FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAFONZO TURNER, No. 11-16881
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00117-WBS-
KJN
v.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY JAIL; JOHN MEMORANDUM *
McGINNESS, Sheriff,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Lafonzo Turner appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was
subjected to excessive force while a pretrial detainee at the Sacramento County
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary
judgment, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004), and for an abuse of
discretion the denial of leave to amend, Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 836
(9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Turner failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was in the custody of
defendants when the alleged incident occurred. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) (to defeat summary judgment, a pro se litigant must
present “significant probative evidence” to rebut that of defendants (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Turner failed to raise a triable
dispute as to whether any incident of alleged excessive force was the product of an
official custom or practice or failure to train. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Turner’s motion to
file a second amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth
factors regarding whether to permit amendment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Turner’s requests
for appointment of counsel. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.
2 11-16881
1991) (setting forth standard of review and requiring “exceptional circumstances”
for the appointment of counsel).
Turner’s contentions that the district court erred in denying his request for an
injunction against a non-party and in failing to give adequate notice are
unpersuasive.
Turner’s motion to supplement the pleadings is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 11-16881