Beckingham v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development

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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Karen L. Withers Gregory F. Zoeller Robert G. Zeigler Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Ashley E. Tatman Heather L. Hagan Frances Barrow Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana ______________________________________________________________________________ In the FILED Indiana Supreme Court Jun 01 2010, 3:49 pm _________________________________ CLERK of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court No. 93S02-0907-EX-308 LISA M. BECKINGHAM, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AND CENVEO CORPORATION, Appellees (Defendants below). _________________________________ Appeal from the Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development, No. 08-R-01919 _________________________________ On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 93A02-0808-EX-00771 _________________________________ June 1, 2010 Sullivan, Justice. The Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development denied Lisa M. Beck- ingham unemployment benefits for violating her employer’s no-fault attendance rule. In accor- dance with another case we decide today, Giovanoni v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., – N.E.2d –, No. 93S02-0907-EX-311, slip op. (Ind. June 01, 2010), we hold that such a rule does not obviate the statutory mandate to analyze whether, under the totality of the circums- tances, the employee’s absenteeism is the result of circumstances beyond that employee’s con- trol. Background Beckingham was a purchasing agent employed from August, 1997, through January, 2008, by Cenveo Corporation (“Cenveo”). She was discharged for violation of Cenveo’s atten- dance policy. Cenveo’s written attendance policy addressed both excused and unexcused ab- sences. Among other components of the policy, four “occurrences” of unexcused absence or tar- diness in any 12-month period, or 13 occurrences of excused absence or tardiness in any 12- month period, subjected an employee to termination. The policy implemented progressive dis- cipline, including written warnings as an employee’s number of occurrences accrued. Beckingham accumulated 14 ½ excused and unexcused occurrences in a 12-month pe- riod. Most, but not all of her absences, were the result of personal illness, illness of Becking- ham’s children, or various difficulties involving daycare. Progressive discipline was imple- mented as these occurrences accrued. Although Cenveo recognized the difficulties of Becking- ham’s situation as a single mother of two young children and allowed for some leniency,1 she was terminated after accumulating 14½ occurrences in a 12-month period. Upon termination, Beckingham sought unemployment benefits. A claims deputy for the Department of Workforce Development denied her request. Following a hearing, an administra- tive law judge (“ALJ”) entered findings of fact and conclusions of law holding that Beckingham had been fired for just cause and therefore affirming the deputy’s decision. The Review Board affirmed the ALJ. 1 Minor tardiness resulted in only one-half of an occurrence being charged against the employee. Addi- tionally, an excused absence that occurred over three consecutive days was charged against the employee as a single occurrence only. 2 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Beckingham was dis- charged for just cause pursuant to reasonable attendance rule under Indiana Code section 22-4- 15-1(d)(2) and therefore was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Beckingham v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Judge Najam dissented. Beckingham sought, and we granted, transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). Discussion At issue in this appeal is whether an employee’s discharge pursuant to violation of an employer’s “no-fault” attendance rule disqualifies the complainant from receipt of unemploy- ment insurance benefits under Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(d)(2) (“subsection (d)(2)”).2 In this case, the ALJ and the Board denied Beckingham’s application for benefits under subsection (d)(2), reasoning that Cenveo’s policy was a reasonable rule and Beckingham’s violation of this rule was just cause to disqualify Beckingham from eligibility for unemployment insurance bene- fits. In Giovanoni, – N.E.2d –, we hold that while it is permissible for an employer to utilize a “no-fault” attendance policy, “[t]he existence of such a policy does not obviate the statutory mandate [in Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(3)] to analyze whether, under the totality of the cir- cumstances, the employee’s absenteeism is the result of circumstances beyond that employee’s control.” Id. at *8. In order to be disqualified from eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits “[a]t a minimum, the claimant must have performed some volitional act or have exer- cised some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from employment. In this regard, whether unemployed persons are without fault must be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case.” Id. at *6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2 To make out a prima facie case of termination for just cause based on a violation of an employer atten- dance rule so as to disqualify a former employee from receiving unemployment insurance benefits under subsection (d)(2), the employer must show that the employee: (1) knowingly violated, (2) a reasonable, and (3) uniformly enforced rule. McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind. 1998). Beckingham does not challenge the knowledge or uniform enforcement prongs of this standard, but rather whether Cenveo’s policy is reasonable as a matter of law. 3 We decide the same here. However, whether Beckingham’s occurrences were the result of circumstances beyond her control seems less clear than the situation presented in Giovanoni. Because the Board specif- ically addressed the reasons for some, but not all, of Beckingham’s occurrences, we reverse and remand the decision of the Board for additional fact-finding. Conclusion Accordingly, the judgment of the Unemployment Review Board is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Shepard, C.J., and Boehm, J., and Rucker, J., concur. Dickson, J., dissents with separate opinion. 4 Dickson, Justice, dissenting. On the facts of this case, I believe that the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm the Review Board's determination that Beckingham was discharged for just cause and therefore not entitled to unemployment benefits. Beckingham v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 903 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).