Attorneys for Petitioners Attorneys for Respondent
Brian P. Popp Thomas M. Atherton
Merrillville, Indiana Robert B. Clemens
Attorneys for the Lake County Property Tax Assessment Ronald M.
Soskin
Board of Appeals and the Lake County Assessor David A.
Suess
Indianapolis, Indiana
John S. Dull
Crown Point, Indiana
Attorney for the Lake County Auditor and Treasurer
Dock McDowell, Jr.
Merrillville, Indiana
Attorney for the Lake County Auditor and Treasurer
________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S10-0309-TA-00401
Lake County Property Tax
Assessment Board of Appeals,
Paul G. Karras, in his
official capacity as Lake County
Assessor, Peter Benjamin, in his
official capacity as Lake County
Auditor,Peggy Holinga
Katona, in her official capacity as the
Lake County Treasurer, and Booker
Blumenberg, in his official
capacity as Calumet Township
Assessor,
Petitioners (Respondents
below),
v.
United States Steel Corporation,
formerly United States Steel, LLC
Respondent (Petitioner
below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Indiana Tax Court, No. 49T10-0209-TA-00106
The Honorable Thomas G. Fisher, Judge
_________________________________
On Petition for Review
_________________________________
January 13, 2005
Sullivan, Justice.
The amount of property taxes payable for an individual piece of
property is set by allocating the total dollar amount anticipated to be
required to meet the revenue needs of the taxing district among all pieces
of property in proportion to their assessed valuations. As such, the
amount of property taxes payable for an individual piece of property will
be a function of three major variables: (1) the assessed valuation of the
individual piece of property; (2) the total dollar amount of revenue to be
raised; and (3) the total assessed valuation of all the pieces of property
in the taxing jurisdiction.
The taxpayer here, United States Steel Corporation (“USS”), came to
the view that local property tax officials had illegally reduced the
aggregate assessed valuation of the property in the taxing jurisdiction
during the “assessment years” 1994, 1995, and 1996.[1] If so, USS’s
property taxes for those years would have been too high. On May 5, 1998,
USS filed papers (using forms denominated “Form 133, Petition for
Correction of Error” and “Form 17T, Petition for Refund”) seeking refunds
of the property taxes it contended had been illegally imposed and overpaid
for the 1994-1996 period.
USS’s challenges were first denied by the Lake County Board of Review
and then by the Indiana Board of Tax Review.[2] USS then sought judicial
review in the Indiana Tax Court. The Tax Court concluded that “[t]he only
question is whether Lake County’s removal of assessed valuation from its
tax rolls (and, hence, the resulting tax rate) was, as a matter of law,
illegal—a question that falls squarely within the ambit of the 133
Petition.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Lake County Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of
Appeals, 785 N.E.2d 1209, 1216 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). The local and state
property tax authorities sought, and we granted, review of the Tax Court’s
decision. Lake Co. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals v. United States
Steel Corp., 804 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. 2003).
Discussion
The principal ground on which the Board of Tax Review dismissed USS’s
claims was that the Board had no subject matter jurisdiction because the
claims involved the county’s tax rate. The Tax Court pointedly rejected
the Board’s disclaimer of jurisdiction. It held that interpreting the
Board’s jurisdiction so narrowly, i.e., that the Board is without
jurisdiction whenever the tax rate is implicated, would allow the Board to
“disclaim subject matter jurisdiction over all appeals concerning assessed
valuation.” U.S. Steel, 785 N.E.2d at 1212-1213 (emphasis in original).
In point of fact, “the removal of the assessed value from Lake County's tax
rolls . . . necessarily implicated the issue of Lake County’s tax rate.”
Id. We agree with this analysis and adopt it.
While we agree with the Tax Court that the local and state property
tax authorities have subject matter jurisdiction over the type of claims
raised by USS, the question remains whether the procedures employed by USS
were in fact available to it.
As we discuss in greater detail in the BP Amoco case decided today,
during the years in question, Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-1 and Indiana
Administrative Code Title 50, Regulation 4.2-3-4 contained appeal
provisions that allowed taxpayers to challenge assessments on this basis
for a current year’s assessment on Form 130. Lake County Prop. Tax
Assessment Bd. of Appeals v. BP Amoco Corp., No. 49S10-0309-TA-00400, __
N.E.2d __, slip op. at 2 (Ind. Jan. 13, 2005). But here, USS did not file
its challenges until several years after the years in question. Instead,
USS proceeded under Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-12 and Indiana
Administrative Code Title 50, Regulations 4.2-3-4, 12, and 14 and filed its
claims on “Form 133, Petition for Correction of Error,” alleging that “the
taxes, as a matter of law, were illegal.” U.S. Steel, 785 N.E.2d at 1215.
So even though the nature of its challenge is quite different than that in
the BP Amoco case, the issue is essentially the same: whether Indiana Code
Section 6-1.1-15-12 and Form 133 are available to provide USS the
retrospective relief it seeks on the grounds it asserts.
In its opinion, the Tax Court focused on the nature of USS’s
challenge. Because USS’s contention was that Lake County officials had
acted illegally, the Tax Court reasoned, this was precisely the kind of
claim that the “illegal as a matter of law” provision of Indiana Code
Section 6-1.1-15-12(a)(6) was designed to cover. Id.[3]
Although USS presents a more sympathetic case than the taxpayer in BP
Amoco, we reach the same result. Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-12(a)(6)
and Indiana Administrative Code Title 50, Regulation 4.2-3-12 authorize the
use of Form 133 to obtain adjustments to assessments and property tax
refunds where the taxes, as a matter of law, have been determined to be
illegal. BP Amoco, slip op. at 8-9. But they are not available “to
challenge the methodology used in generating an assessment.” Id. (quoting
Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 4.2-3-12(a) (1992 & 1996)). We conclude that
the legislative and regulatory scheme required USS to set forth in its
contentions that local property tax officials had illegally reduced the
aggregate assessed valuation in the relevant jurisdiction on Form 130,
subject to the time limitations and other requirements of Indiana Code
Section 6-1.1-15-1 and Indiana Administrative Code Title 50 Section 4.2-3-
4. Because USS did not do so, no timely determination was made that its
taxes were illegal as a matter of law and relief under Indiana Code Section
6-1.1-15-12 and Indiana Administrative Code Title 50 Sections 4.2-3-4, 12
and 14 on Form 133 was not available.[4] The State Board of Tax
Commissioners properly dismissed USS’s petitions.
Conclusion
The decision of the Tax Court in this case is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The decision of the State Board of Tax Commissioners
dismissing USS’s appeals on Form 133 is affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur. Rucker, J., concurs in
result.
-----------------------
[1] Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-17-1 provides that property taxes are
payable based on the prior year’s assessed valuation. As such, the
assessments at issue in this case are those for the years 1994 (property
taxes with respect thereto payable in 1995), 1995 (payable in 1996), and
1996 (payable in 1997).
[2] On January 1, 2002, the Legislature abolished the State Board of Tax
Commissioners and established an Indiana Board of Tax Review. Ind. Code §§
6-1.5-2-1; 6-1.5-4-1 (Supp. 2001); 2001 Ind. Acts 198 § 95. For purposes
of this case, the Indiana Board has the power and authority previously held
by the State Board. As a result, even though BP appealed to the State
Board of Tax Commissioners, the Indiana Board of Tax Review issued the
final determination in this case.
The same legislation also replaced individual county “Boards of
Review” with county “Property Tax Assessment Boards of Appeals.” In this
case, therefore, the Lake County Board of Review is now the Lake County
Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals.
[3] Included in the Tax Court’s analysis is a discussion of the
applicability of a distinction frequently made in cases disputing the
availability of Form 133—whether the appropriate tax officials are required
to make an objective or subjective determination. For the reason we set
forth in BP Amoco, slip op. at 6, n.5, we find it unnecessary to apply the
objective/subjective distinction to resolve this case.
[4] We recognize that USS might conceivably be entitled to relief if it
meets the requirements of the hypothetical Taxpayer “C” in Indiana
Administrative Code Title 50, Regulation 4.2-3-12(g)(1)(D). However, USS
advances no claim in that regard in this case.