Slip Op. 02-109
United States Court of International Trade
RHODIA, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Before: Pogue, Judge
UNITED STATES,
Defendant
Consol. Court No.
and 00-08-00407
JILIN PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.;
SHANDONG XINHUA PHARMACEUTICAL FACTORY
CO., LTD.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
[ITA decision affirmed.]
Decided: September 9, 2002
Williams Mullen Clark & Dobbins (James R. Cannon, Jr., Julia K.
Bailey, William E. Pomeranz) for Plaintiffs.
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, David M.
Cohen, Director, Lucius B. Lau, Assistant Director, Ada E. Bosque,
Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice; Emily Lawson, Attorney, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Of
Counsel, for Defendant.
White & Case (William J. Clinton, Adams C. Lee) for Defendant-
Intervenor Jilin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Garvey, Schubert & Barer (William E. Perry, John C. Kalitka) for
Defendant-Intervenor Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Factory, Ltd.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 2
OPINION
Pogue, Judge: On November 30, 2001, this Court in Rhodia v. United
States, 25 CIT __, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (2001)(“Rhodia I”),1
remanded the Department of Commerce’s final determination in Sales
at Less than Fair Value: Bulk Aspirin from the People’s Republic of
China, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,805 (May 25, 2000), as amended, 65 Fed. Reg.
39,598 (June 27, 2000), and the accompanying Issues and Decision
Memorandum, P.R. Doc. No. 155 (May 17, 2000). The remand order
directed Commerce to review the record evidence pertaining to the
calculation of factory overhead, selling, general and
administrative expenses (SG&A) and profit.2 This Court now reviews
Commerce’s Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand: Rhodia v.
United States (Mar. 29, 2002)(“Remand Determination”).
Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000).3
Background
This case involves the imposition of antidumping duties on
imports of bulk acetylsalicylic acid, commonly referred to as
1
Familiarity with the Court’s earlier opinion is presumed.
2
Commerce also asked for and was granted a voluntary remand
to correct the calculation of the overhead ratio by removing
traded goods from the denominator. Rhodia I, 25 CIT at __, 185
F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
3
Citations to the administrative record include references
to public documents from the original inquiry (“P.R. Doc.”);
proprietary documents from the original inquiry (“C.R. Doc.”);
public documents from the remand inquiry (“R.P.R. Doc.”) and
proprietary documents from the remand inquiry (“R.C.R. Doc.”).
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 3
aspirin, from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).4 In the
Final Determination, Commerce found the PRC to be a nonmarket
economy (“NME”) country and therefore selected India as the
surrogate market economy country in accordance with 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(c)(4). In calculating the antidumping duty, Commerce derived
a normal value for PRC producers of bulk aspirin from three Indian
surrogate companies; Alta Laboratories, Ltd. (“Alta”), Andhra
Sugars, Ltd. (“Andhra”), and Gujarat Organics, Ltd. (“Gujarat”),
which produced salicylic acid, salicylic acid derivatives, or
aspirin. Commerce assumed that these surrogates were not as
integrated as the PRC producers and therefore claimed that the PRC
producers would have a higher overhead-to-raw material ratio than
the surrogate producers. To compensate, Commerce applied the
overhead ratio calculated from the Indian surrogate producers’ data
twice. Commerce also calculated overhead, SG&A, and profit ratios
using a weighted average.
This Court remanded Commerce’s determination because Commerce
did not identify record evidence supporting its assumption that the
surrogates were less integrated than the PRC producers or explain
its reasons for departing from the normal practice of using a
simple average to calculate the overhead, SG&A, and profit ratio.
4
Bulk aspirin is produced by combining two main ingredients,
salicylic acid and acetic anhydride, which react to form
acetylsalicylic acid or aspirin.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 4
Discussion
I. Integration Level of Indian Producers5
In the Final Determination, Commerce assumed that the Indian
surrogate producers were more representative of input producers6
5
Rhodia filed both a response to the Department’s Remand
Determination and Jilin’s remand comments, as well as, a motion
for leave to file a reply brief with a proposed reply brief
attached. Jilin opposes these later filings. According to
Jilin, this court’s remand order “limited the opportunity to file
response comments to the Department, and did not specifically
provide parties with the opportunity to file comments in response
to other parties’ remand comments.” Jilin’s Opp’n to Rhodia’s
July 15, 2002 Mot. for Leave to File a Reply Br. and Mot. to
Strike Rhodia’s May 28, 2002 Comments in Opp’n to Jilin’s Remand
Comments at 2. The original opinion “granted [the parties] 30
days to file comments on the remand determination. The
Department may respond to any comments filed within 20 days.”
Rhodia I, 25 CIT at __, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1358. “Motions to
strike are extraordinary measures,” Acciai Speciali Terni SPA v.
United States, 24 CIT __, __, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (2000),
“not favored by the courts and infrequently granted.” Jimlar
Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 671, 673, 647 F. Supp. 932, 934
(1986). Such motions are only granted when there is a “flagrant
disregard of the rules of the court,” as when “the brief
demonstrates a lack of good faith, or . . . the court would be
prejudiced or misled by the inclusion in the brief of the
improper material.” Id. Here, Rhodia interpreted the remand
order as allowing all parties to respond. Rhodia, however, also
“respectfully request[ed] leave to file its Opposition to Remand
Comments of Jilin . . . .” Because Rhodia’s opposition was filed
within the time limits of the remand order and addresses issues
raised by Jilin yet not previously addressed by Rhodia, we deny
Jilin’s motion to strike. Furthermore, Jilin did not even file
its motion to strike until 49 days after Rhodia’s Opposition was
filed. We also accept Rhodia’s Motion for Leave to File Reply
Brief as “it is in the interest of the court to hear all the
parties' arguments expressed as thoroughly and clearly as
possible.” Borden, Inc. v. United States, 22 CIT 233, 248 n.11, 4
F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 n.11 (1998).
6
In this investigation, Commerce used the term “input
producer” to refer to a company that only produces aspirin
inputs, such as salicylic acid (made from phenol and carbon
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 5
than of fully integrated producers such as those found in the PRC.
Less integrated producers, according to Commerce, have lower
overhead rates. As a result, Commerce applied an overhead ratio at
more than one stage of the production process. Commerce did not
explain, however, why a fully integrated producer has a higher
overhead ratio nor cite any evidence demonstrating that the
surrogate producers were in this instance less integrated than the
PRC producers.
On remand, Commerce adopted the opposite position and applied
the overhead ratio once, at the final stage of production.
Commerce followed this Court’s understanding that “[w]hile
salicylic acid is an input in aspirin production, aspirin is also
a derivative of salicylic acid.” Rhodia I, 25 CIT at __, 185 F.
Supp. 2d at 1349. Commerce therefore reasoned that because the
three Indian surrogates produce at least one major aspirin input,
such as salicylic acid, as well as some salicylic acid derivatives,
the surrogates were representative of the PRC producers’
experience. Since Andhra, one of the Indian surrogates, also
produces aspirin, Commerce’s conclusion was further supported.
Commerce noted that the production of a chemical derivative
necessarily requires some further processing. Remand Determ. at 5
dioxide) or acetic anhydride (made from acetic acid and other
materials);a “fully integrated producer” produces salicylic acid,
acetic anydride and the final aspirin product, bulk
acetylsalicylic acid.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 6
(citing to The Cassell Dictionary of Chemistry 59 (1998), which
defines derivatives as “a chemical compound derived from some other
compound by a straightforward reaction, which usually retains the
structure and some of the chemical properties of the original
compound”). Even though Commerce was unable to ascertain whether
the further processing used by the Indian surrogates to produce the
derivatives was “major or minor,” Commerce found that “there is no
evidence on the record which shows that the further processing is
not commensurate with the additional stage of processing Jilin and
Shandong employ to produce aspirin.” Remand Determ. at 5. Based on
the record, Commerce could not “rule out that the production of
derivatives by [the surrogates] may mean that they are as
integrated as Jilin and Shandong.” Id.
Furthermore, Commerce determined that the quantity of aspirin
a company produces “is not probative of whether the company should
be viewed as an integrated producer.” Id. at 6. Rather, Commerce
found that as Andhra produces a small percentage of aspirin as well
as other chemicals, “because [it] produces both acetic anhydride
and aspirin, we cannot conclude that the company’s overhead amount
better represents the experience of an upstream input producer.”
Id.
Based on this analysis of the evidence, Commerce refrained
from adjusting the Indian surrogate producers’ data in its
calculation of the normal value on remand. This decision is
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 7
consistent with Commerce’s normal practice because Commerce does
not generally adjust the surrogate values used in the calculation
of factory overhead. See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at
Less Than Fair Value: Polyvinyl Alcohol from the People’s Republic
of China, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,057, 14,060 (Mar. 29, 1996); Synthetic
Indigo from the People’s Republic of China, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,706,
25,706-07 (May 3, 2000); Certain Helical Spring Lock Washers from
the People’s Republic of China, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,401, 13,404 (Mar.
18, 1999); Certain Helical Spring Lock Washers from the People’s
Republic of China, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 31,143 (May 16, 2000);
Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Collated Roofing Nails from the People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed.
Reg. 51,410, 51,413, 51,417 (Oct. 1, 1997). Rather, once Commerce
establishes that the surrogate produces identical or comparable
merchandise, closely approximating the nonmarket economy producer’s
experience, Commerce merely uses the surrogate producer’s data. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4) (2001).
Furthermore, Commerce is neither required to “duplicate the exact
production experience of the Chinese manufacturers,” Nation Ford
Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
nor undergo “an item-by-item analysis in calculating factory
overhead.” Magnesium Corp. of Am. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1364,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Moreover, Commerce need not use “perfectly
conforming information,” only comparable information. Antidumping
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 8
Duties; Countervailing Duties: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Request for Public Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 7,308, 7,344 (Feb. 27,
1996). Therefore, on remand, Commerce acted consistently with its
normal practice by refraining from adjusting the Indian surrogate
producers’ data.
In Polyvinyl Alcohol from the PRC, Commerce was faced with a
situation similar to the one before the court here. 61 Fed. Reg.
14,057, 14,060 (Mar. 29, 1996). The petitioners in that
investigation argued that the application of factory overhead at
the final stage of production, rather than to the upstream stages,
would understate normal value. Id. Just as it determined here, in
Polyvinvyl Alcohol from the PRC, Commerce found that “there [was]
no evidence on the record to indicate that the Indian producers are
any less vertically integrated than the PRC PVA producers.” Id.
Commerce also held that there was “no basis to assume that applying
[a] factory overhead percentage once, at the final stage of
production of the PRC producers, undervalues factory overhead.” Id.
Unless there is substantial evidence in the record which
supports a finding that the surrogate producers are less integrated
that the PRC producers, and as a result have a lower overhead
ratio, Commerce cannot depart from its standard practice. Rhodia
claims that by upholding this practice, the Court will be
permitting Commerce to make inferences adverse to the domestic
producer. Here, however, Commerce is not making an adverse
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 9
inference, but is simply following its standard practice of using
data from a surrogate producer of identical or comparable
merchandise.
II. Weighted Average v. Simple Average
In the Final Determination, Commerce calculated surrogate
overhead, SG&A, and profit ratios using a weighted average of the
three Indian producers; Alta, Andhra, and Gujarat. This Court
found that “[i]n almost every antidumping investigation where
Commerce uses only a few surrogate companies, Commerce applies a
simple average to derive overhead, SG&A, and profit,” and remanded
to Commerce to either conform with its usual practice or “explain
the reasons for its departure.” Rhodia I, 25 CIT at __, 185 F.
Supp. 2d at 1350(quoting Hussey Copper, Ltd. v. United States, 17
CIT 993, 997, 834 F. Supp. 413, 418 (1993)).
On remand, Commerce agreed that its “usual practice is to use
a simple average when combining data for these types of
calculations” and found “no facts in this proceeding that warrant
deviation from that practice.” Remand Determ. at 7. Accordingly,
Commerce recalculated the overhead, SG&A, and profit ratios using
a simple average. Id. Both Alta and Gujarat, however, had negative
profits. Id. Rather then set these losses at zero and include them
in the simple average, as was done in Commerce’s draft Remand
Determination, Commerce excluded this information from the profit
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 10
calculation. Id. Therefore, the profit ratio calculation only
included data from Andhra’s financial statement. Id. Jilin claims
that Commerce’s exclusion of Alta and Gujarat’s profit information
is unreasonable, inconsistent with the remand order, and contrary
to the plain language of the statute. Jilin’s Comments On Remand
Determ. at 7-8 (“Jilin’s Remand Comments”).7
Neither the controlling statute nor the regulations specify
how to determine the profit component of constructed value. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2000) provides that Commerce shall
determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on
the basis of the value of the factors of production
utilized in producing the merchandise and to which shall
be added an amount for general expenses and profit . . .
[T]he valuation of the factors of production shall be
based on the best available information regarding the
values of such factors in a market economy country or
countries considered to be appropriate....
Id. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4) (2001), Commerce is
directed to “normally . . . use nonproprietary information gathered
from producers of identical or comparable merchandise in the
surrogate country.” Id. The statute and regulations refer only to
“an amount” for profit that is added to the factors of production
and are silent with respect to the calculation of profit. §
7
Jilin also argues that Commerce’s “practice of excluding
zero profit companies was developed almost entirely after the
issuance of Aspirin.” Jilin’s Remand Comments at 11. The focus
of this court’s inquiry, however, is whether the methodology
applied on redetermination is within the agency’s discretion;
whether the agency has explained its reasons for its practice;
and whether the practice is reasonable and in accordance with
law.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 11
1677b(c)(1); 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4). As even Jilin concedes,
“[t]he statutory language provides no limitation that the profit
amount must be calculated in any particular way.” Jilin’s Remand
Comments at 9. Because the statute is ambiguous, we review
Commerce’s interpretation to determine whether it is reasonable.8
Jilin cites to this Court’s reference in Rhodia I to Notice of
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Bicycles from
the Peoples Republic of China, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,026, 19,039 (Apr.
30, 1996) in support of its argument that Commerce’s decision to
exclude surrogates with negative profits from its calculation is
unreasonable. See Jilin’s Remand Comments at 7-9. According to
Jilin, Bicycles stands for the proposition that Commerce must use
a simple average unless it presents evidence that the surrogate
values are not equally representative of the surrogate experience.
Id. at 7. Jilin claims that the exclusion of zero profits from a
8
Statutory interpretations articulated by Commerce during
its antidumping proceedings are reviewed using the traditional
two step analysis articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). See
Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001); cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
139-40 (1944)(explaining the less deferential “persuasive”
analysis); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
226-27(2001). In determining whether Commerce’s statutory
interpretation is in accordance with law, "first, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If the statute is ambiguous, then
the court asks whether the agency's interpretation of the statute
is reasonable. Id. at 843.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 12
simple determination is essentially a weighted average calculation
in violation of this Court’s directive and Bicycles. See id. at 7-
9.
Jilin, however, misinterprets the Court’s reliance on
Bicycles. This Court referred to Bicycles because it was one of
the few investigations where Commerce actually addressed the issue
of weighted average factory overhead, SG&A, and profit. Bicycles
did not specify, and this Court did not previously address, the
issue of whether a specific simple average needed to be used;
rather the Court referred to Bicycles’ directive that Commerce
adhere to its normal practice unless it could explain the reasons
for its departure. Commerce’s normal practice with regard to
profit calculation in NME cases has evolved since Bicycles.
Commerce has been excluding zero profits in market economy cases
since 1997, see Silicomanganese from Brazil: Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,869, 37,877
(July 15, 1997), and slowly began to apply this methodology to
nonmarket economies. See, e.g., Certain Small Diameter Carbon and
Alloy Seamless Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe from Romania, 65
Fed. Reg. 5,594, 5,598 (Feb. 4, 2000)(discussing the issue of non-
profitable surrogates although excluding on other grounds). As
long as Commerce properly explains its reasons, and its practice is
reasonable and permitted by the statute, Commerce’s practice can
and should continue to change and evolve. See,e.g., Zenith Elecs.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 13
Corp. v. United States, 77 F.3d 426, 430 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Commerce acknowledges that its “practice with respect to
including zero profits in calculating average profit rates has
varied over time and is not consistent.” Remand Determ. at 19.9
It argues, however, that “while exceptions to the practice exist
since the Final Determination, we have followed the policy
described in Reinforcing Bars from the PRC and Reinforcing Bars
from Moldova, and cited to in Windshields from the PRC and Hot-
rolled Steel from the PRC, because the issue was clearly raised and
addressed in these cases.” Id.
In Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair
Value: Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from the People’s Republic
of China, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,522 (June 22, 2001), Commerce explained
that it did not think there was a reason to distinguish between
market and nonmarket economy producers with regard to profit
9
Jilin cites to Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof,
Finished and Unfinished, from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Results of 1999-2000 Administrative Review, Partial
Rescission of Review and Determination not to Revoke Order in
Part, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,420 (Nov. 15, 2001), as a recent example of
Commerce’s varied methodology. Jilin’s Remand Comments at 10.
However, in Tapered Roller Bearings, the only recent case in
which companies with losses were included in the profit
calculation, Commerce did not even follow its normal practice of
using a simple average, but applied a weighted average to
calculate profit. We remanded this case precisely because
Commerce did not explain its inconsistent use of a weighted
average. In the Remand Determination, Commerce attempts to
explain its approach and present a consistent practice. Tapered
Roller Bearings therefore does not affect the situation presented
here.
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 14
calculations. According to Commerce, the same principles apply to
both and therefore it has decided to extend its practice of
excluding negative losses in the calculation of profit for market
economy producers to nonmarket economy producers. As Commerce
articulated in Reinforcing Bars from the PRC,
[a]lthough in some past cases we have averaged in a loss
as zero profit, we believe a better approach is found in
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Ecuador: Preliminary
Results and Partial Recision of Antidumping
Administrative Review, 64 FR 18878 (April 16,
1999)(Flowers from Ecuador), which disregards financial
statements showing a loss for purposes of calculating the
profit component of constructed value under Section
773(e)(2) of the Act in market economy cases. The same
principles applied in Flowers from Ecuador are reasonably
applied in a nonmarket economy case.
See Issues and Decision Memorandum, Comment 8; Reinforcing Bars
from the PRC, 66 Fed. Reg. at 33,522. Flowers from Ecuador,
referring to Silicomanganese from Brazil, disregarded financial
statements of producers that incurred losses because it “enabled
[Commerce] to derive an element of profit as contemplated by the
[Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1440, at
826 (1994) (“SAA”)].” Flowers from Ecuador, 64 Fed. Reg. at
18,883.10 The SAA, according to these investigations, contemplates
the use of positive profits.
10
The SAA is "an authoritative expression by the United
States concerning the interpretation and application of the
Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act in any judicial proceeding
in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or
application." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (2000).
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 15
As Commerce explained in Flowers from Ecuador and
Silicomanganese from Brazil, and as it also argues here,
constructed value “must include an amount for SG&A expenses and for
profit” to be a fair sales price. SAA at 839. In making this
profit calculation, the SAA allows Commerce to “ignore sales that
it disregards as a basis for normal value, such as those
disregarded because they are made at below-cost prices.” Id. As
the SAA explains, “in most cases Commerce would use profitable
sales as the basis for calculating profit for purposes of
constructed value.” Id. at 840. Furthermore, “[s]ales at a loss
are consistently rejected, both as a basis for normal volume (19
U.S.C. § 1677b(b)) and as a basis for constructed value (19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(e)).” Rhodia’s Opp’n to Jilin’s Remand Comments at 8.
Because negative losses are often rejected and ignored for normal
value, based on the clear expression of legislative intent
contained within the SAA, Commerce’s decision to exclude them from
the profit ratio is a reasonable extension of this policy.
Moreover, this practice is consistent with the dictionary
definition of the term “profit.” See Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Pl’s
Second Mot. J. Agency R. and Comments of Def.-Int. at 21 (citing
Silicomanganese from Brazil, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,869, 37,877 (July 15,
1997)). Silicomanganese from Brazil quotes Barron’s Financial
Guides: Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 310 (1987),
defining “profit” as “the ‘positive difference that results from
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 16
selling products and services for more than the cost of producing
these goods’ and also the ‘difference between the selling price and
the purchase price of commodities or securities when the selling
price is higher.’” Silicomanganese from Brazil, 62 Fed. Reg. at
37877. Commerce reasonably relies on the SAA and dictionary
definitions of profit to conclude that only a positive figure
should be included.
Jilin, however, claims that there are “fundamental differences
in market and non-market economy cases.” Remand Determ. at 17.
Jilin argues that the difference lies in the information obtained
by Commerce – for market economy producers, Commerce has enough
below-cost sales information to achieve alternative profit
calculations, but with nonmarket economy producers Commerce only
has public financial statements without sales-specific data. In
nonmarket economy cases, Commerce attempts to construct a product’s
price “as it would have been if the nonmarket economy country were
a market economy, using the best information available regarding
surrogate values.” Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. United States,
22 CIT 433, 435 ,14 F.Supp.2d 737, 741 (1998); see also Remand
Determ. at 17. By only including profitable producers, Jilin
argues that Commerce does not properly construct a product’s price
as it would have been in the nonmarket economy. Notwithstanding
its argument, Jilin offers no substantive or evidentiary basis for
its claim. Even if there are differences in the data available to
Consol. Court No. 00-08-00407 Page 17
Commerce for nonmarket economy and market economy producers, Jilin
has offered nothing to demonstrate that Commerce’s use of a similar
approach for the two will produce erroneous results.
Accordingly, this Court will defer to Commerce’s reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Here, Commerce reasonably applied
the logic and methodology used for market economies to nonmarket
economies. Therefore, we uphold Commerce’s exclusion of zero
profits from the profit calculation.
Donald C. Pogue, Judge
Dated: September 9, 2002
New York, New York