FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 18 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-50283
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:04-cr-00135-CBM-2
v.
MEMORANDUM *
TORREY MITCHELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2012 **
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge.***
Mitchell appeals the district court’s reimposition of supervised release. We
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
The district court did not plainly err in considering the need for restitution
when reimposing Mitchell’s term of supervised release; rather, the court is required
to consider such a need pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c) and 3553(a)(7). The
general rule that district courts may not consider “just punishment” when revoking
and reimposing supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), does not
override the more specific obligation imposed by § 3553(a)(7) to consider the need
to provide restitution. See Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 1354 (2010).
Nor was the court’s imposition of a term of supervised release substantively
unreasonable, in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). In addition to considering the
need for restitution, the district court considered Mitchell’s rehabilitative needs and
imposed a sentence that furthered Congress’s goal to help Mitchell make “a
desirable transition back into the community.” United States v. Hurt, 345 F.3d
1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). The result was a sentence that was “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to accomplish the relevant statutory purposes. Carty, 520
F.3d at 991 (internal quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
2