United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-50309
Summary Calendar.
In the Matter of John W. GREENWAY, Debtor.
Joanne Brito BOYCE; Eric Boyce; John Sommerfield; Terry Rock;
Kay Rock, For Representatives of the Estate of Debbie Rock,
Appellees Cross-Appellants,
v.
John W. GREENWAY, Appellant Cross-Appellee.
Jan. 10, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant John W. Greenway appeals the district court's
partial reversal of the bankruptcy court's order granting
Greenway's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs Joanne Brito
Boyce, Eric Boyce, John Sommerfield, Terry Rock, Kay Rock, and the
Estate of Debbie Rock cross-appeal the district court's partial
affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order granting Greenway's
motion for summary judgment. We reverse in part, affirm in part,
and render judgment.
I
A motorboat, operated by John Greenway, crashed into
Plaintiffs vessel, causing a fatality and various injuries. The
accident occurred on a lake at night. Greenway had been drinking.
Plaintiffs sued in state court, and a jury, finding that Greenway
1
was sixty percent responsible for the accident, awarded the
Plaintiffs damages proportional to Greenway's fault.1 Unable to
pay the judgment, Greenway sought protection under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Plaintiffs commenced this adversary
proceeding in the bankruptcy court to block the discharge of
Greenway's debt. The Bankruptcy Code does not allow the discharge
of debts arising from, among other things, willful and malicious
injuries,2 or from death or personal injuries caused by the
operation of a "motor vehicle" if that operation was unlawful due
to the debtor's intoxication.3 The Plaintiffs argued that these
two provisions barred the discharge of Greenway's debt. The
bankruptcy court disagreed. Because the jury in Greenway's state
trial had rejected liability for gross negligence, the bankruptcy
court found the Plaintiffs collaterally estopped from litigating
whether Greenway's actions were willful or malicious under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court further found that the
plain meaning of the term "motor vehicle," in 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(9), did not include motorboats, and held § 523(a)(9)
1
The jury found Plaintiffs forty percent responsible for the
accident, and under Texas comparative negligence rules, compensated
Plaintiffs for only sixty percent of the total value of their
injuries.
2
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (exempting from discharge any debt
"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity
or to the property of another entity").
3
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (exempting from discharge any debt
incurred "for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because
the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another
substance").
2
inapplicable to Greenway's case. The bankruptcy court thus granted
Greenway's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the Plaintiffs
were collaterally estopped from litigating whether Greenway's
actions had been willful and malicious, but reversed the bankruptcy
court's interpretation of the term "motor vehicle," reading the
term to include motorboats. The district court then remanded the
case to the bankruptcy court for trial on whether Greenway was
intoxicated, within the meaning of § 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy
Code, when the accident occurred.4 Both Plaintiffs and Greenway
filed timely notices of appeal.
II
The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to discharge all debts
incurred prior to filing for bankruptcy, subject to certain
exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Case
(In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir.1991). Greenway appeals
the district court's reading of the exception contained in §
523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code involving the intoxicated
operation of a "motor vehicle." We review a district court's
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code de novo. Bruner v. United
States (In re Bruner), 55 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir.1995).
As with any statutory question, we begin with the language of
the statute. Kellogg v. United States (In re West Texas Marketing
Corp.), 54 F.3d 1194, 1200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
4
In the state court proceeding, the jury made no finding as to
Greenway's possible intoxication.
3
116 S.Ct. 523, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1995). In determining a statute's
plain meaning, we assume that, absent any contrary definition,
"Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Pioneer Investment
Services v. Brunswick Associates, 507 U.S. 380, ----, 113 S.Ct.
1489, 1495, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated: "There is, of course,
no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571,
102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the language is clear, then "the inquiry should
end." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241,
109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989).
The terms "motorboat" or "water craft" do not appear in §
523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. Nor does the Bankruptcy Code
expressly define the term "motor vehicle." Therefore, we must
determine if the plain or common meaning of the term "motor
vehicle," as used in § 523(a)(9), includes motorboats.5 Only if
5
We note that "11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) was enacted without any
reported legislative history." Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54
B.R. 75, 76 (Bankr.D.Minn.1985). Whether § 523(a)(9) bars the
discharge of debts arising from the intoxicated operation of a
motorboat is an issue of first impression in this circuit. The
only two other reported cases addressing the issue reached opposite
results. Compare Radivoj v. Williams (In re Williams), 101 B.R.
356, 358 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1989) aff'd, 111 B.R. 361 (S.D.Fla.1989)
(holding that § 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code includes
motorboats) with Willison v. Race (In re Race), 159 B.R. 857, 860-
61 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1993) (holding that § 523(a)(9) does not include
motorboats).
4
the term is ambiguous will we proceed beyond the language as
written. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at
1030. The dictionary defines "motor vehicle" as "an automotive
vehicle not operated on rails; esp: one with rubber tires for use
on highways." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 775 (1986); see
also RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 871 (revised ed. 1980) (defining
"motor vehicle" as "any transportation vehicle designed for use on
highways, as an automobile, bus, or truck"). Additionally,
Congress has used "motor vehicle" to refer exclusively to
automobiles in other statutes. For example, Chapter 301 of the
Transportation Code defines "motor vehicle" as "any vehicle driven
or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the
public streets, roads and highways, but does not include a vehicle
operated only on a rail line." 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6).6
The above definitions comport with our understanding that the
plain and common meaning of the term "motor vehicle" does not
include motorboats. Had Congress intended to include motorboats
within § 523(a)(9), they would have either defined the term "motor
vehicle" to include motorboats or added motorboats to the
exception. It is not the job of the courts to legislate, and the
Supreme Court has counseled that where the statutory language is
6
In addition, we note that Congress consistently refers to
motor vehicles and water craft separately in its enactments. See,
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (defining "passenger carrier" to mean
"passenger motor vehicle, aircraft, boat, ship, or other similar
means of transportation"); 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (discussing the use
of "motor vehicles, motorized equipment, and motorboats"); 22
U.S.C. § 4304a(a)(2) (setting insurance requirements for "motor
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft").
5
plain, "the sole function of the court is to enforce it according
to its terms." Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. at 241, 109
S.Ct. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district
court erred in reading the term "motor vehicle" in § 523(a)(9) of
the Bankruptcy Code to include motorboats.7 See Willison v. Race
(In re Race), 159 B.R. 857, 860-61 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1993) (resisting
the urge "to give effect to a perceived goal of Congress" and
holding that the plain language of § 523(a)(9) does not include
motorboats). Accordingly, we hold that § 523(a)(9) does not
encompass motorboats, and therefore does not bar the discharge of
Greenway's debt.8
III
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in upholding
the bankruptcy court's ruling that Plaintiffs were collaterally
estopped from litigating whether Greenway's actions were willful
7
We reject the plaintiffs contention that we should parse the
term "motor vehicle" into its component parts, thereby defining the
term as any "vehicle" or "conveyance" that is powered by a
mechanized motor. Such a technical definition of the term "motor
vehicle" would result in including within the statute motorized
wheelchairs, golf carts, riding lawn mowers, and perhaps even
certain children's toys. Reading the term in this way would be
overbroad, and would not comport with the Supreme Court's view that
in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, we must try to discern the
"natural reading" of the language in question. Ron Pair
Enterprises, 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1030.
8
Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that we are
bound to construe the exceptions contained in § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code narrowly and in favor of the debtor. See Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Case (In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th
Cir.1991) ("Any exception to the general discharge of a debtor's
debts is strictly governed by the Code and construed narrowly in
favor of the debtor and against the creditor requesting the
determination.").
6
and malicious under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, a finding
which would disallow the discharge of Greenway's debt. The
preclusive effect of a state court judgment is a question of law
that we review de novo. Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d
677, 679 (5th Cir.1995). A state court judgment's preclusive
effect on a subsequent federal action is determined by the full
faith and credit statute, which provides that state proceedings
"shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State ... from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738;
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
380, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). Under this
statute, we must look to the rules of preclusion of the state in
which the judgment was rendered in order to determine the
judgment's preclusive effects. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380, 105 S.Ct.
at 1332. Because Greenway's state judgment was entered by a Texas
court, we apply Texas preclusion rules. Garner, 56 F.3d at 679.
Under Texas law, "collateral estoppel bars relitigation of
any ultimate issue of fact actually litigated and essential to the
judgment in a prior suit." Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663
S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984); see also Barr v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.1992) (stating that collateral
estoppel "prevents relitigation of particular issues already
resolved in a prior suit"). To determine whether this standard has
been met, "a party must establish that (1) the facts sought to be
litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in
7
the prior action, (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in
the first case, and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the
first action." Bonniwell, 663 S.W.2d at 818; see also Amica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moak, 55 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1995)
(quoting Bonniwell, 663 S.W.2d at 818). The Plaintiffs were
adverse to Greenway in the state trial, and do not dispute that
gross negligence was adequately litigated. Nor do the Plaintiffs
dispute that the facts sought to be litigated in the bankruptcy
court were essential to the judgment in the state trial.
Therefore, we must determine whether the jury's refusal to find
gross negligence in the state trial necessarily determined that
Greenway's conduct was not "willful and malicious" under §
523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. In the state court proceeding,
gross negligence was defined to the jury as "such an entire wont of
care as to establish that the act or omission in question was the
result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, welfare and
safety of the persons affected thereby."9 Conscious indifference
is the salient element of gross negligence under Texas law. See
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.1994)
(tracing development of Texas law on gross negligence). We have
consistently defined "willful and malicious" under § 523(a)(6) of
the Bankruptcy Code to mean "intentional" and lacking "just cause
or excuse." See Garner, 56 F.3d at 681 (listing cases). Comparing
Texas' standard for gross negligence with the language of §
9
Pursuant to Texas law, the jury was asked in "Question 9,"
"Was such negligence by John Greenway gross negligence?" The jury
answered, "No."
8
523(a)(6), we agree with the district court that the jury's refusal
to find that Greenway acted with "actual conscious indifference"
necessarily precludes a subsequent finding that Greenway's actions
were both "intentional" and without "just cause or excuse."
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's holding that the
Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating whether
Greenway's actions were willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6) of
the Bankruptcy Code.
IV
We REVERSE the district court's order insofar as it includes
motorboats within the term "motor vehicle" under § 523(a)(9) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and we hold that § 523(a)(9) does not bar the
discharge of Greenway's debt. We AFFIRM the district court's order
insofar as it holds that Greenway's acquittal for gross negligence
in his state jury trial collaterally estops the Plaintiffs from
seeking to litigate whether Greenway's actions were "willful and
malicious" under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Because
neither of the exceptions at issue here disallows the discharge of
Greenway's debt in bankruptcy, we RENDER judgment in favor of
Greenway.
9