Pierron v. Pierron

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway

FILED MAY 11, 2010

TIMOTHY PIERRON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 138824

KELLY PIERRON,

Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

PER CURIAM.

At issue here is whether a proposed change of school to one that is 60 miles from

the child’s present school would modify the established custodial environment of that

child and whether, absent a change in the established custodial environment, the trial

court must, when considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child,

analyze each of the ‘best-interest’ factors articulated in MCL 722.23, even if a factor is

not relevant to the immediate issue before the court. Under the facts of this case, we

answer each of these questions in the negative and therefore affirm.

Plaintiff-father and defendant-mother have two children from their marriage. The

divorce judgment entered in 2000 granted the parties joint legal custody and established

the children’s primary residence with defendant. Both parties and their children lived in
Grosse Pointe Woods until 2007, when defendant relocated to Howell, which is

approximately 60 miles away. When defendant tried to enroll the children in Howell

public schools, plaintiff objected. At the conclusion of a six-day evidentiary hearing, the

trial court ruled that the established custodial environment was with both parents and that

defendant’s proposed change of schools would modify the children’s established

custodial environment because plaintiff’s parenting time would be adversely affected by

the 60-mile distance between the proposed schools and plaintiff’s home. Additionally,

the trial court held that defendant had not satisfied her burden of proof under the ‘clear

and convincing evidence’ standard to show that the change was in the best interests of the

children. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court

erred by concluding that the established custodial environment would be modified.

Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 250-251; 765 NW2d 345 (2009). Moreover, the

Court remanded the case for the trial court to reevaluate the change-of-school issue and

determine whether defendant had demonstrated by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that

the change was in the children’s best interests. Id. at 264.

Under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., “all orders and judgments of

the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact

against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a

clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28. Under this standard, a reviewing court

should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the factual determination

“‘clearly preponderate[s] in the opposite direction.’” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871,

2
879; 526 NW2d 899 (1994), quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558; 94

NW2d 799 (1959).

The Child Custody Act “applies to all circuit court child custody disputes and

actions, whether original or incidental to other actions.” MCL 722.26(1). The act

provides that when parents share joint legal custody-- as the parties do here-- “the parents

shall share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare

of the child.” MCL 722.26a(7)(b). However, when the parents cannot agree on an

important decision, such as a change of the child’s school, the court is responsible for

resolving the issue in the best interests of the child. Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich

App 151, 159; 507 NW2d 788 (1993); see also MCL 722.25(1).1 When resolving

important decisions that affect the welfare of the child, the court must first consider

whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment. The

established custodial environment is the environment in which “over an appreciable time

the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the

necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). While an important

decision affecting the welfare of the child may well require adjustments in the parenting

time schedules, this does not necessarily mean that the established custodial environment

will have been modified. Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 595-596; 680 NW2d

1
MCL 722.25(1) provides, “If a child custody dispute is between the parents, . . .
the best interests of the child control.”

3
432 (2004).2 If the required parenting time adjustments will not change whom the child

naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort,

then the established custodial environment will not have changed. See id. The court may

not “‘change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented

clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.’” Id. at 585,

quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c).

Here, the trial court found that the proposed change of schools would modify the

established custodial environment because the 60-mile distance between the proposed

schools and plaintiff’s home “would . . . impinge on the father’s ability to provide

educational guidance, discipline, and the necessities of life.” The Court of Appeals,

however, concluded that the trial court’s ruling that the proposed change of schools

would alter the established custodial environment was against the great weight of the

evidence because the distance of the new schools from plaintiff’s home would only

require relatively minor adjustments to plaintiff’s parenting time. We agree with the

Court of Appeals.

2
Brown involved a change in residence of more than 100 miles, and a custodial
environment in which “each parent had fifty percent parenting time.” Brown, 260 Mich
App at 595-596. The dissent asserts that Brown stands for “the proposition that if a
proposed move would relegate an ‘equally active’ parent to the more circumscribed role
of ‘weekend’ parent, the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the
established custodial environment.” Whatever the merits of that proposition, there is no
evidence in the instant case that the allocation of parenting time between plaintiff and
defendant was “nearly equal.”

4
 Although the testimony here established that plaintiff is conscientiously involved

with his children’s education, there is no reason to believe from either the testimony or

the trial court’s findings of fact that the change of schools will significantly modify the

established custodial environment the children share with plaintiff. A review of the

record indicates that the children visit plaintiff’s home approximately three weekends out

of every four, from Saturday afternoon until Sunday evening. Before the instant action

was filed with the trial court, the children did not visit overnight on weeknights during

the school year.3 The record also indicates that plaintiff occasionally picks the children

up from tutoring and takes them out to dinner during the week. And, one week out of

every seven, plaintiff takes the children out to lunch.

Given this record, plaintiff’s weekend parenting time will be unaffected. With

regard to weekdays, plaintiff is involved with the children during the daytime for only

one week out of every seven because this is all that his work schedule allows. Although

3
After the instant action was filed, the trial court entered an order regarding
school district and parenting time, which required the children to attend Grosse Pointe
schools. There is some testimony indicating that the children occasionally stayed
overnight with plaintiff on some school nights after this order was entered, but only
presumably to reduce the amount of time that the children spent traveling between
Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods. The dissent observes that the trial court found that
“overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time for plaintiff would no
longer be practical” if the children were enrolled in Howell schools. In context, the trial
court was clearly referring to the parenting time provision in the judgment of divorce as
part of its analysis of whether the established custodial environment would be modified.
However, plaintiff, in fact, had not been engaged in weeknight, overnight parenting time.
The parenting time provision, by itself, does not establish the actual custodial
environment, Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 579-580; 309 NW2d 532 (1981), and it was
error for the trial court to consider the provision allowing weeknight, overnight visits
without also considering that these visits were not occurring.

5
the 60-mile distance is acknowledgedly more inconvenient for plaintiff, it is not so far

that plaintiff cannot continue his occasional midweek activities with his children and his

involvement in their education.4 Moreover, the record reflects that the children spend the

vast majority of their time in the established custodial environment of their mother, the

defendant. In fact, plaintiff’s own testimony acknowledged that the children “spend most

of their time” with “their mother.” From the children’s perspective, the changes in the

4
The dissent seems to rely largely on the 60-mile distance itself, rather than on the
actual impact that this distance has on the established custodial environment. For
instance, the dissent provides several examples of how plaintiff’s midweek involvement
with his children, much of which pertains to one-time events, may be hindered.
However, even with respect to these events, plaintiff was able to attend his son’s
graduation ceremony that was scheduled during plaintiff’s regular workday because the
school was near plaintiff’s office; when Andrew truanted from school, both plaintiff and
defendant dealt with the issue immediately; and when defendant attempted to register the
children in the Howell schools, she listed plaintiff as the fourth person to contact in case
of emergency, after herself, her sister, who lives closer, and another individual. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff will be unable to attend graduation
ceremonies or other significant events, or to respond to discipline issues or emergencies,
if the children attend Howell schools. More pertinently, however, none of these events
alters to whom the children naturally look for “guidance, discipline, the necessities of
life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The dissent observes that plaintiff
assisted his children with their weeknight homework assignments. According to the
record, this occurred “sometimes” on the same evening that he took his children out to
dinner. The dissent also observes that plaintiff conducted weekly science tutoring
sessions for his son and worked on science projects in the basement. These sessions took
place during a single school year, and it is unclear whether they occurred on a school
night or during the weekend. Therefore, it is also unclear whether such sessions would be
affected by the proposed change of school. Regardless, we do not take issue with the fact
that plaintiff has been a good parent. Although the dissent feels the need to contrast
defendant unfavorably with plaintiff, we merely believe that the additional 60-mile
distance is not so far away that plaintiff cannot continue occasionally to take his children
out to dinner and help them with their homework as he had sometimes done in the past.

6
established custodial environment they share with plaintiff should be minor, if at all.5

This being the case, defendant’s 60-mile move to Howell does not legally effect a change

in the established custodial environment the children share with either plaintiff or

defendant. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court’s

determination that the proposed change of schools would alter the established custodial

environment was against the great weight of the evidence.

Because there is no change in the established custodial environment, the

heightened evidentiary burden is not applicable, and defendant is required to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the proposed change of schools would be in the best

interests of the children, using the best-interest factors identified in MCL 722.23.

However, the best-interest factors are geared toward general custody determinations, and

many of these factors are simply irrelevant to particular “important decisions” affecting

5
In asserting that the established custodial environment would be modified if the
children were to attend Howell schools, the dissent cites matters that are simply irrelevant
in this case. For example, it asserts that the trial court’s finding that the proposed change
of schools would modify the established custodial environment is supported by the fact
that plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis, which limits his prospects of finding
employment closer to Howell and which required plaintiff to use a wheelchair during a
recent vacation with the children. While we share the dissent’s understandable solicitude
for plaintiff and his handicap, there is no evidence to indicate that this handicap affects
his custodial relationship with his children, and it has no bearing on the established
custodial environment either as it is currently or as it would be if the children were to
attend Howell schools. Finally, the dissent claims that defendant’s asserted
“irresponsibility” as a parent “bolsters” the trial court’s finding that the proposed change
of schools would modify the established custodial environment. While, if true, this may
well constitute a relevant consideration in assessing whether the proposed change of
schools would be in the children’s best interests, it is considerably less relevant in
assessing whether the proposed change would modify the custodial environment.

7
the welfare of a child. For instance, factor f, pertaining to the “moral fitness of the parties

involved,” MCL 722.23(f), while highly relevant in making a custody determination

between parents, has no discernible bearing on determining whether a proposed change

of school is in a child’s best interests.

The trial court itself expressed frustration with the best-interest factors because

many of these factors had nothing to do with the issue at hand. Despite this, the trial

court felt obligated to consider factors that were wholly unrelated to the change-of-school

issue. For example, the court determined that factor c, pertaining to the “capacity and

disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care

or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of

medical care, and other material needs,” MCL 722.23(c), favored plaintiff, focusing on

the parties’ disparity of income. The trial court observed that defendant had failed to

make any effort to obtain full-time employment even though she claimed that job

prospects were better in Howell. While disparity of income between the parties and

defendant’s asserted failure to secure full-time employment might be significant if the

issue before the court involved a change of custody, these considerations have little or

nothing to do with the change-of-school issue. The Court of Appeals addressed the scope

of the best-interest factors in this context by concluding that “the court must narrowly

focus its consideration of each best-interest factor on the specific ‘important decision[]

affecting the welfare of the child’ that is at issue.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 252-253.

We agree with this conclusion.

8
 If a proposed important decision affecting the welfare of the child will not modify

the established custodial environment, evaluating best-interest factors that are irrelevant

to the particular issue before the court distracts from the proper focus of the proceeding

and poses the risk that one parent’s preference will prevail even though that preference is

not in the best interests of the child.

Nevertheless, MCL 722.23 requires “the sum total of the . . . factors to be

considered, evaluated, and determined by the court[.]” (Emphasis added.) In Parent v

Parent, 282 Mich App 152; 762 NW2d 553 (2009), the Court of Appeals addressed this

issue, also in the context of a dispute over a proposed change of school. Recognizing that

even though each of the factors might not be relevant to the issue, MCL 722.23 requires

consideration of “all” the factors, the Court held that “[t]he trial court must at least make

explicit factual findings with regard to the applicability of each factor.” Id. at 157

(emphasis added). We believe that this approach complies with MCL 722.23 and allows

for the proper evaluation of whether an important decision is genuinely in the best

interests of the children, in accordance with the Child Custody Act. Therefore, we hold

that when a trial court is considering a decision that will not modify the established

custodial environment, such as the change-of-school issue in this case, it must consider

the applicability of all the factors. However, if the trial court determines that a particular

factor is irrelevant to the immediate issue, it need not make substantive factual findings

concerning the factor beyond this determination, but need merely state that conclusion on

the record.

9
 We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court clearly erred on a

major legal issue regarding factor i, “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the court

considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference,” MCL 722.23(i).

Although both children expressed a preference to attend Howell schools, it appears that

the trial court refused to consider their preferences because neither child had ever

attended a Howell school and, therefore, presumably lacked any factual basis on which to

form a reasonable preference. Essentially, the trial court imposed a requirement of

actual, firsthand experience, in this case with a Howell school, in order for the child’s

preferences to be valid. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that factor i does

not “require that a child’s preference be accompanied by detailed thought or critical

analysis” and that the “reasonable preference” standard merely “exclude[s] those

preferences that are arbitrary or inherently indefensible.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 259.

The trial court did not indicate that the children’s stated preferences violated this minimal

standard of reasonableness.

To summarize, when considering an important decision affecting the welfare of

the child, the trial court must first determine whether the proposed change would modify

the established custodial environment of that child. In making this determination, it is the

child’s standpoint, rather than that of the parents, that is controlling. If the proposed

change would modify the established custodial environment of the child, then the burden

is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the change is in the child’s best interests. Under such circumstances, the trial court must

consider all the best-interest factors because a case in which the proposed change would

10
modify the custodial environment is essentially a change-of-custody case. On the other

hand, if the proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment of

the child, the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests. In addition,

under those circumstances, although the trial court must determine whether each of the

best-interest factors applies, if a factor does not apply, the trial court need not address it

any further. In other words, if a particular best-interest factor is irrelevant to the question

at hand, i.e., whether the proposed change is in the best interests of the child, the trial

court need not say anything other than that the factor is irrelevant.

In this case, because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proposed change

of schools will not modify the established custodial environment,6 we affirm the Court of

Appeals’ decision to vacate the trial court’s order. However, even by a ‘preponderance

of the evidence’ standard, this case presents a very close question with regard to whether

attending Howell Schools is in the best interests of the children. It is clear that plaintiff is

concerned about his children, is involved in their education, and provides guidance,

structure, and discipline even when the children are not in his care. While the change of

schools would not modify the established custodial environment, we recognize that the

change of schools may, in fact, impair plaintiff’s ability to be readily accessible to

6
We emphasize that we do not hold here that a proposed change of school will
never modify an established custodial environment. Rather, we merely hold that, under
the specific facts of this case, this particular change of schools does not modify the
established custodial environment.

11
provide guidance and structure. These facts, of course, are relevant to assessing where

the interests of these children lie, and, on remand, we encourage the trial court to

carefully consider all relevant factors when making this assessment. We remand to the

trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.7

Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway

7
We have considered defendant’s post-argument motion to “correct the record,
strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiff-
appellant; to investigation [sic] into deception systematically perpretrated [sic] by the
plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant,” and it is
denied. However, defendant’s motion contains over 25 specific allegations that
plaintiff’s counsel has “lied,” “intentionally misled,” “deceived,” or been “manipulative”
concerning the facts of this case. Additionally, defendant makes aspersions concerning
the integrity of the attorney grievance process, and she has “noticed that the video tape of
the oral argument in the State Bar’s web cite [sic] was cleaned up a bit and can not be
relied upon for the full record.” We find all these allegations to be irresponsible and
unsubstantiated. Therefore, costs of $250 are assessed against defendant’s counsel in
favor of plaintiff under MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing this vexatious motion.

12
 STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

TIMOTHY PIERRON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 138824

KELLY PIERRON,

Defendant-Appellee.

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority that when a trial court determines that an important

decision affecting the welfare of a child would not modify the child’s established

custodial environment, all 12 best interest factors in MCL 722.23 may not be relevant to

the specific decision before the court. I agree further that in such cases the trial court

nonetheless must consider the applicability of all the statutory best interest factors and

state its factual findings and conclusions regarding each relevant factor on the record. I

acknowledge that this approach comports with the applicable provisions of the Child

Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.

I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the established

custodial environment between plaintiff father and the two minor children will not be

modified in this case. After a six-day evidentiary hearing spanning 1,136 transcript pages

and at least 54 exhibits, the trial court found that an established custodial environment

existed with both parents and that defendant mother’s unilateral decision to remove the
children from Grosse Pointe Public Schools and enroll them in Howell Public Schools

would alter the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff. The record

abundantly supports the trial court’s findings. After scrutinizing the record, I am

mystified by the majority’s blanket endorsement of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence when the Court of

Appeals failed to discuss what evidence clearly preponderated in the opposite direction. I

am similarly perplexed by the majority’s resistance to reviewing the evidence adduced

and its related assertion that much of the evidence on the lower court record—evidence

that the majority deems unnecessary to discuss—is irrelevant. The majority essentially

second-guesses the trial court’s findings regarding the existence of an established

custodial environment with both parents and the destruction of the children’s established

custodial environment with plaintiff. The majority concludes that the children “spend the

vast majority of their time” with defendant, so adjustments were merely to plaintiff’s

parenting time. I cannot join this distortion of the record before us. I further conclude

that the result here does not conform to the highly deferential “great weight of the

evidence” standard of review.

Numerous witnesses testified about the quality of Grosse Pointe and Howell

Public Schools. Only plaintiff and defendant, however, testified about the modifications

to plaintiff’s parenting time and the established custodial environment as a result of the

proposed school change. Defendant failed to squarely rebut plaintiff’s testimony in this

regard. Further, the testimony of the children’s tutor, Deb Dixon, corroborated plaintiff’s

testimony about his strong interest in the children’s education and his active involvement

2
in their daily lives. Under the great weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court

defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the trial court’s factual findings

should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.

Because the record does not reveal that the evidence before the trial court clearly

preponderated in the opposite direction, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision

and reinstate the trial court’s order directing that the children remain enrolled in Grosse

Pointe Public Schools.

I have a firm conviction on the basis of my review of the record that the move to

Howell will strip these children of two parents’ involvement in their education and

discipline, thereby relegating them to the care of a single parent, defendant mother.1 That

1
The trial court expressed a similar concern about enrolling the children in Howell
Public Schools. While issuing its opinion from the bench in regard to best interest factor
j, the trial court found in pertinent part:

[Plaintiff] repeatedly stated his strong conviction that children need
both parents actively involved in their lives. He felt the move to the
Howell school district would impede his ability to participate in their
educational and every day lives. Without both parents in their lives on a
daily basis, [plaintiff] feels the children face a higher potential for failure.
This is especially true in his opinion because Andrew struggles
academically. He wants to be there for his son to help guide his
educational development.

[Defendant] feels [plaintiff] can still participate adequately from
Grosse Pointe, but she did not otherwise address his concerns nor the
general philosophy of the need for two parents to raise their children
actively and on a daily basis.

As the following sample of testimony from the record illustrates, there is no basis to
disturb the trial court’s finding as against the great weight of the evidence:

3
 In response to whether Grosse Pointe Public Schools afforded his children with the
best opportunities that he could offer them, plaintiff responded, “Yes, it is. I think
it is. Is the school system better? Yes. Is that all that matters? No, you need both
parents. You need both parents working together. But honestly with one parent
doing [sic] out in Howell is not going to work with them.”

 In response to the potential impact of the children attending Howell Public
Schools, plaintiff stated, “I’m vastly concerned about what these kids are going to
do in school. Even if they are straight A students in Howell, I’m not sure if that’s
going to be enough; but I honestly, I doubt they’ll be straight A students in
Howell. They’re going to be even worse than they were in Grosse Pointe. With
only Kelly doing it and not two parents, they’re going to fail. And that’s my
biggest fear is they’re not what—that’s my biggest fear is they’re failing if they go
to Howell.”

 In response to whether enrolling Andrew in Howell Public Schools would ease the
stress on plaintiff and Andrew’s relationship, plaintiff responded, “No. My
assumption if he is going to attend Howell school[s], I will lose contact with him
and it’s going to be heinous. Kelly raised Ian by herself. There was no other
father for Ian there. And what happened to Ian? He flunked out. You’re going to
take my kid and put him in Howell schools without a father. And Howell schools,
we’re arguing this, but you know what, Howell schools is [sic] not better than
Grosse Pointe schools. And so you’re going to take my child and put him in a
school system that’s not as good and what’s going to happen to him? Ian is
smarter than Andrew. And Ian flunked out. What’s going to happen to Andrew in
Howell schools?”

 In response to how attending Howell Public Schools would affect the children’s
family relationship with plaintiff, plaintiff explained, “I will see them less. We
cannot do the overnight visits. I will see them intermittently on weekends. When
they’re living in Grosse Pointe around the block, I saw them routinely on
weekends. Now I’m seeing them every once in a while and it takes a fight over
the phone with Kelly.”

 In response to whether plaintiff was willing to work for a relationship with the
children’s friends in Howell, plaintiff stated, “I will do anything to keep my
relationship with my kids. I don’t know if it’s going to be possible though
because, if she is living in Howell, the friends are in Howell, how—as your
example, how are you going to pick up their friends and drive the friends down for
two hours to spend time with me, and then drive them back? . . . I don’t know
how many parents are going to have their friends—their kids go to see—go spend

4
parent seems quite inattentive to the children’s needs. Further, her proposal to enroll the

children in a new school district appears to be based on her desire to relocate, and not

what is in the children’s best interests. Modifying the status quo and enrolling the

children in Howell Public Schools is a decision reflecting defendant’s best interests to be

sure, but not the best interests of the parties’ two minor children.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the majority explains in part, plaintiff and defendant had two children during

their marriage, Andrew (born 5/6/1994) and Madeline (born 1/25/99).2 When the parties

divorced in 2000, the judgment of divorce awarded joint legal custody. With regard to

educational decisions, the judgment provided:

As joint legal custodians, each parent shall have equal decision-
making authority with respect to matters concerning . . . education. Both
parents shall be fully informed with respect to the children’s progress in
school and shall be entitled to participate in all school conferences,
programs and other related activities in which parents are customarily
involved. Both parents shall have full access to the children’s school
records, teachers, counselors, and to their medical records and health care
providers.

a weekend at some other man’s house. In Grosse Pointe, I know the parents. I
spend time with the parents. I see them at the PTA meetings. We have
relationships.”

2
Defendant also has a child from a previous relationship, Ian. The record does not
establish Ian’s date of birth, but the testimony indicates that he was 18 years old at the
time of the evidentiary hearing and resided with defendant while attending community
college.

5
Additionally, the judgment of divorce granted defendant primary physical custody but

awarded plaintiff “reasonable and liberal parenting time . . . which shall include alternate

weekends, alternate holidays, time during school and summer vacations, and as otherwise

agreed between the parties.” In 2001, an amended judgment of divorce entered.

Consistent with the original judgment of divorce, the amended judgment stated that “the

parties shall have joint legal custody and shared parenting time” and that defendant’s

residence “continues as primary residence.” The parenting time provision was modified

to provide greater flexibility. It stated that plaintiff’s parenting time “shall include

overnights and all mutually agreeable times, including first option of parenting time when

and if [defendant] resumes and/or returns to full time employment or continued education

that requires night classes.”

After the divorce, plaintiff, defendant, and the children lived in Grosse Pointe

Woods, where the children had resided since birth. Defendant and the children lived less

than six blocks from plaintiff’s home. The children’s paternal grandparents, with whom

they share a close and loving bond, also resided in Grosse Pointe. Upon reaching school

age, the children both attended Grosse Pointe Public Schools. Madeline’s elementary

school was located 0.25 miles from plaintiff’s home and 1.1 miles from defendant’s

home. Andrew’s middle school was located 1.4 miles from plaintiff’s home and 1.2

miles from defendant’s home.

Despite his demanding radiology practice, plaintiff played an active role in the

children’s education: attending school concerts and ice cream socials, helping the

children with homework on school nights, staying in contact with teachers, and arranging

6
for a private tutor for the children when they struggled academically. In April 2005,

plaintiff was forced to seek judicial intervention to obtain private tutoring for Andrew

after defendant rejected the idea. Defendant was comparatively less involved in the

children’s education even though she was essentially a stay-at-home parent who

occasionally did upholstery work and taught figure skating.3 Additionally, the children

participated in various extracurricular activities in Grosse Pointe, including band,

archery, figure skating, and dance. Plaintiff, defendant, and the children’s paternal

grandparents assisted in transporting the children and encouraging their involvement in

extracurricular activities. For certain extracurricular activities, including Madeline’s

dance classes, plaintiff and the children’s paternal grandmother handled all the

transportation. The children also attended church with plaintiff and their paternal

grandparents.

In April 2007, without notifying plaintiff, defendant offered to purchase a

condominium in Howell.4 At the time, the only individual whom defendant knew in

Howell was her on-again, off-again boyfriend of five years.5 After learning of

3
Although defendant graduated from a four-year university with a degree in
science and a certificate in social work, she stopped working when she married plaintiff.
At the time of the evidentiary hearing, defendant confirmed that she did not have a job
and that she no longer did upholstery work or taught figure skating. Defendant primarily
subsisted on approximately $28,000 a year in tax-free child support from plaintiff.
4
Howell is located approximately 60 miles from Grosse Pointe Woods.
5
Defendant’s sister lived in Cohoctah Township and defendant’s mother lived in
West Bloomfield. According to defendant, it took approximately 25 minutes to drive
from the condominium in Howell to her sister’s home in Cohoctah Township.

7
defendant’s actions, plaintiff proposed that defendant purchase his single family home in

Grosse Pointe Woods for the same price that she offered for the condominium in Howell.

Plaintiff’s proposal would have given defendant more than $100,000 in free equity.

Plaintiff also attempted to negotiate a parenting time schedule with defendant. Defendant

either rejected or did not respond to any of plaintiff’s proposals. In June 2007, defendant

moved to Howell. Contrary to the terms of the judgment of divorce granting equal

decision-making with regard to education, defendant enrolled the children in Howell

Public Schools. In July 2007, plaintiff filed a motion opposing the proposed change of

schools, asserting that the “unilateral decision to move the children more than an hour

from [p]laintiff’s home and completely uproot them from their school district” would

violate the judgment of divorce and modify the children’s established custodial

environment.6 Plaintiff offered to pay for a rental home for defendant and the children

during the pendency of the proceedings, but defendant refused plaintiff’s offer.

During September and October 2007, the trial court conducted a six-day

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proposed change of schools was in the best

interests of the children. At the conclusion, the court issued a 27-page opinion from the

6
Since the proposed change of schools first became an issue, the record reveals
steadily increasing levels of acrimony between the parties and their respective counsel.
This acrimony is aptly illustrated in defendant’s post-argument motion to “correct the
record, strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiff-
appellant; to investigation [sic] into deception systematically perpretrated [sic] by the
plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant.” I wholly
concur with the majority’s decision to deny defendant’s motion and sanction defendant’s
counsel pursuant to MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing a vexatious motion.

8
bench with a detailed consideration of the evidence. The court noted the governing

burdens of proof. The party seeking to implement a school change has the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the change is in the child’s best

interests. If, however, the proposed school change will affect the child’s established

custodial environment, the moving party has the heightened burden of persuading the

court by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court found that both parents had an

established custodial environment with their children. Because the trial court determined

that the proposed school change would affect the parties’ agreed-upon parenting time

schedule and modify the children’s established custodial environment “of flexibility and

continued involvement” with plaintiff, defendant had the burden of persuading the trial

court that the school change was in the children’s best interests. After a careful review of

the evidence and discussion about all 12 statutory best interest factors, the trial court

concluded that defendant had failed to establish that the proposed change was in the

children’s best interests under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the

less rigorous preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, the trial court

ordered that the children remain enrolled in Grosse Pointe Public Schools. Soon

thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.

Defendant appealed by right, arguing that the trial court had applied the incorrect

standard of review, misunderstood the applicable law, and made factual findings against

the great weight of the evidence. Defendant also challenged the trial court’s findings

regarding statutory best interest factor i (reasonable preference of the child).

9
 The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, concluding that the trial court

had erred by finding that the proposed school change would modify the children’s

established custodial environment with plaintiff because “only minor modifications to

plaintiff’s parenting time” would be required.7 The Court further held that the trial court

had made factual findings against the great weight of the evidence regarding statutory

best interest factors a (love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the

parties involved and the child) and h (home, school, and community record of the child).

Additionally, the Court concluded that the trial court had committed clear legal errors

regarding factors b (capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,

affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her

religion), c (capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with

food, clothing, medical care or remedial care, and other material needs), e (permanence,

as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes), and i (reasonable

preference of the child).8 After opining that “defendant likely satisfied her burden of

proof on the change-of-school issue in this case,”9 the Court remanded the case for

reevaluation of the proposed school change issue under the preponderance of the

evidence standard.

7
Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 249; 765 NW2d 345 (2009).
8
Id. at 253-260.
9
Id. at 261.

10
 Plaintiff then applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted plaintiff’s

application and directed the parties to address whether (1) defendant’s decision to enroll

the children in Howell Public Schools, which is 60 miles from their former school district

and from plaintiff’s home, resulted in a change in the custodial environment; (2) the clear

and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard

governed defendant’s burden of proof; (3) defendant demonstrated that the school change

was in the children’s best interests; and (4) the children’s preference for Howell Public

Schools was “reasonable.”10

II. RELEVANCE OF STATUTORY BEST INTEREST FACTORS

I agree that in child custody disputes where the established custodial environment

would not be modified, a trial court need not state its factual findings and conclusions

regarding any statutory best interest factor that is irrelevant to the specific important

decision under review. Further, I agree that requiring trial courts to evaluate best interest

factors that are plainly irrelevant to a specific decision distracts from the overriding focus

in any child custody dispute—namely, what is in the child’s best interest. Consequently,

I concur with the general approach set forth by the majority, but I emphasize that this

approach is limited to those cases in which the proposed important decision would not

modify the child’s established custodial environment.11

10
483 Mich 1135 (2009).
11
As the amicus curiae brief of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of
Michigan observes, if the established custodial environment would be modified by the
proposed important decision, the trial court, as a practical matter, could be addressing a

11
 An established custodial environment exists “if over an appreciable time the child

naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the

necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The Legislature has

instructed courts to consider “[t]he age of the child, the physical environment, and the

inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship” in

analyzing whether the custodian and child share an established custodial environment.

Id. In child custody disputes between parents, “the best interests of the child control.”

MCL 722.25; see Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 466; 547 NW2d 686 (1996) (“In all

events, however, the best interests of [the child], not of [the parents], are central.”). The

Legislature has stated that the “sum total” of 12 factors provides the basis for courts to

consider, evaluate, and determine whether an important decision is in “the best interests

of the child.” MCL 722.23.12 After carefully considering the whole situation, a trial

possible change in custody, which would necessitate a full review of the child’s custodial
placement pursuant to the best interest factors listed in MCL 722.23.
12
Specifically, MCL 722.23 provides:

As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total
of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the
court:

(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parties involved and the child.

(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and
raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.

(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care

12
court may determine that certain factors are plainly irrelevant to the particular decision

before the court. In such cases, a trial court not only must state its factual findings and

conclusions regarding each relevant best interest factor on the record, but it also must

expressly state its conclusion regarding the irrelevance of any remaining factors. See

Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 156-157; 762 NW2d 553 (2009).

By distinguishing applicable and inapplicable best interest factors in child custody

disputes where the established custodial environment would not be modified, a trial court

can create a sufficient record for meaningful appellate review while focusing its analysis

recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical
care, and other material needs.

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.

(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference.

(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent or the child and the parents.

(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was
directed against or witnessed by the child.

(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.

13
on the important decision at issue and how that decision will affect the welfare of the

child. Accordingly, I concur with this aspect of the majority opinion.

III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD AS APPLIED

Although I agree with the majority about the threshold applicability determination

of the statutory best interest factors where the established custodial environment would

not be modified, I disagree that the children’s established custodial environment with

plaintiff would not be modified under these facts. The trial court properly found that the

proposed school change from Grosse Pointe to Howell would modify the children’s

established custodial environment with plaintiff.13 After scrutinizing this voluminous

record, I conclude that plaintiff father was far more than a “weekend parent” and that

defendant’s unilateral decision to enroll the children in a new school district

approximately 60 miles from their lifelong school district and home would modify the

established custodial environment that the children share with plaintiff.14 The evidence

13
I commend the trial court for doing an exemplary job in presiding over the
convoluted evidentiary hearing before it.
14
The majority seems to view the 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse
Pointe, which is less than 100 miles, as a presumptive basis to contravene the trial court’s
factual finding that the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would
be modified. The 60-mile distance itself did not preclude the trial court from finding that
the children had an established custodial environment with both parents and that enrolling
the children in Howell Public Schools would modify the established custodial
environment with plaintiff. Moreover, contrary to the Court of Appeals, I do not read
MCL 722.31(1) as implicitly providing that “a custodial parent may move a child’s
residence by less than 100 miles without first obtaining permission from the court or
consent from the other party.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 245. Instead, the explicit
statutory language is the best means to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s
intent. MCL 722.31(1) provides in part that “a parent of a child whose custody is

14
did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and the Court of Appeals’

application of the great weight of the evidence standard constituted error requiring

reversal. Consequently, I dissent from the majority’s endorsement of the Court of

Appeals’ opinion in this regard.

MCL 722.28 enumerates the three relevant standards of review in child custody

cases.15 “Findings of fact are to be reviewed under the ‘great weight’ standard,

discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for ‘abuse of discretion,’ and questions of law for

‘clear legal error.’” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).

Under the great weight of the evidence standard, “a reviewing court should not substitute

its judgment on questions of fact unless they ‘clearly preponderate in the opposite

governed by court order shall not change a legal residence of the child to a location that is
more than 100 miles from the child’s legal residence at the time of the commencement of
the action in which the order is issued.” The Legislature has demonstrated its ability to
include specific statutory presumptions in the Child Custody Act. See, e.g., MCL
722.27a(1) (“It is presumed to be in the best interests of a child for the child to have a
strong relationship with both of his or her parents.”). However, the Legislature did not
draft a presumption in MCL 722.31(1) that when parents share joint legal custody, a
relocating parent’s unilateral decision to move a child’s legal residence less than 100
miles is presumed not to modify the child’s established custodial environment with his or
her other parent. Consequently, I cannot conclude that the distance itself creates a
presumption that a change in legal residence of less than 100 miles will not modify to
whom the children look “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental
comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).
15
MCL 722.28 provides:

To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and
final adjudication, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be
affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the
great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a
clear legal error on a major issue.

15
direction.’” Id. at 878, quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 NW2d 799

(1959). Moreover, a reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s credibility

determinations. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). As

Fletcher states, “[t]he great weight standard of review allows [for] a meaningful yet

deferential review . . . .” Fletcher, 447 Mich at 878.

After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant’s proposal to

enroll the children in Howell Public Schools, approximately 60 miles away from their

current school district and plaintiff’s home in Grosse Pointe Woods, would affect the

existing parenting time schedule and modify the children’s established custodial

environment. The trial court found that if the children were enrolled in Howell Public

Schools, overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time for plaintiff would

no longer be practical.16 Further, the trial court concluded that the children’s established

custodial environment with plaintiff was one “of flexibility and continued involvement”

and that the testimony established that plaintiff “was involved on a continuing basis with

[the] children’s education.” The trial court cited testimony establishing that plaintiff

“visited the schools regularly, took the children to lunch on occasions, picked them up

16
The majority acknowledges that a review of the record reveals “some testimony
indicating that the children occasionally stayed overnight with plaintiff on some school
nights” after the instant action was filed, but the majority presumes that these weeknight
overnight visits only occurred “to reduce the amount of time that the children spent
traveling between Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods.” Nothing in the record supports
this statement. In light of the majority’s concession that some weeknight overnight visits
were occurring, I am perplexed by the majority’s related conclusion that “it was error for
the trial court to consider the provision allowing weeknight, overnight visits without also
considering that these visits were not occurring.”

16
from tutoring, and saw them regularly despite the absence of a specific parenting time

schedule.”

The majority cites Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 595; 680 NW2d 432

(2004), for the proposition that “[i]f the required parenting time adjustments will not

change who the child naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life,

and parental comfort, then the established custodial environment will not have changed.”

Ironically, Brown concluded that the modification in parenting time in that case

“necessarily would amount to a change in the established custodial environment,

requiring analysis under the best interest factor framework.” Id. at 596. Other Court of

Appeals decisions have cited Brown for the proposition that if a proposed move would

relegate an “equally active” parent to the more circumscribed role of “weekend” parent,

the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the established custodial

environment. See Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526, 528; 752 NW2d 47 (2008). Such

reasoning is equally instructive here because the proposed school change would alter the

extent to which the children look to plaintiff “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of

life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

The majority also describes the Court of Appeals as concluding that the trial

court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence because “the distance of the

new schools from plaintiff’s home would only require relatively minor adjustments to

plaintiff’s parenting time.” I am mystified by this holding on the record before us.

Plaintiff testified in great detail about the modifications to his parenting time and the

established custodial environment that would result from the proposed school change.

17
Defendant failed to squarely rebut plaintiff’s testimony in this regard. Contrary to the

Court of Appeals’ view, the salient issue is the impact of the proposed school change on

plaintiff’s ongoing involvement with the children’s educational and everyday lives, not

the distance between the school districts. See note 1 of this opinion. I find no basis to

conclude that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence.

Instead, ample evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the children’s established

custodial environment would be modified if the proposed school change occurred.

To illustrate, without discussing contradictory evidence, the Court of Appeals

summarily concluded, “[t]he mere 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse Pointe

Woods would not be a substantial barrier to plaintiff's continued parenting time, and the

mere change of school districts would not necessarily alter or materially reduce plaintiff's

opportunity to exercise visitation with the minor children.”17 The trial court, however,

heard testimony about myriad ways in which the proposed school change would modify

the children’s established custodial environment. I concur with the trial court’s finding

that the distance factor would impinge on plaintiff’s ability to provide educational

guidance and discipline for the children.

Plaintiff, for example, testified in great detail about the proposed school change

hindering his ability to see the children flexibly during and after school on weekdays.

While the children attended Grosse Pointe Public Schools, plaintiff could take them to

breakfast before school or to lunch during school depending on his work schedule.

17
Pierron, 282 Mich App at 250.

18
Plaintiff routinely took the children out to dinner on Thursdays after he picked them up

from tutoring. Further, plaintiff personally worked with the children on their weeknight

homework assignments. At one point, plaintiff created a special weekly science tutoring

session for Andrew during which Andrew and plaintiff did science projects in plaintiff’s

basement. Plaintiff also described instances where he had been able to attend daytime

school functions. For example, a graduation ceremony for Andrew was scheduled during

plaintiff’s regular workday. Because the school was near the office where plaintiff’s

radiology group practiced, he was able to attend. The move to Howell would impede this

midday and weeknight availability. Additionally, plaintiff testified that his concern about

remaining involved in his children’s daily lives led him to explore relocating to Howell

and finding employment closer to the children, but his multiple sclerosis limited his

ability to find a comparable position elsewhere.18 Although plaintiff stated that he had

not taken a sick day in 10 years, plaintiff admitted that, because of his multiple sclerosis,

he needed to use a wheelchair during a recent vacation with the children. The testimony

about plaintiff’s efforts to relocate and his multiple sclerosis further supports the trial

court’s finding that the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would

be modified by the proposed school change.

Further, defendant testified that she listed plaintiff as an emergency contact on

forms filed with the Howell Public Schools. Yet, defendant listed plaintiff as the third

18
Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1993.

19
emergency contact after defendant and two other individuals.19 In contrast, during the

evidentiary hearing, both plaintiff and defendant immediately responded when Andrew

truanted from school in Grosse Pointe. Defendant testified that it took about 90 minutes

to travel from Grosse Pointe to Howell in rush hour traffic. When asked whether plaintiff

would have problems being involved with the children’s education in Howell, defendant

responded no. She suggested that plaintiff keep in touch over the computer or telephone.

The evidence establishing plaintiff’s ongoing personal involvement with the children and

their education in Grosse Pointe belies defendant’s suggestion. This testimony also

supports the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the

children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff.

Additionally, the record reveals defendant’s troubling lack of personal

responsibility for and interest in the children’s education. Defendant, for example,

professed that she did not need to attend Andrew and Madeline’s parent-teacher

conferences because she had attended conferences with her older son Ian. By contrast,

plaintiff regularly attended parent-teacher conferences and was known by the school

staff. Defendant also admitted that she received a letter from the school district when

Madeline had amassed 27 tardy reports at school while living in her home. Although

defendant stated that she had resolved the problem by taking away Madeline’s computer

19
On the same form, defendant identified herself as the children’s legal guardian,
but she failed to mark either yes or no to identify plaintiff as the children’s other legal
guardian.

20
time, Madeline nevertheless went on to accrue a total of 72 tardy reports for the school

year, which is remarkable since the average school year is about 180 days.

Andrew had a similar problem, accumulating numerous reports of tardiness and

absences. In one school year alone, Andrew amassed 90 absences from class and 28

tardy reports. Plaintiff described an instance where he came to pick up Madeline from

school only to be told by Madeline’s teacher that Madeline had not attended at all. When

plaintiff called defendant, he spoke to Andrew. Andrew informed plaintiff that he had

overslept in the morning, and, as a result, Andrew failed to wake defendant and Madeline

so that the children could make it to school that day. The record reflects that Andrew,

and not defendant, was responsible for the children’s morning routine. These incidents

reflect defendant’s persistent inattentiveness to her children’s educational needs and the

crucial role played by plaintiff in the children’s daily lives.

After defendant forced plaintiff to obtain a court order to arrange academic

tutoring for Andrew, plaintiff sought the services of Deb Dixon on the basis of the

recommendation of Andrew’s teacher. Dixon testified that she had 11 years of

experience working as an academic tutor with more than 150 students, in addition to her

previous career experience as a German teacher and guidance counselor at a local high

school. She confirmed that plaintiff paid for the twice-weekly tutoring sessions, first to

help Andrew with reading and later to help Madeline with reading and phonics.

Moreover, Dixon testified that plaintiff would consistently inquire about the children’s

academic progress when he transported the children to and from tutoring, even calling

Dixon periodically for updates. In contrast, defendant did not regularly speak to Dixon.

21
Oftentimes, Dixon would go out to plaintiff’s vehicle to tell plaintiff how the children

had done. According to Dixon, defendant canceled tutoring sessions and did not display

the amount of concern about Madeline’s reading progress that one would expect of a

parent. Defendant also suggested that her 18-year-old son Ian would be an appropriate

math tutor for Andrew, even though Ian graduated from high school with a 1.8 grade

point average and was not permitted to attend his high school commencement.

Perplexingly, defendant also testified that “Ian is lazy, and he’s paid for it by going to

community college instead of the college of his choice where his friends went.” Viewed

together, the evidence regarding defendant’s demonstrable irresponsibility and lack of

interest in the children’s education not only illustrates the importance of keeping plaintiff

actively involved in the children’s education, but it also bolsters the trial court’s

conclusion that the proposed school change would modify the children’s established

custodial environment.

The record supports the trial court’s finding that the children had an established

custodial environment “of flexibility and continued involvement” with plaintiff and that

the proposed school change would modify that environment. From the children’s

perspective, their established custodial environment would be modified if they enrolled in

Howell Public Schools. As a practical matter, plaintiff would be relegated to the role of

“weekend parent.” Plaintiff specifically testified about the importance of the children

needing two parents, stating that if defendant enrolled the children in Howell Public

Schools, “it will truly be a single parent raising the kids.” Although the Court of Appeals

attempted to minimize the impact of the proposed school change on the children’s

22
established custodial environment with plaintiff, the Court of Appeals cited no evidence

that clearly preponderated against the trial court’s finding. Because the trial court’s

finding was not against the great weight of the evidence, I dissent.

IV. CONCLUSION

I concur in the principle that if a proposed change would not modify the

established custodial environment, the trial court not only must determine the

applicability of all 12 best interest factors, but it also must address each factor that is

relevant to the specific issue before the court. With regard to this case, however, I

conclude that the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the

children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff did not violate the great

weight of the evidence standard. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’

decision and reinstate the trial court’s order directing that the children remain enrolled in

Grosse Pointe Public Schools.

Maura D. Corrigan

23