People v. Schaefer

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

JULY 27, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 126067

DAVID WILLIAM SCHAEFER,

Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127142

JAMES RICHARD LARGE,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

YOUNG, J.

We granted leave to appeal in these cases and ordered

that they be argued and submitted together to clarify the

elements of operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence of liquor and causing death (“OUIL causing

death”), MCL 257.625(4). In addressing this issue, we
revisit our decision in People v Lardie,1 which held, inter

alia, that to convict a defendant of OUIL causing death,

the prosecution must prove “that the defendant’s

intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the victim’s

death.”2

We conclude that the Lardie Court erred in holding

that the defendant’s “intoxicated driving”3 must be a

substantial cause of the victim’s death. The plain text of

§ 625(4) does not require that the prosecution prove the

defendant’s intoxicated state affected his or her operation

of the motor vehicle. Indeed, § 625(4) requires no causal

link at all between the defendant’s intoxication and the

victim’s death. The statute requires that the defendant’s

operation of the motor vehicle, not the defendant’s

intoxicated manner of driving, must cause the victim’s

death. The defendant’s status as “intoxicated” is a

separate element of the offense of OUIL causing death. It

specifies the class of persons subject to liability under §

625(4): intoxicated drivers.

1
452 Mich 231; 551 NW2d 656 (1996).
2
Id. at 259-260 (emphasis added).
3
Id. at 234 (emphasis in original).

2

 Quite simply, by enacting § 625(4), the Legislature

intended to punish “operating while intoxicated,” not

“operating in an intoxicated manner.” Therefore, to the

extent that Lardie held that the defendant’s intoxicated

driving must be a substantial cause of the victim’s death,

it is overruled.4

Accordingly, in People v Schaefer, we vacate the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the

Court of Appeals to address defendant’s remaining argument

that the trial court erred so as to require reversal in

making repeated references to defendant’s stipulation as to

his 0.16 blood-alcohol level during the jury instructions.

In People v Large, we reverse the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and remand the case to the district court for

reconsideration of whether to bind defendant over on the

charge of OUIL causing death in light of the principles set

forth in this opinion.

4
We do not disturb our other holdings in Lardie, including
that the prosecution need not prove negligence or gross
negligence by the defendant, that the defendant must have
“voluntarily” decided to drive “knowing that he had
consumed an intoxicating liquor,” and that § 625(4)
comports with constitutional due process principles. Id.
at 249-251, 265-267.

3

 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. PEOPLE V SCHAEFER

In January 2002, defendant was driving on Interstate-

75 in the city of Lincoln Park with his friend as a

passenger in the vehicle. Defendant admitted that he

consumed three beers before getting behind the wheel.5

According to several eyewitnesses, defendant was tailgating

various cars and driving erratically.

While on the freeway, defendant’s passenger abruptly

told him that they had reached their freeway exit.

Defendant swerved to exit the freeway, hit the curb, and

lost control of the car. The car rolled over, killing the

passenger. Defendant stipulated at trial that he had a

0.16 blood-alcohol level almost three hours after the

accident.6

Defendant was charged with OUIL causing death7 and

manslaughter with a motor vehicle.8 At trial, a defense

5
Defendant denied drinking the beer contained in the empty
bottles found in his vehicle. He claimed that the bottles
were left over from a party.
6
At the time defendant was charged, § 625(1) set the
statutory intoxication threshold at a blood-alcohol content
of 0.10 grams per one hundred milliliters. Pursuant to
2003 PA 61, however, the statutory intoxication threshold
has been reduced from 0.10 to 0.08.
7
MCL 257.625(4).

4

expert witness testified that the exit ramp was safe for

speeds up to thirty miles per hour, but dangerous at any

greater speed. He stated that he would have expected

numerous accidents, including rollovers, during the thirty-

six years that the ramp was in existence and that he was

surprised to learn that there had been no other rollover

accidents in over twenty years.

In instructing the jury, instead of reading the

standard instruction for OUIL causing death, CJI2d 15.11,9

8
MCL 750.321.
9
CJI2d 15.11 provided at the time:

(1) The defendant is charged with the
crime of operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor . . . or
with an unlawful bodily alcohol level, or
while impaired, and in so doing, causing the
death of another person. To prove this
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

* * *

(4) Third, that the defendant was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor . . .,
or had an unlawful bodily alcohol level, or
was impaired while [he / she] was operating
the vehicle.

(5) Fourth, that the defendant voluntarily
decided to drive knowing that [he / she] had
consumed alcohol . . . and might be
intoxicated.

5

the trial court read the text of the OUIL causing death

statute. When the jury asked for additional instructions

during deliberations, the trial court said all it could do

was tell them what the statute said. Thus, the court again

read the statute to the jury. The jury convicted defendant

of OUIL causing death and negligent homicide.10 Defendant

was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fifty months to

fifteen years for OUIL causing death and one to two years

for negligent homicide.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s

negligent homicide conviction, but reversed his conviction

of OUIL causing death.11 In a two-to-one decision, the

Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury because it did not inform the jury

that defendant’s intoxicated driving must be a “substantial

cause” of the victim’s death, as required by Lardie.12 The

(6) Fifth, that the defendant’s
intoxicated [or impaired] driving was a
substantial cause of the victim’s death.
10
Negligent homicide, MCL 750.324, is a lesser-included
offense of manslaughter with a motor vehicle. MCL 750.325;
People v Weeder, 469 Mich 493, 497-498; 674 NW2d 372
(2004).
11
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 25, 2004
(Docket No. 245175).
12
Id., slip op at 5.

6

dissent concluded that the trial court properly instructed

the jury on the causation element of OUIL causing death by

reading the statute to the jury. We granted the

prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and ordered

that this case be argued and submitted with People v

Large.13

B. PEOPLE V LARGE

In July 2003, while driving on a road in Jackson

County, defendant struck and killed an eleven-year-old girl

who was riding her bicycle in the late afternoon. The girl

emerged onto the road after descending from an elevated

driveway, the street view of which was partially obstructed

by vegetation. The bicycle that she was riding did not

have any brakes. Defendant was driving approximately five

miles an hour over the posted speed limit of fifty-five

miles per hour. Despite swerving in an attempt to avoid

hitting the girl, the two collided. At the time of the

accident, defendant had a 0.10 blood-alcohol level.

Defendant was charged with manslaughter with a motor

vehicle,14 OUIL causing death,15 OUIL (second offense),16 and

13
471 Mich 923 (2004).
14
MCL 750.321.
15
MCL 257.625(4).

7

violation of license restrictions.17 At defendant’s

preliminary examination, the prosecution called a sheriff’s

deputy who testified as an expert witness in accident

reconstruction. The deputy testified that the accident was

unavoidable, opining that the collision still would have

occurred had defendant been sober and driving the speed

limit. According to the deputy, a sober driver would have

required at least 1 1/2 seconds to notice the girl and

attempt to avoid hitting her. On the basis of his

investigation, the deputy concluded that the girl emerged

onto the road, and the impact occurred, all within less

than one second.

The district court bound defendant over on all counts

except OUIL causing death. On appeal to the circuit court,

the court refused to reinstate the charge of OUIL causing

death.18 The prosecution then appealed to the Court of

Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court.19 Relying on

Lardie, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he prosecution

16
MCL 257.625(1).
17
MCL 257.312.
18
The circuit court also dismissed the manslaughter charge
and remanded the case to the district court on the two
remaining misdemeanor counts.
19
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 10, 2004
(Docket No. 253261).

8

failed to present sufficient evidence to justify a finding

that defendant’s intoxicated driving was a substantial

cause of the victim’s death . . . .”20 In refusing to

entertain the prosecutor’s argument that Lardie was wrongly

decided, the Court of Appeals stated that “‘[a] decision of

the Supreme Court is binding upon this Court until the

Supreme Court overrules itself.’ Therefore, we may not

revisit the holding of Lardie.”21 We granted the

prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and ordered

that this case be argued and submitted with People v

Schaefer.22

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is

reviewed by this Court de novo.23 Similarly, jury

instructions that involve questions of law are also

reviewed de novo.24 In reviewing a district court’s

decision to bind over a defendant, the lower court’s

20
Id., slip op at 4.

21
Id. (citation omitted).

22
471 Mich 923 (2004).

23
People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 61; 679 NW2d 41 (2004);

People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 253; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

24
People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418; 670 NW2d 655 (2003);

People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003).

9

determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but the lower court’s

rulings based on questions of law are reviewed de novo.25

III. ANALYSIS

A. MCL 257.625(4)

Our Legislature first enacted the “OUIL causing death”

statute as part of 1991 PA 98 in an attempt to increase the

criminal penalties associated with driving while

intoxicated.26 The Legislature evidently believed that

sentences resulting from involuntary manslaughter and

negligent homicide convictions inadequately deterred

intoxicated drivers from getting behind the wheel.27 Thus,

to address this concern, the Legislature enacted the OUIL

causing death statute, which provides more severe

penalties, with the apparent expectation that these

heightened penalties would deter intoxicated individuals

from driving.

Our OUIL causing death statute, MCL 257.625(4),

provides:

25
People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126-127; 659 NW2d 604
(2003); People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 452; 475 NW2d 288
(1991).
26
Lardie, supra at 253 & n 33.
27
Id. at 246-247, 253.

10

 A person, whether licensed or not, who
operates a motor vehicle in violation of
subsection (1) [under the influence of
alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or
a combination of alcoholic liquor and a
controlled substance, or having an unlawful
body alcohol content], (3) [visibly impaired
by the consumption of alcoholic liquor, a
controlled substance, or a combination of
alcoholic liquor and a controlled substance],
or (8) [any body content of a schedule 1
controlled substance] and by the operation of
that motor vehicle causes the death of
another person is guilty of a crime as
follows:

(a) . . . [A] felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a
fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than
$10,000.00, or both. [28]

B. PEOPLE V LARDIE

In People v Lardie, this Court was presented with a

due process challenge to the OUIL causing death statute.29

The defendants in the two consolidated cases in Lardie

alleged that § 625(4) imposed criminal liability without

requiring a culpable mental state. In rejecting the

defendants’ due process arguments, this Court held that

28
MCL 257.625(4) (emphasis added). The reference to
subsection 8—intoxication by a schedule 1 controlled
substance—in § 625(4) was added as part of 2003 PA 61. At
the time that defendants Schaefer and Large were charged, §
625(4) referenced only subsections 1 and 3.
29
Although § 625(4) has been amended since our decision in
Lardie, none of the amendments limits the holding of Lardie
or is otherwise material to the resolution of the present
cases.

11

OUIL causing death is a general intent crime and that “the

culpable act that the Legislature wishes to prevent is the

one in which a person becomes intoxicated and then decides

to drive.”30 We further held that “there is no requirement

[under § 625(4)] that the people prove gross negligence or

negligence” because “the Legislature essentially has

presumed that driving while intoxicated is gross negligence

as a matter of law.”31

This Court then proceeded to examine the causation

element of the OUIL causing death offense, stating:

The Legislature passed [§ 625(4)] in order
to reduce the number of alcohol-related
traffic fatalities. The Legislature sought to
deter drivers who are “willing to risk
current penalties” from drinking and driving.
In seeking to reduce fatalities by deterring
drunken driving, the statute must have been
designed to punish drivers when their drunken
driving caused another’s death. Otherwise,
the statute would impose a penalty on a
driver even when his wrongful decision to
drive while intoxicated had no bearing on the
death that resulted. Such an interpretation
of the statute would produce an absurd result
by divorcing the defendant’s fault from the
resulting injury. We seek to avoid such an
interpretation.[32]

30
Lardie, supra at 245. We stated, “[t]he Legislature must
reasonably have intended that the people prove a mens rea
by demonstrating that the defendant purposefully drove
while intoxicated or, in other words, that he had the
general intent to perform the wrongful act.” Id. at 256.
31
Id. at 249, 251.
32
Id. at 256-257 (emphasis in original).

12

Thus, relying on policy justifications and its belief that

a contrary construction would lead to an “absurd result,”

the Lardie Court held that “in proving causation, the

people must establish that the particular defendant's

decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in

that driver's operation of the vehicle that caused the

death of the victim.”33 According to the Lardie Court,

“[i]t is the change that such intoxication produces, and

whether it caused the death, which is the focus of [the

causation] element of the crime.”34

The Lardie Court summarized the three distinct

elements the prosecution must prove in securing a

conviction for OUIL causing death:

(1) [That] the defendant was operating his
motor vehicle while he was intoxicated, (2)
that he voluntarily decided to drive knowing
that he had consumed alcohol and might be
intoxicated, and (3) that the defendant's
intoxicated driving was a substantial cause
of the victim's death.[35]

C. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

When interpreting a statute, it is the court’s duty to

give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed

33
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).

34
Id. at 258 n 47 (emphasis in original).

35
Id. at 259-260 (emphasis added).

13

in the actual language used in the statute.36 It is the

role of the judiciary to interpret, not write, the law.37 If

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the

statute is enforced as written.38 Judicial construction is

neither necessary nor permitted because it is presumed that

the Legislature intended the clear meaning it expressed.39

D. THE CAUSATION ELEMENT OF § 625(4)

The plain text of § 625(4) requires no causal link

between the defendant’s intoxication and the victim’s

death.40 Section 625(4) provides, “A person, whether

licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle [while

intoxicated] and by the operation of that motor vehicle

36
Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 576; 683 NW2d 129 (2004);
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d
300 (2000).
37
Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645
NW2d 34 (2002); State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins
Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002).
38
People v Laney, 470 Mich 267, 271; 680 NW2d 888 (2004);
People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 395; 666 NW2d 657 (2003).
39
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d
663 (2002); People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702
(2001).
40
Defendant Schaefer admits this point, stating that “[a]
bare reading of the statute does not require that the
defendant’s intoxicated driving be a substantial cause of
the victim’s death.” Schaefer brief at 12-13 (emphasis in
original). He further states, “[t]he statute does not
require a nexus between the drunken driving, and the cause
of the accident.” Id. at 15.

14

causes the death of another person is guilty of a crime

. . . .”41 Accordingly, it is the defendant’s operation of

the motor vehicle that must cause the victim’s death, not

the defendant’s “intoxication.” While a defendant’s status

as “intoxicated” is certainly an element of the offense of

OUIL causing death, it is not a component of the causation

element of the offense. Justice Weaver succinctly stated

this point in her concurrence in Lardie:

The plain language of the statute clearly
indicates that the Legislature intended
causation to turn on the fact that the
defendant operated the vehicle while
intoxicated, rather than the changed manner
in which, or how, the defendant operated the
vehicle while intoxicated.[42]

The Lardie Court’s reliance on policy considerations

in construing § 625(4) was misplaced. It is true that the

cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect

to the intent of the Legislature.43 However, the

Legislature’s intent must be ascertained from the actual

text of the statute, not from extra-textual judicial

41
MCL 257.625(4) (emphasis added).
42
Lardie, supra at 273 (emphasis in original).
43
Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593, 598; 685 NW2d 198 (2004);
Parkwood Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n v State Housing Dev
Auth, 468 Mich 763, 772; 664 NW2d 185 (2003).

15

divinations of “what the Legislature really meant.”44 As we

stated in Lansing Mayor, supra, “rather than engaging in

legislative mind-reading to discern [legislative intent],

we believe that the best measure of the Legislature's

intent is simply the words that it has chosen to enact into

law.”45

The Lardie Court also erred in assuming that judicial

adherence to and application of the actual text of § 625(4)

“would produce an absurd result.” The result that the

Court in Lardie viewed as “absurd”–imposing criminal

liability under § 625(4) when a victim’s death is caused by

a defendant’s operation of the vehicle rather than the

defendant's intoxicated operation–reflects a policy choice

adopted by a majority of the Legislature. A court is not

free to cast aside a specific policy choice adopted on

behalf of the people of the state by their elected

representatives in the Legislature simply because the court

would prefer a different policy choice. To do so would be

to empower the least politically accountable branch of

government with unbridled policymaking power. Such a model

44
See Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 164;
680 NW2d 840 (2004); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465
Mich 732, 762; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).
45
Lansing Mayor, supra at 164.

16

of government was not envisioned by the people of Michigan

in ratifying our Constitution, and modifying our structure

of government by judicial fiat will not be endorsed by this

Court.

Instead, we must construe the causation element of §

625(4) according to the actual text of the statute.

Section 625(4) plainly requires that the victim’s death be

caused by the defendant’s operation of the vehicle, not the

defendant’s intoxicated operation. Thus, the manner in

which the defendant’s intoxication affected his or her

operation of the vehicle is unrelated to the causation

element of the crime. The defendant’s status as

“intoxicated” is a separate element of the offense used to

identify the class of persons subject to liability under §

625(4).46

46
The flaw in the Lardie Court’s analysis is readily
apparent when one considers the closely analogous crime of
operating a vehicle with a suspended or revoked license and
causing death. MCL 257.904(4). The text of § 904(4)
parallels the language in § 625(4). Section 904(4)
provides:

A person who operates a motor vehicle
[under a suspended or revoked license] and
who, by operation of that motor vehicle,
causes the death of another person is guilty
of a felony . . . . [Emphasis added.]

Under the Lardie Court’s rationale, § 904(4) would
require that the defendant’s suspension or revocation
somehow affect (i.e., be a “substantial cause” of) the

17

 Accordingly, we overrule Lardie only to the extent it

held that the prosecution must prove “that the defendant’s

intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the victim’s

death.”47 We hold that the prosecution, in proving OUIL

causing death, must establish beyond a reasonable doubt

that (1) the defendant was operating his or her motor

vehicle in violation of MCL 257.625(1), (3), or (8); (2)

the defendant voluntarily decided to drive, knowing that he

or she had consumed an intoxicating agent and might be

intoxicated; and (3) the defendant’s operation of the motor

vehicle caused the victim’s death.48

It is ironic that the Lardie Court recognized that the

Legislature’s intent in passing § 625(4) was “to deter

manner by which the defendant operates the vehicle before
criminal liability may be imposed. There is obviously no
textual basis for such a conclusion, just as there was no
such basis in Lardie. As Justice Weaver pointed out in her
concurrence in Lardie, the Lardie majority fundamentally
misunderstood the nature of a “status crime.” Lardie,
supra at 271 n 8. The Lardie majority mistakenly took the
status element of the crime—that the defendant was
intoxicated—and fused it with the causation element of the
offense. Therefore, to the extent that the Lardie Court
was simply attempting to articulate a proximate cause
requirement by creating its “substantial cause” test, the
Lardie Court erred in conflating the “status” and
“causation” elements of the crime.
47
Lardie, supra at 259-260 (emphasis added). As mentioned
in note 4 of this opinion, we do not disturb the other
holdings in Lardie.
48
MCL 257.625(4); cf. Lardie, supra at 259.

18

th[e] gravely dangerous conduct”49 of driving while

intoxicated, yet interpreted § 625(4) in such a way so as

to limit substantially the applicability of § 625(4) beyond

that which the Legislature envisioned. As Justice Weaver

noted in her Lardie concurrence, the Lardie majority’s

“demanding burden of proof”–requiring the prosecution to

show that the defendant’s intoxication changed his or her

manner of operation–“was not intended by the Legislature

and is not found in the language of the statute.”50 Unlike

the Lardie Court, we believe that the best way to “deter

this gravely dangerous conduct” is to enforce the statute

as written and thereby give the statute the teeth that the

Legislature intended.51

Having determined that § 625(4) requires the victim’s

death to be caused by the defendant’s operation of the

49
Lardie, supra at 253.
50
Id. at 272.
51
As we noted in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-
468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), we do not lightly overrule
precedent. However, we do not believe that any of the
considerations discussed in Robinson counsel against
overruling Lardie in the present cases. Notably, we find
it difficult to conceive any possible situation in which a
“reliance interest” would ever exist in the context of a
criminal statute. Additionally, as noted by Justice Weaver
in Lardie, the majority opinion in Lardie defies “practical
workability” because the “change” in operating ability due
to intoxication that the prosecution must demonstrate
creates a nearly impossible burden of proof.

19

vehicle, rather than the defendant’s intoxicated manner of

operation, we turn to the issue of defining the term

“cause.” In the criminal law context, the word “cause” has

acquired a unique, technical meaning.52 Accordingly,

pursuant to MCL 8.3a, we must construe the term “according

to [its] peculiar and appropriate meaning” in the law.53

In criminal jurisprudence, the causation element of an

offense is generally comprised of two components: factual

cause and proximate cause.54 The concept of factual

causation is relatively straightforward. In determining

whether a defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the

52
Indeed, for more than a century, this Court has
recognized that “cause” is a term of art in criminal law.
See People v Cook, 39 Mich 236 (1878); People v Rockwell,
39 Mich 503 (1878); People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 277-
280; 183 NW 177 (1921).
53
MCL 8.3a provides:

All words and phrases shall be construed
and understood according to the common and
approved usage of the language; but technical
words and phrases, and such as may have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning
in the law, shall be construed and understood
according to such peculiar and appropriate
meaning. [Emphasis added.]

See also Babcock, supra at 257-258; People v Jones, 467
Mich 301, 304-305; 651 NW2d 906 (2002).
54
People v Tims, 449 Mich 83, 95; 534 NW2d 675 (1995); see
also 1 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed), § 26;
LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 35, p 246.

20

result, one must ask, “but for” the defendant’s conduct,

would the result have occurred?55 If the result would not

have occurred absent the defendant’s conduct, then factual

causation exists.56

The existence of factual causation alone, however,

will not support the imposition of criminal liability.57

Proximate causation must also be established. As we noted

in Tims, proximate causation is a “legal colloquialism.”58

It is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal

liability from attaching when the result of the defendant’s

conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.59 Thus, a

55
Tims, supra at 95; People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 194;
148 NW 400 (1914); see also 1 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal
Law (15th ed), § 26; Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), pp 687-
688; LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 35, p 249
(1972) (“In order that conduct be the [factual] cause of a
particular result it is almost always sufficient that the
result would not have happened in the absence of the
conduct; or, putting it another way, that “but for” the
antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred.”).
56
Tims, supra at 95.
57
Tims, supra at 95.
58
Id. at 96.
59
See, e.g., Beale, The proximate consequences of an act,
33 Harv L R 633, 640 (1920).

21

proximate cause is simply a factual cause “of which the law

will take cognizance.”60

For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a

proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a “direct and

natural result” of the defendant’s actions.61 In making

this determination, it is necessary to examine whether

there was an intervening cause that superseded the

defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the

defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. If

an intervening cause did indeed supersede the defendant’s

act as a legally significant causal factor, then the

defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of

the victim’s injury.62

The standard by which to gauge whether an intervening

cause supersedes, and thus severs the causal link, is

generally one of reasonable foreseeability. For example,

suppose that a defendant stabs a victim and the victim is

60
1 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed), § 26, pp 147-
148; See also Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), p 690.
61
Barnes, supra at 198; see also 1 Torcia, Wharton’s
Criminal Law (15th ed), § 26; Perkins, Criminal Law (2d
ed), pp 690-695; LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law,
§ 35, pp 251-252 (1972); McLaughlin, Proximate cause, 39
Harv L R 149, 183 (1925).
62
Cook, supra at 239-240; Townsend, supra at 277-279;
People v Vanderford, 77 Mich App 370, 372-373; 258 NW2d 502
(1977).

22

then taken to a nearby hospital for treatment. If the

physician is negligent in providing medical care to the

victim and the victim later dies, the defendant is still

considered to have proximately caused the victim’s death

because it is reasonably foreseeable that negligent medical

care might be provided.63 At the same time, gross

negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating

physician is not reasonably foreseeable, and would thus

break the causal chain between the defendant and the

victim.64

The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis,

therefore, is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable

based on an objective standard of reasonableness. If it

was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct

will be considered a proximate cause. If, however, the

intervening act by the victim or a third party was not

reasonably foreseeable—e.g., gross negligence or

63
Cook, supra at 240. See also Perkins, Criminal Law (2d
ed), p 716 (“And negligence, unfortunately, is entirely too
frequent in human conduct to be considered ‘abnormal.’”);
LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 35, p 259 (“In
short, mere negligence in medical treatment is not so
abnormal that the defendant should be freed of
liability.”).
64
Cook, supra at 240. See also Perkins, Criminal Law (2d
ed), p 719; LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 35,
p 259.

23

intentional misconduct—then generally the causal link is

severed and the defendant’s conduct is not regarded as a

proximate cause of the victim’s injury or death.

In criminal law, “gross negligence” is not merely an

elevated or enhanced form of ordinary negligence. As we

held in Barnes, supra, in criminal jurisprudence, gross

negligence “means wantonness and disregard of the

consequences which may ensue, and indifference to the

rights of others that is equivalent to a criminal intent.”65

Accordingly, in examining the causation element of

OUIL causing death, it must first be determined whether the

defendant’s operation of the vehicle was a factual cause of

the victim’s death. If factual causation is established,

it must then be determined whether the defendant’s

operation of the vehicle was a proximate cause. In doing

so, one must inquire whether the victim’s death was a

direct and natural result of the defendant’s operation of

the vehicle and whether an intervening cause may have

superseded and thus severed the causal link.66 While an act

65
Barnes, supra at 198.
66
Justice Cavanagh suggests in his partial dissent that
both the Lardie Court and the majority in the present cases
require a “more demanding standard” of proximate cause in
the criminal context than that found in tort law. Post at
2. Justice Cavanagh mischaracterizes both Lardie and the
present cases. First, we do not read Lardie to impose the

24

of God or the gross negligence or intentional misconduct by

the victim or a third party will generally be considered a

superseding cause, ordinary negligence by the victim or a

third party will not be regarded as a superseding cause

because ordinary negligence is reasonably foreseeable.67

heightened form of proximate cause in criminal law that
Justice Cavanagh advocates. In fact, in Tims, which was
decided just one year before Lardie, we explicitly rejected
that same argument. Second, contrary to Justice Cavanagh’s
assertion, we do not adopt a heightened form of proximate
cause in the present cases. Instead, we are simply
applying the standard of proximate cause that this Court
articulated in Tims and that has existed in our criminal
jurisprudence for well over a century.
67
Had the Legislature intended to require only factual
causation and not proximate causation as well, the
Legislature would have instead used the words “results in
death” rather than “causes the death.”

Indeed, MCL 257.617, which requires motorists involved
in accidents to remain at the scene of the accident,
specifically uses the phrase “results in . . . death.”
Section 617(2) provides:

[I]f the individual [flees the scene of
an accident] and the accident results in
serious impairment of a body function or
death, the individual is guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than
5 years or by a fine of not more than
$5,000.00, or both. [Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, the Legislature is well aware of how to draft
a statute that requires only factual causation and not
proximate causation.

The United States Court of Appeals reached the same
conclusion in construing an analogous federal criminal
statute: distribution of a controlled substance resulting
in death, 21 USC 841. Specifically § 841(a)(1) makes it

25

 E. APPLICATION

i. PEOPLE V SCHAEFER

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury on OUIL causing death in two respects.

First, defendant contends that the trial court’s

instruction on the causation element of the crime was

illegal to “knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute
. . . a controlled substance” and § 841(b)(1)(C) provides
an enhanced sentence “if death or serious bodily injury
results from the use of such substance . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) In recently addressing the proximate cause issue,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held:

[P]roximate cause is not a required
element for conviction and sentencing under §
841(b)(1)(C). All that is necessary under the
statutory language is that “death . . .
results” from the offense described in
§ 841(a)(1). . . . Cause-in-fact is required
by the “results” language, but proximate
cause . . . is not a required element.
[United States v Houston, 406 F3d 1121, 1124-
1125 (CA 9, 2005).]

In so holding, the Ninth Circuit joined numerous other
circuits that reached the same conclusion. See United
States v Soler, 275 F3d 146, 152 (CA 1, 2002); United
States v McIntosh, 236 F3d 968, 972-973 (CA 8, 2001);
United States v Robinson, 167 F3d 824, 830-832 (CA 3,
1999); United States v Patterson, 38 F3d 139, 145-146 (CA
4, 1994).

Therefore, if the Legislature had intended to
eliminate proximate causation as an element of OUIL causing
death, it would have used the phrase “and by the operation
of that motor vehicle the death of another person results.”
The Legislature, however, deliberately chose to use the
word “cause” in § 625(4) and thereby incorporated the
technical, legal meaning of the term.

26

flawed. Second, defendant argues that the trial court

erred when it reminded the jury three times during

instructions about defendant’s stipulation as to his 0.16

blood-alcohol level.

In initially instructing the jury on the causation

element of OUIL causing death, the trial court read the

text of § 625(4) to the jury. Defendant objected to the

instruction, arguing that the standard jury instruction for

OUIL causing death, CJI2d 15.11, which incorporated this

Court’s Lardie holding, should have been read instead.

Less than an hour into deliberations, the jury specifically

requested clarification from the trial court on the

causation element of OUIL causing death:

The Court: Okay. You’re asking to explain
under the influence, as is
stated in Count I [OUIL causing
death]. [I]s that what you want
to know?

Juror No. 11: Also causing death.

The Court: I’m sorry; also what?

Juror No. 11: Under the influence causing

death.

The Court: Yeah, okay. All I can do is
tell you what the statute says.
If that was the case, you have
to decide that. [Emphasis
added.]

27

Defendant again objected to the instruction, arguing that

the trial court did not adequately explain the causation

element of OUIL causing death.

We agree that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury on causation, but not for the reasons offered by

defendant. Defendant argues that the causation instruction

was flawed because the trial court did not instruct the

jury that defendant’s intoxicated driving must be a

“substantial cause” of the victim’s death, as required by

Lardie. As discussed above, the Lardie Court erred in

requiring that the defendant’s intoxication, rather than

the defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle, constitute

the substantial cause. Accordingly, the trial court’s

causation instruction was not flawed in the manner asserted

by defendant. Instead, we conclude that the trial court

erred because the word “cause” in § 625(4) is a legal term

of art normally not within the common understanding of

jurors, and thus, simply reading the statute to the jury

was insufficient. The jury could not be expected to

understand that the statute required the prosecutor to

prove both factual causation and proximate causation.68

68
While the trial court was not required to read the
jury the standard criminal jury instruction because they
are not binding authority, People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221,
277; 380 NW2d 11 (1985), the court was nevertheless

28

 Having determined that the causation instruction was

flawed, we turn to whether the error was harmless. Mere

error alone in instructing the jury is insufficient to set

aside a criminal conviction. Instead, a defendant must

establish that the erroneous instruction resulted in “a

miscarriage of justice.”69 Specifically, by enacting MCL

769.26, our Legislature has provided:

No judgment or verdict shall be set
aside or reversed or a new trial be granted
by any court of this state in any criminal
case, on the ground of misdirection of the
jury, or the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, or for error as to any matter of
pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion
of the court, after an examination of the
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear
that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.[70]

As we noted in People v Cornell,71 in giving effect to

the “miscarriage of justice” standard of MCL 769.26, a

obligated to “instruct the jury as to the law applicable to
the case”. MCL 768.29. While reading the applicable
statute to the jury may well be instructing the jury as to
the law applicable to the case in most circumstances, it
was not here because the statute contained a term of art
jurors are not presumed to understand, i.e., a jury would
not understand from a reading of the statute that the
existence of factual causation alone would be insufficient
to support a guilty verdict.
69
MCL 769.26; People v Young, 472 Mich 130, 141-142; 693
NW2d 801 (2005).
70
MCL 769.26 (emphasis added).
71
466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).

29

reviewing court is required to classify the type of alleged

instructional error as either constitutional or

nonconstitutional, and as either preserved or unpreserved.72

In Cornell, we held that instructional error based on the

misapplication of a statute is generally considered

nonconstitutional error.73 As such, any error that the

trial court committed in the present case in failing to

explain the causation element of § 625(4) was

nonconstitutional. Moreover, because defendant promptly

objected to the instruction and adequately articulated the

basis for the objection, the alleged error was properly

preserved.

Accordingly, the alleged instructional error in this

case is appropriately classified as preserved,

nonconstitutional error, as noted by the Court of Appeals.

In People v Lukity,74 we held that MCL 769.26 creates a

presumption that preserved nonconstitutional error is

harmless unless the defendant demonstrates that the error

72
Id. at 362-363, citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). Constitutional errors must further be
classified as either structural or nonstructural. Cornell,
supra at 363.
73
Id. at 364-365; see also People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich
466, 473-474; 620 NW2d 13 (2000).
74
460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).

30

was outcome determinative.75 Specifically, in Lukity we

stated that MCL 769.26 “presumes that a preserved,

nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless

‘after an examination of the entire cause, it shall

affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not

that the error was outcome determinative.”76 An error is

not “outcome determinative” unless it “‘undermined the

reliability of the verdict.’”77

Applying the Lukity standard to the alleged

instructional error in the present case, we conclude that

any error on the part of the trial court in merely reading

the statute and failing to explain the causation element of

OUIL causing death was harmless. There is no evidence that

the trial court’s failure to explain fully both the factual

cause and proximate cause components of the causation

element of the offense was “outcome determinative” or that

the “reliability of the verdict was undermined.”

75
Id. at 495-496.
76
Id. (citation omitted).
77
People v Whittaker, 465 Mich 422, 427; 635 NW2d 687
(2001), quoting People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 766; 614
NW2d 595 (2000). Recent cases where we found that
instructional error required reversal include People v
Mass, 464 Mich 615; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), People v Duncan,
462 Mich 47; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), and People v Rodriguez,
supra.

31

 Assuming, arguendo, that the jury gave full credit to

the testimony of defendant’s expert witness on highway

design, the most that the witness’s testimony established

was that the freeway exit was negligently designed. The

witness presented no evidence that there was any gross

negligence in the design of the freeway exit. As such, the

design of the freeway exit could not be considered a

superseding cause that would prevent defendant from being

legally regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s

death. We conclude, therefore, that defendant has failed

to rebut the presumption that the alleged instructional

error was harmless because he has not demonstrated that the

alleged error was outcome determinative in that it

undermined the reliability of the verdict, as required by

MCL 769.26 and Lukity.78

Defendant also argues that the trial court committed

error requiring reversal when it reminded the jury three

times during instructions about defendant’s stipulation as

to his 0.16 blood-alcohol level.79 However, the Court of

78
As noted earlier, defendant’s expert witness admitted at
trial that his defective design theory was inconsistent
with the actual history of accidents associated with the
exit ramp.
79
Schaefer brief at 26 (“the judge reminded the jurors that
the parties stipulated that the Defendant’s blood alcohol

32

Appeals declined to address this argument in light of its

resolution of this case. Accordingly, we remand this case

to the Court of Appeals limited solely to the issue of

whether the trial court committed error requiring reversal

in making repeated references to the stipulation regarding

defendant’s blood-alcohol level.80 We do not retain

jurisdiction.81

level was 0.16. The reminder of the stipulation is used
three times in this instruction . . . .”).
80
Justice Cavanagh’s ex post facto and due process concerns
are misplaced. As the United States Supreme Court has
held, “The Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms, does not
apply to courts. Extending the Clause to courts through
the rubric of due process thus would circumvent the clear
constitutional text.” Rogers v Tennessee, 532 US 451, 460;
121 S Ct 1693; 149 L Ed 2d 697 (2001). Although it is
true, as Justice Cavanagh indicates, that prior precedent
from the United States Supreme Court and this Court has
held that there are due process limitations on the
retroactive application of judicial interpretations of
criminal statutes that are “unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
conduct in issue,” Post at 6, we believe that it is not
“indefensible or unexpected” that a court would, as we do
today, overrule a case that failed to abide by the express
terms of a statute.
81
Because we conclude that the trial court’s other
instructional errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals is
to consider on remand only whether the trial court’s
multiple references to the stipulation constituted error
requiring reversal—i.e., that a “miscarriage of justice”
occurred, as required by MCL 769.26 and Lukity. If the
Court of Appeals determines that no “miscarriage of
justice” occurred, defendant’s conviction of OUIL causing
death is to be affirmed.

33

 ii. PEOPLE V LARGE

The first two elements of OUIL causing death are not

in dispute. Defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.10 grams

and he voluntarily chose to drive knowing that he had

consumed alcohol. The uncertainty lies in the causation

element of the offense.

Defendant’s operation of the vehicle was undeniably a

factual cause of the young girl’s death. Absent

defendant’s operation of the vehicle, the collision would

not have occurred. The issue of proximate causation,

however, is less certain. There is evidence that the

victim’s death was the direct and natural result of

defendant’s operation of the vehicle. At the same time,

the victim rode a bicycle without brakes down a partially

obstructed hill onto a busy road and, thus, according to

the prosecution’s own expert witness, made the collision

unavoidable. Given the fact that during the preliminary

examination the parties did not directly address the

proximate cause issue, including whether the victim’s own

behavior was a superseding cause, the proper course is to

remand this case to the district court for reconsideration

of whether to bind over defendant in light of the

principles discussed in this opinion. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

34

 IV. CONCLUSION

The Lardie Court erred in holding that the defendant’s

“intoxicated driving” must be a substantial cause of the

victim’s death. There is no textual basis for the Lardie

Court’s holding. Indeed, the plain text of the OUIL causing

death statute requires no causal link at all between the

defendant’s intoxication and the victim’s death. The

defendant’s status as “intoxicated” is a separate element of

the offense and entirely irrelevant to the causation element

of the crime. It is the defendant’s operation of the motor

vehicle that must cause the victim’s death under § 625(4),

not the manner by which the defendant’s intoxication may or

may not have affected the defendant's operating ability.

Therefore, to the extent that Lardie held that § 625(4)

requires the defendant’s intoxicated driving to be a

substantial cause of the victim’s death, it is overruled.

In proving the causation element of OUIL causing death, the

people need only prove that the defendant’s operation of the

motor vehicle caused, both factually and proximately, the

victim’s death.

Accordingly, in People v Schaefer, the judgment of the

Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the

Court of Appeals to address defendant’s remaining argument

that the trial court erred so as to require reversal in

35

making repeated references to defendant’s stipulation as to

his 0.16 blood-alcohol level during the jury instructions.

In People v Large, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for

reconsideration of whether to bind defendant over on the

charge of OUIL causing death in light of the principles set

forth in this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction in

either case.

Robert P. Young, Jr.
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen J. Markman

36

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 126067

DAVID WILLIAM SCHAEFER,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127142

JAMES RICHARD LARGE,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

WEAVER, J. (concurring).

I join in the majority’s holding, analysis, and

application in these cases. As the majority concludes—and

as I urged in my separate concurrence in People v Lardie,

452 Mich 231, 267; 551 NW2d 656 (1996)—a proper reading of

the statute prohibiting OUIL causing death is that it

criminalizes a death caused by a person operating a car

while intoxicated, regardless of the manner of operation.
 I write separately to note that the same careful

consideration of the OUIL statutory text that results in

the above conclusion demands I reconsider another point I

made in my Lardie concurrence.

Specifically, I suggested in Lardie that showing

proximate cause was not necessary to prove OUIL causing

death. Lardie, supra at 268 n 5, 273 n 11. However, now

that the issue is squarely before the Court, and I have

reexamined the language of the statute in the two cases

before us, I now agree that the Legislature’s use of the

term “causes the death” indicates that the common-law

meaning of “cause” must be used, and both cause in fact and

proximate cause need to be shown.

The dangers of driving under the influence are no

doubt of concern to the Legislature; however, as the

majority indicates, had the Legislature wanted to remove a

showing of proximate cause from the statute prohibiting

OUIL causing death, it could have used the term “resulting

in the death” instead.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

2

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 126067

DAVID WILLIAM SCHAEFER,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127142

JAMES RICHARD LARGE,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring).

I concur in and join every aspect of the majority

opinion. I write separately to suggest an analytic

approach to the sole remaining issue to be resolved on

remand in People v Schaefer, i.e., whether the trial court

committed error requiring reversal when it reminded the

jury three times during instructions about defendant’s

stipulation regarding his blood-alcohol level of 0.16

grams.
 As the majority correctly observes, ante at 33 n 81,

in determining whether the multiple references to the

stipulation constitute an error requiring reversal, the

Court of Appeals should consider whether defendant has

established that a “miscarriage of justice” occurred, as

required by MCL 769.26 and People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484;

596 NW2d 607 (1999).

In assessing whether a miscarriage of justice

occurred, I believe it is noteworthy that defendant is

mistaken in assuming that his blood-alcohol level at the

time of the accident is the sole factor that the jury was

entitled to consider in finding that he was intoxicated.

MCL 257.625(1) clearly provides two independent bases on

which the jury could have concluded that defendant was

intoxicated. Specifically, at the time defendant was

charged, § 625(1) provided that a defendant is considered

intoxicated for the purpose of OUIL causing death if either

of the following applies:

(a) The person is under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or
a combination of intoxicating liquor and a
controlled substance.

(b) The person has an alcohol content of
0.10 grams or more per 100 milliliters of
blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67
milliliters of urine.

2

Thus, pursuant to § 625(1), the jury could have found that

defendant was intoxicated either on the basis of evidence

of defendant’s blood-alcohol level, or on the basis of

evidence presented at trial demonstrating that defendant

was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”

In instructing the jury, the trial court repeatedly

informed the jury of these two alternative bases:

The Court: So, the elements are either
operating under the influence,
that’s one. Or, operating a
motor vehicle while the blood
alcohol content is 0.10.

* * *

It’s either driving under the
influence, or driving with a
blood alcohol content of 0.10.
And as a result of so operating
a motor vehicle, causes the
death of another person.

Those are the elements of Count
1 [OUIL causing death]. . . .

* * *

So, if you find in Count 1 [OUIL
causing death] that the
defendant operated a motor
vehicle under the influence of
intoxicants, or that he at the
time had a blood alcohol level
in excess of .10. And that as a
result of that, a person was
killed. That is what you call
homicide caused by driving under
the influence. [Emphasis
added.]

3

 Moreover, the trial court explicitly instructed the

jury that it was free to reject defendant’s stipulation

about his blood-alcohol level. Specifically, the trial

court told the jury, “You have a right to accept [the

stipulation], or you have a right to reject it. It’s

entirely up to you.” It is thus quite possible that the

jury chose to ignore completely defendant’s stipulation

about his blood-alcohol level when it found defendant

guilty of OUIL causing death.1

1
The prosecution presented various evidence at trial to
demonstrate that defendant was “under the influence of
intoxicating liquor,” pursuant to § 625(1)(a). First,
defendant himself admitted that he consumed at least three
beers before getting behind the wheel. Defendant also
admitted that his blood-alcohol level was 0.16 grams less
than three hours after the accident and that he did not
consume any alcoholic beverages between the time of the
accident and when his blood was later drawn at the
hospital. The accident occurred about 10:08 pm, and
defendant’s blood was drawn at the hospital about 12:56 am.
The victim, defendant’s passenger, had a blood-alcohol
level of 0.35 grams approximately forty minutes after the
accident occurred. Three hours after the accident, the
victim’s blood-alcohol level had declined to 0.24 grams.

Second, several eyewitnesses told the police that
defendant was tailgating various cars on the freeway,
driving erratically, and swerved suddenly to get off the
highway. Evidence was presented at trial that defendant
followed a car on the freeway for one mile with less than
one-half of a car length between the vehicles and while
traveling at a speed of sixty-five miles an hour.
Defendant acknowledged that the other two lanes of the
freeway were clear for the entire mile that he was
tailgating. Defendant then proceeded to tailgate a
tractor-trailer in a similar manner.

4

 Accordingly, in addressing on remand whether the trial

court committed error requiring reversal in making repeated

references to the stipulation, the Court of Appeals should

consider the alternative bases provided by § 625(1)(a) and

(b) and the trial court’s instruction that the jury was

entitled to disregard the stipulation.

Maura D. Corrigan

Third, when the police investigated the crime scene,
officers found numerous empty bottles of alcohol in
defendant’s vehicle. In addition to the empty bottles of
beer, the police also found an empty vodka bottle in
defendant’s vehicle. Defendant denied drinking any vodka
on the night of the accident.

Fourth, the nature of the accident itself was
described in great detail at trial. Defendant suddenly
swerved to get off the freeway and his vehicle rolled over.
In the prior twenty years, there had been no rollover
accidents on that same freeway exit.

5

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 126067

DAVID WILLIAM SCHAEFER,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 127142

JAMES RICHARD LARGE,

Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in the result reached by the majority that,

to convict a defendant of OUIL causing death under MCL

257.625(4), the prosecution must prove that the defendant

was intoxicated and that his or her driving was both the

factual and the proximate cause of the victim’s death.

Like Justice Weaver, I have carefully reexamined the

language of the statute and this Court’s interpretation of

that language in People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231; 551 NW2d

656 (1996). In doing so, I have come to the conclusion
that the Lardie Court’s interpretation of the statute did

not effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As Justice

Weaver noted in her Lardie concurrence, the Lardie

majority’s conclusion that the focus must be on the

defendant’s “intoxicated driving” imposed an unworkable

burden on the prosecution. Lardie, supra at 272 (Weaver,

J., concurring). After due consideration, I now believe

that the correct interpretation of the statute is that set

forth by the current majority.

I would also suggest that the Lardie majority’s

conclusion that the defendant’s driving must be a

“substantial” cause of the victim’s death, while inartfully

worded, was likely an attempt to accentuate that the

concept of proximate cause in a criminal context is a more

demanding standard than that found in tort law. People v

Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196-199; 148 NW 400 (1914); LaFave &

Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.12, pp 279, 282. This is

true “because the potential deprivation of personal rights

is obviously much more extreme in criminal, as opposed to

tort, actions.” People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 738; 506

NW2d 482 (1993) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Thus, in a criminal context, “[t]he

proximate cause standard requires a sufficient causal

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the result

2

of that conduct. ‘[I]t [must] appear[] that the death

resulted as the natural, direct, and necessary result of

the unlawful act . . . .’” Id. at 737, quoting Barnes,

supra at 196.

As our criminal jury instructions suggest, “the

criminal standard for proximate cause requires a more

direct causal connection than the tort concept of proximate

cause.” Harding, supra at 738. Thus, in establishing

causation under MCL 257.625(4), it is critical to note the

following caveats:

[C]riminal liability requires a more direct
causal connection than merely finding that the
defendant’s actions were “a” cause. Where there
are multiple independent causes contributing to
the victim’s injury or death, so that the
defendant’s conduct alone would not have caused
the death, we would not impose liability for
criminal negligence unless the defendant’s
conduct sufficiently dominated the other
contributing factors, to be fairly deemed a
criminal proximate cause, and the injury was
reasonably foreseeable from the defendant’s
negligence. More specifically, even though a
victim’s contributory negligence is not an
affirmative defense, it is a factor to be
considered by the trier of fact in determining
whether the prima facie element of proximate
cause has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[People v Tims, 449 Mich 83, 111; 534 NW2d 675
(1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).]

Thus, the Lardie Court’s underlying premise, that

proximate cause should be examined differently in a

3

criminal case, was correct, but the current majority’s

approach more accurately conveys the concept.

I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to

remand these cases for further proceedings under the rule

set forth in today’s opinion because I believe that

applying the new rule, which overturns our prior

interpretation of MCL 257.625(4), violates due process and

infringes on the protections inherent in the Ex Post Facto

Clauses of the United States and Michigan constitutions.

US Const 1963, art I, § 10; Const, art 1, § 10.1

In People v Dempster, 396 Mich 700; 242 NW2d 381

(1976), this Court recognized the longstanding rule that to

avoid a deprivation of due process, “[a] criminal statute

must be ‘sufficiently explicit to inform those who are

subject to it what conduct on their part will render them

1
Although the Ex Post Facto Clauses do not directly
apply to the judiciary, People v Doyle, 451 Mich 93, 99;
545 NW2d 627 (1996), citing Marks v United States, 430 US
188; 97 S Ct 990; 51 L Ed 2d 260 (1977), the “principles
are applicable to the judiciary by analogy through the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Doyle, supra at 100, citing Bouie v City of Columbia, 378
US 347; 84 S Ct 1697; 12 L Ed 2d 894 (1964); see also
People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383, 395; 331 NW2d 143 (1982);
People v Dempster, 396 Mich 700, 714-718; 242 NW2d 381
(1976). For the purposes of my analysis, I consider the
concepts inextricably intertwined. When a defendant is
deprived of due process, and, thus, is subjected to a
punishment not available at the time of his or her conduct,
this treatment is precisely what is contemplated, and
prohibited, under ex post facto principles.

4

liable to its penalties’.” Id. at 715, quoting Connally v

Gen Constr Co, 269 US 385, 391; 46 S Ct 126; 70 L Ed 322

(1926). In Lardie, this Court examined MCL 257.625(4) in

great detail in an attempt to clarify its meaning. We

engaged in extensive endeavors of statutory construction to

determine things that were not evident on the statute’s

face. In particular, we examined whether the statute was

meant to impose strict liability; if it was not, whether it

created a general or specific intent crime; whether the

Legislature intended that the prosecution prove some type

of fault; and what the parameters of the statute’s

causation requirement were.

The resulting judicial interpretation of the statute

had, of course, the force of law, and sufficiently

explained to the citizenry what type of conduct on their

part would lead to criminal culpability. Through that

decision, the people of this state were given “fair

warning” of a prohibited type of conduct. As the United

States Supreme Court has explained, “There can be no doubt

that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result

not only from vague statutory language but also from an

unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow

and precise statutory language.” Bouie, supra at 352.

5

 Our decision in Lardie, which had the support of six

justices, was the settled state of the law at the relevant

time of these defendants’ conduct. Due process precludes

“retroactive application of a ‘judicial construction of a

criminal statute [that] is “unexpected and indefensible by

reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the

conduct in issue . . . .”’” Doyle, supra at 101, quoting

Bouie, supra at 354, quoting Hall, General Principles of

Criminal Law (2d ed), p 61. There was nothing in Lardie

that suggested that the law was in some state of flux or

that this Court’s construction of the statute was less than

clear or complete. No fair reading of Lardie would alert a

person that Lardie would later be revisited or revised.

Thus, at the time of these defendants’ conduct, any

construction different than that set forth in Lardie was

both unexpected and indefensible.

The majority’s assertion that “it is not ‘indefensible

or unexpected’ that a court would, as we do today, overrule

a case that failed to abide by the express terms of a

statute,” completely eliminates the protections against ex

post facto punishments and due process violations. See

ante at 33 n 80. Under the majority’s reasoning, no new

court opinion would ever be “indefensible or unexpected,”

because the new opinion would always be “correct.” But

6

this ignores the fact that every court believes an opinion

it issues is correct, just as the Lardie Court believed in

1996, or it would not issue the opinion.

Further, the majority’s reasoning imposes on our

citizenry the untenable burden of guessing and predicting

when one court might overturn a prior court’s settled

interpretation of a statute. I find such a result in grave

conflict with the notions of due process and, thus, fatally

flawed.

As such, I disagree that these defendants must again

undergo the criminal process under our new interpretation

of what was, at the relevant time, settled law. Such a

ruling violates the fundamental principles of due process

and subjects defendants to ex post facto punishment. While

the prosecution had a more difficult burden under Lardie,

today’s decision lessens that burden, making our new

interpretation an unforeseeable judicial expansion of a

criminal statute. Subjecting defendants to a new rule that

increases the chance of culpability, when their conduct was

committed when the old rule was settled law, is a clear

violation of defendants’ constitutional rights.

Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s

dismissal of defendant Large’s case because the district

court found that, under Lardie, probable cause that

7

defendant committed a crime was nonexistent. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in finding so. I would,

though, remand defendant Schaefer’s case for a new trial.

On remand, I would instruct the trial court to give the

jury instruction to which defendant Schaefer was entitled

at his original trial.

Michael F. Cavanagh

8

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 126067

DAVID WILLIAM SCHAEFER,

Defendant-Appellee
_______________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 127142

JAMES RICHARD LARGE,

Defendant-Appellee
_______________________________

KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority’s interpretation of MCL

257.625(4). I write separately to note that I too have

reexamined the language of MCL 257.625(4) and past readings

of it. I continue to believe that the opinion of this

Court in People v Lardie1 and that of the Court of Appeals

1
452 Mich 231; 551 NW2d 656 (1996).
on which I sat2 were both correct in ruling that the statute

is constitutional.

The defendant in Lardie had contended and the trial

court had found that the statute creates an

unconstitutional strict liability, public welfare offense.

Both appellate courts disagreed that the statute is

unconstitutional. I now believe that the statute does not

impose strict liability on the intoxicated driver, as the

Court of Appeals ruled. Nor does it require the prosecutor

to prove that the intoxication caused the injury, as this

Court ruled.

Lardie presented a different issue than the issue in

these cases; it concerned intent. Causation was not the

focus in Lardie, but it is here. The question here is what

causal link between defendant’s actions and the death does

the statute require that the prosecutor show. After

thorough consideration, I conclude that the correct

interpretation of MCL 257.625(4) is that the prosecutor

must prove (1) the defendant was intoxicated and (2) the

defendant’s driving was the factual and proximate cause of

the victim’s death.

I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the majority errs

in remanding People v Large for further proceedings under

2
207 Mich App 615; 525 NW2d 504 (1994).

2

the new rule set forth in its decision. Doing so violates

fundamental notions of fairness that are embedded in the

Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions.

US Const, Am V; Am XIV, § 1; Const 1963, art 1, § 17.

Marilyn Kelly

3