IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-20144
_____________________
WILNA BURR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TRANSOHIO SAVINGS BANK,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
December 28, 1995
Before KING, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Wilna Burr appeals the district court's order dismissing
without prejudice her slip-and-fall negligence claim against
TransOhio Savings Bank ("TransOhio"), TransOhio Federal Savings
Bank ("TransOhio Federal"), the Resolution Trust Corporation (the
"RTC") as receiver for both banks, TransCapital Financial
Corporation ("TransCapital"), and Omni Mortgage Services
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of
opinions that merely decide particular cases on the basis of
well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the
public and burdens the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule,
the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published.
Corporation ("Omni"). The district court, in an order devoid of
reasons, dismissed the case without prejudice. For the reasons
assigned we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 13, 1992, at the Comfort Inn Greensboro (the
"Inn"), in Greensboro, North Carolina, Wilna Burr tripped and
fell headfirst down a flight of stairs, allegedly sustaining
severe and disabling injuries. At the time of Burr's accident,
TransOhio was a record titleholder to the property, having
acquired the Inn via foreclosure approximately one year earlier.
Four months after Burr's accident, on July 10, 1992, TransOhio
was declared insolvent, the RTC was appointed as receiver for
TransOhio, and TransOhio Federal was chartered. On July 15,
1992, a notice to the creditors of TransOhio was published in THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, specifying October 20, 1992, as the last
date to file claims against TransOhio with the RTC.
On March 14, 1994, Burr filed a lawsuit in Texas state court
against TransOhio and TransOhio Federal, and under an alter-ego
theory, against TransCapital and Omni. Claiming that the
defendants were negligent in failing to maintain safe premises at
the Inn, she sought to recover money damages for her injuries.
The case was removed to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas on April 14, 1994. On June 14, 1994,
Burr was notified by the RTC that TransOhio had been declared
insolvent, that the RTC had been appointed receiver, and that
2
there was a deadline for submitting a claim against TransOhio.
On August 12, 1994, Burr filed her Proof of Claim against
TransOhio with the RTC. On September 16, 1994, TransOhio Federal
was closed and the RTC was appointed as receiver. Burr was
notified of this closure on October 5, 1994, when the RTC
informed Burr that the deadline for her to file a claim against
TransOhio Federal was December 30, 1994.
In a motion filed on December 6, 1994, the RTC moved the
district court to dismiss all claims against all defendants--
TransOhio, TransOhio Federal, TransCapital, and Omni. The RTC
argued that, under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),2 the district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims filed
against TransOhio and TransOhio Federal until Burr had exhausted
her administrative remedies. The RTC further argued that there
was no viable cause of action against TransOhio Federal,
TransCapital, and Omni because none of these entities owned the
Inn at the time of Burr's accident--TransOhio Federal was not
even chartered until three months later.
In a response filed December 21, 1994, Burr contended that,
rather than dismissing her pending law suit, the district court
should merely suspend it until the RTC administrative process had
run its course. As to ownership of the Inn, Burr asserted that
2
Congress enacted FIRREA to remedy problems it perceived
in the existing regulatory scheme in the savings and loan
industry. The RTC was established by FIRREA to act as a
conservator and receiver of failed financial institutions. See
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1)(A), et seq.
3
Certificates of Insurance indicated that TransCapital was at
least partially involved in its ownership, operation, or control
at the time of the accident. Burr requested that the court deny
the RTC's motion to dismiss in order to permit the parties to
conduct discovery regarding ownership of the Inn. Also on
December 21, the District Court granted the motion of the RTC--in
its capacity as receiver--to be substituted as defendant in place
of TransOhio and TransOhio Federal. Burr filed her Proof of
Claim against TransOhio Federal with the RTC, in a letter dated
December 30, 1994.
In its reply to Burr's response, filed January 5, 1995, the
RTC reiterated its subject matter jurisdiction argument, and
additionally asserted that Burr's claim failed because it had
been filed in an inappropriate venue. The district court
declined to grant Burr any of the relief she requested. Instead,
deciding that the RTC's motion to dismiss was "well taken," the
district court dismissed Burr's lawsuit in its entirety without
prejudice. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper
venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted are premised on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6), respectively. FED. R. CIV. P.
12. The standard of review for improper venue dismissals under
Rule 12(b)(3) is a narrow one. The reviewing court reverses only
4
upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Beardon v. United States,
320 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922
(1964). However, we review the district court's dismissals under
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) de novo. See Musslewhite v. State
Bar of Texas, 32 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that de
novo review is proper for 12(b)(1) dismissal), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2248 (1995); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 28
F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that de novo review is
proper for 12(b)(6) dismissal). Insofar as a dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) is concerned, we accept the allegations of the
complaint as true, and we do not affirm the district court's
dismissal unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21
(5th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Burr contends that the district court erred in dismissing
any of her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
relevant date for determining whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is the date on which the complaint is filed. Carney
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 19 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1994). In
this case, the district court determined that, under FIRREA, it
could not obtain jurisdiction over Burr's claim because at the
5
time that Burr filed her complaint the RTC already had been named
as receiver for TransOhio.
Congress created a claims determination procedure in FIRREA
that is designed to allow the RTC and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC")3 to deal expeditiously with
failed depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3). After
the RTC has been named as receiver for a failed institution, a
claimant against the institution is required to present her claim
to the RTC before pursuing a judicial remedy. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(3) & (5). The RTC has 180 days to determine whether to
allow or disallow the claim. Id. No court can acquire subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim until the claimant exhausts
her remedies under this accelerated administrative procedure. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); Meliezer v. Resolution Trust Co., 952
F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1992).4 However, in the event that the
RTC denies her claim or does not act on it within 180 days, the
claimant has 60 days to request administrative review or to file
suit in district court. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).5 Moreover,
3
FIRREA provides that the powers attributed to the FDIC
in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1822, and 1823 are applicable to the RTC.
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4).
4
The "Resolution Trust Company" referred to in Meliezer
is the Resolution Trust Corporation established by 12 U.S.C. §
1441a(b)(1)(A), et seq.
5
§ 1821(d)(6)(A) reads in pertinent part:
Before the end of the 60-day period . . . [the claimant
may] file suit on such claim (or continue an action
commenced before the appointment of the receiver), in the
district or territorial court of the United States for the
district within which the depository institution's principal
6
if the district court acquired subject matter jurisdiction before
the RTC was appointed as receiver, it continues to have
jurisdiction over the claim, albeit subordinated for a time to
the administrative procedure of the RTC.6 "Courts will retain
jurisdiction over pending lawsuits--suspending, rather than
dismissing, the suits--subject to a stay of proceedings as may be
appropriate." Carney, 19 F.3d at 956 (quoting Marquis v. FDIC,
965 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1992)).
In FIRREA, Congress has attempted to strike a fair balance
between the expedient resolution of claims and the protection of
creditor's interests. As we have pointed out:
Congress intended to establish a scheme for fairly
adjudicating claims against failed financial institutions.
It did not structure a system for the sandbagging of valid
claims. The statute is not to be used as an easy means of
avoiding consideration of claims on their merits. As
demonstrated by the special provisions governing pre-
receivership suits, Congress had the rights of claimants in
mind when it enacted FIRREA. RTC may not distort the
provisions designed to facilitate the processing of claims into
a tool for subverting the right of claimants to present their
claims on the merits.
place of business is located or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (and such court shall
have jurisdiction to hear such claim).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).
6
FIRREA provides, inter alia, that the filing of a claim
"with the receiver shall not prejudice any right of the claimant
to continue any action which was filed before the appointment of
the receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii) (emphasis added).
It appears clear to us, on a careful reading of § 1821(d)(6)(A)
and the foregoing passage, that the district court continues to
have jurisdiction over claims brought before the RTC is appointed
receiver. Carney, 19 F.3d at 955-96.
7
Whatley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 905, 909-10 (5th Cir.
1994). If the RTC makes no attempt to timely communicate with a
claimant or transmits confusing and contradictory information,
the purpose of FIRREA is frustrated.7 To the extent that Burr
has conscientiously attempted to invoke the proper procedures for
asserting her claim--expending time, money, and energy in the
process, her rights should be protected. Whatley, 32 F.3d at
908-10.
It is uncontroverted that Burr filed her claim after the RTC
had been appointed receiver for TransOhio but before the RTC was
appointed receiver for TransOhio Federal. As such, the district
court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over the
TransOhio claim.8 Under Rule 12(b)(1), Burr's claim against
7
On July 15, 1992, the RTC published notice in THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER that the bar date for filing claims
against TransOhio would be October 20, 1992. After Burr filed
suit in Texas, the RTC, in a letter dated June 14, 1994, informed
her that it had been appointed receiver and that she was required
to "present [her] claims, together with proof, to the Receiver by
August 9, 1993 [sic]." A second notification letter, dated June
23, 1994, stated that:
[a]ny claim not presented to the Receiver . . . on or
before September 21, 1994 will be barred. . . .
[But, n]otwithstanding the present letter, the
Receiver will not and does not extend the period for filing
claims against [TransOhio] past the Original Bar Date
[October 20, 1992] set forth in the previously published
notice.
8
The district court could acquire jurisdiction over
Burr's claim only after Burr had exhausted her remedies under the
RTC's accelerated administrative procedure. Apparently, while
this appeal was being pursued, the RTC denied Burr's request for
administrative relief, thereby exhausting her remedies under the
accelerated administrative procedure. Because she failed to
exercise either of her two options--to request RTC administrative
review or to file a claim in the district court--before the end
8
TransOhio was properly dismissed.9 In contrast, subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim against TransOhio Federal was vested
in the district court from the moment Burr filed suit. Because
of the 60-day period following the disallowance, she has "no
further rights or remedies with respect to" her TransOhio claim.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B).
To preserve the TransOhio claim, it was incumbent on Burr to
take some action, in addition to filing this appeal, before the
expiration of the 60-day period following the administrative
ruling because the district court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the TransOhio claim before the receivership. We agree with
those courts that have held that "12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B)
requires some timely formal affirmative action" to prevent waiver
of a party's rights in a claim. First Union Nat. Bank v. Royal
Trust Tower, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 1564, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Where the original action was filed after receivership, a
judicial appeal alone would be insufficient because, as we noted
in Carney, "a claimant could not 'continue' an action that should
have been dismissed." Carney, 19 F.3d at 955 (emphasis added)
(discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F) which provides that filing
an RTC claim "shall not prejudice any right of the claimant to
continue any action which was filed before the appointment of the
receiver"). Burr's TransOhio claim should have been, and
properly was, dismissed.
9
Despite the fact that she filed her claim against
TransOhio after the RTC was appointed receiver, Burr argues that
the district court should have acquired subject matter
jurisdiction over her TransOhio claim because at the time she
filed she was unaware of the receivership. In Meliezer, we held
that exhaustion of RTC administrative remedies is a precondition
to subject matter jurisdiction in a district court, with or
without notification. Meliezer, 952 F.2d at 882-83 (holding that
alleged noncompliance by the RTC with the requirement of 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(C)(ii) to mail creditors notice of the
statutory bar date for filing claims with the receiver did not
relieve claimant of obligation to exhaust administrative
remedies). Moreover, in this regard, contrary to Burr's attempt
to distinguish Meliezer from the case at bar, we discern no
significant difference between notice of the bar date and notice
of the fact that a receivership has been declared. As we noted
in Meliezer, the Supreme Court has indicated that "it would be
most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to
observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action,
especially when important public rights are at stake." Meliezer,
952 F.2d at 883 (quoting Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253,
260 (1986)).
9
the TransOhio Federal claim had been filed before the RTC
receivership, the claim was merely suspended when the RTC was
appointed receiver for TransOhio Federal. The district court
retained continuing jurisdiction and the timely appeal of the
district court's dismissal served to satisfy the requirements of
§ 1821(d)(6)(B). By appealing the dismissal order before the
lapse of the specified 60-day period, Burr effectively
"continue[d] an action commenced before the appointment of the
receiver."
We conclude that the district court never acquired subject
matter jurisdiction over Burr's TransOhio claim but that
jurisdiction over the TransOhio Federal claim was ongoing. As to
the TransCapital and Omni claims, there has been no assertion
that these defendants are insured depository institutions in
receivership and under the purview of FIRREA. Therefore, the
district court has had continuing subject matter jurisdiction
over TransCapital and Omni from the time Burr filed her claim.
B. Venue
The RTC insists that under FIRREA it is not enough that Burr
continued her claim against TransOhio Federal within the
prescribed time limit. The statute stipulates that, after
administrative review, a suit must be filed or continued either
in the district in which the bank's principal place of business
is located or in the district court for the District of Columbia.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A). TransOhio and TransOhio Federal are
10
based in Ohio. Consequently, the RTC argues, because Burr's suit
was brought in the Southern District of Texas it must fail.
Although the RTC characterizes its argument in terms of both
venue and jurisdiction, we have pointed out that the requirements
of this provision "are treated as venue, rather than
jurisdictional, requirements." Matter of 5300 Memorial
Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d 1160, 1163 (5th Cir. 1992); see also,
Karol v. Resolution Trust Corp., 839 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.3 (E.D.
Tex. 1993); Vinton v. Trustbank Sav., F.S.B., 798 F. Supp. 1055,
1065 (D. Del. 1992) (determining that § 1821(d)(6)(A) is a
special venue provision, notwithstanding use of the term
"jurisdiction").
We conclude that the district court should not have
dismissed Burr's claim against TransOhio Federal and the RTC on
the basis of improper venue. Despite the broad discretion
afforded a district court on issues of venue, we find that
dismissal of Burr's action for improper venue was an abuse of
discretion. Where it is in the interest of justice, Title 28 of
the United States Code stipulates that a district court shall
transfer a case that has been filed in the wrong district. 28
U.S.C. 1406(a); ACF Indus., Inc. v. Guinn, 384 F.2d 15, 20 (5th
Cir. 1967). Rather than dismissing it, the district court must
transfer the case to a district in which it could have been
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
If by reason of the uncertainties of proper venue a mistake
is made, Congress, by enactment of § 1406(a), recognized
that 'the interest of justice' may require that the
complaint not be dismissed but rather that it be transferred
11
in order that the plaintiff not be penalized by . . . 'time-
consuming and justice-defeating technicalities.'
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962).
We instruct the district court, on remand, to transfer
Burr's claim against TransOhio Federal and the RTC to a district
that is proper under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(3)(A) and
1821(d)(6)(A).10 Otherwise Burr would be time-barred from
initiating another action against both TransOhio and TransOhio
Federal. Given that the "functional purpose of 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) is to eliminate impediments to the timely disposition of
cases and controversies on their merits," such a result would
not serve the interests of justice. Minnette v. Time Warner, 997
F.2d 1023, 1027 (2nd Cir. 1993).
C. Failure to State a Claim
The RTC argues that, as to TransOhio Federal, TransCapital,
and Omni, Burr "states no claim or cause of action upon which
relief can be granted." Framed in this way, their argument
raises a 12(b)(6) issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The RTC
supported its motion to dismiss with copies of deeds to the
Comfort Inn Greensboro recorded in North Carolina. In cases
where the district court has considered material extraneous to
10
Under §§ 1441a(l)(3)(A) and 1821(d)(6)(A), venue for a
claim against TransOhio Federal and the RTC would be proper only
in Washington D.C. or in the Northern District of Ohio--the
district in which TransOhio Federal's principal place of business
was located. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(3)(A) and 1821(d)(6)(A). The
parties have treated all defendants as a group insofar as venue
is concerned, and we do not decide any venue issue as to
TransCapital and Omni.
12
the pleadings, "an appellate court may review the lower court's
decision as one for summary judgment, even if the court
mislabeled it as a 12(b)(6) dismissal." Jackson v. Procunier,
789 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1986). The district court did not
expressly state its grounds for dismissal. In spite of the fact
that the district court dismissed the action "without prejudice,"
thereby suggesting that the dismissal was a subject matter
jurisdiction dismissal as to all defendants, both the RTC and
Burr address the district court dismissal, in part, as if it were
a 12(b)(6) summary judgment. However, summary judgment is a
final adjudication on the merits. Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168,
170 (5th Cir. 1991); Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639
F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S.
669 (1987). Dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a
claim is also a decision on the merits. Persyn v. United States,
935 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1991); Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist.
836 F.2d 921, 940 (5th Cir. 1988). Because the district court
dismissed all of Burr's claims without prejudice and because
there was no motion for summary judgment filed, we find that the
district court did not treat the RTC's motion for 12(b)(6)
dismissal as a motion for summary judgment.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be
granted "only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
him to relief." Matter of United States Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d
556, 559 (5th Cir. 1994). Such a dismissal is disfavored in the
13
law and rarely granted. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.
v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). A complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted where the pleadings are
inadequately framed or where the law does not afford relief on
the basis of the facts alleged. Walker v South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that a pleading setting forth a claim for
relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a). There are two grounds on which pleadings may be found to
be inadequately framed: failing to provide notice of the
circumstances giving rise to the claim; or failing to "set forth
sufficient information to outline the elements of [the] claim or
to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist."
Walker, 904 F.2d at 277 (quoting 5 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1216 (1969)). The RTC invokes the second of these two
grounds by arguing that Burr failed to state a claim against
TransOhio Federal, TransCapital, and Omni because none of these
defendants owned the Comfort Inn Greensboro at the time of Burr's
accident.
An innkeeper has a duty to protect his guests against
unreasonable risk of physical harm. Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722
F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing the general rule as set out
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)). Burr alleged
that, in the course of owning, operating, or controlling the
14
Comfort Inn Greensboro, the defendants--TransOhio, TransOhio
Federal, TransCapital, and Omni--negligently failed to provide
her with safe premises. Burr linked TransOhio to TransCapital
and Omni via an alter-ego theory of liability, asserting that:
[T]hese Defendants are sham corporate structures who
failed to follow corporate formalities and, as such,
the act of one is the act of the other and their
corporate identity should be disregarded. Further,
Plaintiff would show that the management and operation
of these Defendants are assimilated to the extent that
the subsidiaries are simply a name or conduit through
which the parent conducts its business so that the
corporate fiction should be disregarded.
We find that the statement of Burr's claim satisfied the
requirements of Rule 8(a). The pleading did not need to outline
all the elements of her claim. Walker, 904 F.2d at 277. As long
as it is possible to draw an inference from Burr's complaint that
the necessary elements existed, her claim will not fail as
inadequate. Id. It does not appear beyond doubt that Burr can
prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle
her to relief. Therefore, we conclude that Burr's complaint
should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Burr's
claim against TransOhio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
but we REVERSE the district court's dismissal of the claims
against TransOhio Federal, the RTC, TransCapital, and Omni for
15
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and the
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and we
REMAND with instructions that the district court transfer these
claims to a district where venue is proper. Costs shall be borne
by the defendants.
16