NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 25 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JILL CAMPBELL, No. 11-55486
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:09-cv-00278-JST-AN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine Staton Tucker, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jill Campbell appeals the district court’s decision affirming the denial of
Social Security disability benefits by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on the
basis that Campbell’s multiple sclerosis (“MS”) did not render her disabled by
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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June 30, 1996, the last date she was insured. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we reverse and remand for an award of benefits. We review de novo
the district court’s decision. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.
1996). We may set aside the ALJ’s decision if it is contrary to law or unsupported
by substantial evidence. Id.
Campbell’s diagnosis is not in dispute, and the ALJ did not find her to be
untruthful or a malingerer. As such, and because Campbell presented evidence that
her underlying impairment could have reasonably caused her fatigue symptoms,
the ALJ should have credited Campbell’s testimony of her symptoms’ severity,
unless he found clear and convincing reasons not to do so. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at
1281. There are no such reasons to discredit Campbell’s testimony here.
Therefore, the ALJ improperly rejected Campbell’s testimony regarding the
frequency and duration of her exacerbations. When her testimony is credited
appropriately, there is credible evidence that her MS rendered her disabled as of
June 30, 1996.
Campbell testified that, each year, she endured eight to ten periods in which
her fatigue and weakness symptoms worsened. When the ALJ included just six to
eight such periods in a hypothetical, the vocational expert testified that someone
with Campbell’s symptoms would be unable to find or maintain employment in the
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national economy. Moreover, medical evidence from Campbell’s treating
physician and an examining physician, as well as declarations about her daily
activities from people who knew her during the relevant time period, establish that
Campbell had no residual functional capacity as of June 30, 1996. Thus, it is clear
that Campbell was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Code as of
that date.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND
with instructions for the district court to remand this case to the ALJ for an award
of benefits.
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