Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED OCTOBER 22, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 121355
JOHN V. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from the Court
of Appeals order directing the trial court to immediately
revoke his bond. He argues that his pending application for
a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court is an “appeal” for
the purpose of MCL 770.8, so that he remains entitled to be
free on bond. We hold that an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is not an appeal within the meaning of MCL
770.8. We thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In 1999, defendant conditionally pleaded guilty1 to a
charge of possessing 225 or more grams, but less than 650
grams, of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), and
the court sentenced him to a seven-and-one-half to thirty-year
term of imprisonment. The plea agreement permitted defendant
to appeal the legality of a search warrant that led to the
discovery of the cocaine. The agreement also permitted
defendant to remain free on bond “pending appeal.” The trial
court accepted the plea, sentenced defendant in accordance
with the agreement, and entered an order that permitted him to
be free on bond of $50,000 or ten percent pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for
leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.2
This Court also denied leave to appeal.3 Defendant then
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
1
Conditional pleas are permitted under MCR 6.301(C)(2)
(permitting conditional pleas to preserve for appeal specified
pretrial rulings and entitling the defendant to withdraw his
plea if the specified pretrial ruling is overturned on
appeal); see also People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655
(1984).
2
Unpublished order, entered August 30, 2000 (Docket No.
228299).
3
463 Mich 976; 623 NW2d 599, reconsideration den 463 Mich
976 (2001).
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certiorari, which it denied.4
The prosecutor then moved in the trial court to revoke
defendant’s bond. While that motion was pending, defendant
filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
pursuant to 28 USC 2254. The prosecutor argued before the
trial court that the federal habeas corpus proceeding was an
independent civil action rather than a continuation of direct
appellate review, and that the trial court therefore no longer
had authority to continue bond. The trial court denied the
prosecutor’s motion, but increased defendant’s bond to
$100,000.
The prosecutor then filed an emergency application for
leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered the trial court to immediately revoke
defendant’s bond and remand him to the custody of the
Department of Corrections.5 Defendant then filed in this
Court an application for leave to appeal and a motion for stay
of proceedings. We denied the motion for stay while we
4
Jones v Michigan, 534 US 954; 122 S Ct 354; 151 L Ed 2d
267 (2001).
5
Unpublished order, entered April 4, 2002 (Docket No.
239673), clarified, unpublished order, entered April 22, 2002
(clarifying that the prior order had immediate effect under
MCR 7.215[F][2]).
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considered the application for leave to appeal.6 We now
affirm.
II
Defendant argues that he is entitled to remain at liberty
during the pendency of his application for a writ of habeas
corpus because the federal proceeding is an appeal for the
purpose of MCL 770.8.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation
that we review de novo. Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466
Mich 95, 99; 643 NW2d 553 (2002).
MCL 770.8 provides:
During the time between the trial court
judgment and the decision of the court to which an
appeal is taken, the trial judge may admit the
defendant to bail, if the offense charged is
bailable and if the offense is not an assaultive
crime as defined in section 9a of this chapter.
This provision permits bail only during the process of
appeal. The statute does not define the word “appeal,” so we
may consult a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the term.
Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163,
n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999) (citing MCL 8.3a). The Legislature
requires that “technical words and phrases, and such as may
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,
6
644 NW2d 762 (2002).
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shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar
and appropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a. Because “appeal” is a
legal term of art, resort to a legal dictionary to determine
its meaning is appropriate. See Consumers Power, 460 Mich
163. An “appeal” is “[r]esort to a superior (i.e.,
appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e.,
trial) court or administrative agency. A complaint to a
higher tribunal of an error or injustice committed by a lower
tribunal, in which the error or injustice is sought to be
corrected or reversed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).
This definition does not describe the instant
relationship in which state courts are not “inferior” to or
“lower” than federal courts, and federal courts are not
“superior” to or “higher” than state courts. Rather, such
courts constitute separate systems of justice.
28 USC 2254 does not grant federal courts the power of
appellate review of state court convictions. Rather, it
provides for an original proceeding in a federal court
challenging the custody of a person who is detained under a
judgment of a state court. It sets forth a process of
“application” for a writ and denominates one who seeks a writ
as an “applicant” rather than an “appellant.” In short, the
statute does not provide for direct or appellate review of the
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state court judgment of conviction and sentence. 28 USC
2254(a)-(h).
Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has
explained:
The whole history of the writ—its unique
development—refutes a construction of the federal
courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate
their task to that of courts of appellate review.
The function on habeas is different. It is to test
by way of an original civil proceeding, independent
of the normal channels of review of criminal
judgments, the very gravest allegations. State
prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas
corpus only upon proving that their detention
violates the fundamental liberties of the person,
safeguarded against state action by the Federal
Constitution. [Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293, 311
312; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963), overruled
in part on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504
US 1; 112 S Ct 1715; 118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992).]
Similarly, Michigan case law has long distinguished
applications for the writ of habeas corpus from appeals from
criminal proceedings:
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main
purpose of which is to cause the release of persons
illegally confined, to inquire into the authority
of law by which a person is deprived of his
liberty. Application for the writ of habeas corpus
is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made
in a new and independent civil action instituted to
enforce a civil right, the right to liberty.
[People v McCager, 367 Mich 116, 121; 116 NW2d 205
(1962)(citations omitted).]
See also In re Palm, 255 Mich 632, 634; 238 NW 732 (1931)
(“The writ of habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of
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error”).
A federal district court considering an application under
28 USC 2254 is simply a trial court exercising original
jurisdiction over an application for a writ authorized under
federal law. See 28 USC 1331. That its habeas corpus
jurisdiction permits it, under carefully defined
circumstances, to scrutinize state court proceedings for
alleged violations of the United States Constitution and
federal laws does not transform the federal district court
into a superior appellate court with jurisdiction to reverse
the judgment of a prisoner’s conviction. Rather, its power is
limited to granting a writ that compels the release of the
prisoner from unlawful detention.
Accordingly, we hold that an application for a writ of
habeas corpus does not constitute a criminal “appeal” within
the meaning of MCL 770.8. A court’s authority to grant a bond
under MCL 770.8 is limited to the time during the appellate
process, and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not a
continuation of that process.
III
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
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MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
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