United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1236
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EDILIO BENJAMIN-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 20-1295
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOHANNI BALBUENA-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Casper, District Judge.*
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Mariángela Tirado-Vales for appellant Edilio Benjamin-
Hernandez.
German A. Rieckehoff for appellant Johanni Balbuena-
Hernandez.
Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief,
for appellee.
September 21, 2022
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HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Following a lengthy period of
pretrial detention, appellants Edilio Benjamin-Hernandez
(Benjamin) and Johanni Balbuena-Hernandez (Balbuena) were
convicted on multiple charges stemming from a conspiracy to
transport cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. They
now argue that the district court should have dismissed the
indictment against them and that the evidence presented at trial
cannot sustain their convictions. Benjamin also lodges two
evidentiary challenges. But their panoply of claims falls short,
and we affirm their convictions.
I.
Benjamin and Balbuena were first indicted in November
2015 on multiple charges of conspiracy and importation of
controlled substances. Following hearings in December, both were
detained pending trial. Superseding indictments adding new co-
defendants followed in March and July of 2016.
The parties engaged in extensive motion practice, with
Benjamin and Balbuena together filing more than forty pretrial
motions. Balbuena eventually filed over two years later a motion
to dismiss the indictment based on alleged violations of both the
Speedy Trial Act ("STA") and the Sixth Amendment. Benjamin joined
this motion, which the court denied, finding no STA or
constitutional violation in the length of the challenged period of
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detention. In June 2018, the court set Benjamin and Balbuena's
cases for joint trial the following October.
During the four-day trial, the government presented
evidence supporting its theory that Benjamin and Balbuena had
transported drugs from the Dominican Republic aboard a yawl, which
they ultimately abandoned near the shore in Vega Baja, Puerto Rico,
when detected by local law enforcement. A jury convicted Benjamin
and Balbuena of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at
least five kilograms of cocaine, and of aiding and abetting the
importation of at least five kilograms of cocaine.1 Following the
verdict, Benjamin and Balbuena each filed renewed motions for
acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c),
which the court denied.
On appeal, Balbuena, joined by Benjamin, challenges the
district court's denial of their motion to dismiss. Balbuena and
Benjamin also argue that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support their convictions. In addition, Benjamin
raises two evidentiary challenges. We address each claim in turn.
1 The jury also convicted Benjamin of improper entry as a
noncitizen and Balbuena of unlawful reentry as a removed
noncitizen. Neither appellant challenges these convictions on
appeal.
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II.
A. Speedy Trial Act
"The STA provides generally that, upon motion, an
indictment must be dismissed if the defendant's trial has not
commenced within 70 days from the latter of the return of the
indictment or the defendant's first appearance before a judicial
officer." United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)). But "[t]his 70-day limit is not
absolute," and certain periods of time may be excluded. Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)). "If a defendant is not brought to
trial" within the required time limit, "the information or
indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant."
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
Typically, we review a "denial of a statutory speedy
trial claim de novo as to legal rulings, and for clear error as to
factual findings." United States v. Irizarry-Colón, 848 F.3d 61,
65 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d
599, 616 (1st Cir. 2015)). But "a defendant can waive or forfeit
a claim of error in the application of the Act by failing to timely
raise the claim in the district court," thereby limiting our
review. United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021)
(citing United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.
2012)), pet. for cert. filed, No. 21-1313 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2022).
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Balbuena argues that his initial appearance on
November 23, 2015, started the seventy-day clock, which ran until
he filed his motion to dismiss on March 6, 2018. This totaled 834
days, "of which only 503 days were properly excluded." But
Balbuena's claim hits a threshold problem: his motion before the
district court challenged only the period between his initial
appearance on November 23, 2015, and May 4, 2016, the day that the
case was transferred to a new judge following the original judge’s
retirement. "[W]e do not go hunting for nonexcludable time;
exclusions of time not specifically challenged in the district
court are waived on appeal." United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797
F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Gates, 709 F.3d at 67-68); see
United States v. Souza, 749 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2014). We thus
limit our analysis of Balbuena's challenge to the specific
timeframe that he raised before the district court.
The STA excludes "reasonable period[s] of delay when the
defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the
time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been
granted." United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6)). "The
Supreme Court has interpreted this section to mean that the clock
does not, in effect, begin to run until the date of the most recent
defendant's initial appearance before the court." Id. (citing
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n.2 (1986)); see
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also United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 2001)
("[T]he time line for the last defendant joined usually becomes
the time line for all defendants."). Here, defendants were
indicted in a second superseding indictment on July 20, 2016, which
also charged several new co-defendants. Accordingly, the district
court found that "the 70-day clock remained tolled until at least
the last co-[d]efendant's triggering event, namely [the last co-
defendant's] arraignment on February 1, 2017." This meant that
"there was no violation of the STA’s 70-day limit" within the time
frame challenged by Balbuena because the clock effectively did not
start until February 2017.
Balbuena now argues that "he was not 'joined for trial'
within the meaning" of the STA with the co-defendants added in the
second superseding indictment because, ultimately, he was tried
with only Benjamin. Balbuena also argues that the district court
failed to make a reasonableness finding before concluding that the
second superseding indictment tolled the clock. But Balbuena
failed to preserve these arguments because he did not raise them
before the district court. See Rockwood v. SKF USA Inc., 687 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) ("Our case law is clear that 'arguments not
raised in the district court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.'" (quoting Sierra Club v. Wagner, 555 F.3d 21, 26 (1st
Cir. 2009))). At most, we can review for plain error, see
Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th at 5-6, but Balbuena "makes no attempt to
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show how his . . . claim[s] satisf[y] the demanding plain-error
standard -- his brief fails to even mention plain error, let alone
argue for its application here." United States v. Cruz-Ramos, 987
F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2021).2 That failure definitively waives
these arguments and denies us the opportunity to consider them
further.
B. Sixth Amendment Violation
When the government violates a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment "right to a speedy and public trial[,]" the
criminal charges against the defendant "must be dismissed." United
States v. Lara, 970 F.3d 68, 80 (1st Cir. 2020) (first quoting
U.S. Const. amend. VI and then quoting United States v. Dowdell,
595 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2010)), cert. denied sub nom. Williams
v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2821 (2021). "To assess whether a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right has been violated, we consider
four factors: (1) 'the length of delay'; (2) 'the reason assigned
by the government for the delay'; (3) 'the defendant's
responsibility to assert his right'; and (4) 'prejudice to the
defendant, particularly "to limit the possibility that the defense
2It may be possible that, in the context of the STA, arguments
not raised before the district court are waived on appeal, rather
than forfeited, thereby preventing even plain error review. See
Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 41; Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th at 5-6. But,
because Balbuena has waived plain error review, the present case
does not require resolution of that question.
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will be impaired."'" Id. (quoting United States v. Handa, 892
F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2018)).
We typically apply the abuse of discretion standard to
a district court's resolution of a defendant's motion to dismiss
based on a Sixth Amendment violation. See United States v.
Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2021). But "there is some
debate about whether" this is the appropriate standard, and
Balbuena asserts that we should review his constitutional claim de
novo. Id. at 15, n.6. Since, for the reasons discussed below,
Balbuena's claim fails under either standard, we may sidestep this
issue for now.
Considering the first factor, "[d]elays of around a year
or longer are presumptively prejudicial," and the district court
correctly found that the roughly thirty-three month delay that
Balbuena and Benjamin experienced weighed in their favor. Lara,
970 F.3d at 81.3
The "second factor concerns the explanation for the
delay" and is the focal point of our inquiry. Id. at 82 (quoting
Souza, 749 F.3d at 82). The district court found that the second
factor "weigh[ed] heavily against Defendants" given the complexity
of the case, numerous pretrial motions (including 43 filed by
3 The district court denied the motion to dismiss in late
August 2018 and the appellants' trial began roughly a month and a
half later, bringing the total delay between their arrest and trial
to approximately thirty-four and a half months.
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Balbuena and Hernandez), lack of any evidence indicating bad faith
by the government, and circumstances out of the parties' control,
including the Hurricane Maria natural disaster and the
unavailability of Balbuena's first counsel due to illness. We
agree that the reasons for the delay described by the district
court, which the record supports, "weigh against a finding of [a]
Sixth Amendment violation." Casas, 425 F.3d at 34; see id. at 33-
34 (noting defendants' filing of numerous pretrial motions and
lack of allegations of bad faith by the government, and explaining
that "the joint prosecution of defendants involved in the same
drug trafficking conspiracy is justified as a means of serving the
efficient administration of justice"); see also Lara, 970 F.3d at
82 (explaining that lack of "evidence that the delay was a product
of bad faith or inefficiency on the government's part" weighed
against finding a Sixth Amendment violation); United States v.
Worthy, 772 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that delay
attributable to "the number of defendants, the multiplicity of
motions and events . . . , and the complexity of the case" did not
violate the Sixth Amendment).
As for the third factor, the district court correctly
found that the undisputed fact that defendants had asserted their
speedy trial right on multiple occasions weighed in their favor.
See Casas, 425 F.3d at 34.
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Turning to the final factor, the court explained that
defendants had not demonstrated "undue pressures" aside from their
lengthy period of detention. "[W]e have previously 'recognized
three types of prejudice: "oppressive pretrial incarceration,
anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the
accused's defense will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of
exculpatory evidence."'" Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 17 (quoting
Lara, 970 F.3d at 82-83). Balbuena asserts that during his
pretrial detention his "anxiety reached such levels that he became
antagonistic and upset" and he "lost faith in his attorney."
Balbuena further argues that he was taken "away from his family
and country and deprived of the opportunity to work" and "was
forced to endure the terrible conditions resulting from Hurricane
Maria while deprived of his liberty." We do not doubt the
challenging nature of Balbuena's time in pretrial detention,
particularly during Hurricane Maria. But Balbuena has not
identified "undue pressures" that go "above and beyond the
'considerable anxiety [that] normally attends the initiation and
pendency of criminal charges,' as [is] necessary to show
prejudice." Worthy, 772 F.3d at 49 (first alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Maxwell, 351 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir.
2003)); see also Carpenter, 781 F.3d at 615 ("While [defendant]
argues convincingly that he has suffered great stress throughout
the proceedings, he does not demonstrate why his anxiety was
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greater than that suffered by many other defendants, other than
that it continued longer." (citing United States v. Colombo, 852
F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1988))).
Balbuena also argues that the length of his detention
alone renders it presumptively prejudicial. Balbuena did not
clearly raise this argument before the district court and thus
likely waived it. See Arrieta-Gimenez v. Arrieta-Negron, 859 F.2d
1033, 1037 (1st Cir. 1988). In any event, his argument falls
short. Balbuena cites Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647
(1992), and our opinion in RaShad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.
2002). But the delays in those cases were significantly longer
than the one here. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 650 (eight and a half
years between indictment and arrest); RaShad, 300 F.3d at 36 (five
years and eight months delay between indictment and trial). In
RaShad, moreover, we noted "that the presumption is [n]either
automatic or inexorable" but rather kicks in only "[i]n aggravated
cases, involving grossly excessive delay." 300 F.3d at 34, 42.
And we have repeatedly looked for actual prejudice in cases where
the delay exceeded the length of the delay here. See, e.g.,
Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 18. We therefore decline to depart
from the "general rule" that "the defendant bears the burden of
alleging and proving specific ways in which the delay attributable
to the [government] unfairly compromised his ability to defend
himself." RaShad, 300 F.3d at 34.
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Applying that general rule, the district court concluded
that Balbuena and Benjamin's "lengthy pretrial detention [gave]
cause for concern," but nevertheless found that the balance of the
factors did not show that appellants' speedy trial rights had been
violated. The district court's observation that the length of
their pretrial detentions was concerning cannot be gainsaid. The
length of time the defendants spent in detention while awaiting
trial is deeply unsettling. No one should assume that, in the
proper case, with a defendant alert to his rights, this or any
other of our cases countenance a holding that the Constitution
accepts pretrial detention of virtually any length for people
waiting to have their day in court. Cf. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th
at 18–19 (explaining this court's concern with the government's
practice of "monolithically process[ing] 'mega-cases'" that result
in some defendants -- presumed innocent -- waiting incarcerated
for years while the trial court resolves codefendants' pleas and
motions); Shon Hopwood, The Not So Speedy Trial Act, 89 Wash. L.
Rev. 709, 739 (2014) (arguing that "[d]elay is a federal
prosecutor's friend" because it increases "the chance a prosecutor
has to flip a co-defendant into a cooperating witness").
But the district court's ultimate conclusion here falls
within the limits permitted by our cases, and the absence of both
bad faith on the part of the government and particularized
prejudice to the appellants persuades us that no Sixth Amendment
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violation occurred here. See, e.g., Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 18
(explaining that "defendants' five-year wait for trial" was
gravely concerning but nevertheless did not violate the Sixth
Amendment where it was counterbalanced by defendants'
"contributions to the pretrial delays" and failure to show "how
their ability to mount an adequate defense was hampered by the
delay"); Casas, 425 F.3d at 36 (holding that forty-one months in
pretrial detention did not violate the Sixth Amendment given "the
large and complex nature of the proceedings and the district
court’s obligation to consider the multitude of pretrial matters
filed by appellants and their co-defendants").
C. Sufficiency challenges
Balbuena and Benjamin next challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting their convictions. We review de novo the
denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United
States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11, 15 (2019). "[W]e must affirm unless
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
could not have persuaded any trier of fact of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (alteration in original)(quoting
United States v. Gómez-Encarnación, 885 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir.
2018)); see also United States v. Davila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2012).
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1. Evidence in the record defeats Balbuena's sufficiency
claim
Balbuena acknowledges the following evidence against
him: 1) that he was "found in the general vicinity of the vessel
and controlled substances," specifically in an abandoned, wooded
area, where he was found wet, sandy, and agitated; 2) Balbuena's
statement to a DEA agent that he was "there to pick up . . . the
stuff you have there," which the agent took as a reference to the
cocaine that the agents had seized; and 3) the testimony of a
cooperating coconspirator who stated that Balbuena was present
when he dropped off five kilograms of cocaine that the
coconspirator understood was to be transported to Puerto Rico in
a vessel, and which he later heard arrived in Puerto Rico but was
"abandoned" near Vega Baja. This evidence notwithstanding,
Balbuena argues that "there simply was no evidence that he ever
participated in the planning of the drug transfer or importation"
or "that he was in the presence of drugs," and therefore "the
government cannot possibly establish that [he] ever had
constructive or knowing possession of the cocaine."
Balbuena "undervalues the evidence against him." United
States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). Without even
considering any of the numerous additional pieces of evidence that
the government identifies, the evidence acknowledged by Balbuena
himself is enough to sustain his convictions. See, e.g., United
States v. Ríos-Ortiz, 708 F.3d 310, 316 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding
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evidence that defendant prepared food delivery orders for prison
which were found to contain drugs was sufficient "circumstantial
evidence to demonstrate the existence of an agreement to distribute
controlled substances"); Meises, 645 F.3d at 12 ("The testimony of
a single witness can be enough to support the government's case,
and even the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may suffice
'to establish the facts underlying a defendant's conviction.'"
(internal citations omitted)).
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, this is not, as Balbuena argues, a mere presence
case. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d
367, 371 (1st Cir. 2015) ("We have said repeatedly that mere
presence alone 'is insufficient to prove knowing possession of
narcotics.'" (quoting United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 923
(1st Cir. 1991))). Rather, all three pieces of evidence "support
the inference" that Balbuena "had knowledge of the crime." Id.
Balbuena's sufficiency claim thus fails.
2. Benjamin waived his sufficiency claim
In his brief to this court, Benjamin begins his
sufficiency argument by summarizing the government's evidence. He
then states that "[a]s it will be argued in the next section,
[this] evidence . . . is insufficient to support and sustain the
conviction." But the next section of Benjamin's brief discusses
the district court's alleged evidentiary errors, and Benjamin
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never returns to his sufficiency argument. By failing to develop
this argument, Benjamin has waived it. See Acevedo-Garcia v.
Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 561 (1st Cir. 2003).4
D. Evidentiary challenges
Finally, Benjamin argues that the district court made
two evidentiary errors: a) admitting unauthenticated telephone
recordings, and b) allowing inappropriate opinion testimony by
Agent Irvin Robert García-Martínez, a law enforcement agent with
the National Directorate of Drug Control in the Dominican Republic.
We review preserved objections to evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 335 (1st
Cir. 2019). Unpreserved objections receive plain error review,
"which is -- by design -- extremely hard to establish." United
States v. Galíndez, 999 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2021); see also
United States v. Pabon, 819 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2016).
Benjamin raises his argument about the authentication of
the telephone recordings for the first time on appeal. Our review
is thus limited to plain error. But Benjamin does not argue plain
error; "he does not anywhere cite the four-factor test or attempt
4 A generous reading of Benjamin's brief could take this
section to mean that, without the telephone recordings and opinion
testimony that Benjamin challenges later in his brief, the
government's evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
But even taking that evidence out of the picture, Benjamin's
sufficiency challenge would fail for the same reasons that
Balbuena's fails.
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to establish its . . . factors," and has thus waived this claim.
Pabon, 819 F.3d at 34; see also Cruz-Ramos, 987 F.3d at 40.
Benjamin's objection to Agent García's testimony fares
no better. Benjamin raises "general grievances" with the testimony
but fails to identify any specific portion of it as problematic.
United States v. Belanger, 890 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2018). In a
footnote, Benjamin does cite a five-page section of the trial
record where he objected to Agent García's testimony. Even if
this was sufficient to preserve this claim on appeal, our own
unaided review of those five pages reveals one statement that
perhaps Benjamin has in mind in alleging improper overview
testimony, where the agent testified, apparently from background
knowledge of the investigation, that Benjamin had used a different
phone number not identified by law enforcement to contact another
person about a proposal to act as drug courier. But, as the
government notes, any error in permitting this testimony was
clearly harmless given the evidence against Benjamin. See United
States v. Flores-de-Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The
admission of improper testimony is harmless if it is 'highly
probable that the error did not influence the verdict.'" (quoting
United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 121 (1st Cir. 2004))).5
5 Threaded into Benjamin's discussion of Agent García's
testimony are statements that 1) Agent García's testimony was not
truthful, and 2) Agent García's testimony was "an attempt by the
government to bolster the credibility of" a cooperating
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, Benjamin and Balbuena's
convictions are affirmed.
codefendant who testified after Agent García. To the extent that
these statements can be considered additional claims outside of
Benjamin's general objection to Agent García's overview testimony,
they are waived for lack of development. See Acevedo-Garcia, 351
F.3d at 561.
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