NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1665
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ALFREDO MESTRE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN GEORGE A. WAGNER
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 5:11-cv-02480)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 18, 2012
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Alfredo Mestre, Jr., a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from
the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly here. In April 2011, Mestre filed a
pro se complaint in the District Court against George Wagner, Warden of the Berks
County Jail System (“BCJS”). The complaint, which sought injunctive relief and
damages, took issue with Mestre’s conditions of confinement while housed in the BCJS.
Specifically, Mestre alleged that, after he attempted suicide in December 2010, he was
placed on a Nutriloaf-only diet for 40 days, and his mattress was removed from his cell
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. for a 14-day period.
In June 2011, Wagner moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On February 1, 2012, the
District Court entered an order granting that motion and dismissing the complaint. As an
initial matter, the court noted that, because Mestre had been transferred out of the BCJS
— he was now incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill — his
request for injunctive relief was moot. As for his request for damages, the court noted
that it was unclear whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner when the
alleged events took place. Because the Fourteenth Amendment would govern his claims
if he were a pretrial detainee, see Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008),
and the Eighth Amendment would govern his claims if he were a convicted prisoner, see
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Hubbard I], the court
analyzed his claims under both constitutional provisions. The court concluded that, under
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either provision, his claims failed on the merits, and that amendment of his complaint
would be futile.
Mestre now seeks review of the District Court’s decision.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise
plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). In conducting
this review, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading
of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
As noted above, the District Court analyzed Mestre’s claims under both the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments because it was unclear whether he was a convicted prisoner
or a pretrial detainee during the relevant time period. It is now clear that, “at all relevant
times to Mestre’s Complaint, he was a pretrial detainee.” (Wagner’s Br. 9 n.2.)
Accordingly, we review his complaint under the Fourteenth Amendment only.1
For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree with that
court that the allegations in Mestre’s complaint failed to state a claim under the
1
We note that the constitutional protections afforded to a pretrial detainee under the
Fourteenth Amendment are greater than those provided by the Eighth Amendment. See
Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 167 n.23.
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Fourteenth Amendment. Although we afforded Mestre an opportunity to identify in his
appellate brief any amendments to his claims that might enable him to survive dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), he has not identified any such amendments. Accordingly, we agree
with the District Court that amendment of his complaint would be futile.
Having found no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Mestre’s complaint, we
will affirm.
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