Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 17, 2004
PATRICIA MYRA CORLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 119773
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
JOSEPH SMITH, and BARBARA FINCH,
jointly and severally
Defendants-Appellant.
_________________________
PER CURIAM
In this sexual harassment action, plaintiff claims to
have suffered an adverse employment action as a consequence
of a prior romantic relationship with one of the defendants,
MCL 37.2103(i)(ii), and a hostile work environment, MCL
37.2103(i)(iii). We conclude that plaintiff’s complaint
does not allege facts sufficient to show sexual harassment
under either theory and, therefore, fails as a matter of
law. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision pertaining
to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims and reinstate the
trial court’s order granting summary disposition for
defendants.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff and defendant Joseph Smith were employed by
the Detroit Board of Education to work in its adult
education program at the Golightly Vocational Center.
Plaintiff was employed part-time as a counselor,1 and
defendant Smith was her supervisor. During the course of
their employment, plaintiff and Smith became romantically
involved in a relationship that lasted three or four years.
The relationship ended when Smith started dating another
employee, defendant Barbara Finch. Plaintiff alleges that
after Smith and Finch became involved, defendant Smith
repeatedly threatened plaintiff with adverse employment
action if she said or did anything that interfered with his
relationship with Finch.2 Plaintiff also alleges that Finch
taunted, embarrassed, and humiliated her by causing
plaintiff’s work station to be moved and by engaging in
“catty” conversations with others that were about plaintiff
and intended to be overheard by her. According to
plaintiff, the alleged harassment culminated when she was
1
Plaintiff simultaneously held full-time employment
with the Detroit Board of Education. The facts relevant to
this case involve only plaintiff’s part-time employment at
Golightly.
2
discharged at the conclusion of the 1995-1996 school year.
Plaintiff filed suit, claiming sexual harassment,
breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Regarding the sexual harassment claim, plaintiff
alleged that she was subjected to two species of harassment
prohibited by the Michigan Civil Rights Act: a hostile
working environment, MCL 37.2103(i)(iii), and quid pro quo
sexual harassment, MCL 37.2103(i)(ii). Pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), the circuit court granted defendants’
motion for summary disposition, ruling that plaintiff failed
to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that
there was no genuine issue of material fact.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part.3 The panel reversed the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition regarding the sexual harassment claims,
reasoning that the alleged persistent and hostile
communications could reasonably be considered communications
of a sexual nature because defendants “disliked” plaintiff’s
“continued presence in the workplace as Smith’s former
2
Defendants Smith and Finch have since married.
3
The Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition
regarding breach of contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 246 Mich App 15, 25-26; 632 NW2d 147
(2001). Plaintiff did not appeal those rulings.
3
paramour.”4 Furthermore, the Court determined that
plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence of quid pro quo
sexual harassment because she suffered adverse employment
actions as a result of “her ‘submission’ to Smith’s prior”
romantic overtures.5 The panel additionally reasoned that
the alleged threats, offensive remarks, and adverse working
conditions established sufficient evidence of a hostile work
environment. Defendants seek leave to appeal to this Court.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo the resolution of a summary
disposition motion.6
A motion "under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings
alone."7 "The purpose of such a motion is to determine
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The motion should be granted if no factual
development could possibly justify recovery."8
4
246 Mich App 22.
5
246 Mich App 23.
6
Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d
508 (2002).
7
Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 193; 649 NW2d 47
(2002).
8
Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129-130; 631 NW2d
308 (2001).
4
"A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
sufficiency of the complaint."9 In evaluating such a
motion, a court considers the entire record in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
evidence submitted by the parties. Where the proffered
evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.10
III. Analysis
We turn initially to whether plaintiff alleges facts
sufficient under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to establish a claim of
sexual harassment actionable under either a quid pro quo
theory or a hostile work environment theory, MCL
37.2103(i)(ii), (iii).
“Sexual harassment” is defined in MCL 37.2103(i) as:
[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct or communication of a sexual nature under
the following conditions:
* * *
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the
conduct or communication by an individual is used
9
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817
(1999).
10
Id. at 118-120.
5
as a factor in decisions affecting the
individual’s employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing.
(iii) The conduct or communication has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering
with an individual’s employment, public
accommodations or public services, education, or
housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive employment, public accommodations,
public services, educational, or housing
environment.
Thus, as a threshold matter, plaintiff must allege
facts showing that she was subjected to “unwelcome sexual
advances,” “requests for sexual favors,” or “conduct or
communication of a sexual nature” before she can establish
actionable sexual harassment under a hostile work
environment theory or a quid pro quo theory. MCL
37.2103(i).
Plaintiff does not contend that defendants made either
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors. We
thus turn to the third element of MCL 37.2103(i) to
determine if she was subjected to “conduct or communication
of a sexual nature.” “Sexual nature” is not defined in the
statute. Where a term is not defined in the statute, we
will review its ordinary dictionary meaning for guidance.11
“Sexual” is defined, in part, as “of or pertaining to sex”
6
or “occurring between or involving the sexes: sexual
relations.”12 “Nature” is defined as a “native or inherent
characteristic.”13 Utilizing these two commonly understood
definitions, we conclude that actionable sexual harassment
requires conduct or communication that inherently pertains
to sex.14
The conduct and communication alleged by plaintiff do
not meet this definition. Plaintiff contends that defendant
Smith repeatedly warned plaintiff not to interfere with his
relationship with Finch and threatened her with consequences
if she did. The Court of Appeals, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to plaintiff, concluded that the
threats could constitute unwelcome sexual communications
because they stemmed from Smith’s past intimate relationship
with plaintiff. We disagree.
After their intimate relationship ended, their working
relationship became difficult, but defendant Smith’s alleged
11
Cox v Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18; 651 NW2d
356 (2002).
12
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1990).
13
Id.
14
See Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302,
312; 664 NW2d 129 (2003); see also Barrett v Kirtland
Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 321; 628 NW2d 63 (2001)
7
threats that he would fire plaintiff if she interfered with
his new relationship were not inherently sexual in nature.
Verbal or physical conduct or communication that is not
sexual in nature is not sexual harassment.15 For this
reason, we conclude that plaintiff cannot meet the threshold
requirement to establish either a quid pro quo sexual
harassment claim or hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim against defendant Smith.
Regarding defendant Finch, plaintiff alleges that Finch
contributed to a hostile work environment by engaging in
“catty” conversations about plaintiff and by causing
plaintiff’s work station to be relocated. As discussed
above, plaintiff must establish that the asserted conduct or
communication were of a sexual nature. That is, that
Finch’s conduct or communication inherently pertained to
sex. Here, the asserted communication by Finch conveyed
nothing more than Finch’s personal animosity towards
plaintiff. MCL 37.2103(i) does not forbid the communication
of enmity between romantic rivals, even if the predicate for
the dislike is sexual competition, as long as the conduct or
communication is not inherently sexual. In summary, what
(reiterating that the Civil Rights Act is not so broad as to
bar all conduct that is in any way related to sex).
15
Haynie, supra at 310.
8
may have been sexual in this case did not involve
harassment, while what did involve harassment was not
sexual. It cannot be said by any understanding of the
language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to
"sexual harassment." Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has
failed to meet the threshold requirement to establish sexual
harassment by Finch because this connection between sex and
the alleged conduct and communication is missing.16
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law because she
has not established evidence of conduct or communication of
a “sexual nature” as required to support a claim of sexual
harassment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals with respect to plaintiff’s sexual harassment
claims and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting
summary disposition for defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
16
Because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we need not decide the legal
sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
9
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PATRICIA MYRA CORLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 119773
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
JOSEPH SMITH, and BARBARA FINCH,
jointly and severally
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While the majority sees fit to
dispose of this case by an opinion per curiam after a
perfunctory fifteen minutes of oral argument on the
application, I believe that defendant’s application for
leave should be granted and this case should be decided only
after full briefing and argument. The Court of Appeals
opinion in this case is published. Further, the issue
presented is jurisprudentially significant and is more
closely drawn than the majority would have the reader
believe.
I am unclear whether the result reached by the majority
is correct. Additionally, I am troubled by the majority’s
quick resort to the dictionary, without any consideration of
the purpose or principles underlying Michigan’s Civil Rights
Act and without any examination of the federal cases that
have considered this issue. Therefore, I must respectfully
dissent because this Court, and the parties, would be better
served by granting defendant’s application for leave.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
2