dist. Ct. Mem. Op.
entered Feb. 1, 2012, at 9, 11.) We also agree with the court’s conclusion that Mestre’s
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One of the appellees argues that Mestre’s pro se informal brief has not preserved any
issues for appeal. Although we recognize that Mestre’s informal brief is far from a model
filing, we believe that he has stated enough — if only barely — to preserve a challenge to
the District Court’s dismissal of his claims.
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complaint failed to state a Free Exercise claim. (See id. at 9-11.) Although we afforded
him an opportunity to identify in his appellate brief any amendments to his Free Exercise
claim that might enable him to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), he has not
identified any such amendments. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that
amendment would be futile. Lastly, we agree with the District Court’s decision to
dismiss Mestre’s RLUIPA claim. We note, however, that this claim should have been
dismissed without reaching the merits. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“RLUIPA cannot impose direct liability on Defendants, who were not parties
to the contract created between Pennsylvania and the federal government.”); see also
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011) (holding that “States, in accepting
federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for
money damages under RLUIPA”).
Having found no reason to disturb the District Court’s dismissal of Mestre’s
complaint, we will affirm.
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