Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JANUARY 30, 2001
CHERYL DENISE SEWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116528
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and
JOHN DOE,
Defendants,
and
JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord,
alleging negligence and unlawful eviction. During trial, the
defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that a
prior judgment in the district court had resolved the issue
whether the eviction was lawful. The circuit court denied the
motion and later entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgments of
the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, and remand this
case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
I
Defendant Jeffrey Cruse owned a house at 17184 Warrington
Drive in Detroit. He rented a flat in the house to plaintiff
C. Denise Sewell for $450 per month.
Ms. Sewell soon fell behind in her rent. She says that
she was withholding rent because of numerous unrepaired
problems in the flat.
In May 1995, Mr. Cruse filed a complaint in the district
court, seeking termination of Ms. Sewell’s tenancy.1 This led
to a consent judgment that entered twelve days later.2 The
judgment required Ms. Sewell to pay $450 by June 2. However,
the judgment further provided:
[Mr. Cruse] agrees to make repairs to side
door, lock on front door, tile in bathroom, repair
bathroom leak, bath ceiling, repair hot water &
electrical; all to be made before money is due on
6/2/95.[3]
Mr. Cruse says he made the required repairs. Ms. Sewell
says he did not. However, Mr. Cruse has testified that Ms.
Sewell did sign a form indicating that the repairs had been
made.
1
Summary proceedings for the recovery of possession of
premises are governed by MCL 600.5701 et seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et
seq. and by MCR 4.201.
2
MCR 4.201(K).
3
This language is handwritten on the judgment form and
is not entirely legible. We have added punctuation.
2
Using this documentation, Mr. Cruse returned to the
district court, where he signed a June 5 application for a
writ of restitution.4 The form indicated that Mr. Cruse had
complied with the terms of the judgment and that Ms. Sewell
had not met her payment obligation. The court signed the writ
on June 7. The form directed the court officer to “remove
[Ms. Sewell] from the premises described and to restore
peaceful possession to [Mr. Cruse].”
Ms. Sewell did not appeal the consent judgment or the
writ of restitution. Neither did she ask the district court
to set aside the judgment or the writ.
Several weeks later, a district court bailiff effected
the eviction. There is conflicting testimony about whether he
removed all of Ms. Sewell’s possessions from the flat. At a
minimum, he put most of her possessions on the front lawn.
Ms. Sewell, who had been in the hospital, learned of the
eviction a few days later. With family members, she went to
the flat. Apparently while removing additional property from
the premises, she slipped and fell. Ms. Sewell had received
a kidney transplant in 1991 and another in 1995, and her fall
evidently caused serious complications in that regard.
In March 1996, Ms. Sewell sued Mr. Cruse in circuit
court.5 In count I of the complaint, she alleged that he had
4
MCR 4.201(L).
5
The defendants named in the complaint were Clean Cut
Management, Inc.; Mr. Cruse, individually and doing business
3
negligently maintained the premises and that she had suffered
serious injury as the result. In count II, she alleged that
she had been unlawfully evicted.6
This case was tried before a jury in circuit court.
During trial, Mr. Cruse moved for a directed verdict. He
argued that the district court eviction order was a binding
resolution of the question whether the eviction had been
legal. The court denied the motion.
In its verdict, the jury found that Mr. Cruse had been
negligent,7 and that his negligence had been the proximate
cause of $4,700 in lost wages for Ms. Sewell, as well as
$50,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found that she
had been unlawfully ejected from her premises and that her
property loss was in the amount of $5,000. Thus the total
verdict was $59,700.
as Clean Cut Management; and John Doe. The complaint was
answered by Mr. Cruse, doing business as Clean Cut Management,
and he has been the only defendant to participate in this
litigation. Thus we will continue to refer to him as the sole
defendant.
6
Ms. Sewell also asked for treble damages under MCL
600.2918(1); MSA 27A.2918(1), which provides:
Any person who is ejected or put out of any
lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful
manner, or being out is afterwards held or kept
out, by force, if he prevails, is entitled to
recover 3 times the amount of his actual damages or
$200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to
recovering possession.
7
The jury found no negligence on the part of Ms. Sewell.
4
Mr. Cruse moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, alternatively, for new trial. He argued that the district
court proceedings that granted him possession of the
Warrington premises were res judicata and collateral estoppel.
He also argued that, in light of the district court judgment
and writ, Ms. Sewell had been a trespasser at the time she
slipped and fell. The circuit court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed,8 citing our decision in
JAM Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc, 461 Mich 161; 600 NW2d 617
(1999).
Mr. Cruse has now applied to this Court for leave to
appeal.
II
The procedural history in JAM Corp was complicated by
uncertainty regarding the proper names and identities of the
parties. However, there came a point when JAM9 began summary
proceedings in district court to regain control of premises
that had been leased to AARO Disposal, Inc. Because of
problems relating to the corporate status (or lack thereof) of
JAM, the district court action was dismissed with prejudice
(though the premises were returned to the control of JAM).
461 Mich 162-165.
8
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 3,
1999, reh den February 25, 2000 (Docket No. 208148).
9
There were several variants of the “JAM” corporate name
but, for present purposes, they are not important.
5
Following the dismissal in district court, JAM filed suit
against AARO in circuit court.10 The complaint stated six
causes of action, including implied contract and unjust
enrichment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, finding the district court dismissal to be res
judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed.11 461 Mich 165-166.
In JAM Corp, this Court examined several sections of the
chapter dealing with summary proceedings. Our conclusion was
that “[p]lainly the Legislature took these cases outside the
realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order
that attorneys would not be obliged to fasten all other
pending claims to the swiftly moving summary proceedings.”
461 Mich 168-169. We also said that “it is evident that
judgment in these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails,
does not bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170.
Accordingly, we reversed the judgments of the Court of
Appeals and circuit court in JAM Corp, and remanded the case
for further proceedings on JAM’s circuit court suit. 461 Mich
171.
III
In the present case, the Court of Appeals fastened on our
statement that judgment in summary proceedings does not bar
10
JAM also appealed the district court dismissal, though
the result of that appeal was unknown to us as we wrote our
opinion in JAM Corp. 461 Mich 165.
11
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 16,
1998, reh den April 21, 1998 (Docket No. 193594).
6
other claims for relief. Quoting that holding, it affirmed a
circuit court judgment based on a jury’s verdict that the
eviction had been illegal, notwithstanding that the eviction
occurred pursuant to an unappealed district court consent
judgment and writ of restitution.
This is not consistent with the statute or with our
analysis in JAM Corp. We said in JAM Corp that “judgment in
these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails, does not
bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170. Nothing in the
statute or in JAM Corp stands for the proposition that, having
litigated in the district court the issue who has the right to
the premises, that question can be relitigated de novo in a
subsequent suit. Such an approach would empty MCL 600.5701 et
seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et seq. of all significance. After
repossessing premises in accord with the statute and an order
of the district court, a landlord would remain in jeopardy of
further litigation on that same question.
Neither do principles of res judicata support judgment of
the Court of Appeals. In Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586; 597
NW2d 82 (1999), we explained:
Res judicata bars a subsequent action between
the same parties when the evidence or essential
facts are identical. Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs
v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375; 521 NW2d 847
(1994). A second action is barred when (1) the
first action was decided on the merits, (2) the
matter contested in the second action was or could
have been resolved in the first, and (3) both
actions involve the same parties or their privies.
Id. at 375-376.
7
Michigan courts have broadly applied the
doctrine of res judicata. They have barred, not
only claims already litigated, but every claim
arising from the same transaction that the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised
but did not. Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409
Mich 147, 160-163; 294 NW2d 165 (1980); Sprague v
Buhagiar, 213 Mich App 310, 313; 539 NW2d 587
(1995).
This case obviously presents issues concerning the
relationship between summary possession proceedings and the
doctrine of res judicata. As explained in Dart, Michigan’s
broad res judicata rule bars claims arising out of the same
transaction that could have been litigated in a prior
proceeding, but were not. JAM Corp, 461 Mich 167.
Our decision in JAM Corp recognized a statutory exception
to this rule with respect to claims that “could have been”
litigated in a prior proceeding. See id. at 168, citing MCL
600.5750; MSA 27A.5750. There, we recognized that the
legislative intent for this exception was to remove the
incentive for attorneys to “fasten all other pending claims to
swiftly moving summary proceedings.” Id. at 169. Our
decision in JAM Corp said nothing about the preclusive effect
of claims actually litigated in the summary proceedings.
Thus, the “other claims of relief,” described in JAM Corp at
170, were those claims that “could have been” brought during
the summary proceedings, but were not. This Court was not
describing subsequent claims involving the issues actually
litigated in the summary proceedings.
8
In the present case, Ms. Sewell sought damages for
personal injuries suffered on Mr. Cruse’s premises and for
damage to personal property. Mr. Cruse says she was a
trespasser and that the circuit court should have granted a
directed verdict in his favor. We need not decide in this
opinion the full effect of the district court’s judgment and
writ, with respect to the status of Ms. Sewell as she entered
the premises or the extent, if any, of Mr. Cruse’s duty toward
her. However, we do hold that, where the district court
judgment and writ have not been reversed or vacated, they are
conclusive on the narrow issue whether the eviction was
proper.
Unlike JAM Corp, this case presents a question regarding
the preclusive effect of a claim that was actually litigated
in the summary proceeding. Therefore, the limited statutory
exception to Michigan’s res judicata rule does not apply. The
circuit court thus erred in failing to grant, at least in
part, the motion for a directed verdict.
For these reasons we reverse the judgments of the circuit
court and the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the
circuit court. On remand, the circuit court shall enter
judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s wrongful
eviction claim. Because the verdict in favor of the plaintiff
on her negligence claim may have been influenced by the error
9
with regard to her wrongful eviction claim, we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion with regard
to the negligence claim. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred.
10
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
CHERYL DENISE SEWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116528
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and
JOHN DOE,
Defendants,
and
JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a
CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________
CAVANAGH, J.
I would not decide this case by a per curiam opinion.
Because this case offers the opportunity to address a
jurisprudentially significant issue, I would grant leave so we
might avail ourselves of full briefing and argument by the
parties.
KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.