Twichel v. MIC General Insurance Corporation

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chief Justice Justices

Opinion
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED MARCH 9, 2004

MARK TODD TWICHEL, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of BRADY S. SIES, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 121822

MIC GENERAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________

PER CURIAM

This case involves whether defendant insurer, MIC

General Insurance Corporation, is liable for either (1) no-

fault personal protection insurance benefits or (2) policy-

provided uninsured motorist benefits as the result of a

fatal accident. The issue is whether the deceased was the

"owner" of the vehicle under either MCL 500.3113(b) or the

language of the policy. The Court of Appeals held that the

deceased was not the owner, and that benefits were

therefore payable. We reverse.

1

 I

At the time of the fatal accident on November 17,

1998, decedent Brady S. Sies was driving a 1988 GMC pickup

truck. Five days earlier, he had purchased the truck from

a friend, Matthew Roach. The sale price was set at $600.

Sies gave Roach $300 and was to pay the remainder at a

later date. Sies took possession of the vehicle, but the

title was not signed over because of the incomplete

payment. There was no insurance policy listing the

vehicle.

At the time of the accident, Brady Sies was living

with his grandfather, Elmer Sies, who had a policy issued

by the defendant covering his vehicles.1 The personal

representative of Brady Sies=s estate brought this action

against the defendant, claiming both personal protection

insurance benefits and uninsured motorist coverage. The

circuit court held that the deceased was covered by the

policy both for personal protection insurance and uninsured

motorist benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a

published opinion.2

1
As a relative residing in the same household, Brady
could potentially obtain benefits under Elmer=s policy.
MCL 500.3114(1).
2
251 Mich App 476; 650 NW2d 428 (2002).

2

 II. Personal Protection Insurance Benefits

A. Statutory Language

MCL 500.3113(b) precludes owners of uninsured vehicles

from receiving personal protection insurance benefits:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal
protection insurance benefits for accidental
bodily injury if at the time of the accident any
of the following circumstances existed:

* * *

(b) The person was the owner or registrant
of a motor vehicle . . . involved in the accident
with respect to which the security required by
section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.

The key question presented is whether Brady Sies was

the "owner" of the truck. That term is defined in

MCL 500.3101(2)(g) as follows:

(i) A person renting a motor vehicle or
having the use thereof, under a lease or
otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30
days.

(ii) A person who holds legal title to a
vehicle, other than a person engaged in the
business of leasing motor vehicles who is the
lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease
providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the
lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days.

(iii) A person who has the immediate right
of possession of a motor vehicle under an
installment sale contract. [Emphasis added.]

B. Standard of Review

This case involves the proper interpretation of

MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i). Issues of statutory interpretation

are questions of law that we review de novo. Oade v
3

Jackson Nat=l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 NW2d 126

(2001); Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248;

596 NW2d 574 (1999). In analyzing questions of statutory

construction, our obligation is to determine the intent of

the Legislature as expressed in the language of the

statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53,

60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001); Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc,

442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993).

C. Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals read Ardt v Titan Ins Co,

233 Mich App 685; 593 NW2d 215 (1999), and Chop v

Zielinski, 244 Mich App 677; 624 NW2d 539 (2001), as

indicating that under subsection i, the person in question

must actually have had use of the vehicle for thirty days

or more. The Court declined to follow Ringewold v Bos, 200

Mich App 131; 503 NW2d 716 (1993). Ringewold involved MCL

257.401, the owner's liability section of the Michigan

Vehicle Code. That statute has a definition of “owner”

that is similar to MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i).3 The defendant in

3
MCL 257.37 defines Aowner@ as:

(a) Any person, firm, association, or
corporation renting a motor vehicle or having the
exclusive use thereof, under a lease or
otherwise, for a period that is greater than
30 days.

4

Ringewold claimed that she was not the owner of the vehicle

because she did not hold legal title and did not have

possession of it for more than thirty days before the

accident.4 The Ringewold Court held that MCL 257.401 did

not require actual use of the vehicle for more than thirty

days and that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle

under these circumstances.

The panel in this case refused to follow Ringewold,

not because of any material differences in the language of

the two statutes, but because of the differing purposes of

the Michigan Vehicle Code and the no-fault insurance act.

It said that the former is intended to place liability on

the person who has ultimate control of the vehicle. By

contrast, the goal of the no-fault insurance system is to

assure that persons injured in motor-vehicle accidents

receive prompt and adequate reparation for injuries. The

panel thus concluded that it was reasonable to construe the

(b) Except as otherwise provided in
section 401a, a person who holds the legal title
of a vehicle.

(c) A person who has the immediate right of
possession of a vehicle under an installment sale
contract. [Emphasis added.]
4
The plaintiff in Ringewold was injured when struck by
a vehicle that had been purchased by the defendant's former
husband for their daughter fifteen days before the
accident. He had paid the entire purchase price, but did
not make arrangements to record the transfer of title.
5
similar language in a different manner because of the

different statutory purposes.

The panel also noted the factual differences between

the two cases. In Ringewold, the full purchase price had

been paid and, although the title had not been transferred,

the defendant had insured the vehicle and put on license

plates from a previously owned vehicle. In the present

case, the full price had not been paid, the title had not

been delivered because the sale was not complete, and the

seller's plates were retained. Thus, the panel concluded

that this was not a case, like Ringewold, "where ownership

had been transferred permanently." 200 Mich App 138.

D. Analysis

We agree with the reasoning in the Ringewold decision,

which construed the virtually identical language of MCL

257.37. As the Ringewold Court explained, it is not

necessary that a person actually have used the vehicle for

a thirty-day period before a finding may be made that the

person is the owner. Rather, the focus must be on the

nature of the person's right to use the vehicle.

Once again, MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i) defines “owner” as

“[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use

thereof . . . for a period that is greater than 30 days.”

(Emphasis added.) Reading this language in the manner

suggested by plaintiff requires substitution of the phrase
6

“having used the vehicle” for the phrase “having the use

thereof.”

Nothing in the plain language of MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i)

requires (1) that a person has at any time actually used

the vehicle, or (2) that the person has commenced using the

vehicle at least thirty days before the accident occurred.

The statute merely contemplates a situation in which the

person is renting or using a vehicle for a period that is

greater than thirty days.

Accordingly, if the lease or other arrangement under

which the person has use of the vehicle is such that the

right of use will extend beyond thirty days, that person is

the "owner" from the inception of the arrangement,

regardless of whether a thirty-day period has expired. For

example, in the case of a lease running longer than thirty

days, the plain language of the statute would make that

person an "owner" from the inception of the lease; the

person's status would not change simply because of the

passage of time.

In this case, the arrangement between the seller and

the deceased was for a permanent transfer of ownership of

the vehicle and it contemplated that the deceased would

have exclusive use of the truck permanently. The fact that

the accident occurred before the expiration of thirty days

7

does not affect the nature of the deceased's interest in

the vehicle.

The Court of Appeals declined to follow Ringewold

because that case involved the Michigan Vehicle Code rather

than the no-fault statute. The Court reasoned that the

differing purposes of those statutes permit giving

different meaning to the identical language. We reject

that view. The focus of statutory interpretation must be

on the language used by the Legislature. The courts are

not free to manipulate interpretations of statutes to

accommodate their own views of the overall purpose of

legislation. See Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm=rs, 465 Mich

492, 504; 638 NW2d 396 (2002).

Like the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i)

treats a person as an "owner" of a vehicle if the person

rents or has the use of the vehicle for a period greater

than thirty days. It is the nature of the right to use the

vehicleCwhether it is contemplated that the right to use

the vehicle will remain in effect for more than thirty

daysCthat is controlling, not the actual length of time

that has elapsed.

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that there

were differences between the transactions in Ringewold and

the present case. However, those details, regarding

whether the full purchase price had been paid, etc., are
8

inconsequential. Despite those differences, the key fact

remains the same. The arrangement under which Brady Sies

obtained the vehicle contemplated that he would have the

use of it for more than thirty days, thus bringing him

within the statutory definition of "owner" under

§ 3101(2)(g)(i).5

5
The Court of Appeals additionally rejected
defendant’s alternative argument that the decedent was “[a]
person who has the immediate right of possession of a motor
vehicle under an installment sale contract” and thus
qualified as an “owner” under MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(iii). In
light of our conclusion that the decedent was the owner of
the truck under § 3101(2)(g)(i), it is not necessary to
address this issue at length. However, we wish to note our
disagreement with the Court of Appeals’ analysis.

The panel looked to the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act (MVSFA), MCL 492.101 et seq., and adopted its
definition of “installment sale contract” (“a contract for
the retail sale of a motor vehicle . . . under which part
or all of the price is payable in 2 or more scheduled
payments . . . ”). See MCL 492.102(9). Accordingly,
because the transaction between the decedent and Roach was
not a retail sale or a commercial transaction and because
there was no payment schedule, the panel concluded that §
3101(2)(g)(iii) was inapplicable.

We conclude that in addition to qualifying as an
“owner” under § 3101(2)(g)(i), the decedent qualified as an
“owner” under § 3101(2)(g)(iii). The MVSFA is inapposite,
as it applies only to sellers who are “engaged in the
business of selling, offering for sale, hiring, or leasing
motor vehicles under installment sale contracts or a legal
successor in interest to that person,” not including
isolated sales. MCL 492.102(4). Thus, the panel erred in
importing into the no-fault act the MVSFA’s definition of
“installment sale contract.”
The commonly understood meaning of the undefined
phrase “installment sale contract” in § 3101(2)(g)(iii)
would include the arrangement between the decedent and
Roach. The phrase “installment sale contract” does not
9
 III. Uninsured Motorist Benefits

The second issue is whether uninsured motorist

benefits under defendant's policy are available. The

interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of

law that we review de novo. Henderson v State Farm Fire &

Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). Uninsured

motorist benefit clauses are construed without reference to

the no-fault act because such insurance is not required

under the act. Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich

520, 525; 502 NW2d 310 (1993).

The policy excludes coverage for injury sustained

while the insured is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle

that is "owned" by the insured:

require a writing; nor does it require a sale at retail.
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed) provides
a typical definition of the term “installment”: “One of the
parts into which a debt is divided when payment is made at
intervals.” Moreover, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed)
defines the more specific term “installment contract” as
“[a] contract requiring or authorizing the delivery of
goods in separate lots, or payments in separate increments,
to be separately accepted.” Thus, there is no material
difference whether the term is accorded its commonly
understood meaning or is considered to be a term of art.
The decedent had a contract for the purchase of the truck.
The purchase price was payable in at least two
installments. The decedent had the immediate right of
possession of the truck pursuant to the sale contract.
Under these circumstances, he qualified as one having the
“immediate right of possession of a motor vehicle under an
installment sale contract” and was thus an “owner” under §
3101(2)(g)(iii).

10

 A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists
Coverage for "bodily injury" sustained:

1. By an "insured" while occupying, or when
struck by, any motor vehicle that is owned by
that "insured" which is not insured for this
coverage under this policy.

Brady Sies was an "insured" because he was residing

with his grandfather, the policyholder. The vehicle

involved in the accident, however, was not covered by the

policy, and coverage would thus be excluded if Brady

"owned" the vehicle. The policy does not define the term

"owner" or "owned." The Court of Appeals applied the same

definition of the policy term “owned” as it had in

construing the term “owner” in the no-fault statute:

“Having found that the decedent was not the ‘owner’ of the

vehicle under the no-fault act, we also find that he did

not own the vehicle pursuant to the insurance policy.” 251

Mich App 490.

The Court of Appeals erred in importing the statutory

definition of “owner” into the policy language. There is

nothing in the plain language of the policy supporting the

application of the definition of “owner” in MCL

500.3101(2)(g) to this independent, nonstatutory coverage.

An insurance policy is enforced in accordance with its

terms. Where a term is not defined in the policy, it is

accorded its commonly understood meaning. Allstate Ins Co

v McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 280; 645 NW2d 20 (2002). Reference
11

to dictionary definitions indicates that possession,

control, and dominion are among the primary features of

ownership. See, e.g., Merriam Webster=s Collegiate

Dictionary (10th ed, 1977) (defining "owned" as to "have or

possess"); Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of

the English Language (Deluxe ed, 1994) (listing various

definitions of "owned," such as "to acknowledge as one's

own; recognized as having full claim, authority, power,

dominion, etc."); American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (3d ed, 1993) (defining “own” as “[t]o

have or possess” and “ownership” as “[l]egal right to the

possession of a thing”).

Brady Sies had possession and control of the vehicle,

as well as dominion and authority over the vehicle, and,

thus, would commonly be understood to have “owned” it at

the time of the accident. The facts that the entire

purchase price had not yet been paid and that the technical

transfer of title had not yet occurred are not dispositive.

Brady, who had paid part of the purchase price and taken

control of the truck with the intention of permanently

possessing it, “owned” the vehicle as that term would be

understood in ordinary usage. Because Brady "owned" the

12

uninsured vehicle, uninsured motorist benefits are not

recoverable under the policy.6

IV

Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the

Genesee Circuit Court are reversed, and we remand the case

to the circuit court for entry of judgment for the

defendant.

Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

6
The dissent asserts that the term “owned,” because it is
undefined in the policy, must be construed against the
drafter. We disagree. As we recently explained in Klapp v
United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459; 663 NW2d 447
(2003), the rule of contra proferentem is a rule of last
resort that does not apply unless (1) there is a true
ambiguity and (2) the parties’ intent cannot be discerned.
A word is not ambiguous merely because different dictionary
definitions exist. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466
Mich 304, 317-318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). The word “owned” is
not ambiguous as used in the policy. Rather, we conclude
that the plain and ordinary meaning of that word would
include circumstances, as in the case before us, in which
an agreement for sale is reached, a portion of the purchase
price is paid, and control and dominion of the vehicle are
relinquished to the purchaser. Although our dissenting
colleague correctly notes that the definition of "owner" in
MCL 500.3101(2)(g) addresses concepts other than possession
and control, he likewise acknowledges that the Court of
Appeals "erred in transplanting the statutory definition"
into the policy. See post at 4 n 2.

13

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

MARK TODD TWICHEL, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of BRADY S. SIES, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 121822

MIC GENERAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusion
regarding the personal protection insurance benefits in
this case. However, I respectfully dissent with respect to
the analysis contained in part III of the majority’s
opinion and its conclusion regarding the unavailability of
uninsured motorist benefits under defendant’s policy. I
would conclude that such benefits are available.
As the majority correctly notes, the term “owned” or
“owner” is not defined in the policy.1 In determining

1
The policy, however, does define such terms as “you,”
“your,” “we,” “us,” “our,” “bodily injury,” “business,”
“family member,” “occupying,” “property damage,” “trailer,”
and “insured.” The term “your covered auto” is defined as:

1. Any vehicle you own shown in the Declarations.

2. Any of the following types of vehicles on the date
you become the owner:

a. a private passenger auto;
1
whether decedent was the “owner” under the terms of the
policy, this Court examines the language of the policy and
interprets its terms pursuant “to well-established Michigan
principles of construction.” Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 466
Mich 277, 280; 645 NW2d 20 (2002). “An insurance policy
must be enforced in accordance with its terms. If not
defined in the policy, however, we will interpret the terms
of the policy in accordance with their ‘commonly used
meaning.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The majority, pointing to various dictionary
definitions, concludes that “possession, control, and
dominion are among the primary features of ownership.”
Ante at 12. The commonly used meanings of “own” and
“ownership,” however, may contain additional features not
contemplated by the majority. Unlike the majority, I
cannot limit the definition of the word “own” and prefer to
consider all of the features of ownership.
The common usage of a nonlegal term is to be found in
a lay dictionary. Sands Appliance Services, Inc v Wilson,
463 Mich 231, 240-241; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). Referencing
lay dictionary definitions indicates that ownership may
entail more than possession, dominion, and control. See,

b. a pickup or van that:

(1) has a Gross Vehicle Weight of less than
10,000 lbs.; and

(2) is not used for the delivery or
transportation of goods and materials unless
such use is:

(a) incidental to your “business” of
installing, maintaining or repairing
furnishings or equipment; or

(b) for farming or ranching; . . . .
2
e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
Unabridged (1966) (defining “own” as “to have or hold as
property or appurtenance: have a rightful title to whether
legal or natural,” “owner” as “one that has the legal or
rightful title whether the possessor or not,” and
“ownership” as a “lawful claim or title”); Webster’s New
Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed, 1983)
(defining “owner” as “one who has the legal or rightful
title, whether he is the possessor or not”); The Oxford
English Dictionary (2d ed, v XI, 1991) (defining “owner” as
“one who has the rightful claim or title to a thing [though
he may not be in possession]”).2 In short, the common

2
These definitions are consistent with the definitions
in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), which defines “own” as
“[t]o have or possess as property; to have legal title to.”
Similarly, “owner” is defined as “[o]ne who has the right
to possess, use, and convey something” and “ownership” is
defined as “[t]he collection of rights allowing one to use
and enjoy property, including the right to convey it to
others.” Id. (emphases added).

I agree with the majority that terms of the policy are
construed independently of the statute and that the Court
of Appeals erred in transplanting the statutory definition
of “owner” into the policy. However, the statutory
definition of “owner” further illustrates the concept that
“ownership” may involve more than the features cited by the
majority under certain circumstances. The statute defines
“owner” as:

(i) A person renting a motor vehicle or
having the use thereof, under a lease or
otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30
days.
(ii) A person who holds legal title to a
vehicle, other than a person engaged in the
business of leasing motor vehicles who is the
lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease
providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the
lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days.
3

features of “ownership” appear to involve more than mere
possession, dominion, and control.
While it is clear that decedent possessed and
controlled the vehicle, it is equally clear that decedent
did not have title to the vehicle. Instead, title remained
at all relevant times with Matthew Roach. As such, it is
unclear whether decedent would be considered the “owner” of
the vehicle under the common usage of that term and,
consequently, the terms of the policy itself.
Applying another “well-established Michigan principle
of construction,” I would conclude that uninsured motorist
benefits are available under the terms of the policy. To
the extent the term “owner” is ambiguous in the policy,
such ambiguity is strictly construed against the insurer in
favor of coverage. State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co v
Enterprise Leasing Co, 452 Mich 25, 38-40; 549 NW2d 345
(1996). If “ownership” merely involves possession,
dominion, and control, then decedent is an “owner” and
coverage under the policy is unavailable. If “ownership”
contemplates possessing legal title and the ability to
convey such title to others, then decedent is not an
“owner” and, thus, covered under the policy.
If a fair reading of the entire contract of
insurance leads one to understand that there is
coverage under particular circumstances and
another fair reading of it leads one to
understand there is no coverage under the same
circumstances the contract is ambiguous and
should be construed against its drafter and in
favor of coverage. [Raska v Farm Bureau Mut Ins

(iii) A person who has the immediate right
of possession of a motor vehicle under an
installment sale contract. [MCL 500.3101(2)(g)
(emphasis added).]
4
 Co of Michigan, 412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440
(1982).]
I disagree with the majority's decision to construct a
decision favorable to defendant, rather than construing the
insurance contract against its drafter, as we are bound to
do under our principles of construction. Raska, supra at
361-362; Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Kneeland, 464 Mich
491, 509-510; 628 NW2d 491 (2001) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
While defendant deemed it appropriate to define such terms
as “you” and “we,” it failed to define an essential term
such as “owner.” Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority’s conclusion that uninsured motorist benefits are
unavailable under the terms of the policy. I would
construe the insurance contract against its drafter and
conclude that uninsured motorist benefits are available.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly

5