Snedeker v. Will County State's Attorney's Office

2022 IL App (3d) 210133

Opinion filed November 15, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022

ROBERT SNEDEKER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Will County, Illinois,
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-21-0133
) Circuit No. 20-CH-690
THE WILL COUNTY STATE’S )
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, )
) Honorable John C. Anderson,
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice Hauptman concurred in the judgment and
opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Petitioner, Robert Snedeker (a Michigan resident), filed a petition pursuant to section 10(c)

of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (Act) (430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2020)), seeking

the restoration of his firearms rights. Respondent, the Will County State’s Attorney’s Office, filed

a motion to dismiss the petition. The trial court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant

relief to a non-Illinois resident and dismissed the petition. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 As a result of a 2009 conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery in Illinois, petitioner is

prohibited from possessing a firearm under Illinois law (id. § 8(l)) and federal law (18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(9) (2018)). Petitioner resided in Will County, Illinois, at the time of his conviction.

Subsequently, petitioner moved to Michigan.

¶4 On August 26, 2020, petitioner filed a petition in Will County pursuant to section 10(c) of

the Act. He sought the restoration of his firearm rights. Petitioner did not seek a Firearm Owner’s

Identification (FOID) card as relief. Instead, he sought only the removal of the prohibition against

obtaining a FOID card. He attached a copy of an order entered by a Michigan court restoring his

gun rights. However, he noted that he must have his rights restored in Illinois so that he is no longer

prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law.

¶5 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)). Respondent argued that section 10(c) of the Act only

provided relief to Illinois residents. According to respondent, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

hear the petition as petitioner no longer lived in Illinois.

¶6 Ultimately, the trial court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief to

petitioner due to his status as a non-Illinois resident. The court dismissed the petition. Petitioner

appeals.

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 On appeal, the specific question we must consider is whether a non-Illinois resident with

an Illinois conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery may petition the trial court to have their

civil rights restored under section 10(c) of the Act. This is a question of statutory interpretation,

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which we review de novo. People v. Manning, 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16. In relevant part, section 10

of the Act provides:

“(a) Whenever an application for a Firearm Owner’s

Identification Card is denied *** or whenever such a Card is

revoked or seized as provided for in Section 8 of this Act, the

aggrieved party may appeal to the Director of State Police for a

hearing upon such denial, revocation or seizure, unless the denial,

revocation, or seizure was based upon a forcible felony, stalking,

aggravated stalking, domestic battery, any violation of the Illinois

Controlled Substances Act, the Methamphetamine Control and

Community Protection Act, or the Cannabis Control Act that is

classified as a Class 2 or greater felony, any felony violation of

Article 24 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of

2012, or any adjudication as a delinquent minor for the commission

of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony, in

which case the aggrieved party may petition the circuit court in

writing in the county of his or her residence for a hearing upon such

denial, revocation, or seizure.

***

(c) Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under

Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring

a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under Section 8 of this Act

may apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit court

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 in the county where the petitioner resides, whichever is applicable

in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section, requesting relief

from such prohibition and the Director or court may grant such relief

if it is established by the applicant to the court’s or the Director’s

satisfaction that [five factors have been met.]” 430 ILCS 65/10(a),

(c) (West 2020).

¶9 In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition based on respondent’s contention that it

lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition filed by a nonresident. The trial court relied on the portion

of section 10(c), which requires an individual to “petition the circuit court in the county where the

petitioner resides” to conclude that relief under section 10(c) is only available to Illinois residents.

(Emphasis added.) See id. § 10(c). Given that petitioner did not reside in Illinois, the court found

petitioner was not entitled to relief under section 10(c).

¶ 10 The purpose of the Act is to establish a

“system of Firearm Owner’s Identification Cards, thereby

establishing a practical and workable system by which law

enforcement authorities will be afforded an opportunity to identify

those persons who are prohibited by Section 24-3.1 of the Criminal

Code of 2012, from acquiring or possessing firearms and firearm

ammunition and who are prohibited by this Act from acquiring stun

guns and tasers.” Id. § 1.

The Act creates an administrative process in which the Illinois State Police is tasked with the

issuance, revocation, and seizure of FOID cards. See id. §§ 5, 8. The Illinois State Police is also

tasked with monitoring databases for firearms prohibitors and maintain those records with FOID

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 card holders to ensure compliance with the Act. See 430 ILCS 65/8.5 (West Supp. 2021). This is

an administrative process subject to administrative review. In contrast to courts’ broad subject

matter jurisdiction with regard to most disputes, “[t]he circuit and appellate courts have jurisdiction

to review administrative agency actions only as provided by statute.” State of Illinois ex rel.

Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 13 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,

§§ 6, 9). Whether section 10(c) permits petitioner to seek relief is a question of jurisdiction.

¶ 11 Now, we must determine whether relief under section 10(c) of the Act is available only to

Illinois residents. This is a question of statutory interpretation. The primary objective of statutory

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Evans v. Cook County State’s

Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of

the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 24. When

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written without resort

to aids of statutory construction. People v. Howard, 228 Ill. 2d 428, 438 (2008). We may not depart

from a statute’s plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature

did not express. People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2006). Courts should not attempt to read a

statute other than in the manner it was written. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,

226 Ill. 2d 559, 567 (2007).

¶ 12 To best understand petitioner’s argument, we first review the procedure set forth in section

10. Section 10 provides two distinct tracks for appeals from adverse decisions of Illinois State

Police. Hanson v. De Kalb County State’s Attorney’s Office, 391 Ill. App. 3d 902, 910-11 (2009).

First, section 10(a) applies to individuals challenging the Illinois State Police’s decisions regarding

the issuance, revocation, or seizure of a FOID card. Id. Second, section 10(c) applies to “[a]ny

person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1 of the Criminal Code

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 of 2012 or acquiring a [FOID] Card under Section 8 of [the] Act.” 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2020).

Petitioner in this case is prohibited from obtaining a FOID card under section 8 of the Act.

Therefore, he must seek relief under the second track provided by section 10(c). Section 10(c)

provides:

“(c) Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under

Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring

a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under Section 8 of this Act

may apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit court

in the county where the petitioner resides, whichever is applicable

in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section, requesting relief

from such prohibition and the Director or court may grant such relief

if it is established by the applicant to the court’s or the Director’s

satisfaction that [five factors have been met.]” Id.

¶ 13 We find the plain language of section 10(c) is unambiguous in that relief under it is limited

to Illinois residents. To begin with, section 10(c) requires an individual to “petition the circuit court

in the county where the petitioner resides.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, an individual must be an

Illinois resident to file their petition in the circuit court. Petitioner is a Michigan resident and is not

permitted to obtain relief under the plain language of section 10(c).

¶ 14 In addition, the only relief available under the portion of section 10(c) that petitioner sought

relief under is the issuance of a FOID card. Section 10(c) applies in two situations. First, persons

“prohibited from possessing a firearm under Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1 of the Criminal Code of

2012” may seek relief from such prohibition. Id. Petitioner is not seeking relief under this

provision. He is prohibited from acquiring a FOID card under section 8 of the Act due to his

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 conviction for domestic battery. Therefore, he relies on the second provision, which allows persons

prohibited from “acquiring a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under Section 8” of the Act to

seek relief from such prohibition. Id. This provision applies to individuals seeking to restore their

firearms rights so that they may acquire a FOID card. In other words, the end result under section

10(c) is the issuance of a FOID card. This presumes the individual is eligible to obtain a FOID

card, but only Illinois residents may apply for a FOID card. Id. § 4(a)(2)(xiv) (residency

requirement). Therefore, section 10(c) only applies to Illinois residents. Contrary to petitioner’s

assertion, section 10(c) does not provide a general process to restore an individual’s firearms

rights. Instead, it is intended to provide a process through which individuals acquire a FOID card.

¶ 15 In sum, we find that the plain language of section 10(c) of the Act creates a procedure

intended only for Illinois residents. Given that petitioner is a Michigan resident, he is not entitled

to relief under section 10(c). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it dismissed his petition

seeking to restore his firearms rights.

¶ 16 In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioner’s reliance on the Illinois State Police’s

website. The website has a “Frequently Asked Questions” section. See Office of Firearms Safety

FAQs, Ill. State Police, https://isp.illinois.gov/FirearmsSafety/FAQs (last visited Nov. 1, 2022)

[https://perma.cc/34ML-UFBV]. One question is, “I was convicted of a Felony in Illinois but no

longer live in Illinois. I would like to purchase a firearm in my current state of residence. What

can I do to appeal this firearm prohibitor?” Id. The answer provided is: “You may file an appeal

in Illinois. Please contact the Office of Firearms Safety *** to request additional information.”

Id. Petitioner argues that this court should adopt the Illinois State Police’s interpretation.

However, a reviewing court is not bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute.

Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455,

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 471 (2005) (citing Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210,

214 (1994)). As discussed above, the plain language of section 10(c) establishes that relief is

only available to Illinois residents. We will not depart from the plain language.

¶ 17 We acknowledge that the plain language of section 10(c) may appear unfair to nonresidents

with Illinois convictions. Petitioner is understandably placed in a difficult position given that he

cannot seek to restore his firearms rights unless he moves back to Illinois. It is also arguably unfair

given that an Illinois resident who is convicted in another state must have their rights restored in

the convicting state in order to possess a firearm in Illinois. See Beecham v. United States, 511

U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (the law of the convicting jurisdiction governs whether an individual’s civil

rights have been restored); Brown v. Illinois State Police, 2021 IL 126153. However, when

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written. Howard, 228

Ill. 2d at 438.

¶ 18 Further, Illinois is not constitutionally required to provide a process for individuals to

restore their firearms rights. McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (2d Cir. 1995). The

ability to restore firearms rights is a “a measure by which the government relieves an offender of

some or all of the consequences of his conviction,” and “extend[s] to an offender a measure of

forgiveness.” Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26, 32 (2007). To that end, “Congress sought

to accommodate a state’s judgment that a particular person *** is, despite a prior conviction,

sufficiently trustworthy to possess firearms.” McGrath, 60 F.3d at 1009. Our legislature may have

determined that our state could not properly make a judgment as to whether an out-of-state resident

is sufficiently trustworthy to possess a firearm. While reasonable minds can differ as to the fairness

of Illinois’s procedure, “whether a statute is wise and whether it is the best means to achieve the

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 desired result are matters for the legislature, not the courts.” Moline School District No. 40 Board

of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 28.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

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 Snedeker v. Will County State’s Attorney’s Office, 2022 IL App (3d) 210133

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 20-CH-690;
the Hon. John Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Bryant Chavez, of Bryant Chavez Law Office, LLC, of Chicago,
for and David G. Sigale, of Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., of
Appellant: Wheaton, for appellant.

Attorneys James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Scott Pyles, Philip
for A. Mock, and Kevin Meyers, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
Appellee: counsel), for appellee.

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