People v. Lively

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 16, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 123145

TIFFANY FREE LIVELY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

CORRIGAN, C.J.

We granted leave to appeal1 to consider whether the

materiality of a false statement is an element of the

statutory offense of perjury, MCL 750.422 and 750.423. The

Court of Appeals held that materiality is an element that

must be submitted to the jury,2 but the plain language of

MCL 750.423 sets forth a definition of perjury that does

not require proof of materiality. Because the Legislature

has decided that materiality is not an element, the trial

1
468 Mich 942 (2003).
2
254 Mich App 249; 656 NW2d 850 (2002).
court did not err in refusing to submit that issue to the

jury. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals

and reinstate defendant’s perjury conviction.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from an underlying divorce action.

Defendant’s husband sued her for divorce. A default

judgment was entered. Defendant moved to set it aside. At

the hearing on that motion, defendant testified that she

was unaware of the divorce proceeding until after the

judgment had entered and that the complaint for divorce had

never been served on her. She also submitted an affidavit

to that effect in support of her motion. The trial court

set aside the default judgment.

The prosecutor charged defendant with one count of

committing perjury in a court proceeding, MCL 750.422. The

prosecutor alleged that defendant had falsely testified

both that she had not been served with the complaint for

divorce and that she had lacked knowledge of the divorce

proceeding. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the

ground that the allegedly false testimony was not material.

The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the

testimony was material.

The case proceeded to trial. The prosecution

presented testimony from the divorce attorney for

2

defendant’s husband, an officer who served the complaint on

defendant, and a caseworker for the friend of the court.

Defendant did not object to the court’s use of a standard

criminal jury instruction, CJI2d 14.1, which, at the time,

did not include materiality as an element for the jury to

consider. Defendant did, however, request an instruction

on specific intent that referred to a false statement on a

material matter. The court denied defendant’s request to

include the phrase “on a material matter” in the

instruction. The jury found defendant guilty.

The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It

concluded that the materiality of a false statement is an

element of perjury. The Court noted that in United States

v Gaudin, 515 US 506; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444

(1995), the Supreme Court had concluded that materiality is

an element in a federal prosecution for making false

statements on federal loan documents, and had rejected the

contention that materiality in perjury cases is a

traditional exception to the rule that all the elements of

an offense must be submitted to a jury. The Court of

Appeals rejected case law suggesting that materiality is an

issue for the court, rather than the jury, to decide. See

People v Noble, 152 Mich App 319; 393 NW2d 619 (1986);

People v Hoag, 113 Mich App 789; 318 NW2d 579 (1982).

3

Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court

erred in precluding the jury from considering materiality,

and it determined that this error was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to

appeal.3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to determine whether the

materiality of the false statement is an element of the

statutory offense of perjury. We review de novo this

question of law. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 531; 664

NW2d 685 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

To provide the proper context for our interpretation

of Michigan’s perjury statute, we must discuss the

constitutional principle set forth in Gaudin, supra. The

Supreme Court explained in Gaudin that every essential

element of an offense, including—where it is an element—

materiality, must be submitted to the jury. Gaudin

involved a federal statutory offense and the government had

3
468 Mich 942 (2003).

4

conceded that materiality was an element.4 Gaudin thus

provides that if materiality is an element of a perjury-

related offense, then it, like all other essential

elements, must be submitted to the jury as a matter of

federal constitutional law.

The holding in Gaudin offers no guidance on the

interpretive question before us, i.e., whether materiality

is an element of perjury under our state perjury statute.

See Gaudin, supra at 525 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)

(“Nothing in the Court’s decision stands as a barrier to

legislatures that wish to define—or that have defined—the

elements of their criminal laws in such a way as to remove

issues such as materiality from the jury’s

consideration.”). In other words, Gaudin simply makes

4
The federal statute at issue in Gaudin provides:

Whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and wilfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. [Gaudin,
supra at 509, quoting 18 USCS 1001 (emphasis
added).]

5

clear that if materiality is an essential element under our

state statute, then it must be submitted to the jury. If,

however, we conclude that materiality is not an element,

then the holding in Gaudin has no bearing on our

determination.

The central question we must resolve, then, is whether

our Legislature has defined the offense of perjury to

include materiality as an element. This Court has

previously indicated that, at common law, materiality was

an element of perjury. See, e.g., People v Fox, 25 Mich

492, 496-497 (1872). Our Legislature, however, has

constitutional authority to change the common law. Const

1963, art 3, § 7; Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich

243, 256; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). It appears that this Court

has never expressly decided whether MCL 750.423 or its

predecessors altered the common-law definition of perjury.

To discern the meaning of our perjury statute, we

apply the interpretive principles recently set forth in

Mendoza, supra:

Relying on established doctrines of
interpretation, one cannot disagree that the
first step in discerning legislative intent
requires review of the statutory text adopted by
the Legislature. House Speaker v State
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d
539 (1993). See also MCL 8.3a (“All words and
phrases shall be construed and understood
according to the common and approved usage of the

6

 language . . . .”). If unambiguous, the
Legislature will be presumed to have intended the
meaning expressed. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). [Mendoza,
supra at 550 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in
result).]

MCL 750.423 provides:

Any person authorized by any statute of this
state to take an oath, or any person of whom an
oath shall be required by law, who shall wilfully
swear falsely, in regard to any matter or thing,
respecting which such oath is authorized or
required, shall be guilty of perjury, a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not more than 15 years. [Emphasis added.]

Our Legislature has thus defined perjury as a

willfully false statement regarding any matter or thing, if

an oath is authorized or required. Noticeably absent from

this definition is any reference to materiality. The

Legislature could easily have used a phrase such as “in

regard to any material matter or thing,” or “in regard to

any matter or thing material to the issue or cause before

the court,” but the Legislature did not use such language.

The phrase “any matter or thing” is a broad one. The

commonly understood word “any” generally casts a wide net

and encompasses a wide range of things. “Any” has been

defined as:

1. one, a, an, or some; one or more without
specification or identification. 2. whatever or
whichever it may be. 3. in whatever quantity or
number, great or small; some. 4. every; all . .

7

 . . [Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(2d ed, 1997).]

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature

intended for perjury to consist of a willfully false

statement concerning every matter or thing for which an

oath is authorized or required, because it did not limit

the matters or things in question on the basis of their

materiality.

Reinforcing our conclusion that the Legislature’s

failure to include a materiality requirement in MCL 750.423

is dispositive is the fact that several perjury-related

statutes not at issue here do require that the false matter

or statement be material. See MCL 28.422a, 32.1131,

168.729, 257.254, 324.5531(2), 380.1003, 500.2014,

500.4509, 600.8813, 764.1e(2), and 765.25.5 These statutes

demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to make

materiality an element of a perjury-related offense. Thus,

the failure to make materiality a requirement in the

perjury statutes at issue here must be given meaning.

In light of the broad scope of the statutory phrase

“any matter or thing,” we conclude that the Legislature

5
We also note that the federal perjury statute
expressly requires that the false statement be material.
See 18 USC 1623.

8

intended that a willfully false statement about any matter

or thing concerning which an oath was authorized or

required falls within the statutory definition of perjury

and thus may be charged as perjury if a prosecutor so

chooses.6

We note that many prior decisions of this Court have

not analyzed the statutory language or adequately

differentiated the statutory offense from its common-law

6
The dissent opines that our decision will allow a
prosecutor “unfettered discretion to charge a party or
witness with perjury for any discrepancy made under oath,
no matter how trivial.” Post at 1. In responding to this
argument, we find it useful to quote our response to a
similar argument by the dissent in People v Chavis, 468
Mich 84, 94, n 6; 658 NW2d 469 (2003):

The dissent also criticizes our opinion as
allowing the prosecutor “unfettered discretion,”
post at 99, in determining when to bring charges
under the statute. It is invariably the case
that the prosecutor always has great discretion
in deciding whether to file charges. Such
executive branch power is an established part of
our constitutional structure. Any apprehension
that the prosecutor may abuse this power should
be tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there
are significant systemic protections afforded
defendants, including the defendant’s right to a
preliminary examination and right to a jury
trial. Moreover, there are other protections
against the misuse of power that spring from
daily scrutiny by the media as well as from
periodic elections, which call all office holders
to account to their constituents.

9

counterpart.7 See, e.g., People v Collier, 1 Mich 137, 138

(1848); Hoch v People, 3 Mich 552, 554 (1855); Flint v

People, 35 Mich 491 (1877); Beecher v Anderson, 45 Mich

543, 552; 8 NW 539 (1881); People v McCaffrey, 75 Mich 115,

123-124; 42 NW 681 (1889) (quoting the predecessor to MCL

750.423, yet still assuming that materiality is required);

People v Almashy, 229 Mich 227, 230; 201 NW 231 (1924);

People v Kert, 304 Mich 148; 7 NW2d 251 (1943). These

cases are overruled to the extent that they are

inconsistent with our opinion today.8

7
The dissent is therefore quite right to observe that
for well over a century and a half Michigan courts have
assumed that materiality is an element of perjury. This
long history might be a reason to apply stare decisis and
acquiesce in the judiciary’s redefinition of perjury, if
not for the fact that we are compelled by Gaudin to revisit
our perjury jurisprudence. As noted, Gaudin holds that
materiality, like any element of a crime, must be submitted
to and decided by the jury. Therefore, despite our
precedent to the contrary, we are constitutionally
compelled to reject the dissent’s assertion that
“materiality is a question of law for the trial court to
determine . . . .” Post at 4. Once we jettison one
fundamental tenet of our 150-year jurisprudence on perjury,
we have no reason to shy away from the other question posed
by this appeal—whether materiality is truly an element of
perjury as defined by our Legislature.
8
The Court of Appeals has treated materiality as an
element, but has also construed prior decisions of this
Court to require that this element be decided by the trial
court rather than a jury. See People v Hoag, supra; People
v Jeske, 128 Mich App 596; 341 NW2d 778 (1983); People v
Noble, supra. Obviously, the holdings in those cases are
Footnotes continued on following page.

10

 Although the prior case law in this area has not been

a model of clarity, the statutory definition of perjury is

clear. We are bound to follow the Legislature’s directive

that materiality is not an element of this offense. Our

Legislature is responsible for defining the elements of

criminal offenses, and we therefore adhere to those

definitions.9

Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Gaudin

expressly recognized that legislatures are free to define

“the elements of their criminal laws in such a way as to

remove issues such as materiality from the jury’s

consideration.” Gaudin, supra at 525. That is precisely

inconsistent with Gaudin, which requires that a jury decide
essential elements of an offense. We make clear that these
cases should no longer be followed.
9
The dissent’s analysis of stare decisis is incomplete
because it fails to consider reliance interests. In
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000),
we explained that this Court “must ask whether the previous
decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so
fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it
would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-
world dislocations.” Here, the dissent fails to explain
how our overruling of earlier case law that (1) improperly
read an element into a perjury statute and (2) required the
court rather than the jury to decide that element, will
produce any real-world dislocations.

11

what our Legislature has done. We must respect that

legislative choice and apply the plain statutory language.10

10
While it is not necessary to our decision, we note
that other state legislatures have made a similar choice to
alter the common law by eliminating the element of
materiality from their perjury statutes. For example, in
Beckley v State, 443 P2d 51 (Alas, 1968), the Alaska
Supreme Court construed a statute similar to our own and
concluded that it did not require proof of materiality.
The Alaska statute provided: “‘A person authorized by law
to take an oath or affirmation, or a person whose oath or
affirmation is required by law, who willfully and falsely
swears or affirms in regard to a matter concerning which an
oath or affirmation is authorized or required, is guilty of
perjury.’” Id. at 54. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded:

The statute is unambiguous. It clearly
indicates the intent of a legislative body to
enlarge the scope of the crime of perjury as it
existed at common law so as to make it a crime
for one to willfully and falsely swear in regard
to any matter in respect to which an oath is
authorized or required, regardless of the
question of materiality of such matter to an
issue before the court.

Materiality is not mentioned in the Alaska
perjury statute; therefore it is unnecessary, in
order to prove the crime of perjury, to establish
that the matter concerning which willfully false
testimony under oath was given was material to an
issue before the court. The crime is complete if
one shall willfully swear falsely in regard to
any matter respecting which an oath is authorized
or required. [Id. at 54-55.]

The court further noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had reached the same conclusion regarding a similarly
worded statute in that state. See State v Miller, 26 RI
282; 58 A 882 (1904).

We find the Alaska Supreme Court’s reasoning
persuasive. Like the Alaska law, our statute unambiguously
Footnotes continued on following page.

12

 The dissent would follow earlier decisions of this

Court treating materiality as an issue to be decided by the

trial court, rather than the jury. The dissent’s position,

however, is inconsistent with the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Gaudin. As a matter of federal

constitutional law, all essential elements of an offense

must be submitted to a jury. We are no longer free, in

light of Gaudin, to follow earlier case law treating

materiality as an element for the trial court to decide as

a matter of law. We must conclude either that materiality

is an element that must be submitted to the jury, or that

it is not an element at all.11 As discussed above, we have

defines perjury to exclude the common-law element of
materiality.
11
The dissent purports to follow Gaudin by insisting
that materiality is not really an element, but simply a
question of law to be decided by the trial court. But if,
as the dissent contends, a defendant may not legally be
convicted of perjury without proof of materiality, then
materiality would, by definition, be an essential element
of the offense. See Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed)
(defining “elements of crime” as “[t]he constituent parts
of a crime . . . that the prosecution must prove to sustain
a conviction”).

The dissent cannot have it both ways. Either
materiality is an essential element that must be submitted
to the jury under the federal constitution or it is not an
element at all. The dissent would essentially create out
of whole cloth a special “sub-element” category that is
immune from the strictures of the federal constitution. In
light of Gaudin, this Court’s obligation under the federal
Footnotes continued on following page.

13

read the statutory language as it is clearly written. The

statutory text simply does not require proof that the false

statement was material.

IV. CONCLUSION

The plain language of our perjury statute alters the

common law and does not require proof of materiality. We

thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and

reinstate defendant’s perjury conviction.

Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.

constitution is to require all essential elements of an
offense to be submitted to a jury. We adhere to that duty
and conclude that materiality simply is not an element
under the language of our perjury statute.

14

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 123145

TIFFANY FREE LIVELY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________

MARKMAN, J. (concurring).

I concur with the majority and would reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant's

perjury conviction, but I would do so for different

reasons. Further, I agree with the thoughtful analysis of

the majority concluding that the plain language of the

perjury statutes, MCL 750.422 and 750.423, clearly does not

require as an element of perjury that a false statement be

material. Indeed, it does not appear that the dissent

itself disagrees with this conclusion.1 Finally, I agree

1
Although the dissent observes that it "disagree[s]
with the majority’s assertion that in all prior cases
dealing with perjury, our courts did not properly analyze
the statutory language," post at 3, the dissent neither
invokes any particular past statutory analysis in support
of this observation, nor sets forth any contrary statutory
analysis of its own. The dissent's argument is predicated
Footnotes continued on following page.
with the majority that United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506,

510; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995), requires that

the issue of materiality, if it is indeed an element of

perjury, must be submitted to the jury for its

determination.

I write separately because, in my judgment, it is

unnecessary to address the most difficult question in this

case—whether, under the standards of Robinson v Detroit,

462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), longstanding

precedents in Michigan, holding that the materiality of a

false statement constitutes an element under MCL 750.422

and 750.423, should be overruled. As the dissent correctly

observes, post at 4, and the majority does not dispute,

ante at 9 n 7, it has been the law of Michigan for more

than 150 years that materiality constitutes an element of

perjury. It is unnecessary to address the application of

Robinson to the instant question because defendant's

statement here was clearly "materially" false. Therefore,

whether Michigan's prior case law is maintained or not,

defendant here was properly convicted of perjury.

exclusively upon the authority of precedent. While I do
not find the dissent unreasonable and, indeed, do not
reject its principal argument, there is nonetheless nothing
in the dissent that purports to repudiate the majority's
thorough statutory analysis.

2

 Defendant's false statement was made in support of her

motion to set aside a default judgment, and pertained to

whether she was aware that a divorce action had been filed

and whether she had been served with the complaint. In

granting her motion, the trial court stated that with the

divorce "only ten days old," and with "[s]ome question" in

his mind regarding defendant's lack of notice, it seemed

desirable to set aside the default. The trial judge

remarked, "Listening to it all, it sounds to me like the

mother ought to have known there was a divorce going on,

but I'm not convinced. So at any rate, we'll set it

aside." I agree with the prosecutor that the gist of these

remarks was that the trial judge was unsure whether

defendant was lying, but that he chose to give her the

benefit of the doubt and vacate the default. Contrary to

the Court of Appeals, I do not believe that the trial judge

was asserting that defendant's false statements were

immaterial to his decision on her motion. However, even if

the Court of Appeals is correct in its estimation of the

judge's remarks, the test for materiality is not whether

false testimony actually affected the outcome of court

proceedings, but merely whether it could have affected such

proceedings. People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 432; 556

3

NW2d 512 (1996); People v Jeske, 128 Mich App 596, 603; 341

NW2d 778 (1983).

In the context of a motion to set aside a default

judgment—a proceeding in which matters of actual notice and

service will often prove determinative, see MCR 2.603(D)—

statements pertaining to whether notice has been served or

received will almost always carry with them the potential

to influence the court. Because such statements will

typically go to the heart of the rationale for default

placed in question by a motion to set aside a judgment, it

will almost always be true that such statements could have

affected the proceedings. Therefore, they will almost

always constitute "material" statements and, where false,

will almost always constitute "materially" false

statements. In the instant case, defendant's statements

carried with them the potential to influence the outcome of

her motion to set aside the default judgment, and the trial

court’s statement that “I’m not convinced” that defendant

is lying, “so . . . we’ll set it aside,” indicates that her

statements, in fact, did influence the outcome.

Thus, even if "materiality" is an element of perjury,

and even if the trial court's failure to send this issue to

the jury constituted error, Gaudin, supra at 510, the error

was harmless under the present circumstances because no

4

reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant's

false statements in their context were not "materially"

false.2 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully disagree

with the Court of Appeals that a contrary result could have

obtained on the part of a reasonable juror. Thus, I

conclude that the prosecutor has shown beyond a reasonable

doubt that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury

on materiality was, at most, harmless error.

I concur with the majority in reinstating defendant's

conviction, but I would avoid reaching the question whether

longstanding Michigan precedents concerning the meaning of

MCL 750.422 and 750.423 should now be reversed.3

Stephen J. Markman

2
Viewing the error here—one depriving the jury of an
instruction concerning an element of the crime—as of
constitutional dimension, see People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47,
51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000), and assuming arguendo that this
question was preserved, I agree with the Court of Appeals
that this error does not constitute a structural defect
incompatible with harmless error analysis, People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765 n 11; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), but
is subject instead to the preserved constitutional error
standard of People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392;
521 NW2d 538 (1994). Under this standard, the burden is
upon the prosecutor to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error is harmless.
3
The Legislature, of course, might well choose the
occasion of this opinion to make clear its present
intentions on "materiality" as an element of Michigan's
perjury statutes.

5

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 123145

TIFFANY FREE LIVELY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Today, the majority determines that MCL 750.423, which

sets forth the definition of perjury, does not require

proof of materiality. The majority’s decision allows a

prosecutor unfettered discretion to charge a party or

witness with perjury for any discrepancy made under oath,

no matter how trivial. While I concur with the majority

that materiality is not an element for the jury to decide,

I believe that the issue of materiality is a question of

law, which is a threshold requirement for the trial court

to determine. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

A person accused of perjury in a court proceeding is

charged under MCL 750.422. MCL 750.422 states the

following:
 Any person who, being lawfully required to
depose the truth in any proceeding in a court of
justice, shall commit perjury shall be guilty of
a felony, punishable, if such perjury was
committed on the trial of an indictment for a
capital crime, by imprisonment in the state
prison for life, or any term of years, and if
committed in any other case, by imprisonment in
the state prison for not more than 15 years.
MCL 750.423 defines perjury and became effective on

September 18, 1931. MCL 750.423 states the following:

Any person authorized by any statute of this
state to take an oath, or any person of whom an
oath shall be required by law, who shall wilfully
swear falsely, in regard to any matter or thing,
respecting which such oath is authorized or
required, shall be guilty of perjury, a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not more than 15 years.
From May 18, 1846, to the time MCL 750.423 was enacted

in 1931, perjury was defined as follows:

If any person authorized by any statute of
this state to take an oath, or if any person of
whom an oath shall be required by law, shall
willfully swear falsely, in regard to any matter
or thing, respecting which such oath is
authorized or required, such person shall be
deemed guilty of perjury . . . . [RS 1846, ch
156, § 2.]
Since 1846, our Legislature has defined perjury as

falsely swearing “to any matter or thing.” Also since that

time, this Court has repeatedly held that alleged perjured

statements must have been material to an issue or cause in

the prior proceeding.

In People v Almashy, 229 Mich 227, 230; 201 NW 231

(1924), this Court stated, “It is fundamental that both the

2

oath and the facts sworn to must be material in order to

justify conviction of perjury.” In People v Kert, 304 Mich

148, 154-155; 7 NW2d 251 (1943), this Court stated, “While

perjury . . . is defined as a wilful false swearing in

regard to any matter or in respect to which such oath is

authorized or required, it is always necessary to show that

the perjury was in regard to a material fact.” Numerous

other cases have also stated that claims of perjury must

allege materiality. See People v Cash, 388 Mich 153, 159;

200 NW2d 83 (1972); People v Vogt, 156 Mich 594, 595; 121

NW 293 (1909); People v Ostrander, 110 Mich 60, 61; 67 NW

1079 (1896); People v McCaffrey, 75 Mich 115, 120, 124,

126; 42 NW 681 (1889); Flint v The People, 35 Mich 491, 493

(1877); People v Fox, 25 Mich 492, 496 (1872) (majority

opinion by Cooley, J.); People v Gaige, 26 Mich 30, 33

(1872); People v Collier, 1 Mich 137, 138 (1848) (“It is a

well-settled rule, that it must appear on the face of the

indictment that the false allegation was material to the

matter in question; for if it be of no importance, though

false, it will not be perjury . . . .”); see also Model

Penal Code, § 241.1; ULA Penal Code 241.1.

I disagree with the majority’s assertion that in all

prior cases dealing with perjury, our courts did not

properly analyze the statutory language. Even Chief

3

Justice Corrigan, the author of the majority opinion in

this case, wrote an opinion when she was at the Court of

Appeals stating that materiality is an essential element of

statutory perjury. People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 428-

429, 432; 556 NW2d 512 (1996). In Kozyra, supra at 432,

the Court of Appeals stated, “One of the essential elements

of perjury is that the issue or cause to which the

defendant swears is material. . . . For purposes of a

perjury prosecution, a statement is material if it could

have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding.”1

The idea that materiality is a question of law for the

trial court to determine is not a novel one. For over 150

years, this Court has recognized this proposition. Today,

the current majority states that for over a century and a

half, justices who have come before them have been wrong.

I do not agree with such a notion.2

1
While I disagree that materiality is an element of
perjury for the jury to determine, the necessity that the
allegedly perjured statement be material to the proceedings
has been consistently held in our jurisprudence.
2
I also do not agree that this issue is controlled by
federal constitutional law. I agree with the majority that
all essential elements of an offense must be submitted to a
jury, as stated in United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 523;
115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995); however, I believe
that the issue of materiality is not an element. Rather,
consistently with our past jurisprudence, materiality is a
Footnotes continued on following page.

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 “The application of stare decisis is generally the

preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,

predictable, and consistent development of legal

principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and

contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the

judicial process.” People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 633; 648

NW2d 193 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Even if this Court determines an error was made,

“‘[b]efore this court overrules a decision deliberately

made, it should be convinced not merely that the case was

wrongly decided, but also that less injury will result from

overruling than from following it.’” Id. at 634, quoting

McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006

(1904). Even if past Courts erred, I find it hard to

fathom that the majority believes that less injury will

result to our citizens when they can be charged with

perjury over immaterial discrepancies.

The majority states that I have not considered

reliance interests and have not explained how overruling

earlier case law “will produce any real-world

dislocations.” Ante at 11 n 9. I note that there are

likely no superficial reliance interests to consider when a

question of law. As such, it is well within the purview of
the courts to determine.

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case involves a matter of criminal justice. How unlikely

it would be for this Court to decide not to overrule a past

case because criminals have been relying on it to further

their criminal conduct. Notably, the majority’s argument

can be made any time a case involves a matter of criminal

justice. However, I do not believe that, merely because a

case involves a criminal matter, the edicts of stare

decisis are discarded. This Court’s 150-year history of

recognizing that materiality is a question of law and our

citizens’ reliance on this Court’s consistent application

of the law must not be discarded merely because of a

perceived lack of reliance interests.

Further, the majority quotes from People v Chavis, 468

Mich 84, 94 n 6; 658 NW2d 469 (2003), and states that

prosecutors have always had great discretion in whether to

file charges. The majority also notes, “'Any apprehension

that the prosecutor may abuse this power should be

tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there are

significant systemic protections afforded defendants,

including the defendant’s right to a preliminary

examination and right to a jury trial.'” Ante at 9 n 6,

quoting id. However, by eliminating any determination of

materiality by the court, a preliminary examination and

jury trial will offer little protection to those charged

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for trivial matters. The majority certainly does not mean

to advocate jury nullification, yet that is what it is

doing when it mentions the protections of a jury trial.

While the prosecutor must prove his case beyond a

reasonable doubt, the problem is in the nature of the

charge. The perjury charge may be related to an

inconsequential discrepancy, yet if it is proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, the jury has no choice but to convict.

Finally, while the majority is comforted by the

prosecutor’s daily scrutiny by the media and periodic

elections, I am certain this provides little comfort to the

witness, undoubtedly a witness who testified in a manner

that was contrary to that sought by the prosecutor, who

sits in prison.

Accordingly, I concur with the majority that

materiality is not an element of perjury for the jury to

determine. However, I would hold, consistently with this

Court’s decisions for over 150 years, that the issue of

materiality in a perjury prosecution is a question of law

for the trial court to determine. Therefore, I

respectfully dissent.

Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly

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