United States v. Mazza

11-3714-cr United States v. Mazza UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 15th day of November, two thousand twelve. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 Chief Judge, 8 REENA RAGGI, 9 JON O. NEWMAN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14 Appellee, 15 16 -v.- 11-3714-cr 17 18 CHEYNE MAZZA, 19 Defendant-Appellant, 20 21 JOSEPH CASSETTI, JAMES CANAVAN, 22 STERLING MAZZA, PHILIP NEGRON, and 23 GARY EICHENSEHR, 24 Defendants. 25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 26 27 FOR APPELLANT: Michael S. Hillis, New Haven, 28 Connecticut. 1 1 2 FOR APPELLEES: David X. Sullivan, Sandra S. 3 Glover, for David B. Fein, 4 United States Attorneys Office 5 for the District of Connecticut, 6 New Haven, Connecticut. 7 8 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 9 Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.). 10 11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 12 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 13 AFFIRMED. 14 15 Cheyne Mazza challenges his sentence, arguing that the 16 district court erred in applying the United States Federal 17 Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) by [1] 18 refusing to grant a reduction for acceptance of 19 responsibility and [2] counting a prior Connecticut 20 conviction in determining criminal history category 21 notwithstanding that Connecticut afterward decriminalized 22 the conduct giving rise to that conviction. We assume the 23 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 24 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 25 26 This Court reviews the procedural reasonableness of a 27 district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United 28 States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2008). “A 29 district court commits procedural error where it fails to 30 calculate the Guidelines range . . . , makes a mistake in 31 its Guidelines calculation, or treats the Guidelines as 32 mandatory.” Id. at 190 (citations omitted). 33 34 1. In refusing a reduction for acceptance of 35 responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2009), the district 36 court did not abuse its discretion by considering the 37 untimeliness of the plea. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 1(h) 38 (“In determining whether a defendant qualifies under 39 subsection (a), appropriate considerations include . . . the 40 timeliness of the defendant’s conduct in manifesting the 41 acceptance of responsibility.”); id. cmt. 6 (“The timeliness 42 of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is a 43 consideration under both subsections.” (emphasis added)). 44 Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 45 612, 636 (2d Cir. 2010), is unpersuasive because in this 46 case, the timeliness of Defendant’s plea was not the only 47 factor upon which the district court based its decision to 2 1 deny the reduction. Moreover, Defendant pled guilty on the 2 morning of jury selection. See id. at 637 (emphasizing that 3 Kumar did not plead “‘on the morning of trial’” (quoting 4 United States v. Teyer, 322 F. Supp. 2d 359, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 5 2004)). 6 7 2. The district court did not base its denial of a 8 reduction on Defendant’s request for a Fatico hearing, as 9 Defendant argues. The district court refused the reduction 10 in part on Defendant’s request for a Fatico hearing because 11 the request was “totally and completely frivolous.” 12 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 50, Aug. 29, 2011.) Relatedly, a 13 defendant’s refusal to admit to his role as leader of the 14 conspiracy (the subject of the Fatico hearing) is in itself 15 a proper basis upon which the district court denied 16 Defendant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See 17 United States v. Zhuang, 270 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) 18 (denying reduction where defendant asserted that he “was 19 paid to do the job, [and] that he was merely a ‘middle 20 person’”). 21 22 3. Defendant was not denied a reduction for 23 acceptance of responsibility for refusing to admit to 24 uncharged conduct. He was denied the reduction for refusing 25 to admit to his role in the conspiracy, which, as Zhuang 26 holds, was proper. In any event, Defendant’s reliance on 27 United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 629-30 (2d Cir. 28 1990), is unavailing, as the court in Oliveras relied on 29 language in section 3E1.1 that has since been changed. 30 31 4. The district court properly calculated Defendant’s 32 criminal history category. One of Defendant’s prior 33 convictions was for possession of a small amount of 34 marijuana, conduct that the Connecticut legislature 35 subsequently decriminalized. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36 21a-279a (2011); id. § 53a-24(a) (“Every offense which is 37 not a ‘crime’ is a ‘violation’. Conviction of a violation 38 shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage 39 based on conviction of a criminal offense.”); id. § 40 53a-27(b) & (c). However, a state’s classification of 41 conduct as a “violation” or a “crime” is irrelevant for the 42 purpose of calculating a defendant’s prior criminal history 43 under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c). As the Application Notes to 44 section 4A1.1 explain: “To minimize problems with imperfect 45 measures of past crime seriousness, criminal history 46 categories are based on the maximum term imposed in previous 47 sentences rather than on other measures, such as whether the 3 1 conviction was designated a felony or misdemeanor.” 2 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) cmt. background. Exceptions for certain 3 minor infractions (such as traffic violations and loitering) 4 are listed in section 4A1.2(c), but drug possession is not 5 among them. See United States v. Jenkins, 989 F.2d 979, 979 6 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court correctly 7 applied criminal history points to defendant’s prior state 8 marijuana convictions that were “merely infractions under 9 Nebraska law”). Moreover, a state’s reclassification that 10 occurs after a conviction has become final does not apply 11 retroactively. The Guidelines’ concern with “[r]epeated 12 criminal behavior [as] an indicator of a limited likelihood 13 of successful rehabilitation” suggests that the only 14 relevant consideration is whether the defendant has engaged 15 in criminal behavior in the past. U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, pt. A, 16 intro. cmt. Defendant’s behavior was criminal at the time 17 he engaged in it, and as such, is an “indicator of a limited 18 likelihood of successful rehabilitation.” Id.; see 19 generally McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011) 20 (holding that state’s subsequent lowering of punishment for 21 crime of prior conviction did not render conviction 22 inapplicable to Federal Armed Career Criminal Act). 23 24 Finding no merit in Mazza’s remaining arguments, we 25 hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 26 27 28 FOR THE COURT: 29 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 30 4