Slip Op. 06-141
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
________________________________________
)
SICHUAN CHANGHONG ELECTRIC CO., LTD., )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Richard K. Eaton,
and ) Judge
)
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORP.,) Consol.
APEX DIGITAL INC., PHILIPS CONSUMER ) Court No. 04-00265
ELECTRONICS CO. OF SUZHOU LTD., TCL )
CORP., )
Plaintiff-Intervenors, ) Public
) Version
v. )
)
UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant, )
)
and )
)
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF )
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, FIVE RIVERS )
ELECTRONICS INNOVATION, LLC, KONKA )
GROUP CO., LTD., INDUSTRIAL DIVISION OF )
THE COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, )
PRIMA TECHNOLOGY, INC. )
)
Deft.-Intervenors )
________________________________________)
OPINION
Dated: September 14, 2006
[United States Department of Commerce’s Final Determination
sustained in part, remanded in part.]
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, LLP (Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.), for
plaintiff.
Hunton & Williams, LLP (Richard Preston Ferrin and William
Silverman), for plaintiff-intervenors Philips Electronics North
America Corp. and Philips Consumer Electronics Co. Of Suzhou Ltd.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 2
McDermott, Will & Emery, LLC (Raymond Paul Paretzky), for
plaintiff-intervenor TCL Corp.
O’Melveny & Myers, LLP (Veronique Lanthier), for plaintiff-
intervenor Apex Digital.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice; David M. Cohen,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice; Jeanne E. Davidson, Deputy
Director, International Trade Section, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice
(Michael David Panzera); United States Department of Commerce,
Office of Chief Counsel for Import Administration (Marisa Beth
Goldstein), of counsel, for defendant.
Kelley Drye Collier, Shannon PLLC, (Mary Tuck Staley), for
defendant-intervenors Five Rivers Electronics Innovation, LLC;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Industrial
Division of the Communication Workers of America.
White & Case LLP, (Adams Chi-Peng Lee), for defendant-
intervenor Konka Group Co., Ltd.
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, LLP, (Daniel Lewis Porter), for
defendant-intervenor Prima Technology, Inc.
Eaton, Judge: Before the court is a consolidated action for
judgment upon the agency record.1 Plaintiff Sichuan Changhong
Electric Co., Ltd., (“Changhong” or “plaintiff”), and defendant-
1
On September 19, 2005, the court ordered the
consolidation of Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd., et. al.,
v. United States, number 04-00265 and IBEW v. United States,
number 04-00270 under the lead case, Sichuan Changhong Electric
Co., Ltd., et. al., v. United States, consolidated court number
04-00265.
Prior to consolidation, IBEW, Industrial Division of the
Communication Workers of America, and Five-Rivers Electronics
Innovation, LLC, were plaintiffs to the action, IBEW v. United
States, number 04-00270. Upon consolidation, however, the
original plaintiff-parties were designated as defendant-
intervenors.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 3
intervenor International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
(“IBEW” or “defendant-intervenors”) et. al., challenge aspects of
the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or “the
Department”) Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
and Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances:
Certain Color Television Receivers From the People’s Republic of
China. See Certain Color Televisions from the People’s Republic
of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,594 (Apr. 16, 2004) (“Final
Determination”), as amended by Notice of Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Color
Television Receivers from the People’s Republic of China, 69 Fed.
Reg. 28,879 (May 19, 2004) (“Amended Final Determination”). The
court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000) and
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2000). For the following
reasons, the court sustains the Final Determination in part, and
remands it in part.
BACKGROUND
On May 2, 2003, petitioners IBEW, Industrial Division of the
Communication Workers of America (“IUE-CWA”), and Five Rivers
Electronics Innovation LLC (“Five Rivers LLC”), filed an
antidumping duty petition with Commerce alleging that imports of
color television receivers (“CTRs”) from the People’s Republic of
China (“PRC”) were, or were likely to be sold at less than fair
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 4
value in the United States. See Pet. for the Imposition of
Antidumping Duties (ITA May 2, 2003). On May 29, 2003, Commerce
initiated an antidumping investigation. See Notice of Initiation
of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Certain Color Television
Receivers from Malaysia2 and the People’s Republic of China, 68
Fed. Reg. 32,013 (May 29, 2003). The period of investigation
(“POI”) was October 1, 2002 through March 31, 2003.3 Id.
On June 16, 2003, Commerce issued antidumping questionnaires
to multiple Chinese companies and the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce. Because of the substantial number of respondents,
Commerce thereafter chose to limit its investigation to the four
largest (“the mandatory respondents”): Changhong; Konka Group
Company, Ltd.; Philips Consumer Electronics Co. of Suzhou Ltd.
(“Philips”); TCL Holding Company Ltd.; and Xiamen Overseas
Chinese Electronic Co., Ltd. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-
1(c)(2) (“If it is not practicable to make individual weighted
average dumping margin determinations . . . because of the large
2
Although part of the initial investigation, merchandise
from Malaysia is not the subject of this consolidated action.
3
Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(b)(1)(2005), the POI
for an investigation involving merchandise from a nonmarket
economy is the two most recent fiscal quarters prior to the month
of the filing of the petition, i.e., May 2002.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 5
number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or
review, the administering authority may determine the weighted
average dumping margins for a reasonable number of exporters or
producers by limiting its examination to . . . exporters and
producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject
merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably
examined.”). Petitioners thereafter filed their “Critical
Circumstances Allegations” with Commerce, alleging that critical
circumstances4 existed with respect to imports of CTRs from
Malaysia5 and the PRC. See Letter from Mary T. Staley to Lou
Apple, et. al. of Oct. 16, 2003.
On November 28, 2003, Commerce published its affirmative
preliminary determination. See Notice of Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Postponement of
Final Determination, and Affirmative Preliminary Determination of
4
A finding of critical circumstances pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(e), is an emergency measure to “provide prompt
relief to domestic industries suffering from large volumes of, or
a surge over a short period of imports.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-317 at
63 (1979). It is designed to deter “exporters whose merchandise
is subject to an investigation from circumventing the intent of
the law by increasing their exports to the United States during
the period between initiation of an investigation and a
preliminary determination by [Commerce].” Id; see Coalition for
the Preservation of Am. Brake Drum and Rotor Aftermarket Mfrs. v.
United States, 23 CIT 88, 112 n.38, 44 F. Supp. 2d 229, 252 n.38
(1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-412) (1994).
5
On April 16, 2004, Commerce terminated its
investigation with respect to Malaysia.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 6
Critical Circumstances: Certain Color Television Receivers from
the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,800 (ITA Nov. 28,
2003) (“Preliminary Determination”). On April 16, 2004, Commerce
published its Final Determination. See Final Determination, 69
Fed. Reg. 20,594. In its Final Determination, Commerce
reaffirmed its finding that all of the Chinese respondents had
sold merchandise in the United States at less than fair value.
Id. Commerce also found, however, that “for purposes of the
final determination, critical circumstances do not exist with
regard to imports of CTVs from the PRC.” See Id. at 20,596.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final determination in an antidumping or
countervailing duty investigation, “[t]he court shall hold
unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to
be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .” 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’” Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United
States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla.” Consol. Edison, 305
U.S. at 229. The existence of substantial evidence is determined
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 7
“by considering the record as a whole, including evidence that
supports as well as evidence that ‘fairly detracts from the
substantiality of the evidence.’” Huaiyin, 322 F.3d at 1374
(quoting Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff Changhong’s Challenges
A. Commerce’s Selection of Infodriveindia Data to Derive
Surrogate Value for Certain Inputs
The first issue presented for review concerns the valuation
of 25-inch Curved Picture Tubes (“CPTs”), and television Speakers
(“Speakers”). With the exception of these two inputs, Commerce
valued respondents’ factors of production, using import
statistics published in the Monthly Statistics of the Foreign
Trade of India (“MSFTI”), and the World Trade Atlas Trade
Information System (“World Trade Atlas”).6 Although noting that
import data from MSFTI was the Department’s usual source of
surrogate value data, Commerce valued the CPTs and the Speakers
using data obtained from Infodriveindia, a fee-based website
6
These sources compile and disseminate official import
statistics collected by the Government of India. The MSFTI is
published by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence
and Statistics of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry by the
Government of India, and is available in the World Trade Atlas.
See http://www.gtis.com/wta.htm (last visited August 18, 2006).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 8
reporting Indian customs data. Changhong contests Commerce’s use
of this data.7
a. Relevant Law
In an antidumping investigation, Commerce must determine
whether the subject merchandise is being, or is likely to be
sold, at less than fair value in the United States by comparing
the export price,8 with the normal value (“NV”) of the
merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a). The NV of subject
merchandise is “the price at which the foreign like product is
first sold . . . for consumption . . . in the usual commercial
quantities and in the ordinary course of trade . . . at the same
level of trade as the export price . . . .” See §
7
As a producer and exporter of CTRs covered by the
antidumping duty order, Changhong is an “interested party” within
the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A), and is thus entitled to
challenge Commerce’s determination. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2).
8
The statute defines export price as:
the price at which the subject
merchandise is first sold (or
agreed to be sold) before the date
of importation by the producer or
exporter of the subject merchandise
outside of the United States to an
unaffiliated purchaser in the
United States or to an unaffiliated
purchaser for exportation to the
United States, as adjusted by
subsection (c) of this section.”
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 9
1677b(a)(1)(B)(i). It is usually determined by examining sales
of the subject merchandise in the exporter’s home market, or in a
third country. Id.
In cases involving exports from a nonmarket economy country
(“NME”),9 however, where “available information does not permit”
the calculation of NV using prices paid for factors of
production, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) instructs Commerce to determine
normal value “on the basis of the value of the
factors of production10 utilized in producing the merchandise . .
9
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) defines a nonmarket economy
country as “any foreign country that the administering authority
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or
pricing structure, so that sales of merchandise in such country
do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”
In a market economy, prices are generally the result of
competitive forces of supply and demand. In a nonmarket economy,
however, supply and demand forces do not influence producers’
business decisions to the same extent. Costs, prices and
allocation of resources are frequently determined by government-
controlled entities, without regard to market forces. As a
result, NME prices do not reflect the fair value of the
merchandise. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801
F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
10
The factors of production used in producing the subject
merchandise include, but are not limited to: (1) hours of labor
required; (2) quantities of raw materials employed; (3) amounts
of energy and other utilities consumed; and (4) representative
capital cost. See § 1677b(c)(3). Subsection 1677b(c)(1) further
directs Commerce to add to this value, an amount for general
expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and
other expenses. See § 1677(b)(c)(1).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 10
. .”11 § 1677b(c)(1). In most investigations involving NMEs, the
factors of production are valued using surrogate values from a
market economy country. See Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div.
Of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit, however, has recognized
that surrogate country values are “at best, an estimate” of “what
a non-market economy manufacturer might pay in a market-economy
setting.” See id. at 1382 (citing Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v.
United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1445–46 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Section 1677(b)(c) further requires that the valuation of
factors of production “be based on the best available information
regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country
. . . .” § 1677(b)(c)(1). The words “best available
information” are not statutorily defined. See Allied Pac. Food
(Dalian) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 30 CIT __, __, 435 F. Supp.
2d 1295, 1313 (2006) (“Congress did not define the term “best
available information” . . . [however,] [t]he Department’s
exercise of discretion . . . must be guided by the larger purpose
of the antidumping law. The [Tariff] Act sets forth procedures
11
Commerce has treated the PRC as an NME in all past
antidumping investigations. See, e.g., Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Critical Circumstances: Certain
Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings From the People’s Republic of China,
68 Fed. Reg. 61,395, 61,396 (ITA Oct. 28, 2003). A country’s
designation as an NME remains in effect until it is revoked by
the Department. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(c)(i).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 11
in an effort to determine margins as accurately as possible. ”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Commerce’s exercise
of discretion is, of course, subject to judicial review. Where a
question arises concerning the time period from which surrogate
prices have been obtained, this Court has found:
While accuracy is of utmost importance, 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c) fails to indicate the time
periods from which surrogate values are
supposed to be taken. This court, however,
has repeatedly recognized that Commerce’s
practice is to use surrogate prices from a
period contemporaneous with the period of
investigation. Accordingly, while the
standard of review precludes the court from
determining whether Department’s choice of
surrogate values was the best available on an
absolute scale, the court may determine the
reasonableness of Commerce’s selection of
surrogate prices.
See Citic Trading Co. Ltd. v. United States, 27 CIT __, __, slip
op. 03-23 at 16 (Mar. 4, 2003) (not published in the Federal
Supplement)(footnotes omitted).
b. Commerce’s Valuation of 25-inch CPTs
As an initial matter, Changhong argues that Commerce has
“explicitly rejected the use of Infodriveindia as a source of
information” in other investigations. Br. Pl. Sichuan Changhong
Electronic Co., Ltd. Supp. Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Ag. Rec. (“Pl.’s
Br.”) at 8. In response, the Department insists that “simply
because Commerce determines not to use a particular data source
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 12
in one administrative proceeding does not preclude it from using
that same data source in another administrative proceeding
involving a different product and a different administrative
record.” Def.’s Mem. Opp. Mot. For J. Ag. Rec. (“Def.’s Resp.”)
at 15. Commerce further maintains that “selection of a data
source in a particular determination” does not “constitute[] a
‘practice’ forever binding Commerce to use that data source or
requiring explanation to justify use of any other data source.”
Id. at 15.
Here, plaintiff has produced no evidence demonstrating that
Commerce has an established practice of not using Infodriveindia
data. See Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. United States,
23 CIT 861, 884-85 74 F. Supp. 1253, 1374 (1999)(“An action . . .
becomes an ‘agency practice’ when a uniform and established
procedure exists that would lead a party, in the absence of
notification of change, reasonably to expect adherence to the
established practice or procedure.”). Therefore, while Commerce
may have passed up opportunities to use Infodriveindia
information in the past, this alone is not a bar to its use to
value CPTs in this case.
Next, Changhong argues that Commerce erred in its use of the
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 13
Infodriveindia data because there is “no sound reason” for
Commerce’s departure from, what Changhong characterizes as, its
“past practice of using official [MSFTI] import statistics as the
basis for surrogate values for 25-inch CPTs.” Pl.’s Br. at 7.
In support of its position, Changhong contends that not only has
Commerce consistently used MSFTI data in past determinations, but
it has used these statistics “even where the import categories
involved were basket categories containing a range of items.”
Id. at 9–10. It further argues that Commerce should have valued
all CPTs using a single value derived from merchandise imported
under Indian HTS number 8540.11.00, which it claims is “not even
truly a basket category as it contained only color picture
tubes,” and is therefore specific to the input to the 25-inch
CPTs. Pl.’s Br. at 11. The court finds Changhong’s contentions
unconvincing.
As an initial matter, despite Changhong’s arguments to the
contrary, information on the record indicates that Indian HTS
category 8540.11.00 includes not only 25-inch curved CPTs, but
also other types of picture tubes in other sizes. See Pet.’s
Addt’l Factual Info. (“IBEW Submission”) at 24. A review of
MSFTI data indicates that reported within category 8540.11.00,
are values reflecting curved and flat-screened, 14, 21, 24, 28,
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 14
and 29-inch CPTs, none of which are within the scope of this
investigation. See id. at Attachment 3 (listing CPT import data
for category 8540.11.00). Indeed, an examination of this data
reveals that the majority of imports under HTS number 8540.11.00
are of 14-inch and 21-inch CPTs. Id. Thus, Changhong’s proposed
source is not specific to the merchandise at issue.
The Infodriveindia data, on the other hand, was
disaggregated into individual imports of specific size and type
of color picture tube. See Factors Valuation Mem. at Attachment
3 (displaying size-specific and type-specific examples of
Infodriveindia data for 29-inch flat CTRs). Commerce explained
that the product specificity of the data for this input was
particularly important in its source selection “because, as
Changhong concedes, color picture tubes . . . are important parts
of color televisions, and they constitute a [significant] percent
of the total value of materials used to produce televisions.”
Def.’s Resp. at 18 (citing Pl.’s Br. at 8.).
In addition, although the Department maintains preferences
for using particular data sources, courts have held that no one
source will always provide the best available information. See
Peer Bearing Co. v. United States, 22 CIT 472, 480, 12 F. Supp.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 15
2d 445, 455 (1998) (“Although Commerce expresses a strong
preference for obtaining all factor values from a single
surrogate source, both case law and Commerce’s determinations are
filled with instances in which Commerce used a blend of sources
and surrogates to determine FMV.”). Thus, Commerce is not bound
by its preference for a particular source, rather its charge is
to use the best available information. Based on the foregoing,
the court finds reasonable Commerce’s preference for
Infodriveindia data because that information was more product and
size specific than that preferred by plaintiff.
Next, Changhong contends that the Infodriveindia data “was
unreliable because Commerce lacked such basic information as:
where Infodriveindia obtained the underlying data; how the
information was collected; what was included and what was left
out,” inter alia. See Pl.’s Br. at 14.
Plaintiff’s contentions lack merit. First, to verify the
reliability of the data collection and the authenticity of the
information,12 Commerce contacted Infodrive India Pvt. Ltd., the
12
After a petitioner [[ ]] submitted a proposal to
use import statistics from Infodriveindia to derive surrogate
values, Changhong argued that the source was unreliable. See
IBEW Oct. 6, 2003 Submission at 4, 10; Changhong Nov. 6, 2003
Submission at 9.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 16
company responsible for maintaining the Infodriveindia website.
Following this inquiry, the Department placed on the record, e-
mail correspondence between one of its analysts and a
representative from Infodriveindia, reflecting that the company:
“(1) obtains the information in question from official Indian
customs data; (2) receives daily customs data transmitted each
month from the Indian customs department; and (3) presents the
Indian customs data exactly as it is received, without additions
or deletions.” See Issues & Decision Mem. at 43.13 Plaintiff
has made no showing that seriously calls these representations
into question. Thus, the court finds that Commerce has
13
An example of the content of these emails is as
follows:
1) Does the information on infodriveindia
consist of any other source besides
official import statistics from the
Indian government (i.e., customs)? . . .
No this covers only official source. . . .
2) Do you delete/omit any information from the data
you receive from Indian customs before making it
available on your website? . . .
We don’t delete and add any information which
Indian Gov’t Publishes, we relicate [sic] exactly
the same information.
Memo to File regarding “Placing Information on the Record
Regarding Infodriveindia in the Antidumping Duty Investigation on
Color Television Receivers from the People’s Republic of China”
(“Infodriveindia Verification Letter) at 1–2.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 17
adequately addressed Changhong’s initial allegations of
unreliability.
Plaintiff next objects to what it calls the “unreliability
of the Infodriveindia data . . . [that] is highlighted by the
mystery regarding the country of origin of the tubes in question.
For 25" curved tubes . . . 538 of the 858 units reported by
Infodriveindia were shown as coming from Austria and France. Yet
. . . there was no production of curved picture tubes in either .
. . countr[y].” Pl.’s Br. at 14. Commerce, however, insists
that the country of origin is not relevant to its inquiry.
Rather, what matters for Commerce is that the CPTs were the
subject of a market economy sale. The Department cites 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.408 to bolster its argument. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1)
(“[W]here a factor is purchased from a market economy supplier
and paid for in market economy currency, the Secretary normally
will use the price paid to the market economy supplier.”). Thus,
for Commerce, § 351.408(c)(1) directs the use of prices derived
from market economy transactions, not that the merchandise be
produced in a market economy country. See Polyethylene Retail
Carrier Bag Comm. v. United States, 29 CIT __, __, slip. op. 05-
157 at 47 (Dec. 13, 2005) (not published in the Federal
Supplement) (“In past cases, Commerce has interpreted 19 C.F.R. §
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 18
351.408(c)(1) as not disqualifying transactions based on the
goods’ country of origin.”). On this record it is reasonable to
assume that any price anomaly resulting from a sale by a
nonmarket economy producer in its home country has been corrected
by the subsequent market economy sale. Commerce was, therefore,
within its discretion in finding that even if Austria and France
did not produce CPTs, because they are market economy countries,
imports into the United States that have been the subject of a
sale in these countries are legitimate sources of surrogate value
data. Issues & Dec. Mem. at 51.
Changhong further contests the reliability of the
Infodriveindia data claiming that “none [of it] concerned imports
during the [POI],” and that the “imports reported by
Infodriveindia entered India up to eight months before the
beginning of the investigation.” Pl.’s Br. at 16 (“All of the
information upon which Commerce relied for surrogate values for
25" curved picture tubes was dated before the period of
investigation.”).
In defense of its findings, Commerce states that it
considered it sufficient that the Infodriveindia data was
“contemporaneous,” or from “a period very close to the beginning
or end of the [period of investigation] . . . .” Def.’s Resp. at
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 19
21 (citing to Issues & Decision Mem. at 51). Specifically,
Commerce states that “the Infodriveindia data reflected data
beginning six months14 before the start of the [POI], but ending
one month before the close of the POI.”
Although the Department states that there was near
contemporaneity between the POI and the data contained in
Infodriveindia, it does not point to any record evidence
supporting its claim – nor has the court found any. In order for
the court to assess Commerce’s statements as to contemporaneity,
it must examine record evidence supporting them. Here, so far as
can be determined, absent from the record is any evidence
indicating if the Infodriveindia data fell within, or near the
POI. On remand, Commerce must provide record evidence indicating
when the imports reported in the Infodriveindia data entered
India. If indeed the imports entered before the beginning of the
POI, and Commerce wishes to continue to rely on these values, it
must explain how this information is most contemporaneous with
the POI, or why the non-contemporaneity is outweighed by other
aspects of the data making it the best available information.
14
Defendant itself is unclear as to whether the data is
six, seven, or eight months before the POI. While in its
response defendant claims that the data is six months before the
POI, Commerce, in its Issues and Decision Memorandum, indicates
that the data is seven months before the POI. Neither document
provides any citation establishing the actual dates for the
information.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 20
See Int’l Imaging Materials, Inc. v. United States, 30 CIT __,
__, slip op. 06-11 at 13 (Jan. 23, 2006) (not published in the
Federal Supplement) (“[An] agency must explain its rationale . .
. such that a court may follow and review its line of analysis,
its reasonable assumptions, and other relevant
considerations.”)(quoting Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United
States, 29 CIT __, __ 358 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1344) (2005)
(alterations in original)) .
Changhong also contends that the Infodriveindia data did not
reflect “usable commercially significant entries,” and thus was
unreliable. Pl.’s Br. at 15. The Infodriveindia data at issue
consisted of four entries, comprised of sales of 858 units. See
Prelim. Factors Mem. at Attachment 6. In response to plaintiff’s
assertions, Commerce’s sole argument is that “there is no
information on the record . . . to show that the quantities shown
in the Infodriveindiadata do not represent commercial
quantities.” Issues & Decision Mem. at 51.
The Court has previously found that Commerce can rely on
import statistics as a basis for surrogate values only “after
[reasonably] concluding that [the import statistics] are based on
commercially and statistically significant quantities.”
Polyethylene, 29 CIT at 43 (internal quotations and citations
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 21
omitted). While Commerce has stated its conclusion, it has
neither explained why its conclusion is reasonable, nor supported
its conclusion with record evidence. In order to rely on the
Infodriveindia statistics, on remand, Commerce must point to
record evidence supporting its conclusion that the quantities
shown in the Infodriveindia data represent commercial quantities,
and explain why its conclusion is valid. See, e.g., Shanghai
Foreign Trade Enters. Co. v. United States, 28 CIT __, __, 318 F.
Supp. 2d 1339, 1352–53 (2004).
c. Commerce’s Valuation of Speakers
Changhong also contests Commerce’s valuation of Speakers
using the Infodriveindia data. In reaching its determination,
Commerce placed on the record surrogate value information for
Speakers obtained from Infodriveindia for September 2002 and
April 2003 (“March 17th Infodriveindia data”). Commerce invited,
and Changhong submitted, comments on the use of this information.
See Issues & Decision Mem. at 57. Changhong and other Chinese
producers subsequently placed four invoices for purchases of
Speakers by television producers in India on the record. See
Issues & Decision Mem. at 57–58. Changhong urged Commerce to
rely upon its January 2003 invoice submission as the best
available information as to price. In an ancillary argument,
plaintiff further insists that the invoice is the best available
information because the January 2003 invoice is within the POI.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 22
See Pl.’s Br. at 19–20. This invoice reflected the sale of
100,000 speakers15 by an Indian company, Woodstock Electronics,
to Philips, a producer of color televisions in both India and
China in a purchase unrelated to the present investigation. See
Pl.’s Br. at 18 (citing Changhong Final PAI Submission, at 5 and
Exhibit 5). The date of the invoice was January 8, 2003; within
the October 1, 2002 – March 31, 2002 POI. Id.
In its Final Determination, Commerce considered Changhong’s
alternative data source, but concluded that it has a “clear
preference to use publicly-available prices, as opposed to
specific price quotes (or invoices), unless there is evidence on
the record of the [specific price quotes/invoices] demonstrating
that the input used in the production of subject merchandise is
of a specific type, which would not be accurately represented by
the more public data.” Issues & Decision Mem. at 62 (citing PVA
from the PRC at Comment 5). The Department then stated that it
relied upon the Infodriveindia data because it was “publicly-
available, representative of a range of prices, non-export
values, and tax-exclusive.” Id. Commerce concluded that “this
data represents the best information available for speakers,” and
15
According to plaintiff, the largest quantity of units
reported in Infodriveindia was 9,000 units. During the POI,
Changhong produced [[ ]] units of the subject CTVs for
export to the United States alone. See Pl.’s Br. at 20.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 23
further found “no persuasive evidence on the record demonstrating
that the speakers shown on Changhong’s invoices are more
representative of the speakers used by the respondents than those
referenced in the Infodriveindia data.” Id. at 63, 62. Commerce
also considered Changhong’s POI argument, weighed this aspect of
the proposed data source, but found it outweighed by the fact
that it was not publicly available and not indicative of the
industry as a whole.
In its response, Commerce reiterates its preference for
publicly-available prices by referencing the following language
contained in 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1): “The Secretary normally
will use publicly available information to value its factors.”
The next sentence of this provision further provides: “However,
where a factor is purchased from a market economy supplier and
paid for in a market economy currency, the Secretary normally
will use the price paid to the market economy supplier.” 19
C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1). The import of this provision is that,
when a respondent itself makes a market economy purchase of an
actual input, that price is to be preferred as the best available
information. Here, however, Changhong merely placed upon the
record a non-public invoice for a market economy purchase
consummated between strangers to plaintiff’s transactions.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 24
The Court has consistently sustained Commerce’s preference
for publicly-available information representative of the industry
norm. See Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. &
Exp. Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT __, __, slip. op. 04-109 at
12, (Aug. 20, 2004) (not published in the Federal Supplement)
(affirming Commerce’s selection of surrogate data because it
represented, inter alia, published, publicly-available data); see
also Peer Bearing Co., 25 CIT at 1217, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1307
(“Commerce’s goal is to use surrogate values that represent the
industry norm of the surrogate country, not company-specific
surrogate values. . . .”). The invoice submitted by Changhong is
representative only of the price paid by a single producer, and
has not been shown to be indicative of the entire industry. See
Zhejiang, 28 CIT at __, slip. op. at 12 (sustaining Commerce’s
decision to “reject the . . . price calculated from [the
processor’s] financial statement, on the grounds that the value
for [the subject merchandise] represents the value . . . as
experienced by a single processor [of the subject merchandise] in
a particular region of India.”). Commerce was, therefore,
justified in not considering plaintiff’s proffered data as
sufficient to constitute the best available information, when it
had available public information representing a range of prices
and transactions. See, e.g., See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 25
Comm. v. United States, 30 CIT __, __, slip. op. 06-94 at 8-9
(June 21, 2006) (not published in the Federal Supplement).
B. Commerce’s Determination to Disregard Certain Market
Economy Purchases from Korea and Thailand
The next issue before the court is whether Commerce erred in
disregarding Changhong’s market economy purchases of certain
inputs used in the production of its CTVs. In Changhong’s Third
Supplemental Response, it stated that it had purchased numerous
inputs from the market economy countries of Korea and Thailand,
and that therefore, prices paid for these inputs should be used
to value the factors of production. See Pl.’s Br. at 24 (citing
Supplemental Response, at Exhibit SD3-1). Although Commerce may
rely on surrogate values, its regulations provide that values
based on actual purchases made by a respondent from market-
economy suppliers, paid for in market economy currency, are to be
preferred in valuing the factors of production. See 19 C.F.R. §
351.408(c)(1). Thus, in its Preliminary Determination, Commerce
indicated that, in valuing inputs purchased from market economy
suppliers, in most circumstances, it would use the actual price
paid for these inputs. See Preliminary Determination, 68 Fed.
Reg. 66,807–08. Commerce also stated, however, that where it has
reason to believe or suspect that the price of an input is
subsidized, it would select a surrogate value rather than use a
price that might be distorted. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b. As a
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 26
result, in its calculations, the Department declined to use
Changhong’s market economy purchase prices for inputs purchased
from Korea and Thailand because it found that those countries
maintained broadly-available, non-industry specific subsidies.
See Issues & Decision Mem. at 36–37. In its Final Determination,
Commerce affirmed its position. See id. at 38 (stating that
Commerce will disregard market economy purchases where they were
made from “countries [that] maintain broadly-available, non-
industry-specific subsidies which may benefit all exports to all
export markets.”).
Changhong argues that in declining to use its purchases from
the market economy countries of Korea and Thailand in the
calculation of normal value, Commerce did not act in accordance
with the precedent of this Court, or Commerce’s own practices.
See Pl.’s Br. at 25–27. Specifically, Changhong argues that
Commerce may disregard purchases made in market economy countries
only if there is “particularized evidence showing that the prices
paid . . . have been distorted by subsidies,” and that the record
did not support such findings in this case. Id. at 25. In
support of this claim, plaintiff cites Fuyao Glass Industrial
Group Co., Ltd. v. United States, 27 CIT __, __, slip op. 03-113
(Dec. 18, 2003) (not published in the Federal Supplement)(“Fuyao
I”), and Fuyao Glass Industrial Group Co. v. United States, 30
CIT __, __ slip op. 05-06 (Jan. 25, 2005) (not published in the
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 27
Federal Supplement) (“Fuyao II”). Id. at 25-28.
The “reason to believe or suspect” standard first appeared
in the legislative history for 19 U.S.C. § 1677b, which states
that “in valuing such [nonmarket economy] factors, [Commerce]
shall avoid using any prices which it has reason to believe or
suspect may be dumped or subsidized prices.” See Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576 at
590 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1623.
In Fuyao II, the Court found that Commerce has a reason to
believe or suspect that an input may be subsidized if it can
demonstrate by specific and objective evidence that:
(1) subsidies of the industry in question
existed in the supplier countries during the
period of investigation (“POI”); (2) the
supplier in question is a member of the
subsidized industry or otherwise could have
taken advantage of any available subsidies;
and (3) it would have been unnatural for a
supplier to not have taken advantage of such
subsidies.
Fuyao II, 29 CIT at __, slip op. 05-6 at 10. Commerce purported
to apply this three-prong test in declining to use Changhong’s
market economy purchases. See Def.’s Resp. at 26 (“[I]n
accordance with Fuyao, Commerce placed upon the record
‘particular, specific, and objective evidence’ of generally-
available non-specific export subsidies that the Thai [and]
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 28
Korean . . . governments provide all exporters, regardless of the
product.”).
Commerce’s justification16 for excluding the market economy
purchases consists of selected portions of the Fuyao Glass Remand
Determination listing the export subsidy programs it found to be
available in Korea and Thailand: “For Korea the identified
programs include: Duty Drawback, Export Credit and Short-Term
16
Commerce also relied upon what it calls its general
policy, and a supporting memorandum, for disregarding subsidized
factor input prices from Korea and Thailand. See Issues &
Decision Mem. at 36–37; see also Def.’s Resp. at 25–27. In its
Issues and Decision Memorandum, Commerce stated that it has a
general policy of not including prices paid for inputs from Korea
and Thailand because it has reason to believe or suspect that
those countries maintain subsidy programs which distort export
price. See Issues & Decision Mem. at 36. As a basis for this,
Commerce pointed to a February 2002, memorandum entitled, “NME
Investigations: procedures for disregarding subsidized factor
input prices.” Id. Therein, Commerce stated the policy advising
that for “all non-market economy investigations, factor input
prices from Korea, [and] Thailand . . . should be disregarded . .
. . Each of these countries maintain broadly available, non-
industry specific export subsidies. In prior decisions, we have
found that the existence of these subsidies provides sufficient
reason to believe or suspect that export prices from these
countries are distorted.” Id. The policy relied upon by
Commerce includes general findings regarding broadly available,
non-industry specific export subsidies in the countries, but does
not explain the findings in any way.
The court notes that Commerce’s reliance on this general
policy in the context of a lawsuit is misplaced. This “general
policy” does not provide the court with the specific and
objective evidence necessary for Commerce to meet its burden.
Indeed, Commerce’s findings based on its policy appear to suffer
from the infirmities identified in Fuyao. See e.g., Fuyao II, 29
CIT at __, slip op. 05-6 at 22.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 29
Export Financing programs. For Thailand, the identified programs
include: Export Packing Credits, Duty Exemption for Raw
Materials, and Tax Certificate for Exporters subsidy programs.”
See Def.’s Resp. at 37 (citing Fuyao Glass Remand Redetermination
at 29–32)(indicating that “[b]ecause this list equally applies
here, we have placed it on the record of the instant
investigation.”) (internal citations omitted). A corresponding
memorandum is also referenced, in which Commerce provided a brief
description of each of the listed programs. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from Elizabeth Eastwood, Placing Information on the
Record Regarding Subsidy Programs In the Investigation of Certain
Color Television Receivers from the People’s Republic of China
(Apr. 12, 2004) (P.R. 544) (“Eastwood Memorandum”) at 29.17
17
An example of the information provided in Commerce’s
memorandum regarding the Korean subsidy program is presented in
full:
1) Korea
Among the many Korean subsidy programs
listed were Duty Drawback on Non-Physically
Incorporated Items and Excessive Loss Rates
(“Duty Drawback”), Export Credit Financing
from the Export Import Bank of Korea (“Korean
Export Credit”), and Short-Term Export
Financing.
The Duty Drawback subsidy program is
described in part, as: “The Government of
Korea establishes an authorized loss rate for
raw materials used in the manufacture of
exported goods. . . . The Government of Korea
reduces the amount of duty drawback received
on the exported product to account for the
sales of by-products produced from the excess
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 30
Assuming that Commerce is able, on remand, to satisfy
prong-1 of the Fuyao test, the court finds that Commerce has
provided sufficient evidence to meet prong-2 of the test, i.e.,
“the supplier in question is a member of the industry or
otherwise could have taken advantage of any available subsidies.”
See Fuyao II, 29 CIT at __, slip op. 05-6 at 10.
raw materials used in the production of
exported goods.”
The Export Credit program is described,
in part, as: “The National Investment Fund
(NIF), which was established by the
Government of Korea in 1973, is a source of
funds for banks to loan. NIF funds are used
to finance development or to finance exports
on a deferred payment basis . . . Because
the loans are contingent upon export and the
rates of interest charged are less than that
on comparable financing, these loans confer
benefits which constitute export subsidies.”
The Short-term Export Financing program
is described, in part, as: “Under Article 16
of the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control
Act (TERCL), a domestic person engaged in a
foreign currency earning business can
establish a reserve amounting to the lesser
of one percent of foreign exchange earnings
or 50 percent of net income for the
respective tax year. . . . This program
constitutes an export subsidy because the use
of the program is contingent upon export
performance.
See Eastwood Mem. at 29–30 (omissions in original). Similar
descriptions were also included for Thailand. See id. at 30–32.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 31
In the Eastwood Memorandum, Commerce pointed to record
evidence indicating that the programs listed were non-product
specific and non-industry specific. See Eastwood Mem. at 31, 32
(“None of these programs in any of these three countries are
specific to any particular type of product. . . . Further, each
of these programs are available to any company engaged in export
activities.”). The contents of the memorandum, i.e., the listed
subsidy programs and their description and corresponding
explanation, are sufficient to demonstrate that the supplier in
question could have taken advantage of available subsidies. In
other words, because the described subsidy programs were non-
industry specific, they fulfill the requirements of prong-two.
Although being generally available and non-industry specific
provides some support of Commerce’s reasonable belief or
suspicion that the inputs may be subsidized in the instant
matter, this information alone is insufficient to demonstrate the
specific and objective evidence that the inputs may have been
subsidized.
First, Commerce has failed to show that the subsidies
existed in the supplier countries during the period of
investigation, as is demanded by prong one. Instead, Commerce
has established the existence, at some point in time, of the
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 32
subsidy programs in the subject countries. With respect to
Korea, Commerce indicated only that certain of the subsidy
programs were established prior to the POI. See, e.g., id. at 30
(“The National Investment Fund (NIF) . . . was established by the
Government of Korea in 1973 . . . .”). No date information at
all was provided as to Thailand. Id. It is simply not
reasonable to assume that subsidy programs, once established,
exist in perpetuity. Because Commerce failed to indicate that
the subsidies existed during the October 1, 2002 - March 31, 2003
POI, it did not provide the specific and objective evidence
required under prong-one of the Fuyao test.
Second, the court finds that Commerce failed to establish
the third-prong of the Fuyao test. The third prong requires a
relatively minimal showing by Commerce, i.e., that it “would have
been unnatural for a supplier not to have taken advantage of any
available subsidies.” See Fuyao II, 29 CIT at __, slip op. 05-6
at 10. Previously, this Court has found this prong satisfied by
a showing of “the competitive nature of market economy
countries.” Id. at 24. Contrary to Commerce’s insistence,
however, the burden with respect to this finding is not on
plaintiff. See Def.’s Resp. at 25 (“[T]he burden shifts to the
respondent to demonstrate that the supplier did not take
advantage of those subsidies.”). Indeed, prong three of the
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 33
Fuyao test specifically requires that “Commerce must demonstrate
by specific and objective evidence that . . . it would have been
unnatural for a supplier to not have taken advantage of such
subsidies.” Fuyao II, 29 CIT at __, slip op. 05-06 at 10. In
the instant matter, Commerce has failed to do so.
Accordingly, the court finds that Commerce’s determination
not to include prices for inputs purchased by Changhong from
Korea and Thailand in the calculation of normal value, was
unsupported by substantial evidence. The court remands this
issue to Commerce with instructions to either use the prices for
inputs purchased from Korea and Thailand, or if it continues to
find that it has reason to believe or suspect that these prices
may be subsidized, to search the record for further probative
evidence; or to re-open the record and do a literature search18
to provide, if possible, additional evidence to support its
conclusions that: (1) the generally available subsidies were in
effect during the POI; and (2) it would be unnatural for a
supplier not to take advantage of these subsidies.
18
Commerce is not required to conduct a full-scale
investigation to determine that prices are subsidized. See Peer
Bearing Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT __, __ 298 F. Supp. 2d
1328, 1337 (2003)(“[T]he statute does not require Commerce to
conduct a formal investigation.”). Indeed, Commerce need only
conduct a search using the reference materials available to it.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 34
C. Commerce’s Computation of Financial Ratios
The next issue before the court involves Changhong’s
challenge to Commerce’s calculation of the financial ratios used
to determine normal value.
First, Changhong disputes Commerce’s removal of “Managerial
Remuneration” from the calculation of one of its relied upon
financial ratios. See Pl.’s Br. at 39. As previously discussed,
in constructing normal value in the NME context, Commerce
typically employs surrogate values. See § 1677b(c)(1). When
relying on surrogate values, Commerce calculates financial ratios
for the surrogate companies for the purpose of constructing
normal value.19 Id. In the Final Determination, Commerce
removed values for Managerial Remuneration from one of the
financial ratios’ denominators.20 See Pl.’s Br. at 39.
19
Once Commerce calculates these ratios, the results are
used in a formula aimed at deriving normal value. Specifically,
[f]inancial ratios are used to determine overhead, financial
and selling, general and administrative factors (“E”). The
denominator consists of the surrogate's material, labor, and
energy costs (“Y”). Consequently, if (1/Y x (surrogate
value)) = E, and (E + (surrogate value)) = normal value
(“NV”), then the greater Y is, the smaller NV becomes.
Anshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United States, 27 CIT __,
slip op. 03-83 at 15 n.5 (July 16, 2003) (not published in the
Federal Supplement).
20
In its Final Determination, Commerce also removed
certain values for “Sitting Fees to Directors,” and “Remuneration
to Directors.” See Final Determination Factors Mem. at Attachment
(continued...)
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 35
Changhong challenges the adjustment to Managerial Remuneration on
two separate grounds. Id.
Plaintiff initially claims that Commerce erred by failing to
refer to the source from which it derived the subtracted amount.
Id. at 39-40 (Commerce has not indicated “where in any of the
schedules the value can be found to have been reported.”). It
insists that Commerce’s “adjustment for Managerial Remuneration
does not appear in any of the schedules, the [surrogate]
company’s income statement, statement of cash-flows, or balance
sheet. Instead, Commerce appears to have plucked the value from
a table . . . .” Id. at 39–40.
Changhong further insists that Commerce made the adjustment
but “provided no justification for why the total value . . . was
subtracted from the calculation [of the financial ratio].” Id. at
20
(...continued)
5 (BPL calculation) (P.R. 545); see also Pl.’s Br. at 39.
Changhong, however, does not contest the source of the value
used for the adjustment to Director’s Remuneration. Rather, it
states that “Commerce identified the removal of the line item for
director’s remuneration and referred to the particular schedule
where the . . . value [used] was obtained.” See Pl.’s Br. at 39.
This action taken by Commerce is precisely what Changhong
maintains as error with respect to managerial remuneration.
Similarly, Changhong does not dispute the adjustment to
“Sitting Fees to Directors.” See id. at 39-40.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 36
40. In other words, Changhong maintains that Commerce provided
no explanation for the amount of its adjustment.
Finally, Changhong alleges that Commerce’s calculation of
its financial ratios resulted in double-counting. See id. at
39–40. Plaintiff asserts that Commerce’s calculation does not
properly reflect that “gross remuneration for certain of the
[surrogate] companys’ management may include items such as
certain managers’ compensation as members of [the surrogate
companys’] board of directors.” Id. at 40. Because “at least
three” of the surrogate companys’ managers also sit on the board
of directors, Changhong insists that “it is likely” that the
value for total executive compensation used by Commerce
erroneously “includes not only managerial pay, but also
director’s pay.” Id. This, Changhong maintains, “represents a
double counting of total executive compensation.” Id.
Commerce’s sole argument in opposition to Changhong’s claims
is that it is too late in raising its objections. Thus,
it disagrees with plaintiff’s characterization of its
allegations. See Def.’s Resp. at 31-33. The Department contends
that Changhong is not attacking its methodology, but rather is
raising ministerial errors in the application of its methodology.
Id. at 33. Commerce insists that any adjustments made (or not
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 37
made) to its calculations were due to inadvertent clerical
errors. Id. Accordingly, it maintains that, because plaintiff’s
claims were not raised at the agency level, they were waived.
See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d))21 (“Changhong chose not to
object to the deduction of managerial remuneration from labor, or
raise how managerial remuneration could overlap with directors’
remuneration or sitting fees, as a ministerial error.”).
A ministerial error is “an error in addition, subtraction,
or other arithmetic function, clerical error resulting from
inaccurate copying, duplication, or the like, and any other
similar type of unintentional error which the Secretary considers
ministerial.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.224(f) (2004); see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671d(e). The Federal Circuit has defined the term “clerical
error” to be an error that “by [its] nature [is ] not [an] error
in judgment but merely [an] inadvertenc[y].” NTN Bearing Corp.
v. United States, 74 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Were all
of plaintiff’s challenges related solely to ministerial error
claims, they should have been raised within a reasonable time at
the agency level. Any such claims not raised within a reasonble
time during the investigation would be waived. See generally
IPSCO Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
21
“[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where
appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”
28 U.S.C. § 2637(d).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 38
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 144
(1987) (“This provision allows for the correction of ministerial
errors in final determinations within a limited time period after
their issuance. . . . [As such, the court finds that] appellant
did not raise the alleged error within a reasonable time after
the original final determination.”).
To the extent that Changhong objects to Commerce’s failure
to provide the source from which it derived the subtracted
amount, it makes a clerical, and thereby ministerial error claim.
See 19 C.F.R. § 351.224(f). Indeed, Commerce’s failure to point
to the table or schedule reflecting the subtracted value is
properly viewed as an inadvertency. Because Changhong did not
raise this claim within a reasonable time, it was waived pursuant
to 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(f).
Changhong, however, does not take issue solely with
Commerce’s clerical errors; it additionally claims that Commerce
provided no rationale for excluding certain values from the
ratios, and that double counting may have been included in
Commerce’s remuneration calculation. The court finds that both
of these objections go to the methodology22 employed by Commerce,
22
It is possible that plaintiff’s double counting claim
could have been corrected as a ministerial error at the agency
(continued...)
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 39
and thus are not waived. See Hebei Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp.
Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT __, __, slip. op. 04-88 at 18
(July 19, 2004) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (“With
regard to the methodology Commerce uses to resolve an issue, the
exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable where a respondent did not
have the opportunity to challenge the methodology because
Commerce failed to articulate the methodology . . . .”). In the
first instance Changhong claims error in Commerce’s failure to
explain why it made the adjustments; and secondly, Changhong
contests Commerce’s methodology itself, i.e., why it took action
that might lead to double counting. Both of these claims involve
a challenge to Commerce’s judgment. As such, Changhong’s
challenges are not to ministerial errors, but to Commerce’s
methodology. Because these claimed errors were first raised in
its Motion for Judgment Upon Agency Record, Changhong had no
opportunity to challenge them at the administrative level and so
it is proper for this Court to hear them. See Carpenter
Technology Corp. v. United States, 30 CIT __, slip op. 06-134
(Sept. 6, 2006) (not published in the Federal Supplement).
It is apparent that Commerce has not articulated its
22
(...continued)
level. However, since Commerce makes no effort to explain its
actions, the court finds that they were the result of its
methodology.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 40
methodology with respect to the calculation of the financial
ratios. The United States Supreme Court has “frequently
reiterated that an agency must cogently explain why it has
exercised its discretion in a given manner.” See Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48
(1983). Accordingly, the issue of financial ratios is remanded
to Commerce with instructions to clearly set forth the
methodology used in the Final Results, and to justify its
conclusions. See Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 737
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
D. Commerce’s Determination Not to Exclude Values for
Small Quantities of Imports
In its Preliminary Determination, with the exception of two
inputs,23 Commerce valued respondents’ factors of production,
using import statistics published by the MSFTI. Following the
publication of the Preliminary Determination, Changhong claimed
that, in calculating the average values from the MSFTI, Commerce
departed from its long-standing practice of omitting those import
values that were reported either: (1) in small quantities; and/or
(2) at aberrational prices. See Changhong Case Brief at 27–28
(“[T]he Department should remove from its import data any
23
As has been previously discussed, Commerce valued 25-
inch CPTs and Speakers using import data from Infodriveindia.
See Preliminary Determination, 68 Fed. Reg. at 66,808.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 41
aberrational unit values . . . and should remove . . . any import
values that are imported in such small quantities . . . .”). In
its Final Determination, Commerce stated that it is not its
normal practice to “automatically exclude imports of small
quantities of merchandise from the calculation of surrogate
values.” See Issues & Decision Mem. at 30. Rather, “the
Department’s practice is to exclude only data that is deemed to
be distortive.” Id. Thus, Commerce agreed that it should remove
from its calculations data representing aberrational values, but
declined to remove values “merely because certain of the
underlying import quantities were small.” Id. at 31. Commerce
then re-examined the surrogate value data on the record to
determine if any of the values cited by the respondents in their
case briefs appeared to be aberrational. As a result of this
examination the Department excluded from its calculations,
certain values used in the Preliminary Determination. See id.
With respect to Changhong’s small quantities claim, in its
Issues and Decision Memorandum, Commerce stated that its practice
has not been to exclude all small quantity purchases, but rather
“to exclude only data that is deemed distortive.” Id. at 30. The
Department then points to several determinations illustrating its
adherence to this methodology. See Id. at 30 (citing Notice of
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value Saccharin
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 42
From the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,530, cmt. 1
(Dep’t of Commerce May 20, 2003)); see also Issues and Decision
Memorandum for the Administrative Review of Heavy Forged Hand
Tools from the People’s Republic of China at Comment 11,
accompanying Heavy Forged Hand Tools from the People’s Republic
of China, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,026 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 17,
2001)(final results). Indeed, the Court has previously approved
Commerce’s established practice “to disregard small-quantity
import data when the per-unit value is substantially different
from the per-unit values of the larger quantity imports of that
product from other countries,” and thereby distortive. See
Shakeproof Assmebly Components Div. Of IL Tool Works, Inc. v.
United States, 23 CIT 479 485, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (1999)
(citing Heavy Forged Hand Tools, Finished or Unfinished , With or
Without Handles, from the People’s Republic of China, Final
Administrative Reviews, 62 Fed. Reg. 11813 (Mar. 13, 1997);
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or
Unfinished, from Romania, Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,194 (July 11, 1997)).
While Changhong asserts that Commerce has a practice of excluding
small quantity purchases from its import data, it has pointed to
nothing to prove its case. Thus, it is apparent that, despite
plaintiff’s arguments, Commerce has not had a longstanding
practice of omitting import values merely because they were the
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 43
product of a small quantity of imported goods.
In a related claim, plaintiff challenges Commerce’s
methodology on the basis that it was internally inconsistent with
its policy with respect to actual market economy purchases. See
Pl.’s Br. at 35. Specifically, Changhong argues that Commerce’s
inclusion of inputs purchased in small quantities in the
calculation of surrogate values is inconsistent with its
exclusion of Changhong’s actual small-quantity purchases from
market economies. Id. at 33–35. Commerce insists, however, that
there is a distinction between a price obtained from a surrogate
country that is used to value a factor of production, and the
price actually paid by a NME producer to procure a factor of
production from a market economy supplier. Commerce states that
it employs a different methodology in each of these
determinations, and thus, that its behavior is not internally
inconsistent.
As has been previously noted, where Commerce values a factor
of production using a surrogate value, it is its practice to
disregard only small quantity values, that are aberrational in
price. See generally Luoyang Bearing Corp. v. United States, 28
CIT __, __ 347 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1353. Where the Department
values a factor of production using actual market economy
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 44
purchases, however, its practice is to disregard purchases that
are not large enough to be representative of the NME producer’s
purchases of the input during the POI. According to defendant,
such distinct treatment is reasonable because, with respect to a
respondent’s market economy purchases, there is greater potential
for manipulation of import data by a respondent. See Defendant-
Intervenors’ Resp. Br. (“Def-Int.’s Resp.”) at 34 (“Such a policy
is reasonable. First, as a practical matter, in a market
setting, small volume purchases would not generally reflect true
commercial values . . . and therefore it is appropriate to
disregard these transactions. These values for small volume
purchases of self-selected market economy purchases could be
manipulated by respondent.”).
The court finds that Commerce’s behavior is not internally
inconsistent because it is based on separate methodologies, i.e.,
when seeking a surrogate value, Commerce disregards insignificant
purchases that are distortive; when using actual prices paid it
excludes small quantity purchases as possible subjects of
manipulation. Moreover, these two separate methodologies are the
past practice of the Department, and have each been upheld as
such by the Court. See Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. Of IL
Tool Works Inc., v. United States, 24 CIT 485, 491, 102 F. Supp.
2d 486, 492 (2000), aff’d, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 45
Next, Changhong maintains that even if Commerce is allowed
to include small volume imports in its surrogate analysis, it
failed to revise fully its surrogates to adjust for all
aberrational values. See Pl.’s Br. at 35-37. Specifically,
Changhong objects to the inclusion of “five transformers valued
at Rs. 29,000 . . . 20 kilograms of varnish valued at Rs. 29,000"
from New Zealand, and “other surrogate values,” which it believes
are aberrational. Id. at 37.
With respect to this claim, the court finds that because
Changhong failed to raise its objection when alleging ministerial
errors following the Final Determination it has waived its
objection. See IPSCO, 965 F.2d at 1061–62. Changhong and other
respondents specifically complained of Commerce’s inclusion of
aberrational small-quantity imports following the Preliminary
Determination. Upon reviewing these objections, in its Final
Determination, Commerce removed certain aberrational values from
its calculation of several surrogate values. These revisions
were published in Attachment 2 of its Final Factors Memorandum,
and made available to all parties. Following the Final
Determination, IBEW, TCL Corp., and Konka Group Co. Ltd., made
ministerial error allegations concerning calculation of surrogate
values, and where appropriate, Commerce corrected these errors.
Changhong too had the opportunity to challenge the inclusion of
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 46
these quantities at the administrative level, but made no
objection. Indeed, Changhong itself indicates that it was aware
of what it considered to be errors by Commerce following the
publication of the revisions. See Pl.’s Br. at 37 (“[A] review
of Commerce’s revision reveals that . . . Commerce failed to make
several required changes to its surrogate values.”).
Unlike its claims with respect to Commerce’s calculation of
financial ratios, here, plaintiff’s complaint relates to a
ministerial error. That is, Changhong complains about Commerce’s
failure to make, what it considers to be, required changes.
Thus, is alleges ministerial errors. The court finds that
Changhong failed to avail itself of the opportunity to raise its
objection within a reasonable time, and therefore has waived its
objections. See IPSCO, 965 F.2d at 1061–62. Accordingly, the
court will not entertain Changhong’s claim that Commerce failed
to fully revise its surrogates to adjust for all aberrational
values.
E. Commerce’s Valuation of Changhong’s Electricity
Utilization
The court next addresses whether substantial evidence
supports Commerce’s valuation of electricity. In its Preliminary
Determination, Commerce valued Changhong’s electricity
utilization based upon data from the International Energy
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 47
Agency’s Key World Energy Statistics 2002 Report (“IEA Report”),
adjusted24 for the POI. See Preliminary Factors Valuation Mem.
at 5. Following the preliminary determination, Changhong placed
on the record, data obtained from the all-India average
electricity rate tariff published by the Power & Energy Division
of the Government of India’s Planning Commission (“P&ED Report”).
See Changhong Jan. 28, 2004 Factor Values Submission at 6. In
its case brief, Changhong argued that Commerce should rely on the
P&ED Report because it: (1) was an official government source
that has been published on a continuous basis for fourteen years;
(2) covered the fiscal year 2001 through 2002; and (3) had been
relied upon by Commerce in multiple recent administrative reviews
and investigations. See Changhong Case Br. at 29. In its Final
Determination, Commerce declined to use the P&ED Report average
tariff because it found that “this tariff does not represent the
best information available on the record of this investigation
because it is not an actual consumption rate, but rather is an
estimated or ‘AP’ (i.e., annual plan) rate.” Issues & Decision
Mem. at 31. Instead, Commerce based its surrogate value for
electricity on the 2000-01 Revised Estimate average rate (“RE”)
for industrial consumption published in the IEA Report. See id.
24
Commerce revised the reported price [[
]] See Preliminary Factors Valuation Mem. at 5, &
Attachment 7.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 48
Changhong argues that the Department’s decision to value
electricity based upon the IEA Report, instead of the P&ED
Report, was flawed. See Pl.’s Br. at 42–43. First, Changhong
insists that Commerce “failed to take into account deficiencies
in the IEA Report,” including that its data was not
contemporaneous with the POI. Id. at 42, 43 (“Commerce departed
from its normal practice by relying upon surrogate factors that
are not contemporaneous with the period under review.”).
In support of its decision to use the IEA Report, Commerce
states that “[t]he Department consulted a World Bank economist
with respect to the differences between ‘AP’ [Annual Plan Rate
proposed by Plaintiff] and ‘RE’ [Revised Estimate]. According to
the World Bank economist . . .[the IEA Report] figures tend to be
closer to the actuals as they contain adjustments to AP [Annual
Plan] figures [found in the P&ED Report] prepared the year
before.’” See Placement of Information on Record Re: Surrogate
Value (Apr. 12, 2004 Surrogate Value for Electricity Mem.) at ¶
IV. Based on the economist’s description, the Department
determined that the IEA Report 2000-01 rate was “more reliable”
than the P&ED Report 2001-02 rate because it updated the
estimated rate with actual usage information. See id. Thus,
Commerce weighed the non-contemporaneity of the IEA Report data
against the evidence indicating that its data was more accurate,
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 49
and determined that the non-contemporaneity failed to overcome
the evidence that the IEA Report was the best available
information. Id. (citing administrative review of persulfates
from the PRC, for the proposition that the revised estimate were
preferable to the annual plan); see also Def.’s Resp. at 37 (IEA
Report data is the best available information “even though the
annual plan [P&ED Report data] was contemporaneous with the
period of review.”).
Commerce has pointed to record evidence indicating a greater
accuracy of the data contained in the IEA Report, i.e., that the
data was more accurate because it updated the estimated rate with
actual usage information. Because the selected information
appears to be more accurate, it cannot be said that Commerce was
unreasonable in choosing it over a more contemporaneous, but less
accurate alternative.
Next, plaintiff maintains that the IEA Report is further
flawed because Commerce “did not abide by its statutory
requirements [in] utiliz[ing] a ‘fully-loaded’ tax-inclusive
electricity price in calculating normal value for Changhong’s
merchandise.” Pl.’s Br. at 43. Specifically, Changhong contests
the use of the data on the basis that “Commerce failed to note
the fact that the Indian electricity pricing that it collected
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 50
from the IEA Report included various taxes and surcharges.” Id.
In earlier determinations, Commerce has expressed a
preference to use surrogate price data which is . . . tax
exclusive. See Taiyuan Heavy Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United
States, 23 CIT 701, 711 (1999) (not published in the Federal
Supplement). The Court, however, has recognized Commerce’s
practice to remove sales and excise taxes from its calculation of
normal value only “when there is an affirmative indication of
their presence.” Taiyuan, 23 CIT at 711 (emphasis added). To
supply this affirmative indication, Changhong states that
“[a]ccording to Footnote (g) of the IEA printout, the electricity
for industry pricing is tax exclusive for only Australia and the
United States.” See Pl.’s Br. at 43 (citing Preliminary Factors
Mem. at Attachment 7) (emphasis added). An examination of
footnote (g), however, reveals no evidence, specific or
otherwise, reflecting that the IEA value for electricity is tax
exclusive for Australia and the United States. Rather, any
information regarding tax inclusion/exclusion is absent from the
cited source. See Prelim. Factors Mem. at Attachment 7
(reflecting data concerning HS Codes, product description,
quantity, value, AUV, [average unit value] unit, foreign port and
country). As such, Changhong has failed to point to specific
evidence showing an “affirmative indication” that the IEA Report
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 51
surrogate values included tax. Commerce’s decision not to deduct
taxes from the surrogate values, therefore, is in accordance with
law. See Taiyuan, 23 CIT at 711 (“Since plaintiff did not
present information about a specific surrogate value containing
excise and sales tax, Commerce’s decision [not to deduct taxes
from its surrogate value] is based on substantial evidence and
otherwise is in accordance with law.”). Accordingly, Commerce’s
surrogate valuation of electricity is sustained.
II. Defendant-Intervenors’ Challenges
The court next turns to the issues presented for review in
one of the consolidated cases, IBEW v. United States. In their
complaint, IBEW, IUE-CWA, and Five Rivers LLC, the defendant-
intervenors, contest various aspects of Commerce’s Final
Determination. See Compl. of 07/30/04 (“Def.-Int.’s Compl.).
A. Commerce’s Negative Critical Circumstances
Determination
On October 16, 2003, IBEW alleged that critical
circumstances existed. A finding of critical circumstances
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e), is an emergency measure to
“provide prompt relief to domestic industries suffering from
large volumes of imports, or a surge over a short period in,
imports.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-317 at 63 (1979). Following its
investigation, Commerce published its preliminary affirmative
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 52
finding that dumping had occurred, and its preliminary
affirmative determination of critical circumstances. See
Preliminary Determination, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,800, 66,808–10.
Because of the affirmative critical circumstances determination,
Commerce ordered Customs to “suspend liquidation of all imports
of subject merchandise from the PRC entered . . . on or after 90
days prior to the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register.” Id. at 66,810; see also 19 U.S.C. §
1673b(e)(2).25 Thus, the suspension applied retroactively to
entries made from August 30, 2003 through November 27, 2003.
In the Final Determination, however, Commerce found that
critical circumstances did not exist and therefore issued a
negative determination on that issue. See Final Determination,
69 Fed. Reg. 20,594. Commerce then instructed Customs to
terminate the retroactive suspension of liquidation of entries.
Thereafter, defendant-intervenors filed their complaint
contesting the negative critical circumstances determination.
See Def.-Int.’s Compl. ¶¶ 9-13.
On August 30, 2004, defendant-intervenors filed a consent
25
Pursuant to § 1673b(e)(2), if Commerce determines that
affirmative critical circumstances exist, Commerce may order a
retroactive suspension of liquidation, applicable to imports of
subject merchandise, made 90 days prior to the publication of the
preliminary determination.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 53
motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the liquidation of
entries of CTRs produced or exported by Changhong. Defendant-
intervenors did not, however, contemporaneously file a motion for
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The next day, Changhong26
and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) each filed consent motions
to intervene; which motions were granted, respectively, on
September 8th and 9th, 2004. On September 2, 2004 defendant-
intervenors filed an amended motion for preliminary injunction,
but again made no request for a TRO. On September 9, 2004,
Changhong filed its opposition to the motion for preliminary
injunction. Wal-Mart filed its motion contesting the motion for
preliminary injunction on September 14, 2004. On October 25,
2004, the court, sua sponte, issued an order temporarily
enjoining Customs from “making or permitting liquidation of any
unliquidated entries of certain color television receivers, as
defined in the scope of the United States Department of
Commerce’s antidumping duty order on certain color television
receivers from the People’s Republic of China . . . entered by
Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., from August 30, 2003 through May
31, 2005. . . .” See TRO of 10/25/2004. On February 11, 2005,
following Oral Argument, the court issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining Commerce and Customs from “causing or
26
Changhong’s motion was filed prior to the consolidation
of the member cases addressed herein. See generally Order of
09/19/2005.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 54
permitting liquidation of the entries” made “on or after August
30, 2003 through May 31, 2005 . . . which remain unliquidated” as
of the date of service of the order. See Prelim. Inj. Order of
02/11/05.
There is controversy, however, as to the effect of the
injunction because the United States insists that the entries at
issue were deemed liquidated by operation of law, prior to the
issuance of either the TRO or the preliminary injunction. See
Def.’s Resp. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. J. Ag. Rec. (“Def.’s 04-270 Resp.”)
at 18. That is, defendant claims that the suspension of
liquidation occasioned by the affirmative preliminary
determination of critical circumstances, ceased upon the
publication of the negative final determination. As a result,
Commerce contends that on October 16, 2004, six months after the
April 16, 2004 Final Determination publication date, the entries
were liquidated by operation of law pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1504(d), and that the court’s October 25, 2004 TRO and February
11, 2005 preliminary injunction had no effect on the already
liquidated merchandise. See id. at 18; see also Prelim. Inj.
Order of 02/11/05. Thus, the Department contends that defendant-
intervenors’ challenge to Commerce’s negative critical
circumstances determination is moot. See Def.’s 04-270 Resp. at
17–19.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 55
Liquidation is the “final computation or ascertainment of
the duties . . . accruing on an entry.” 19 C.F.R. § 159.1; see
also Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345–46
(Fed. Cir. 1995). In most circumstances, Commerce will order
Customs to liquidate entries within one year of the date of entry
or withdrawal of the subject merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. §
1504(a). There is, however, a statutory provision specifically
directing deemed liquidation (liquidation by operation of law),
if certain criteria are met. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).
Section 1504(d) provides that, except in circumstances not
relevant here,27
When a suspension [of liquidation] required by statute
or court order is removed,28 the Customs Service shall
liquidate the entry . . . within 6 months after
receiving notice of the removal from the Department of
Commerce . . . . Any entry . . . not liquidated by the
Customs Service within 6 months after receiving such
notice shall be treated as having been liquidated at
the rate of duty . . . at the time of entry . . . .
19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). Thus, this section directs the deemed
liquidation of unliquidated entries six months after the order
27
Specifically, “unless liquidation is extended under
subsection (b) [the provision allowing for extension by request,
for good cause shown, by the importer of record] of this section
. . . .” See § 1504(d).
28
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(2)(A), if Commerce’s
final determination is negative, Commerce must terminate the
suspension of liquidation required by § 1671b(d)(2).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 56
suspending liquidation has been removed. Id. For this deemed
liquidation to occur, however, certain criteria must be met: “(1)
the suspension of liquidation that was in place must have been
removed; (2) Customs must have received notice of the removal of
the suspension; and (3) Customs must not liquidate the entry at
issue within six months of receiving such notice.” Koyo Corp. of
U.S.A. v. United States, 29 CIT __, __, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1308 (2005) (citing Fujitsu v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). Pursuant to § 1504, if these criteria are
met, the entry is liquidated at the entered rate six months after
the suspension order is removed.29 See § 1504(d) (stating that
entries meeting the requirements of this subsection “shall be
treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value,
quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of entry by the
importer of record.”).
Unsurprisingly, defendant-intervenors disagree with
Commerce’s position that the entries were liquidated by operation
of law and that their claims with respect to critical
29
At oral argument, counsel for defendant-intervenors
argued that if this court finds that the subject entries are
deemed liquidated, the court should, nonetheless, order
liquidation at “the bonding rate of 57 percent.” Oral Arg.
Trans. at 58. The court finds that, having found the entries to
be deemed liquidated, § 1504(d) clearly directs that the entries
be liquidated at the “rate of duty . . . asserted at the time of
entry by the importer of record.” § 1504(d).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 57
circumstances are moot. Defendant-intervenors argue that “the
court has jurisdiction to hear this claim because the preliminary
injunction currently in place prevented liquidation of the
entries regardless of whether the liquidation would be through
actual liquidation or liquidation by operation of law.” Pl.’s
Reply Br. Supp. Pl.’s R. 56.2 Mot. J. Ag. Rec. (“Def.-Int.’s
Reply”) at 2. Thus they contend that “the court-ordered
injunction prevents the liquidation of these entries regardless
of the type of liquidation. That is, the injunction prevents the
actual liquidation of these entries and prevents liquidation of
these entries by operation of law.” Def.-Int.’s Reply at 4. The
court finds defendant-intervenors’ argument unconvincing.
The TRO issued on October 25, 2004, halted the liquidation
of unliquidated entries from that date forward. In like manner,
the preliminary injunction entered on February 11, 2005, by its
terms, had no effect on entries liquidated before the date of its
issuance. See Prelim. Inj. Order of 02/11/2005 (“This Order
applies to any and all of the following entries. (1) Entries . .
. that were; (2) entered . . . on or after August 30, 2003
through May 31, 2005; and (3) remain unliquidated . . . after the
date on which this order is . . . served.”) (emphasis added).
This is the case whether liquidation is made by action of the
Customs Service or by operation of law. Because defendant-
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 58
intervenors did not make an application for a TRO when they filed
their motion for a preliminary injunction, no order was entered
to stop the impending deemed liquidation. Therefore, on October
16, 2004, pursuant to § 1504(d), the entries were deemed
liquidated – not by some action of the Customs Service, but
rather by statute.30 See Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United
States, 30 CIT __, __, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, slip. op. 04-00608
at 4 (August 10, 2006) (finding that “without an injunction
[covering the unliquidated entries] liquidation means an
interested party will forever lose its statutory right to
challenge an administrative review.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
The preliminary injunction, upon which defendant-intervenors
rely, cannot undo the deemed liquidation of the subject entries.
Once liquidation occurs, it moots the underlying agency decision
because “the statutory scheme does not authorize this court to
30
The TRO enjoining liquidation was not issued until
after the expiration of this date, i.e., on October 25, 2004, and
was entered sua sponte. See TRO. This TRO was a measure taken
by the court, and covered all “unliquidated” entries. Id. At
the time of issuance, however, the entries at issue here had been
liquidated by operation of law, and thus were outside the purview
of the order.
Although the entries are deemed liquidated by operation of
law as of October 16, 2004, pursuant to the preliminary
injunction, the United States has not performed the ministerial
functions related to that liquidation. Nonetheless, the entries
have been deemed liquidated.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 59
order a reliquidation of entries once they are liquidated . . .
.” Chr. Bjelland Seafoods A/S v. United States, 19 CIT 35, 46
slip. op. 95-5 (Jan. 18 1995)(not published in the Federal
Supplement). Indeed, “the statutory scheme has no provision
permitting reliquidation and once liquidation occurs, a
subsequent decision by the trial court on the merits . . . can
have no effect on the dumping duties assessed on [subject]
entries.” Mitsubishi Elecs. Am. v. United States, 18 CIT 167,
180, 848 F. Supp. 193, 203 (1994)(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 710 F.2d 806, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983))(internal
quotations omitted).
In the instant matter, the entries at issue meet the
requirements of § 1504(d) and therefore, were liquidated by
operation of law. The April 16, 2004 publication of Commerce’s
negative final determination removed the suspension of
liquidation resulting from the preliminary affirmative
determination. See Final Determination 69 Fed. Reg. at 20,597
(“[B]ecause we find that critical circumstances do not exist . .
. we will instruct the CBP [Customs & Border Protection] to
terminate the retroactive suspension of liquidation . . .
instituted due to the preliminary affirmative critical
circumstances finding.”); see also Int’l Trading Co v. United
States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[t]he date of
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 60
publication provides an unambiguous and public starting point for
the six-month liquidation period . . . .”). During this six-
month period, Customs did not liquidate the entries at issue.
Accordingly, this court finds that the entries at issue were
liquidated by operation of law on October 16, 2004, six months
from the date of publication of the notice of removal of the
suspension of liquidation order.
Because of this deemed liquidation, the court concludes that
any dispute over Commerce’s negative critical circumstances
determination is moot. See Gerdau Ameristeel, 30 CIT at __, __
F. Supp. 2d at __, slip. op. 04-00608 at 2 (Aug. 10, 2006)
(“Because all of the subject entries at issue have been
liquidated this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter.”).
Mootness has been described as “the doctrine of standing set in a
time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at
the commencement of litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness).” United States Parole
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). “Simply stated, a case is moot when the
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court has held that “liquidation renders moot any
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 61
pending court challenge to the underlying agency determinations
regarding those entries . . . .” Chr. Bjelland Seafoods, 19 CIT
at 46. It has long been settled that a federal court has no
authority “to give opinions upon moot questions . . . .” Church
of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); see also
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). Accordingly,
defendant-intervenors’ challenge to Commerce’s negative critical
circumstances determination in its Final Determination is
dismissed as moot.
B. Valuation of 29-inch CPTs
In its Preliminary Determination, Commerce valued
Changhong’s production of 29-inch CPTs using import data reported
on Infodriveindia. See Preliminary Determination, 68 Fed. Reg.
66,808. In its Final Determination, however, Commerce found that
it was no longer appropriate to value CPTs using this data based
on its examination of information relating to Changhong’s market
economy purchases of CPT’s. See Issues & Decision Mem. at 52,
56. At verification, Commerce confirmed that Changhong purchased
a significant quantity of CPTs from Mexico, a market economy
country, approximately three weeks after the POI. Thus, in the
Final Determination, Commerce valued the 29-inch CPTs using
Changhong’s market economy purchases. Id. at 56.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 62
Defendant-intervenors contend that in the Final
Determination, the “Department inexplicably amended the value
assigned to Changhong’s consumption of 29-inch, curved color
picture tubes in the preliminary determination. See Def.-Int.’s
Mem. at 28. They argue that the Department committed error in
relying on post-POI purchases and, in doing so, deviated from
“Commerce’s longstanding policy of not relying on . . . purchases
. . . that occur outside of the POI.31 Id.
Plaintiffs’ contentions are without merit. First, unlike
Changhong’s claims concerning contemporaneity, infra, here there
is no question as to the actual dates of the transactions. In
31
In its reply, defendant-intervenors contend that the
“Department has an established practice of not relying on an NME
producer’s purchases from market economy suppliers that occur
outside of the POI . . . .” Def.-Int.’s Reply at 16. Although
defendant-intervenors maintain that Commerce “has discussed this
approach and applied it in numerous cases,” they point to only
one example: Certain Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields
from the People’s Republic of China, 67 Fed. Reg. 6482, 6485
(Dep’t Commerce Feb. 12, 2002)(final determination). Id. This
determination is not on point. Although, in that investigation,
Commerce indicated that “consistent with its practice,” it would
continue not to use market economy inputs “if they are
insignificant or purchased outside of the period of
investigation” the matter itself did not involve pre- or post-POI
inputs. 67 Fed. Reg. at 6485. Instead, the issue there was
whether the purchase of market economy inputs was “meaningful.”
See e.g., Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that the “factors of production for domestically
purchased merchandise may be obtained by extrapolating the market
economy import price only when a ‘meaningful amount of
merchandise is imported.”).
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 63
addition, while preferring information that is contemporaneous
with the POI, Commerce also has a longstanding preference for
using prices paid by NME producers for inputs purchased from a
market economy country. See Sparklers from the People’s Republic
of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,588, 20,590 (ITA May 6, 1991)(final
determination)(listing in preferential order, information used to
value factors of production in NME cases: “(1) prices paid by the
NME manufacturer for items imported from a market economy; (2)
prices in the primary surrogate country of domestically produces
or imported materials . . . .”); see also Oscillating Fans and
Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg.
55,271 (1991) (final determination) (“Where an input was sourced
from a market economy country and paid for in a market economy
currency, we have used the actual price paid for the input in
calculating FMV.”). Indeed, when valuing factors of production
in an NME country, like China, “[t]he cost for raw materials from
a market economy supplier, paid in convertible currencies,
provides Commerce with the closest approximation of the cost of
producing the goods in a market economy country.” Lasko Metal
Prods. v. United States, 16 CIT 1079, 1081, 810 F. Supp. 314, 317
(1992).
In determining which value to base its final determination
upon, Commerce had two options: (1) value factors of production
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 64
using surrogate import values during the POI; or (2) value
factors based upon actual market economy purchases made by
respondent approximately three weeks outside of the POI. In its
Issues and Decision Memorandum, Commerce explained why it no
longer found it appropriate to base the value for 29-inch CPT’s
on data from Infodriveindia. See Issues & Decision Mem. at 56.
Commerce indicated that “at verification we examined information
related to Changhong’s market-economy purchases of this input
from Thomson Mexico.” Id. As a result, the Department
determined that the market economy purchases represented “a
significant quantity of Changhong’s overall purchases of this
input, and thus found that they were significant” and
consequently “meaningful” as is required by law, and the
Department’s practice. See Issues and Decision Mem. at 56;
accord Shakeproof, 268 F3d at 1382. Thus, Commerce took into
account the circumstances of the purchases, i.e.,: (1) the volume
of the purchase; (2) that the supplier was a market economy
entity; and (3) that the purchase was in market economy currency.
See id. at 55. Given Commerce’s justifiable preference for
market economy purchases, it determined that these aspects
overcame the fact that purchases were modestly outside of the
POI.
It is apparent that no fault can be found with the
Department’s choice of market prices when valuing 29-inch CPTs.
Consol. Court No. 04-00265 Page 65
Commerce properly preferred the post-POI, market economy
purchases over NME import data within the POI. That these
purchases were slightly outside the POI cannot be said to
materially diminish their reliability.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the court sustains in
part, and remands in part, Commerce’s Final Results. Commerce’s
remand results are due on December 13, 2006, comments are due on
January 12, 2007, and replies to such comments are due on January
23, 2007.
/s/ Richard K. Eaton
Richard K. Eaton, Judge
Dated: September 14, 2006
New York, New York