Dressel v. Ameribank

                                                                       Michigan Supreme Court
                                                                       Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                                C h i e f J u s ti c e           J u s t ic e s
                                                                Maura D. Corrigan                Michael F. Cavanagh



Opinion
                                                                                                 Elizabeth A. Weaver
                                                                                                 Marilyn Kelly
                                                                                                 Clifford W. Taylor
                                                                                                 Robert P. Young, Jr.
                                                                                                 Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

                                                                                         FILED JUNE 24, 2003





                PAUL DRESSEL and THERESA DRESSEL,


                        Plaintiffs-Appellees,


                v                                                                                No. 119959


                AMERIBANK,


                     Defendant-Appellee.

                ___________________________________

                BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH


                KELLY, J.


                        With this case we determine whether a lender that charges


                a fee for the completion of standard mortgage documents


                engages in the unauthorized practice of law under MCL 450.681.


                The Court of Appeals held that the lender is so engaged and


                reversed a circuit court order granting summary disposition in


                favor of defendant.               We conclude that such conduct does not


                constitute the practice of law and, accordingly, reverse the

Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate the circuit court


order in favor of defendant.


                      I. FACTUAL   AND   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


       In 1997, plaintiffs obtained from defendant Ameribank a


real estate loan secured by a mortgage on their home.                            In


connection with the loan, the bank prepared an adjustable rate


note       and   a   mortgage.          On   its    settlement      statement,   it


designated a $400 fee for "document preparation." It provided


written material to plaintiffs stating that the document


preparation fee was "a separate fee that some lenders charge


to cover their cost of preparation of final legal papers, such


as a mortgage, deed of trust, note or deed."1


       Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the charging of a


fee for completing the mortgage documents constituted the


unauthorized         practice      of    law      and    violated   the   Michigan


Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. In March


of 1999, the case was certified as a class action to provide


potential relief for other borrowers who also had been charged


a document preparation fee by lending institutions. 


       The       circuit   court        granted         summary   disposition    to


defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denied reconsideration.


On appeal to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs again argued




       1
      United States Department of Housing & Urban Development,

Buying Your Home (Washington, DC: United States Government

Printing Office, 1997), p 19.


                                             2

that defendant's assessment of a document preparation fee


constituted the unauthorized practice of law.                    The Court of


Appeals ruled for the plaintiffs, noting that the statutes


governing        the    unauthorized        "practice     of    law"   do    not


specifically define that term and that this Court has never


decided the issue.            It held that the charging of a separate


fee for the preparation of legal documents by an interested


party constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.                    It held,


also,     that    neither       of   the    exceptions     to   the    statutes


proscribing the unauthorized practice of law2                      applied to


defendant's conduct.3


        The   Court     of    Appeals      concluded    that    defendant     had


violated the MCPA and the Savings Bank Act (SBA), MCL 487.3101


et seq.       Because the trial court had erred in dismissing


plaintiffs' claims of unauthorized practice of law, the Court


reasoned, it erred also in dismissing the SBA and MCPA claims.


Basic to these conclusions was the determination that, because


defendant was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, its


activities       were    proscribed        by   the    Credit   Reform      Act's


prohibition        on        excessive      fees.         MCL    445.1857(3).


Consequently, given that the fees were excessive under the




     2
         MCL 450.681 and MCL 600.916.

     3
      The Court of Appeals specifically held that the pro se

and "as otherwise authorized by law" exceptions to the statute

did not apply. 247 Mich App 133; 635 NW2d 328 (2001).


                                           3

Credit Reform Act, they were not authorized by the SBA.                         MCL


487.3430(1)(a). 


     Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because


defendant was in violation of the SBA, plaintiffs' claims


under the MCPA were also valid.            MCL 445.904(2)(d); see also


Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 467; 597 NW2d 28


(1999).    Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the


circuit court and remanded the case.                  We granted leave to


appeal.


                         II. STANDARD     OF   REVIEW


     Issues concerning the proper interpretation of statutes


are questions of law that we review de novo.                     Hoste v Shanty


Creek Mgt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 569; 592 NW2d 360 (1999).


Similarly,    this   Court     applies     a     de      novo    standard       when


reviewing motions for summary disposition made under MCR


2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual support for a claim.


Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d


201 (1998). We consider the facts in the light most favorable


to the nonmoving party, in this case, the plaintiffs.                      Smith,


supra at 454.


     III. INTERPRETING   THE   UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE      OF    LAW STATUTES


     In Michigan, the practice of law is regulated by statute.


MCL 450.681 provides, in part:


          It shall be unlawful for any corporation or

     voluntary association to practice or appear as an

     attorney-at-law for any person other than itself in


                                     4

       any court in this state or before any judicial

       body, or to make it a business to practice as an

       attorney-at-law, for any person other than itself

       . . . .


       It is the cardinal principle of statutory construction


that       courts   must    give    effect    to   legislative     intent.


Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich 524, 528; 647 NW2d 493


(2002).      When reviewing a statute, courts must first examine


the language of the statute. If the intent of the Legislature


is clearly expressed by the language, no further construction


is warranted.       Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309


(2000). 


       In the past, this Court concluded that it is impossible


to   formulate      a    specific   and    enduring   definition   of   the


practice of law "'for the reason that under our system of


jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with the


everchanging business and social order.'"                  State Bar of


Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116, 133; 249 NW2d 1 (1976),


quoting Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v Denkema, 290 Mich 56, 64; 287


NW 377 (1939).          We disagree with that conclusion.


       Although formidable, the task of formulating a definition


of the practice of law is not impossible.             The full meaning of


the language in MCL 450.681, and in its sister provisions,4


prohibiting the unauthorized "practice of law" and engagement



       4
      MCL 600.916 prohibits individuals, as opposed to

corporations, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of

law or the law business.


                                      5

in   the    "law     business"     may   not    be   immediately       apparent.


However, the language is capable of being construed. In order


to accomplish that, we review the purposes of the unauthorized


practice of law statutes.


      These     purposes    are     discernable      from      the    regulations


governing the legal profession that preceded and coincided


with the enactment of the statutes. From them, it is possible


to extrapolate a sufficiently accurate definition of the


"practice of law" to guide parties in their dealings with each


other.


      A. THE PURPOSE     OF THE   UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE   OF   LAW STATUTES


      Regulation of the legal profession began early in the


English      legal    tradition.         See,   generally,        1    Pollock   &


Maitland, History of English Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co,


2d ed, 1899), pp 211-217; Baker, An Introduction to English


Legal History (London: Butterworths, 3d ed, 1990), pp 21, 179.


In our nation, also, regulation of the practice of law has


been an innate characteristic of the legal tradition. See


Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times (St Paul:


West, 1953), pp 130, 135-136; see, e.g., 2 Works of John Adams


(Boston: Little & Brown, 1850), pp 45-50.


      In the period between the American Revolution and the


Civil War, however, regulation of the profession receded.5                       By



      5
          See, e.g., Ind Const 1851, art VII, § 21 ("Every person

                                                   (continued...)


                                         6

the turn of the last century, increasing concern had developed


that the spread of unlicenced practitioners was harmful to the


profession   and   dangerous   to    the   public.      See   Comment,


Unauthorized practice of law—The full service bank that was:


Bank cashier enjoined from preparing real estate mortgages to


secure bank loans, 61 Ky L J 300, 303-304 (1972). 


     Thus, at the time our unauthorized practice of law


statutes were enacted, there was a trend toward restoring the


organized bar as a means of regulating the practice of law.


At the core of this movement and of all other attempts to


regulate the practice was an interest in protecting the public


from the danger of unskilled persons practicing law.               See


Comment, supra at 301-302, 304.       It became the basic purpose


for our unauthorized practice statutes.              As we stated in


Cramer, "'Laymen are excluded from law practice . . . solely


to protect the public.' . . . It is this purpose of public


protection which must dictate the construction we put on the


term 'unauthorized practice of law'."         Id., at 134, quoting


Oregon State Bar v Security Escrows, Inc, 233 Or 80, 87; 377


P2d 334 (1962).


     Having discerned the purpose of the statutes, we now


explore the extent of their reach.         In this regard, we find




     5
      (...continued)

of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to

admission to practice law in all courts of justice.")


                                7

persuasive the analysis of the trial judge in this case, Judge


Dennis Kolenda.


               B. CONDUCT PROSCRIBED   BY THE   STATUTES


     Judge Kolenda noted:


          Some activities are plainly the practice of

     law.   "'It is too obvious for discussion'" that

     "'the conduct of cases in courts'" is the practice

     of law, as is "'the preparation of pleadings and

     other papers incident to actions . . . and the

     management of such actions and proceedings on

     behalf of clients before judges and courts . . .

     [.]" Detroit Bar Assn v Union Guardian Trust Co,

     282 Mich 216, 222[ 276 NW 365] (1937), quoting In

     re Duncan, 83 SC 186; 65 SE 210 (1909); and

     Denkema, [supra] at 63.    Doing those things, at

     least doing them well, demands the unique training

     and skills of an attorney. It is likewise obvious

     that, for the same reason, the practice of law

     includes "the giving of legal advice in any action

     taken for others in any matter connected with the

     law," [id.] at 63, even though unrelated to any

     action in court.     Much of what lawyers do is

     "'performed outside of any court and [has] no

     immediate relation to proceedings in court,'" [id.]

     at 64, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass

     607, 613; 194 NE 313 (1934), and giving competent

     legal advice requires a lawyer's training and

     skill.


          More problematic is the drafting of documents.

     In Denkema, supra [at 63], our Supreme Court said

     that the practice of law includes "the preparation

     of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a

     legal right is secured," and in Detroit Bar Assn,

     [supra] at 221, that Court quoted holdings from

     other courts which included within the practice of

     law "'the drafting of legal documents of all kinds.

     [ . . .]'" Very significantly, however, the Court

     prefaced those quotations with the reservation,

     "[w]ithout giving full sanction thereto," Id., and

     a careful reading of those and subsequent cases

     discloses that such a broad definition has never

     actually been applied in this State.      Only some

     documents, e.g., wills, have actually been held to

     constitute the practice of law, [Denkema, supra] at


                                8

      65.    When composing a document requires "the

      determination of the legal effect of special facts

      and conditions," that activity is the practice of

      law, [Ingham Co Bar Ass'n v Walter Neller Co, 342

      Mich 214, 228; 69 NW2d 713 (1955)(citations

      omitted).]    "[P]rofound legal knowledge [is]

      necessary" to properly draft such documents.

      Detroit Bar Assn, [supra] at 223 (citations

      omitted).


           The practice of law does not, on the other

      hand, encompass drafting "the ordinary run of

      agreements [used] in the every day activities of

      the commercial and industrial world," Detroit Bar

      Assn, [supra] at 229. Legal training and knowledge

      are not necessary to properly compose them.

      Drafting simple documents, which drafting does not

      entail giving advice or counsel as to their legal

      effect and validity, is not the practice of law.

      Denkema, [supra] at 66.         Specifically, the

      preparation of ordinary leases, mortgages and deeds

      do not involve the practice of law, [Walter Neller

      Co, 342 Mich 226-227.]      They have become "'so

      standardized that to complete them for usual

      transactions requires only ordinary intelligence

      rather than legal training.'" Id. at 224, quoting

      Hulse v Criger, 363 Mo 26, 44; 247 [SW2d] 855

      (1952).   To insist that only a lawyer can draft

      such documents would impede numerous commercial

      transactions without protecting the public, [id.]

      at 229, i.e., would not further the purpose of

      restricting the practice of law to trained and

      licensed attorneys. Cramer, [supra] at 133.


      Hence,   our   courts    have    consistently    rejected   the


assertion that the Legislature thought that a person practiced


law when simply drafting a document that affected legal rights


and   responsibilities.       Walter   Neller,   342   Mich   228-229;


Cramer, 399 Mich 133.         Instead, our courts have found a


violation of the unauthorized practice of law statutes when a


person counseled another in matters that required the use of


legal knowledge and discretion.        We agree and reiterate that


                                  9

a person6 engages in the practice of law when he counsels or


assists another in matters that require the use of legal


discretion and profound legal knowledge.


     This definition is in accord with the purpose of the


statutes, the protection of the public.                  It maintains the


integrity of the legal profession without overburdening our


normal economic activities with unnecessary restrictions.


Also, it provides parties with a common-sense approach to


conforming    their   conduct    so      as   to   avoid    committing   the


unauthorized practice of law.7


                   IV.     APPLICATION   OF THE STATUTES



     Plaintiffs       contend       that      defendant's       activities


constituted the unauthorized practice of law because they


affected     plaintiffs'    legal     rights       and   responsibilities.


Plaintiffs also contend that defendant's decision to charge a




     6
      As used in this opinion, "person" refers to any legal

entity.

     7
      A report by the American Bar Association's Task Force on

the Model Definition of the Practice of Law supports our

conclusion that this definition comports with the general

purpose for regulating the practice of law. The Task Force

reviewed the regulation of the practice of law among the

several states and ultimately recommended "that every

jurisdiction adopt a definition of the practice of law . . .

[that] include[s] the basic premise that the practice of law

is the application of legal principles and judgment to the

circumstances or objectives of another person or entity." See

Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on the Model

Definition of the Practice of Law to the House of Delegates,

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_429.pdf.

June 11,2003. 


                                    10

fee for its services compels a holding that it engaged in the


practice of law and the "law business." 


       As we noted previously, the preparation of ordinary


mortgages is not the practice of law.        Plaintiffs do not


assert that the bank's preparation of their mortgage document


was in conjunction with anything other than an ordinary


transaction in the normal course of the bank's      business. 


The bank's employees did not draft the mortgage document.


They merely completed a standard form document that the


federal government compiled and that is readily available to


the public.


       In performing the act of completing the standard form


mortgage, defendant was acting as an amanuensis, a kind of


secretary for plaintiffs.    No legal knowledge or discretion


was involved in the document's completion.    The bank did not


counsel plaintiffs with regard to the legal validity of the


document or the prudence of entering into the transaction. In


general, the completion of standard legal forms that are


available to the public does not constitute the practice of


law.   State Bar of Michigan v Kupris, 366 Mich 688, 694; 116


NW2d 341 (1962); see also Denkema, 290 Mich 68; Walter Neller,


324 Mich 222.    Accordingly, defendant was not practicing law


when it completed the mortgage form at issue in this case.


       Moreover, because defendant was not practicing law when


it completed the mortgage, it was not engaged in the "law


                              11

business."   It is immaterial that it charged a fee for its


services.    Charging a fee for nonlegal services does not


transmogrify those services into the practice of law.8


                          CONCLUSION


     We hold that a person engages in the practice of law when


he counsels or assists another in matters that require the use


of legal discretion and profound legal knowledge.   Defendant


completed standard mortgage forms for plaintiffs and charged


a fee for the service.    But it did not counsel or assist


plaintiffs in matters requiring legal discretion or profound


legal knowledge. Therefore, it did not engage in the practice



     8
      Plaintiffs' reliance on Walter Neller and Kupris for the

proposition that charging a fee for a law-related service

constitutes the practice of law is misplaced.


     In Walter Neller, we remarked that a realtor who charged

a separate fee for a real estate closing might be engaged in

the practice of law. However, the holding in the case was

that the defendant was not practicing law by completing and

executing form documents that were incidental to his business.


     In Kupris, the defendant real estate broker was enjoined

from advising another broker and that broker's clients in the

preparation of a chattel mortgage.        The fact that the

defendant had charged a fee for the service does not bind that

case to this. Rather, what distinguishes Kupris from both

Walter Neller and this case is that there the defendant took

upon himself the role of advising others about the legal

effect of a document. Kupris, 366 Mich 692-693.


     Because the discussions about charging a fee were not

necessary to the resolution of either case, they are obiter

dicta.   Thus, neither discussion constitutes a holding to

which the binding principle of stare decisis is applied.

People v Bouchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 286 n 4; 597 NW2d 1

(1999), citing Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594,

596; 374 NW2d 905 (1985).


                             12

of law and did not violate MCL 450.681. Accordingly, we


reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the


circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of


defendant.


                              Marilyn Kelly

                              Maura D. Corrigan

                              Michael F. Cavanagh

                              Clifford W. Taylor

                              Robert P. Young, Jr.

                              Stephen J. Markman





                             13

                  S T A T E   O F   M I C H I G A N


                           SUPREME COURT





PAUL DRESSEL and THERESA DRESSEL,


     Plaintiffs-Appellees,


v                                                        No. 119959


AMERIBANK,


     Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________

WEAVER, J. (concurring).


     I concur with the majority that the filling out of


standardized    mortgage   documents   does   not    constitute   the


practice of law.


     I disagree, however, with the reasoning employed by the


majority   in   reaching   this   conclusion.       Specifically,   I


seriously question the majority's attempt to formulate a


comprehensive definition of the "practice of law." Such a


definition runs contrary to prior precedent and appears to


contribute little clarity or guidance to the unauthorized­

practice-of-law analysis. 


     This Court has long held that the "practice of law"


defies precise definition. "‘Even if possible, it is not


practical or advisable to attempt specific definition of

“practice of law.”’" Detroit Bar Ass'n v Union Guardian Trust


Co, 282 Mich 216, 220; 276 NW 365 (1937) (citation omitted).


This reluctance to adopt an inclusive definition of the


"practice of law" derives from the fact that "under our system


of jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with


the everchanging business and social order." Grand Rapids Bar


Ass'n v Denkema, 290 Mich 56, 64; 287 NW 377 (1939); see also


Ingham Co Bar Ass'n v Walter Neller Co, 342 Mich 214; 69 NW2d


713 (1955); State Bar of Michigan v Kupris, 366 Mich 688; 116


NW2d 341 (1962); State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116;


249 NW2d 1 (1976).      Constant new developments in society,


technology, business, and the law preclude any chance of


arriving at a lasting definition.1


     Today,   the   majority   deviates   from   this   longstanding


restraint and defines the "practice of law" as "counsel[ing]


or assist[ing] another in matters that require the use of


legal discretion or profound legal knowledge." Ante at 12-13.


     1
       The view that the "practice of law" does not admit of

exact definition is shared by many other jurisdictions.

Arkansas Bar Ass’n v Block, 230 Ark 430; 323 SW2d 912 (1959);

State of Florida v Sperry, 140 So 2d 587 (Fla, 1962); Fought

& Co, Inc v Steel Engineering and Erection, Inc, 87 Hawaii 37;

951 P2d 487 (1998); Iowa Supreme Court Comm on Unauthorized

Practice of Law v Sturgeon, 635 NW2d 679 (Iowa, 2001); Bd of

Overseers of the Bar v Mangan, 2001 ME 7; 763 A2d 1189 (2001);

Cardinal v Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc, 433 NW2d 864

(Minn, 1988); State of Nebraska v Childe, 147 Neb 527; 23 NW2d

720 (1946); Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayer’s Rights, 137 NH

720; 634 A2d 1345 (1993); State of North Dakota v Niska, 380

NW2d 646 (ND, 1986).


                                 2

To reach this new standard, the majority analyzes the purpose


of the statute—the protection of the public from untrained


legal practitioners—and extrapolates a definition meant to


effectuate that purpose.         Ante at 6-7.2


     However, I do not believe that the majority's definition


(or, for that matter, any definition) will better protect the


public than the statute currently does.              Whether certain


conduct requires the use of "legal discretion or profound


legal knowledge" is as open-ended an inquiry as whether that


same conduct constitutes the "practice of law."                   "Legal


discretion"   and   "profound      legal   knowledge"     are   amorphous


concepts   that,    like   the   "practice   of   law,"    do   not   lend


themselves to a single interpretation.            Thus, even with the


majority's definition, a lack of consensus will persist among


the courts.   Moreover, any attempt to conclusively define the


term necessarily runs the risk of sweeping too broadly—thereby


impeding public access to certain quasi-legal services at more


competitive prices—or cutting too narrowly—thereby permitting


nonlawyers to engage in legal activities to the detriment of


the public.    See United States Department of Justice and


Federal Trade Commission December 20, 2002, joint letter


recommending that the "practice of law" not be defined.



     2

       The majority does not explain what has changed that

allows it to define today what it was incapable of defining in

the past. 


                                    3

http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm.


      The prudent and restrained course therefore seems to be


to   remain   committed   to   our    prior   holdings   and   continue


deciding these issues on a case-by-case basis.                 Since no


definition of the "practice of law" can fully account for the


infinite variety of fact situations that will inevitably


arise, it is best to decide these cases in light of their


specific circumstances. This approach allows the lower courts


to explore the concept's dimensions without confining their


analyses to the parameters of an artificial formula.


      Judge Kolenda's exemplary opinion demonstrates the wisdom


of this approach.    In his opinion, Judge Kolenda traced the


relevant case law, examined it in light of the facts of the


case, and properly concluded that filling out standardized


mortgage documents does not constitute the practice of law.


I support and adopt both his case-specific method of analysis


and his conclusion. 


                                     Elizabeth A. Weaver





                                     4