Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
April 14, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
130190 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
IN RE CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE Robert P. Young, Jr.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Stephen J. Markman,
Justices
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________________/
PAUL VELIZ, et al,
Plaintiffs,
and
DAVID A. ABNEY, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v SC: 130190
CA-9: 04-16843
ND Cal: CV-03-1180-SBA
CINTAS CORPORATION, et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the question certified by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is considered, and the Court respectfully declines the request to
answer the certified question.
YOUNG, J., concurs and states as follows:
I concur in the Court's decision to decline the request of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to answer its question concerning our Minimum Wage
Law, MCL 408.381 et seq.
I have previously expostulated at length concerning why I believe that this Court
lacks the constitutional authority to provide such "advisory opinions" to the federal
courts. See In re Certified Question (Melson v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc), 472 Mich 1225
(2005) (Young, J., concurring). While I rely on all the reasons I have laboriously, but
thus far unpersuasively, stated previously on the question of our lack of authority, I write
here to note, not only does this Court lack constitutional authority to provide an “advisory
lesson on Michigan law” for the Ninth Circuit, but that the parties who sought
2
certification by the Ninth Circuit have failed even to bother to comply with the
requirements of MCR 7.305(B). That rule outlines procedures by which a federal court
may seek such gratuitous advice from this Court. The parties apparently have so little
regard for our procedures that they failed to follow (or ignored) the obligation of our rule
to file conforming briefs and a joint appendix with this Court (MCR 7.305[B][3]).
Admittedly, these are "mere" procedures that impede the march to provide a
federal court a didactic exegesis on our law. However, failure to abide by the controlling
rules of the state court concerning certified questions has been a sufficient basis for other
state courts to decline a federal court's request to answer a certified question. See
Diamond Club v Ins Co of North America, 984 F2d 746, 747-748, (CA 6, 1993) (Ohio
Supreme Court refused to answer a certified question because the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals failed to comply with Ohio’s rules.).
We hold parties over whom we actually do have jurisdiction to meticulous
compliance with our rules. I see no reason why we should accord parties over which we
have no authority to a lesser standard of compliance. This alone is a sufficient reason for
me to decline to answer the Ninth Circuit's certified question in this case.
Finally, I appreciate my dissenting colleague’s concerns that federal courts should
not misconstrue Michigan law or disrespect our state’s judicial system.1 However
laudatory these prudential considerations may be, I do not believe they are a legitimate
basis for exceeding our constitutionally limited “judicial power.” As I have stated
elsewhere, the limit on our judicial power precludes this Court from issuing nonbinding
advisory opinions. In re Certified Question, supra at 1225. Hence, this Court has not
“default[ed] on its responsibility” by adhering to the constitutional constraints imposed
by the people of this state. Rather, we have honored our responsibility.
KELLY, J., would answer the certified question.
MARKMAN, J., dissents and states as follows:
For the reasons set forth in my statement in In re Certified Questions, 472 Mich
1225 (2005) -- in particular out of a sense of comity with the certifying court and in order
to maintain the integrity of Michigan law -- I would hold hearings and promptly answer
1
I note that this Court is obliged to construe federal law without the assistance of a
certification process. That we lack such a vehicle in no way undermines our obligation to
apply federal law faithfully in our cases. I see no basis for concluding that federal courts
will be less dedicated to their task than we are to ours. Therefore, it is not apparent to me
why our decision not to answer the certified question is detrimental and deleterious to our
federal structure.
3
the certified question submitted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. By choosing not
to do so, this Court defaults on its responsibility to exercise its judicial powers in support
of Michigan's sovereignty within our Constitution's system of federalism.
Having already deterred the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals from seeking the
guidance of this Court concerning the meaning of Michigan law -- guidance routinely
offered by nearly every other supreme court in the union -- it is apparently now this
Court's determination to deter all other federal courts in a similar fashion.
The confusion of one of my colleagues is reflected in a concurring statement that
seems to chastise the Ninth Circuit for its impositions upon this Court in certifying a
question. Instead of recognizing that the Ninth Circuit has sought to accord respect to the
complementary roles of the federal and state judiciaries within our constitutional system,
and to defer to this state in its understanding of its own laws, the concurring Justice is
troubled that the Ninth Circuit would seek "gratuitous advice" from this Court, rather
than just plowing ahead with its own interpretation of Michigan law and ignoring the
judicial process established by the people of this state for giving meaning to their laws.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 14, 2006 _________________________________________
d0411 Clerk