11-3856
Young v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
28th day of January, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.1
_____________________________________
Sinatra Young,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 11-3856
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Sinatra Young, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: Robert I. Steiner and Sean R. Flanagan, Kelley Drye & Warren,
LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Gleeson, J.).
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Because Judge John M. Walker, Jr., originally assigned to this panel, recused himself
from this case, the remaining two judges issue this order in accordance with Second Circuit
Internal Operating Procedure E(b).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Sinatra Young, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his defamation action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for failure to prosecute. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
The Second Circuit has “adopted the rule that failure to object timely to a magistrate
judge’s report may operate as a waiver of any further judicial review of the decision, as long as
the parties receive clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object.” United States v.
Male Juvenile (95-CR-1074), 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). The magistrate judge gave Young
adequate notice that he was required to file objections to the report and recommendation,
specifically informing him that failure to do so would result in a waiver of his right to appellate
review and citing the pertinent statutory and civil rules as well as relevant case law. Young did
not object and consequently waived his right to appellate review. Moreover, in light of the
record as a whole, the “interests of justice” do not warrant excusing Young’s default. See
Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003).
We have considered Young’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without
merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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